Purificati v. Meyer & Diesenhouse, 243 A.D.2d 697 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997). · Go Syfert
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Purificati v. Meyer & Diesenhouse, 243 A.D.2d 697 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
15 citation events (6 in the last 25 years) across 4 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Greenberg v. Spitzer (nyappdiv, 2017-09-13)
Top citers, strongest first. 7 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Greenberg v. Spitzer
N.Y. App. Div. · 2017 · confidence medium
Based on the documentary evidence before it, the Supreme Court properly determined that Spitzer failed to show that the statements were either substantially true (see International Shoppes, Inc. v Spencer, 34 AD3d 429, 430 [2006]) or privileged pursuant to Civil Rights Law § 74 (see Rivera v Greenberg, 243 AD2d 697, 698 [1997]).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Decter v. Second Nature Therapeutic Program, LLC
E.D.N.Y · 2014 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Rivera v. Greenberg, 243 A.D.2d 697 , 663 N.Y.S.2d 628, 629 (1997) (“[T]he Supreme Court should have dismissed the plaintiffs thirtieth cause of action, which alleges conspiracy to defame, since New York does not recognize civil conspiracy as an independent tort.” (citation omitted)); accord Transit Mgmt., LLC v. Watson Indus., Inc., 23 A.D.3d 1152 , 803 N.Y.S.2d 860, 863 (2005) (“[I]t is well established that New York does not recognize civil conspiracy as an independent tort.”); see also Treppel v. Biovail Corp., 03 Civ. 3002(PKL), 2005 WL 2086339 , at *5 (S.D.N.Y.
cited Cited "see, e.g." Conte v. Newsday, Inc.
E.D.N.Y · 2010 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Rivera v. Greenberg, 243 A.D.2d 697 , 663 N.Y.S.2d 628, 629 (1997).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Alternative Electrodes, LLC v. Empi, Inc.
E.D.N.Y · 2009 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Rivera v. Greenberg, 243 A.D.2d 697, 698 , 663 N.Y.S.2d 628 (N.Y.App.Div.1997) (“[T]he Supreme Court should have dismissed the plaintiffs thirtieth cause of action, which alleges conspiracy to defame, since New York does not recognize civil conspiracy as an independent tort ....”) (citation omitted); accord Transit Management, 803 N.Y.S.2d at 863 (“it is well established that New York does not recognize civil conspiracy as an independent tort”); see also Treppel v. Biovail Corp., 03 cv 3002(PKL), 2005 WL 2086339 , at *5, 2005 U.S. Dist.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Collard & Roe, P.C. v. Vlacancich
N.Y. App. Term. · 2004 · signal: see also · confidence low
In order to prevail on his counterclaim, defendant was required to show, in part, that plaintiff “ ‘failed to exercise that degree of care, skill and diligence commonly possessed and exercised by an ordinary member of the legal community, that such negligence was the proximate cause of the actual damages sustained by the [client] . . .’ (Logalbo v Plishkin, Rubano & Baum, 163 AD2d 511, 513 ; see also, Purificati v Meyer & Diesenhouse, 243 AD2d 697 ; Lavin & Kleiman v Heinike Assoc., 221 AD2d 919 ; L.I.C.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Gardner v. Honest Weight Food Cooperative, Inc.
N.D.N.Y. · 2000 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
Defamation Claim Plaintiffs Ninth Cause of Action brings a defamation claim based on statements allegedly made by Defendants Zeitlow, Winslow and Toye that included, inter alia, “a campaign to falsely portray the plaintiff as an individual who discriminated against African-Americans,” Amended Compl. at ¶ 208, and inferring that Plaintiff was terminated “due to racially discriminatory conduct.” See id. at ¶210; see, e.g., Rivera v. Greenberg, 243 A.D.2d 697 , 663 N.Y.S.2d 628, 629 (2d Dep’t 1997); Scott v. Cooper, 226 A.D.2d 360 , 640 N.Y.S.2d 248, 249 (2d Dep’t 1996).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Lefkowitz v. Lurie
N.Y. App. Div. · 1998 · signal: see also · confidence low
It is well settled that a claim of legal malpractice requires proof that the attorney “failed to exercise that degree of care, skill and diligence commonly possessed and exercised by an ordinary member of the legal community, that such negligence was the proximate cause of the actual damages sustained by the [client], and that but for the [attorney’s] negligence, the [client] would have been successful in the underlying action” (Logalbo v Plishkin, Rubano & Baum, 163 AD2d 511, 513 ; see also, Purificati v Meyer & Diesenhouse, 243 AD2d 697 ; Lavin & Kleiman v Heinike Assocs., 221 AD2d 919…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
John Purificati
v.
Meyer & Diesenhouse, and Third-Party Plaintiffs-Respondents. Anthony Toots LaBella, Third-Party
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
Oct 27, 1997.
243 A.D.2d 697
Cited by 5 opinions  |  Published

In an action to recover damages for legal malpractice, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Goldstein, J.), entered July 23, 1996, as, upon an order of the same court dated May 17, 1996, granting the motion of the defendants third-party plaintiffs for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross-claims against them, dismissed the complaint.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

For the defendants in a legal malpractice case to succeed on a motion for summary judgment, they must present evidence in admissible form establishing that the plaintiff is unable to prove one of the three essential elements of a malpractice cause of action (see, Greene v Payne, Wood & Littlejohn, 197 AD2d 664; see also, Platt v Portnoy, 220 AD2d 652; Andrews Beverage Distrib. v Stern, 215 AD2d 706; L.I.C. Commercial Corp. v Rosenthal, 202 AD2d 644). Here, the respondents made a prima facie showing that the plaintiff could not prove that but for any negligence he would have prevailed in the underlying action, and the plaintiff failed to submit any admissible evidence to the contrary. Thus, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to the defendants. O’Brien, J. P., Santueci, Joy and Altman, JJ., concur.