Ramesar v. State, 224 A.D.2d 757 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep't 1996). · Go Syfert
Ramesar v. State, 224 A.D.2d 757 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep't 1996). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
26 citation events (21 in the last 25 years) across 4 distinct courts.
Treatment trajectory · 1997 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1997 2011 2026
Cited for
At page 759 holding that “the regulations are strictly construed and are given the binding effect of the law unless they are found to be unreasonable.12 citing cases1 citing court put it this way
  • Pina v. New York State Gaming Comm'n, No. 1:24-cv-05383 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2024).
    (holding that “the regulations are strictly construed and are given the binding effect of the law unless they are found to be unreasonable.)
  • White v. Cuomo, 2022 NY Slip Op 1954 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep't 2020). 2 cites
    Because "[p]ublic policy continues to disfavor gambling," exceptions to the constitutional prohibition on gambling must be strictly construed to ensure that they do not consume the rule itself ( Ramesar v State of New York , 224 AD2d 757,…
  • Horvath v. High Peaks Sand, Gravel & Mins., LLC, No. 2018 NYSlipOp 51214(U) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 1, 2018).
    The mere hope that further discovery will disclose such evidence is insufficient ( see Clochessy v Gagnon , 58 AD3d 1008, 1010 [3d Dept 2009]; Ramesar v State of New York , 224 AD2d 757, 759 [3d Dept 1996], lv denied 88 NY2d 811 [1996]).
  • Morizio v. Roeder, No. 2018 NYSlipOp 50027(U) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 8, 2018). 2 cites
    The mere hope that further discovery will disclose evidence that will prove the plaintiff's case is insufficient ( see Ramesar v State of New York , 224 AD2d 757, 759 [3d Dept 1996], lv denied 88 NY2d 811 [1996]).
  • Boyle v. Caledonia-Mumford Cent. Sch., 140 A.D.3d 1619 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dep't 2016). 2 cites
    Plaintiffs failed to establish that facts essential to oppose the motion were in defendant’s possession, and their “mere hope” that further depositions would disclose evidence to prove their case is insufficient to support denial of the mo…
  • Consola v. State, 84 A.D.3d 1557 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep't 2011).
    Tax Law § 1604 (a) (4) authorizes the Division to promulgate regulations concerning the establishment and operation of the state lottery, including “[t]he manner of selecting the winning tickets.” Knowledge of the regulations is presumed a…
  • DeLorenzo v. St. Clare's Hosp., 69 A.D.3d 1177 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep't 2010).
    In any event, plaintiff has failed to identify any evidence that might have been developed if additional discovery had been conducted that would have served to bar Supreme Court’s order granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment dism…
  • J.K. Tobin Constr. Co. v. David J. Hardy Constr. Co., 64 A.D.3d 1206 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dep't 2009).
    Hardy failed to establish that facts essential to oppose the motion were in plaintiffs possession, and a “mere hope” that discovery will disclose evidence to establish that plaintiff, rather than Hardy, breached the subcontract is insuffic…
  • Brummer v. Barnes Firm, 56 A.D.2d 1177 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dep't 2008).
    Plaintiff failed to establish that facts essential to oppose the motion were in defendants’ possession, and a “mere hope” that discovery will disclose evidence to prove plaintiffs case is insufficient to defeat the motion (Ramesar v State…
  • In re the Est. of Nofal, 35 A.D.3d 1132 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep't 2006).
    A “mere hope that further discovery will disclose” relevant evidence is insufficient grounds for a continuance (Ramesar v State of New York, 224 AD2d 757, 759 [1996], lv denied 88 NY2d 811 [1996]; see Cox v Maloney, 262 AD2d 832, 833 [1999…
Show 2 more citing cases
  • Balgobin v. State of New York, 2019 NY Slip Op 13 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep't 2019).
    "Knowledge of the regulations is presumed and the regulations are strictly construed and will be given the binding effect of the law unless they are found to be unreasonable" ( Consola v State of New York , 84 AD3d at 1558 ; see Ramesar v…
  • Dalton v. Pataki, 11 A.D.3d 62 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep't 2004).
    Instead, “[t]he trend in New York State demonstrates ah acceptance of licensed gambling transactions as a morally acceptable activity, not objectionable under the prevailing standards of lawful and approved social conduct” (Intercontinenta…
At page 758 breach of contract and negligence. Supreme Court granted the State’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the claim, giving rise to this appeal. We affirm.…1 citing caseopening of page *758 (no citing court says what it cites this page for)
  • Alsaedi v. Alsaedi, 177 Misc. 2d 440 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1998).
    Servs., supra, 58 NY2d, at 526-529 ; Ramesar v State of New York, 224 AD2d 757, 758 [3d Dept 1996]; Pando v Fernandez, 127 Misc 2d 224, 227 [Sup Ct, NY County 1984].) Indeed, in Molina (supra, at 529 ), the Court of Appeals ruled that in l…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Christopher Ramesar
v.
State of New York
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
Feb 1, 1996.
224 A.D.2d 757
1996 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 810
Cardona.
Cited by 20 opinions  |  Published
—Cardona, P. J.

