HSBC Bank USA v. Ungar Fam. Realty Corp., 111 A.D.3d 673 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013). · Go Syfert
HSBC Bank USA v. Ungar Fam. Realty Corp., 111 A.D.3d 673 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
26 citation events (26 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Paulsen (nyappdiv, 2025-04-10)
Treatment trajectory · 2015 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2015 2020 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 7 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Paulsen (2×)
N.Y. App. Div. · 2025 · confidence medium
In any event, since Paulsen was not the owner when the action was commenced and no claim was made against her, neither Paulsen nor a representative of her estate was a necessary party ( see RPAPL 1311 [1]; U.S. Bank, N.A. v Carrington , 179 AD3d 743, 744 [2d Dept 2020]; US Bank N.A. v Esses , 132 AD3d 847, 848 [2d Dept 2015]; HSBC Bank USA v Ungar Family Realty Corp. , 111 AD3d 673, 673-674 [2d Dept 2013]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bank of N.Y. v. Richards
N.Y. App. Div. · 2021 · confidence medium
Since plaintiff elected not to seek a deficiency judgment against Richards, he was not a necessary party and the action was not stayed ( see HSBC Bank USA v Ungar Family Realty Corp. , 111 AD3d 673, 674 [2013]; Federal Natl.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) U.S. Bank N.A. v. Spence
N.Y. App. Div. · 2019 · confidence medium
In a mortgage foreclosure action, a decedent who executed a note and mortgage on real property is not a necessary party if the decedent made an absolute conveyance of all of her interest in the property and if the plaintiff does not seek a deficiency judgment against the decedent's estate ( see Wells Fargo Bank, NA v Emma , 161 AD3d 1131 , 1132 [2d Dept 2018]; Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v Keys , 27 AD3d 247 , 247 [1st Dept 2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 702 [2006]; HSBC Bank USA v Ungar Family Realty Corp. , 111 AD3d 673, 673-674 [2d Dept 2013]; Waterfall Victoria Master Fund, Ltd v Dingilian , 92 …
discussed Cited "see" Citimortgage, Inc. v. Fimbel
N.Y. App. Div. · 2025 · signal: see · confidence high
By virtue of the absolute conveyance of the property from the decedent to Janice, and the plaintiff's waiver of its right to seek a deficiency judgment against the decedent or his estate, "strict adherence to the requirement that the proceedings be stayed pending substitution was not necessary" ( Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Bachmann , 145 AD3d at 714 ; see HSBC Bank USA v Ungar Family Realty Corp. , 111 AD3d at 673-674 ).
discussed Cited "see" Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Baymack
N.Y. App. Div. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
"In the context of a mortgage foreclosure action, where a deceased defendant made an absolute conveyance of all his or her interest in the mortgaged premises to another defendant, including his or her equity of redemption, and the plaintiff either discontinued the action as against the deceased defendant or elected not to seek a deficiency judgment against the deceased defendant's estate, then the deceased defendant is not a necessary party to the action" ( U.S. Bank N.A. v Esses , [*2] 132 AD3d 847, 848 ; see HSBC Bank USA v Ungar Family Realty Corp. , 111 AD3d 673 ; Bank of N.Y.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." NewRez LLC v. Janetta Cumberbatch's Unknown Heirs-at-Law, Next-of-Kin, Distributees, Executors, Admrs., Trustees, Devises, Legatees, Assignees, Lienors, Creditors, & Successors in Interest (2×)
N.Y. Sup. Queens · 2025 · signal: see also · confidence low
Procedural Background Where a homeowner/mortgagor has died, the plaintiff mortgagee cannot commence a foreclosure action against the deceased homeowner/mortgagor because "the dead cannot be sued" ( Marte v Graber , 58 AD3d 1, 3 [1st Dept 2008], citing Jordan v City of New York , 23 AD3d 436, 437 [2d Dept 2005]; see also HSBC Bank USA, NA v Ungar Family Realty Corp ., 111 AD3d 673 [2d Dept 2013]).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Schubnel
N.Y. App. Div. · 2019 · signal: compare · confidence medium
In the absence of a substitution of Schubnel, a discontinuance of the action insofar as asserted against Schubnel or a representation by plaintiff that it would be waiving its right to seek a deficiency judgment against Schubnel, the death of Schubnel affects the merits of the case ( see U.S. Bank N.A. v Esses , 132 AD3d 847, 848 [2015]; compare HSBC Bank USA v Ungar Family Realty Corp. , 111 AD3d 673, 673-674 [2013]).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
HSBC Bank USA, as Trustee for Nomura Asset Acceptance Corporation Mortgage Pass Through Certificates, Series 2006-AF2
v.
Ungar Family Realty Corp.
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
Nov 13, 2013.
111 A.D.3d 673
Cited by 255 opinions  |  Published

In an action to foreclose a mortgage, the defendant Ungar Family Realty Corp. appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an amended order of the Supreme Court, Rockland County (Alfieri, J.), entered January 17, 2012, as granted the plaintiffs motion, among other things, for summary judgment on the complaint insofar as asserted against it and to discontinue the action as against Jakab Ungar, and denied its cross motion to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against it or, in the alternative, to stay all proceedings in the action pending appointment of an administrator for the estate of Jakab Ungar.

Ordered that the amended order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

On this appeal, the defendant Ungar Family Realty Corp. (hereinafter UFRC) contends that the Supreme Court erred in granting the plaintiffs motion, among other things, for summary judgment on the complaint insofar as asserted against it and to discontinue the action as against Jakab Ungar, and denying its cross motion to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against it or, in the alternative, to stay all proceedings in the action pending appointment of a personal representative for the estate of Ungar.

UFRC contends that Ungar, who was the signer of the subject note and mortgage, was a necessary party to the action and that the action was a nullity inasmuch as he died before the action was commenced. Normally, “[a] party may not commence a legal action or proceeding against a dead person, but must instead name the personal representative of the decedent’s estate” (Jordan v City of New York, 23 AD3d 436, 437 [2005]). When a party’s death does not affect the merits of a case, however, “there is no need for strict adherence to the requirement that the proceedings be stayed pending substitution” (Bova v Vinciguerra, 139 AD2d 797, 799 [1988]; see DLJ Mtge. Capital, Inc. v 44 Brushy Neck, Ltd., 51 AD3d 857, 858 [2008]; cf. Marte v Graber, 58 AD3d 1, 2 [2008]). Here, since Ungar had made an absolute conveyance of all his interest in the mortgaged premises to UFRC, including his equity of redemption, and af[*674] ter learning of his death, the plaintiff elected not to seek a deficiency judgment against him, Ungar was not a necessary party (see Federal Natl. Mtge. Assn, v Connelly, 84 AD2d 805, 805 [1981]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly, inter alia, granted the plaintiff’s motion, among other things, for summary judgment on the complaint insofar as asserted against it and to discontinue the action as against Ungar, and denied its cross motion to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against it or, in the alternative, to stay all proceedings in the action pending appointment of an administrator for the estate of Ungar (see DLJ Mtge. Capital, Inc. v 44 Brushy Neck, Ltd., 51 AD3d at 858-859; Federal Natl. Mtge. Assn. v Connelly, 84 AD2d at 805; cf. Marte v Graber, 58 AD3d at 2). Mastro, J.E, Skelos, Balkin and Roman, JJ., concur.