Watler v. Riccuiti, 282 A.D.2d 741 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001). · Go Syfert
Watler v. Riccuiti, 282 A.D.2d 741 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
13 citation events (13 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Art of Healing Medicine, P.C. v. Global Liberty Ins. Co. of N.Y. (nyappterm, 2020-11-20)
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discussed Cited as authority (rule) Art of Healing Medicine, P.C. v. Global Liberty Ins. Co. of N.Y.
N.Y. App. Term. · 2020 · confidence medium
Consequently, defendant failed to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for its default ( see Weitzenberg v Nassau County Dept. of Recreation & Parks , 282 AD2d 741, 742-7 [*2]43 [2001]) and, therefore, it is not necessary to consider whether defendant offered a potentially meritorious defense to the action ( see Deutsch Bank Natl.
discussed Cited "see" Seon Uk Lee v. Corso
N.Y. App. Div. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
However, “CPLR 306-b, which permits the Supreme Court to extend a plaintiff’s time to serve a summons and complaint for ‘good cause shown or in the interest of justice,’ is applicable where service, timely made within the 120-day period, is subsequently found to have been defective” (Citron v Schlossberg, 282 AD2d 642 ; see Watler v Riccuiti, 282 AD2d 741 ; Murphy v Hoppenstein, 279 AD2d 410 ; Gurevitch v Goodman, 269 AD2d 355 ).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Caputo v. Peton
N.Y. App. Div. · 2004 · signal: see also · confidence medium
However, under the circumstances of this case, Sciannameo’s excuse of law office failure was not reasonable (see Kyriacopoulos v Mendon Leasing Corp., 216 AD2d 532, 533 [1995]; see also Weitzenberg v Nassau County Dept. of Recreation & Parks, 282 AD2d 741, 741-742 [2001]).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Bianca O. Watler
v.
Robert F. Riccuiti
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
Apr 30, 2001.
282 A.D.2d 741
2001 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4322
Cited by 1 opinion  |  Published

—In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiffs appeal from (1) an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Pitts, J.), dated May 8, 2000, which granted the defendant’s motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (8) to dismiss the complaint, and denied their cross motion pursuant to CPLR 306-b to extend their time to serve the summons and complaint, and (2) an order of the same court, dated May 22, 2000, which denied as academic their motion for leave to enter a judgment against the defendant upon his default in answering the complaint.

Ordered that the order dated May 8, 2000, is reversed, as a matter of discretion, the motion is denied, and the cross motion is granted; and it is further,

Ordered that the order dated May 22, 2000, is modified by deleting the provision thereof denying as academic the motion for leave to enter a judgment against the defendant upon his default in answering the complaint, and substituting therefor a provision denying the motion; and it is further,

Ordered that the plaintiffs’ time to serve the summons and complaint is extended until 30 days after service upon them of a copy of this decision and order, with notice of entry; and it is further,

Ordered that the plaintiffs are awarded one bill of costs.

The Supreme Court correctly determined that the plaintiffs did not properly serve the defendant with the summons and complaint pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 253 (2), as they did not comply with the requirements of that statute (see, Jean-Laurent v Nicholas, 182 AD2d 805). However, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying the plaintiffs’ cross motion pursuant to CPLR 306-b to extend their time to serve the summons and complaint “in the interest of justice” (CPLR 306-b; see, Leader v Maroney, Ponzini & Spencer, 276 AD2d 194). Therefore, the plaintiffs’ cross motion should have been granted, and the complaint is reinstated.

The plaintiffs’ remaining contentions are without merit. Ritter, J. P., Krausman, Florio and Feuerstein, JJ., concur.