Chatterjee Fund Mgmt., L.P. v. Dimensional Media Assocs., 260 A.D.2d 159 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999). · Go Syfert
Chatterjee Fund Mgmt., L.P. v. Dimensional Media Assocs., 260 A.D.2d 159 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
25 citation events (23 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: McGowan v. Clarion Partners, LLC (nyappdiv, 2020-11-12)
Treatment trajectory · 2000 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2000 2013 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 6 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited as authority (rule) McGowan v. Clarion Partners, LLC
N.Y. App. Div. · 2020 · confidence medium
Benham, 118 AD3d at 607; Chatterjee Fund Mgt. v Dimensional Media Assoc., 260 AD2d 159, 159-160 [1st Dept 1999]).
cited Cited as authority (rule) McGowan v. Clarion Partners, LLC
N.Y. App. Div. · 2020 · confidence medium
Benham, 118 AD3d at 607; Chatterjee Fund Mgt. v Dimensional Media Assoc., 260 AD2d 159, 159-160 [1st Dept 1999]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Funk v. Seligson, Rothman & Rothman, Esqs.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2018 · confidence medium
In other words, it is unclear whether plaintiffs agreed to proceed (a) if Petit postponed the Commitment Date and closing or (b) only if there were a new written agreement. [*2]"When parties do not intend to be bound until their agreement is reduced to writing and signed, there is no contract in the interim even if the parties have orally agreed upon all the terms of the proposed contract" ( Chatterjee Fund Mgt. v Dimensional Media Assoc., 260 AD2d 159, 159 [1st Dept 1999] [internal citations omitted]; see also e.g.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Giunta v. Dingman
2d Cir. · 2018 · confidence medium
Chatterjee Fund Mgmt., L.P. v. Dimensional Media Assocs., 260 A.D.2d 159, 159 (1st Depʹt 1999).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jordan Panel Systems Corp. v. Turner Construction Co.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2007 · confidence medium
For the reasons discussed above, Jordan could not reasonably have relied upon Turner’s statements during the July 14 conference call as an unambiguous promise to enter into a subcontract with Jordan; therefore, no cause of action for promissory estoppel has been stated (see Hollinger Digital v LookSmart, Ltd., 267 AD2d at 77; Chatterjee Fund Mgt. v Dimensional Media Assoc., 260 AD2d 159, 159-160 [1999]; Prestige Foods v Whale Sec.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) SportsChannel Associates v. Sterling Mets, L.P.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2006 · confidence medium
Further, since plaintiff did not controvert defendant’s assertion that the 1982 agreement was predominantly drafted by plaintiff and controlled the 1996 agreement, any ambiguities in the agreements must be interpreted against plaintiff (see Chatterjee Fund Mgt. v Dimensional Media Assoc., 260 AD2d 159, 159 [1999]).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Chatterjee Fund Management, L.P.
v.
Dimensional Media Associates
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
Apr 1, 1999.
260 A.D.2d 159
1999 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3224
Cited by 18 opinions  |  Published

—Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Herman Cahn, J.), entered February 11, 1998, which granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs complaint, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

When parties do not intend to be bound until their agreement is reduced to writing and signed, there is no contract in the interim (Brown Bros. Elec. Contrs. v Beam Constr. Corp., 41 NY2d 397, 399; Scheck v Francis, 26 NY2d 466, 469-470), even if the parties have orally agreed upon all the terms of the proposed contract (R.G. Group v Horn & Hardart Co., 751 F2d 69, 74). In this case, the clear language of the parties’ written summary of intention indicates that any agreement was “[sjubject to legal and tax counsel” and to all of the requirements outlined under paragraph 20, including “[njegotiation of a definitive agreement and documentation”. If there is any ambiguity in this language, it must be construed against plaintiff as drafter of the document (see, Dunhill Sec. Corp. v Microthermal Applications, 308 F Supp 195, 197).

Plaintiffs attempt to recoup its due diligence expenses on the basis of promissory estoppel and quantum meruit must also fail. The parties’ failure to exempt paragraph 10 of the aforementioned summary of intention, respecting the allocation of responsibility for due diligence expenses, from the above-noted conditions precedent outlined under paragraph 20 of the same summary, as they expressly did for paragraphs 18 and 19, leads to the conclusion that in the absence of a written contract, there was no “ 'clear and unambiguous promise’ ” to reimburse such expenses (R.G. Group v Horn & Hardart Co., [*160] 751 F2d, supra, at 79; Frutico, S.A. de C.V. v Bankers Trust Co., 833 F Supp 288, 299). The element of detrimental reliance is also lacking inasmuch as the performance of due diligence was a precondition to negotiation of the final contract, and unjust enrichment is not an appropriate remedy for recovery of the expenses of a failed negotiation (Songbird Jet v Amax, Inc., 581 F Supp 912, 926). Concur — Ellerin, P. J., Tom, Wallach and Saxe, JJ.