Appeal from an order of the Court of Claims (Benza, J.), entered September 16, 1994, which granted the State’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the claim.

Claimant, maintaining that he won the $10 million prize for the "pick six” lottery (hereinafter Lotto) drawing held on July 17, 1993, commenced this action against the State alleging[*758] breach of contract and negligence. Supreme Court granted the State’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the claim, giving rise to this appeal.

We affirm. It is not disputed that claimant filled out and mailed to the Division of the Lottery an application to participate in the Division’s subscription program. This program allows individuals to select combinations of numbers that are automatically entered in each Lotto drawing for a 15, 26 or 52-week period. It provides an alternative to individually purchasing Lotto tickets from authorized Division agents. Although claimant contends that he mailed his application on May 7, 1993, he admittedly did not receive confirmation of his subscription until July 28, 1993. The confirmation notice verified the numbers claimant had selected on his application and stated that the beginning date of his subscription would be August 7, 1993.

The Division’s rules and regulations provide that "[v]alid Lotto subscription entries will be included in the Lotto game” (21 NYCRR 2817.14 [d]). In order to be a "valid subscription entry”, the regulations state that the: "(a) * * * subscription must meet the following requirements: (1) The application and game numbers selected by the player must be entered on the appropriate [Division] computer file, which is the official record of subscription entry. (2) A membership confirmation is issued to the subscriber containing the game panels, game numbers, subscription start date and subscription end date, as recorded on the [Division] computer file of subscription records” (21 NYCRR 2817.16 [emphasis supplied]). The regulations also specifically state that "[t]he number selections in the [Division] computer file as they appear on the confirmation notice shall be the only numbers eligible for participation in the Lotto drawings” (21 NYCRR 2817.18 [b] [emphasis supplied]).

In this case, it is undisputed that claimant did not receive his confirmation notice until after the July 17, 1993 drawing. Two Division employees also averred and claimant does not dispute that there was no record of claimant’s subscription in the computer’s files immediately subsequent to the July 17, 1993 drawing. In addition, claimant’s subscription application was date-stamped as received by the Division on July 21, 1993, four days after the Lotto drawing. Thus, clearly, under the Division’s rules and regulations, claimant did not have a valid subscription entry until August 7, 1993 which was the beginning date listed in his confirmation notice. This is true regardless of when he mailed his subscription application. At the time of the July 17, 1993 drawing, his number selections were[*759] not in the computer files and no confirmation notice had been issued to him. Claimant, therefore, did not qualify for the July 17, 1993 drawing.

In reaching this conclusion, we emphasize the “limited power of the court in cases such as this” (Molina v Games Mgt. Servs., 58 NY2d 523, 529). Gambling in this State in general is prohibited (General Obligations Law § 5-401). The Lottery is authorized because it is operated with the specific purpose of raising funds for education (see, NY Const, art I, § 9; Tax Law § 1600 et seq.). Public policy continues to disfavor gambling; thus, the regulations pertaining thereto are to be strictly construed (see, Molina v Games Mgt. Servs., supra, at 529; Craft v Capital Dist. Regional Off Track Betting Corp., 107 AD2d 952, 954). Notably, claimant does not challenge the propriety of the regulations (see, Matter of Cramer v New York State Racing Assn., 136 AD2d 104) and they are binding on both the agency and the person affected; knowledge of the regulations’ restrictions is presumed (see, Craft v Capital Dist. Regional Off Track Betting Corp., supra, at 954). Unfortunately, under the applicable regulations, claimant did not have a valid subscription entry at the time of the Lotto drawing at issue and, therefore, was ineligible to participate in the July 17, 1993 drawing. The Court of Claims thus properly granted the State’s motion for summary judgment.

We also reject claimant’s contention that the Court of Claims erred in granting summary judgment prior to discovery (see, CPLR 3212 [f]). Claimant failed to offer any evidentiary basis to support a claim that “facts essential to jxistify opposition [to the motion] may exist but [could not] then be stated” (CPLR 3212 [f]; see, Harris v Alcan Aluminum Corp., 91 AD2d 830, affd 58 NY2d 1036). A mere hope that further discovery will disclose evidence that will prove claimant’s case is insufficient (see, Babcock v Allan, 115 AD2d 297, 298).

A discussion of claimant’s remaining arguments is unnecessary because they are either lacking in merit or have been rendered academic given our decision in this case.

Mikoll, Crew III, Yesawich Jr. and Peters, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs. [162 Mise 2d 420.]