Goldstein v. Dep't of State, 144 A.D.2d 463 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988). · Go Syfert
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Goldstein v. Dep't of State, 144 A.D.2d 463 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
20 citation events (9 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Northland E., LLC v. J.R. Militello Realty, Inc. (nyappdiv, 2018-07-06)
Treatment trajectory · 1990 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1990 2008 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 4 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Northland E., LLC v. J.R. Militello Realty, Inc. (2×) also: Cited "see"
N.Y. App. Div. · 2018 · confidence medium
Accordingly, he [or she] cannot act as agent for both seller and purchaser of property in a real estate transaction" ( Matter of Goldstein v Department of State, Div. of Licensing Servs. , 144 AD2d 463, 464 [2d Dept 1988]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lyons v. Menoudakos & Menoudakos, P.C.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2009 · confidence medium
Moreover, a fiduciary’s personal interest in a transaction constitutes evidence of self-dealing or breach of fiduciary duty (see Dubbs v Stribling & Assoc., 96 NY2d 337, 340 [2001]; Queens Structure Corp. v Jay Lawrence Assoc., 304 AD2d 736 [2003]; Matter of Goldstein v Department of State, Div. of Licensing Servs., 144 AD2d 463, 464 [1988]).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Coldwell Banker Residential Real Estate v. Berner (3×) also: Cited "see"
N.Y. App. Div. · 1994 · confidence medium
An agent breaches this affirmative duty by acting for a party whose interests are adverse to those of the principal (see, Matter of Goldstein v Department of State, Div. of Licensing Servs., supra, at 464) or by failing to disclose information obtained during the period of engagement which affects the transaction in which the agent is engaged, so that the principal may take steps to protect his or her interests (see, Klein v Twentieth Century-Fox Intl.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Yellot v. Poritzky
N.Y. App. Div. · 1991 · signal: see also · confidence low
Contrary to the plaintiff’s contentions, the defendant-broker’s undisclosed purchase of an unrelated, contiguous parcel in which the plaintiff had no interest does not, under the circumstances, constitute a breach of the defendant’s fiduciary duty as a broker (see, Matter of Grant Realty v Cuomo, 58 AD2d 251, 255 ; see also, Matter of Goldstein v Department of State, 144 AD2d 463, 464 ; Real Property Law § 441-c; 19 NYCRR 175.4).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
In the Matter of Glen B. Goldstein, Peititoners
v.
Department of State, Division of Licensing Services
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
Nov 14, 1988.
144 A.D.2d 463
1988 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 15107
Cited by 9 opinions  |  Published

Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the Secretary of State, dated March 17, 1987, which after a hearing, found that the petitioners demonstrated untrustworthiness as real estate brokers and imposed a penalty.

[*464] Adjudged that the determination is confirmed and the proceeding is dismissed on the merits, with costs.

A broker may not buy from his principal without full and frank disclosure (see, 19 NYCRR 175.4; Matter of Grant Realty v Cuomo, 58 AD2d 251; see also, 11 NY Jur 2d, Brokers, § 35, at 380-381). There is substantial evidence in the record to support the Hearing Officer’s findings and conclusions that the petitioners breached their fiduciary duties of good faith and loyalty to the coprincipals in the McLaughlin/Harris matter by offering to purchase the property without full and frank disclosure of all the facts (see, 300 Gramatan Ave. Assocs. v State Div. of Human Rights, 45 NY2d 176). Further, because of a broker’s fiduciary duties, he has the affirmative duty not to act for a party whose interests are adverse to those of the principal, unless he has the consent of the principal given after full knowledge of the facts (see, Hasbrouck v Rymkevitch, 25 AD2d 187; 11 NY Jur 2d, Brokers, §36; 3 NY Jur 2d, Agency, § 201). Accordingly, he cannot act as agent for both seller and purchaser of property in a real estate transaction (see, 11 NY Jur 2d, Brokers, § 36). We find substantial evidence to support the hearing officer’s findings and conclusions that the petitioners acted as dual agents in the Busch transaction (see, 300 Gramatan Ave. Assocs. v State Div. of Human Rights, supra).

Finally, we reject the petitioners’ contention that the six-month suspension and continued suspension thereafter until restitution of unearned fees and secret profits is made is shocking to one’s sense of fairness (see, Kostika v Cuomo, 41 NY2d 673; Matter of Pell v Board of Educ., 34 NY2d 222; Matter of Gold v Lomenzo, 29 NY2d 468). Spatt, J. P., Sullivan, Harwood and Balletta, JJ., concur.