Kirshon, Shron, Cornell & Teitelbaum v. Savarese, 182 A.D.2d 911 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992). · Go Syfert
Kirshon, Shron, Cornell & Teitelbaum v. Savarese, 182 A.D.2d 911 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
19 citation events (13 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Lawrence v. Kennedy (nysupct, 2011-09-22)
Top citers, strongest first. 7 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lawrence v. Kennedy
N.Y. Sup. Ct. · 2011 · confidence medium
Moreover, “[a]t this early ‘stage of the proceedings, where discovery has not yet been had, disqualification’ ” would be premature (Spinner v County of Nassau, 82 AD3d at 871; Kirshon, Shron, Cornell & Teitelbaum v Savarese, 182 AD2d 911, 912 [1992]).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Spinner v. County of Nassau
N.Y. App. Div. · 2011 · confidence medium
At this early “stage of the proceedings, where discovery has not yet been had, disqualification ... is premature” (Kirshon, Shron, Cornell & Teitelbaum v Savarese, 182 AD2d 911, 912 [1992]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Skiff-Murray v. Murray (2×)
N.Y. App. Div. · 2004 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
As to plaintiffs contention that Wardlaw’s testimony would not be contrary to the client’s interests, we note that the potential prejudicial impact of an attorney’s testimony is not pertinent where, as here, the testimony is necessary to establish the client’s claim (see MSKCT Trust v Paraneck Enters., 296 AD2d 769, 771 [2002]; cf. Kirshon, Shron, Cornell & Teitelbaum v Savarese, 182 AD2d 911, 912 [1992]; Luk Lamellen u.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Sokolow, Dunaud, Mercadier & Carreras LLP v. Lacher
N.Y. App. Div. · 2002 · confidence medium
The cases cited by Lacher are distinguishable because the testimony of the attorneys-witnesses in those cases would be cumulative to other available evidence (see Matter of Cowen & Co. v Tecnoconsult Holdings, 234 AD2d 86, 87 [attorney’s testimony not necessary as four other witnesses available to testify on same issue]; Kirshon, Shron, Cornell & Teitelbaum v Savarese, 182 AD2d 911, 912 [no showing that attorney’s testimony would be noncumulative of records and testimony of plaintiffs representatives]).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Tate & Lyle North American Sugars, Inc. (2×)
S.D.N.Y. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See Kirshon, Shron, Cornell & Teitelbaum, P.C., 182 A.D.2d at 912 , 581 N.Y.S.2d 487 (attorney testimony not necessary where there is “no showing that [the attorney’s] records and testimony ... will be, other than merely cumulative of the records and testimony *348 provided by [the client]”). 7 Such other evidence may include: the testimony of, among others, Twenty, Hoyt and Friedman; Defendant’s privilege log; pretrial stipulation(s) between parties; and a declaration from Maner, dated February 9, 2000 (“Maner Declaration”), elaborating on certain documents listed in Defendant’s…
discussed Cited "see" Forrest v. Par Pharmaceutical, Inc. (2×)
S.D.N.Y. · 1999 · signal: see · confidence high
See Parke-Hayden, Inc., 794 F.Supp. at 528 (stating that testimony is not “necessary” where it would be cumulative of other evidence) (citing Kirshon, Shron, Cornell & Teitelbaum P.C. v. Savarese, 182 A.D.2d 911 , 581 N.Y.S.2d 487 (3d Dep’t 1992)).
discussed Cited "see" Parke-Hayden, Inc. v. Loews Theatre Management Corp.
S.D.N.Y. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See Kirshon, Shron, Cornell & Teitelbaum P.C. v. Savarese, — A.D.2d-, 581 N.Y.S.2d 487 (App.Div.3d Dep’t 1992) (testimony not “necessary” where cumulative of other evidence); see also Lamborn, 873 F.2d at 532 (not disturbing district court finding that testimony on certain issue would have been cumulative and therefore not grounds for disqualification).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Kirshon, Shron, Cornell & Teitelbaum, P. C.
v.
Albert Savarese
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
Apr 2, 1992.
182 A.D.2d 911
1992 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5287
Yesawich.
Cited by 13 opinions  |  Published
Yesawich Jr. J.

Appeal (transferred to this court by order of the Appellate Division, Second Department) from that part of an order of the Supreme Court (Beisner, J.), entered March 25, 1991 in Dutchess County, which granted plaintiff’s motion to disqualify defendants’ attorney from representing defendants.

Seeking to recover for accounting, financial and business management services allegedly performed in connection with the marketing and sale of two corporations formerly owned and operated by defendants, plaintiff, an accounting firm, commenced the instant action. Defendants answered and counterclaimed charging accounting malpractice, which put in issue the quality of the work performed and the reasonableness of the fees charged. The stimulus for this appeal is Supreme Court’s order granting plaintiff’s motion to disqualify McCabe & Mack, the law firm representing defendants, because one of the firm’s partners, Phillip Shatz, had reportedly worked closely with two of plaintiff’s principals in negotiating the underlying sale and could be called as a witness at trial (see, Code of Professional Responsibility DR 5-101 [B]; 5-102). Defendants’ application for a stay pending appeal has been granted.

Although plaintiff’s motion was supported by an affidavit by Stephen Kirshon, one of plaintiff’s principals, indicating that he worked closely with Shatz in consummating the sale and an affirmation by plaintiff’s attorney stating that he intends to subpoena Shatz and the latter’s billing and telephone logs, plaintiff has furnished no evidence that Shatz’s testimony will be either necessary to establish plaintiff’s cause or prejudicial to Shatz’s clients, defendants herein (see, S & S Hotel Ventures Ltd. Partnership v 777 S. H. Corp., 69 NY2d 437, 445-446; Cicero & Pastore Assocs. v Patchogue Nursing Center, 149 AD2d 647, 648). Moreover, there is no showing that Shatz’s records and testimony regarding the time spent or the advice given by plaintiff respecting the sale will be other than merely cumulative of the records and testimony provided by plaintiff’s representatives (see, Burdett Radiology Consultants v Samaritan Hosp., 158 AD2d 132, 134-135). The fact that plaintiff intends to call Shatz as a witness is not sufficient in and of itself to override defendants’ right to choose their own counsel (see, L & W Supply Corp. v Ruthman, 135 AD2d 877, 878; cf., Hoerger v Board of Educ., 129 AD2d 659, 660). At this stage of the proceedings, where discovery has not yet been had, disqualification of McCabe & Mack from representing defendants is premature (see, Code of Professional Responsibility DR 5-102[*913] [B]; of, Emerald Green Homeowners’ Assn, v Aaron, 90 AD2d 628).

Weiss, P. J., Mikoll and Levine, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is modified, on the law, with costs to defendant, by reversing so much thereof as granted plaintiffs motion; motion denied; and, as so modified, affirmed.