Wray v. 654 Madison Avenue Assocs., L.P., 253 A.D.2d 394 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998). · Go Syfert
Wray v. 654 Madison Avenue Assocs., L.P., 253 A.D.2d 394 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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Footnote 2: Contrary to plaintiffs' position, there is no basis to disregard Helwani's testimony as "self-serving" because there is no indication that it conflicts with some prior testimony ( see Miller v City of New York , 253 AD2d 394, 395 [1st Dept 1998]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hernandez v. Ortiz
N.Y. App. Div. · 2018 · confidence medium
In this trip and fall case involving an uneven sidewalk, defendant Ortiz's testimony that she lived in a one-family home adjacent to the sidewalk was sufficient competent evidence to make a prima facie showing that she qualified for the exemption provided at Administrative Code of City of NY § 7-210(b) ( see Coogan v City of New York , 73 AD3d 613 [1st Dept 2010]; Miller v City of New York , 253 AD2d 394, 395 [1st Dept 1998] ["that an affidavit is submitted by a party or other interested person does not detract from its sufficiency as competent evidence"]).
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Where competent evidence is presented by a defendant in support of a motion for summary judgment, the burden shifts to plaintiff to produce proof in admissible form sufficient to establish the existence of material issues of fact which require a trial of the action (Miller v City of New York, 253 AD2d 394, 395-396 [1998]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Garris v. City of New York
N.Y. App. Div. · 2009 · confidence medium
Lighthouse met its burden on summary judgment with a prima facie showing establishing as a matter of law that plaintiff did not trip on the sidewalk, but rather on a “gap” between the metal portion of the curb and the concrete portion of the curb, and that Lighthouse neither caused nor created the defect involved in plaintiffs accident (see Miller v City of New York, 253 AD2d 394, 395-396 [1998]).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Ostrovsky v. City of New York
N.Y. Sup. Ct. · 2002 · confidence medium
(CPLR 3212 [b]; Miller v City of New York , 253 AD2d 394, 395-396 [1st Dept 1998].)
cited Cited as authority (rule) Ostrovsky v. City of New York
N.Y. Sup. Ct. · 2002 · confidence medium
(CPLR 3212 [b]; Miller v City of New York, 253 AD2d 394, 395-396 [1st Dept 1998].)
discussed Cited "see" Padawer v. City of New York
N.Y. App. Div. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
“It is well settled that the owner or lessee of land abutting a public sidewalk owes no duty to the public to keep the sidewalk in a safe condition unless the landowner or lessee creates a defective condition in the sidewalk or uses it for a special purpose” (Otero v City of New York, 213 AD2d 339, 340 ; see, Miller v City of New York, 253 AD2d 394, 395 ; see also, Paula v City of New York, 249 AD2d 100 ).
Leroy Wray
v.
654 Madison Avenue Associates, L.P., Appellants 654 Madison Avenue Associates, L.P., Third-Party Plaintiffs-Appellants-Respondents v. P.S. Marcato Elevator Co., Inc., Third-Party Defendant-Respondent-Appellant
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
Aug 20, 1998.
253 A.D.2d 394
1998 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 8952
Cited by 4 opinions  |  Published

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Luis Gonzalez, J.), entered July 11, 1997, which, in an action by plaintiff elevator maintenance worker against defendant building owners for common-law negligence and violations of Labor Law § 241 (6) and § 200, and a third-party action by the building owners against plaintiff’s employer, denied the owners’ and the employer’s motions for summary judgment, unanimously modified, on the law, to dismiss so much of the second cause of action as is based upon a violation of Labor Law § 241 (6), and otherwise affirmed, without costs.

We reject appellants’ claims that the owners bore no common-law responsibility for plaintiff’s injuries caused by the dangerous condition he was called upon to repair, since the accident was caused not by the noise and vibration in the compensating elevator sheave that plaintiff was called upon to remedy, but by the absence of a pit shut-off switch (see, 9 NYCRR 1062.3 [d]; compare, Kowalsky v Conreco Co., 264 NY 125). We agree with the IAS Court that an issue of fact exists as to whether this particular building was required to have such a switch. However, it was error not to dismiss so much of the action as claims a violation of Labor Law § 241 (6), since plaintiff was not engaged in construction, excavation or demolition work at the time of the accident (see, Spiteri v Chatwal Hotels, 247 AD2d 297, 299). We have considered appellants’ other arguments and find them to be without merit. Concur— Milonas, J. P., Wallach, Williams, Tom and Mazzarelli, JJ.