Lanaro v. Morris Ford Mercury, Inc., 256 A.D.2d 913 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998). · Go Syfert
Lanaro v. Morris Ford Mercury, Inc., 256 A.D.2d 913 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
2 citation events across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: AKV Auto Transport, Inc. v. Syosset Truck Sales, Inc. (nyappdiv, 2005-12-01)
Top citers, strongest first. 1 distinct citer. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) AKV Auto Transport, Inc. v. Syosset Truck Sales, Inc.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2005 · confidence medium
Turning next to plaintiffs appeal from the grant of Syosset’s cross motion, we agree with Supreme Court that Syosset’s proof that it did no repair work involving the truck’s light bar established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law because plaintiffs complaint had attributed the second truck fire to a fault in the light bar rather than in the truck itself (see Nichols v Cummins Engine Co., 273 AD2d 909, 909 [2000], lv denied 96 NY2d 703 [2001]; Lanaro v Morris Ford Mercury, 256 AD2d 913, 913 [1998]; Pollock v Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., 222 AD2d 766, 768 [1995]).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Nicola Lanaro
v.
Morris Ford Mercury, Inc.
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
Dec 17, 1998.
256 A.D.2d 913
1998 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 13562
Peters.
Cited by 2 opinions  |  Published
Peters, J.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Caruso, J.), entered May 21, 1998 in Schenectady County, which granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Plaintiff Nicola Lanaro (hereinafter plaintiff) was injured in June 1994 when he turned on the ignition of his 1993 Ford truck, parked in his driveway, and it unexpectedly lurched forward, striking another motor vehicle owned by plaintiff. Plaintiff and his wife subsequently commenced this action against defendant, the dealership that had sold them the truck in 1992 and had serviced it up to the time of the accident, alleging causes of action sounding in strict products liability and common-law negligence, the latter purportedly arising out of defendant’s repair and inspection of the truck. After issue had been joined and discovery was complete, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Supreme Court granted the motion and plaintiffs appeal.

Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate the existence of triable issues of fact sufficient to require a trial. The proof presented by them in opposition to defendant’s summary judgment motion included only the affidavit of a mechanic who opined “that a shift linkage malfunction allowed the vehicle to move unexpectedly when it was started by [plaintiff] in the parked position”. Not included in this affidavit was any indication as to how defendant had been guilty of negligence in either its inspection or servicing of plaintiffs’ truck, nor was there any showing of the way in which defendant’s actions or inactions had brought about the truck’s alleged malfunction (see, Nutting v Ford Motor Co., 180 AD2d 122, 130). In addition, no proof was presented to show that the truck had been defectively manufactured, a necessary element to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of fact in regard to plaintiffs’ strict products liability cause of action (see, Pollock v Toyota Motor Sales, 222 AD2d 766, 767; see also, Codling v Paglia, 32 NY2d 330, 342). We conclude that Supreme Court correctly granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Cardona, P. J., Crew III, Yesawich Jr. and Carpinello, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.