Dufel v. Green, 198 A.D.2d 640 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993). · Go Syfert
Dufel v. Green, 198 A.D.2d 640 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
18 citation events (9 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: In re the Arbitration between Philadelphia Insurance & Utica National Insurance Group (nyappdiv, 2012-07-06)
Top citers, strongest first. 6 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re the Arbitration between Philadelphia Insurance & Utica National Insurance Group
N.Y. App. Div. · 2012 · confidence medium
The doctrine of stare decisis “recognizes that legal questions, once resolved, should not be reexamined every time they are presented” (Dufel v Green, 198 AD2d 640, 640 [1993], affd 84 NY2d 795 [1995]). “ ‘The doctrine . . . rests upon the principle that a court is an institution, not merely a collection of individuals, and that governing rules of law do not change merely because the personnel of the court changes’ ” (People v Taylor, 9 NY3d 129, 148 [2007], quoting People v Bing, 76 NY2d 331, 338 [1990], rearg denied 76 NY2d 890 [1990]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re the Arbitration between Philadelphia Insurance & Utica National Insurance Group
N.Y. App. Div. · 2012 · confidence medium
The doctrine of stare decisis “recognizes that legal questions, once resolved, should not be reexamined every time they are presented” (Dufel v Green, 198 AD2d 640, 640 [1993], affd 84 NY2d 795 [1995]). “ ‘The doctrine . . . rests upon the principle that a court is an institution, not merely a collection of individuals, and that governing rules of law do not change merely because the personnel of the court changes’ ” (People v Taylor, 9 NY3d 129, 148 [2007], quoting People v Bing, 76 NY2d 331, 338 [1990], rearg denied 76 NY2d 890 [1990]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kash v. Jewish Home & Infirmary of Rochester, N.Y., Inc. (2×)
N.Y. App. Div. · 2009 · confidence medium
V In concluding that we should adhere to our decisions in Goldberg and Doe , the dissenters rely on “the doctrine of stare decisis, which recognizes that legal questions, once resolved, should not be reexamined every time they are presented” (Dufel v Green, 198 AD2d 640, 640 [1993], affd 84 NY2d 795 [1995]).
cited Cited as authority (rule) NYCO Minerals, Inc. v. Town of Lewis
N.Y. App. Div. · 2007 · confidence medium
Group v Fahey, 257 AD2d 964, 965 [1999], quoting Dufel v Green, 198 AD2d 640, 640 [1993], affd 84 NY2d 795 [1995]).
discussed Cited "see" GOODWIN, ROBETTE v. PRETORIUS, M.D., RICHARD
N.Y. App. Div. · 2013 · signal: see · confidence high
While stare decisis is the preferred course, that doctrine “does not enjoin departure from precedent or preclude the overruling of earlier decisions” (Matter of Simonson v Cahn, 27 NY2d 1, 3 [1970]; see Dufel v Green, 198 AD2d 640, 640-641 [1993], affd 84 NY2d 795 [1995]).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." US Bank N.A. v. UBS Real Estate Sec., Inc.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2019 · signal: see also · confidence low
Neither [*2]plaintiff has demonstrated the "compelling circumstances" required to depart from stare decisis ( see People v Aarons , 305 AD2d 45, 56 [1st Dept 2003], affd 2 NY3d 547 [2004]; see also Dufel v Green , 198 AD2d 640 [3d Dept 1993], affd 84 NY2d 795 [1995]).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Susan E. Dufel
v.
Randy H. Green
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
Nov 10, 1993.
198 A.D.2d 640
Casey.
Cited by 16 opinions  |  Published
Casey, J.

Appeals (1) from a judgment of the Supreme Court (White, J.), entered July 20, 1992 in Montgomery County, upon a verdict rendered in favor of plaintiffs, and (2) from an order of said court, entered September 22, 1992 in Montgomery County, which denied defendants’ motion to set side the verdict.

Defendants contend that Supreme Court erred in allowing plaintiffs’ medical experts to express their opinions as to whether plaintiff Susan E. Dufel’s injuries satisfied the statutory standard required by Insurance Law § 5102 (d). In Robillard v Robbins (168 AD2d 803, affd 78 NY2d 1105), this Court rejected an identical argument and held that expert testimony on the ultimate issue of fact was permissible. The Court of Appeals’ affirmance was based upon the absence of specific objections sufficient to preserve the issue for that Court’s review. Defendants ask that we reconsider our holding in Robillard.

Once this Court has decided a legal issue, subsequent appeals presenting similar facts should be decided in conformity with the earlier decision under the doctrine of stare decisis, which recognizes that legal questions, once resolved, should not be reexamined every time they are presented (see, People v Bing, 76 NY2d 331, 338). Although the rule does not require unyielding adherence to even recent precedent, the mere existence of strong arguments to support a different result is not sufficient, in' and of itself, to compel the court to overturn judicial precedent (see, Matter of Higby v Mahoney, 48 NY2d 15, 18). The exceptions to the rule are limited (see, People v Hobson, 39 NY2d 479, 488-491), even in tort cases involving personal injury "where courts will, if necessary, more readily re-examine established precedent to achieve the ends of justice in a more modern context” (supra, at 489). In the end, there must be a compelling reason to change the established rule (see, Matter of Eckart, 39 NY2d 493, 502), and we find the arguments advanced by defendants for changing the rule[*641] established in Robillard insufficient. Supreme Court’s judgment and order should, therefore, be affirmed.

Yesawich Jr., J. P., Mercure and Crew III, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment and order are affirmed, with costs.