People v. Tavarez, 147 A.D.2d 355 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989). · Go Syfert
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People v. Tavarez, 147 A.D.2d 355 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
33 citation events (6 in the last 25 years) across 8 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: People v. Garai (Bela) (nyappterm, 2021-12-10)
Treatment trajectory · 1990 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1990 2008 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 9 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Garai (Bela)
N.Y. App. Term. · 2021 · confidence medium
Since the People had not previously declared their readiness for trial, the 49 days from September 8, 2016, when they stated they were not ready for trial, to October 27, 2016 are chargeable to the People, as this time is not excludable as a delay caused by court scheduling ( see People v Smith , 82 NY2d 676, 678 [1993]; People v Kendzia , 64 [*3]NY2d 331, 337 [1985]; People v Tavarez , 147 AD2d 355, 356 [1989]; People v Green , 90 AD2d 705, 706 [1982]) or an adjournment made at the request or consent of defendant ( see CPL 30.30 [4] [b]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. McCarthy
N.Y. App. Div. · 2017 · confidence medium
Here, there is no evidence in the record that the People’s announcement of readiness on November 12, 2009, was not made in good faith or did not reflect an actual present state of readiness (see People v Brown, 28 NY3d 392 [2016]; People v Santana, 233 AD2d 344, 345 [1996]; People v Tavarez, 147 AD2d 355, 356 [1989]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Mortoza
N.Y. City Crim. Ct. · 2014 · confidence medium
If it was, only delay which is directly attributable to the People is chargeable to them (see CPL 30.30 [4] [f]; see also People v Corporan, 221 AD2d 168 [1st Dept 1995]; Cortes, 80 NY2d at 209 ), not delay due to court congestion (see People v Chavis, 91 NY2d 500, 502 [1998]) or court unavailability (see People v Shaw, 44 Misc 3d 79, 80 [App Term, 1st Dept 2014], citing People v Tavarez, 147 AD2d 355, 356 [1st Dept 1989]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Shaw
N.Y. App. Term. · 2014 · confidence medium
Rather, as the remand court noted in its written decision, the length of the adjournment appears to have reflected “the scarcity of available trial parts during the intervening summer months,” a species of court unavailability that, as with court congestion, is not chargeable to the People for speedy trial purposes {see People v Tavarez, 147 AD2d 355, 356 [1989], lv denied 73 NY2d 1022 [1989]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Jacobs
nydistctnassau · 2010 · confidence medium
(The court notes that the actual period of adjournment was from December 16, 2008 to March 12, 2009 [86 days].) The People argue that “ [i]t is also well-settled that ‘the unavailability of the court due to vacation or for its own convenience’ is not chargeable to the People since ‘CPL 30.30, although entitled “Speedy trial,” really addresses prosecutorial, not court, readiness.’ (People v Tavarez, 147 AD2d 355, 356-357 [1st Dept 1989]; see also People v Anderson, 66 NY2d 529, 535 [1985].)” The court finds that the People have misconstrued the legal principle articulated in Tav…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Simpkins
N.Y. City Crim. Ct. · 2001 · confidence medium
(See, e.g., People v Sebak, 245 AD2d 242, 243-244 [1st Dept 1997]; People v Tavarez, 147 AD2d 355, 356 [1st Dept], lv denied 73 NY2d 1022 [1989]; see also People v Brown, 195 AD2d 310, 311 [1st Dept], lv denied 82 NY2d 891 [1993].) Because the delay flowing from the filing of pretrial motions results from a defendant’s own action, the time consumed by the resolution of those matters ordinarily must be excluded from the relevant section 30.30 period, and they are excluded by specific statutory command in any event.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Sanchez
N.Y. Sup. Ct. · 1996 · confidence medium
(People v England, 84 NY2d 1, 2 [1994]; People v Kendzia, 64 NY2d 331, 337 [1985]; People v Robinson, 171 AD2d 475, 477 [1st Dept 1991]; People v Tavarez, 147 AD2d 355, 356 [1st Dept 1989].) Accordingly, as I held originally, the People were responsible for only 24 days of delay as of the adjournment ordered on March 2, 1995. 1 Thereafter, however, events occurred which should have made clear to the People that their ability to produce Ms. Segarro as a witness had, at the very least, been seriously impaired.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Rivera
N.Y. App. Div. · 1990 · confidence medium
(See, People v Worley, 66 NY2d 523, 525 [1985]; People v Tavarez, 147 AD2d 355, 356 [1st Dept 1989], lv denied 73 NY2d 1022 [1989] [holding that "(j)ust as court congestion is not chargeable to the People * * * neither should the unavailability of the court * * * for its own convenience”]; cf., People v Toro, 151 AD2d 142, 144 [1st Dept 1989] [repeated adjournments between indictment and arraignment held chargeable to the People].) 2 We also note that the People promptly answered ready at the arraignment on the indictment herein.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." People v. Quiles
N.Y. City Crim. Ct. · 1998 · signal: see also · confidence medium
(People v Davino, 173 Misc 2d 410, 413 [Crim Ct, Kings County 1997]; see also, People v Tavarez, 147 AD2d 355, 356 [1st Dept 1989]; People v Middlemiss, 198 AD2d 755, 756 [3d Dept 1993].) The People’s trial readiness time as to the entire accusatory instrument expired March 18, 1998.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
The People of the State of New York
v.
Pedro Tavarez
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
Feb 2, 1989.
147 A.D.2d 355
1989 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 764
Cited by 28 opinions  |  Published
2 passages pin-cited by 2 cases
Pinpoint authority: #41,368 of 633,719
Citer courts: First Circuit (1) · E.D. New York (1)

— Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Carol H. Arber, J.), entered January 7, 1987, which granted defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment pursuant to CPL 170.30 (1) (e) and 30.30 (1) (a), unanimously reversed, on the law and the facts, and the motion is denied, the indictment reinstated, and the matter remanded for further proceedings.

A felony complaint charging defendant with criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree was filed on March 2, 1986. Under CPL 30.30 (1) (a), the People had until September 2, 1986, a period of six months or 184 days, to be ready for trial, plus any periods of excludable time both before and after they validly declared themselves ready to proceed to trial (CPL 30.30 [3] [b]; [4]; People v Anderson, 66 NY2d 529, 534).

On June 12, 1986, the date previously scheduled for a suppression hearing, the Assistant District Attorney informed the court that his police witnesses were off from work and requested an adjournment to June 17, 1986, when the People would be ready to proceed. Nevertheless, because a month-long vacation was planned beginning on June 22nd, the court adjourned the case until July 31st. On June 17th, the People filed a certificate announcing that they were "presently ready to hold the [suppression] hearing and move the action to trial.”

In granting defendant’s CPL 30.30 motion to dismiss, the trial court found the June 17th statement of readiness incredible in light of the People’s subsequent lack of readiness on July 31st and September 11th.

We disagree and accordingly reverse and deny defendant’s motion to dismiss.

It is apparent that the People, as previously announced on June 12th, were ready to proceed on June 17th, the day they[*356] filed their statement of readiness, and there is no evidence in the record that their statement was not made in good faith or that it did not reflect an actual, present state of readiness (see, People v Rhee, 111 AD2d 655, 656).

Unlike People v Kendzia (64 NY2d 331, 338), where the People’s statement, in a May 6th letter, that they would be ready for trial on May 26th was found insufficient because it merely expressed an expectation of readiness, the People’s statement here met the two-pronged test announced in that case (64 NY2d 331, 337, supra): (1) the communication of readiness must appear on the trial court’s record; and, (2) the prosecutor must make the statement of readiness when the People are in fact ready to proceed.

The fact that the People were not ready to proceed on two subsequent occasions does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that they were not ready to proceed on June 17th. "The statute was intended to limit the People’s time for preparation to the period specified, but they are entitled to the full period allowed, either before or after answering ready.” (People v Anderson, 66 NY2d 529, 537, supra.)

The People’s subsequent requests for short adjournments on July 31st and September 11th, while indicative of their lack of readiness at the time, did not impugn their effective announcement. Although in People v O’Neal (99 AD2d 844) there was some indication that the People’s responsibility for subsequent delays negated the effectiveness of their original announcement of readiness, there, unlike the instant case, the People’s statement of readiness was not a matter of record and their subsequent lack of readiness does not appear to have been the determinative factor in the court’s decision. People v O’Neal (supra) and People v Giordano (81 AD2d 1003, affd 56 NY2d 524) "clearly stand for the proposition that even after the People timely announce their readiness for trial, they may be charged with subsequent delays caused by them which affect their continued readiness for trial.” (People v Jones, 105 AD2d 179, 184, affd 66 NY2d 529.) Those cases should not be expanded to retroactively invalidate an otherwise valid statement of readiness.

Just as court congestion is not chargeable to the People (People v Giordano, supra), neither should the unavailability of the court due to vacation or for its own convenience. (See, People v Green, 90 AD2d 705, 706.) CPL 30.30, although entitled "Speedy trial”, really addresses prosecutorial, not court, readiness (see, People v Anderson, 66 NY2d, supra, at 535).

[*357] Thus, with the exclusion of the period from June 17th to July 31, 1986 from the period of postreadiness delay chargeable to the People, such period totals less than six months and defendant’s speedy trial motion must be denied. It is unnecessary, therefore, to consider the later periods of delay which are in dispute. Concur — Kupferman, J. P., Sullivan, Kassal, Ellerin and Smith, JJ.