Hargro v. Ross, 134 A.D.3d 1461 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015). · Go Syfert
Hargro v. Ross, 134 A.D.3d 1461 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
12 citation events (12 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: Jennifer M.C.-Y. v. Boring (nyappdiv, 2019-07-31)
Top citers, strongest first. 6 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jennifer M.C.-Y. v. Boring
N.Y. App. Div. · 2019 · confidence medium
Even assuming, arguendo, that the dog possessed the requisite vicious propensities, we conclude that defendant met her initial burden on the motion by submitting deposition testimony from herself, her son, and her then boyfriend, which established that defendant lacked actual or constructive knowledge that the dog had any vicious propensities, and plaintiffs failed to raise an issue of fact ( see S.K. v Kobee , 158 AD3d 1219 , 1220 [4th Dept 2018]; Brady , 148 AD3d at 1546 ; Hargro v Ross , 134 AD3d 1461, 1462 [4th Dept 2015]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hewitt v. Palmer Veterinary Clinic, PC (2×)
N.Y. App. Div. · 2018 · confidence medium
Ctr. , 161 AD3d 525 , 525 [1st Dept 2018], lv denied 32 NY3d 908 [2018]; Hargro v Ross , 134 AD3d 1461, 1462 [4th Dept 2015]; Christian v Petco Animal Supplies Stores, Inc. , 54 AD3d 707, 708 [2d Dept 2008]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Blake v. County of Wyoming
N.Y. App. Div. · 2017 · confidence medium
We conclude that the County met its “initial burden by establishing that [it] lacked actual or constructive knowledge that the dog had any vicious propensities” (Hargro v Ross, 134 AD3d 1461, 1462 [2015]; see Doerr v Goldsmith, 25 NY3d 1114, 1116 [2015]; Collier v Zambito, 1 NY3d 444, 446 [2004]) and that, in opposition, plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Hargro, 134 AD3d at 1462 ).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Blake v. County of Wyoming
N.Y. App. Div. · 2017 · confidence medium
We conclude that the County met its “initial burden by establishing that [it] lacked actual or constructive knowledge that the dog had any vicious propensities” (Hargro v Ross, 134 AD3d 1461, 1462 [2015]; see Doerr v Goldsmith, 25 NY3d 1114, 1116 [2015]; Collier v Zambito, 1 NY3d 444, 446 [2004]) and that, in opposition, plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Hargro, 134 AD3d at 1462 ).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cruz v. Stachowski
N.Y. App. Div. · 2016 · confidence medium
Defendants established, however, that Stachowski was entitled to judgment by submitting evidence that Stachowski “lacked actual or constructive knowledge that the dog had any vicious propensities” (Hargro v Ross, 134 AD3d 1461, 1462 [2015]) and, in opposition to that part of the motion, plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Doerr v Goldsmith, 25 NY3d 1114, 1116 [2015]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cruz v. Stachowski
N.Y. App. Div. · 2016 · confidence medium
Defendants established, however, that Stachowski was entitled to judgment by submitting evidence that Stachowski “lacked actual or constructive knowledge that the dog had any vicious propensities” (Hargro v Ross, 134 AD3d 1461, 1462 [2015]) and, in opposition to that part of the motion, plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Doerr v Goldsmith, 25 NY3d 1114, 1116 [2015]).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Sonya Hargro
v.
Scott Ross, Individually and Doing Business as Uncorked
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
Dec 23, 2015.
134 A.D.3d 1461
Cited by 8 opinions  |  Published

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Erie County (Tracey A. Bannister, J.), entered January 20, 2015 in a personal injury action. The order denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously reversed on the law without costs, defendant’s motion is granted and the complaint is dismissed.

Memorandum: Plaintiff commenced this action seeking damages for injuries she sustained from a dog bite. Plaintiff was inside defendant’s restaurant at the time of the incident, and[*1462] the dog allegedly was owned by another patron. Defendant appeals from an order denying his motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. We agree with defendant that Supreme Court erred in denying the motion insofar as plaintiff alleges that defendant was negligent in failing to maintain a safe premises. Plaintiff cannot recover for her alleged injuries based upon the alleged negligence of defendant in failing to maintain a safe premises, and may recover only under a theory of strict liability (see Bernstein v Penny Whistle Toys, Inc., 40 AD3d 224, 224 [2007], affd 10 NY3d 787 [2008]; Claps v Animal Haven, Inc., 34 AD3d 715, 716 [2006]). The court also erred in denying defendant’s motion insofar as plaintiff alleges that he violated a provision of the State Sanitary Code regarding the presence of animals in food service establishments (see 10 NYCRR 14-1.183). A violation of a regulation is only some evidence of negligence, and negligence is not a basis for imposing liability herein (see Petrone v Fernandez, 12 NY3d 546, 550 [2009]).

We further conclude that the court erred in denying defendant’s motion with respect to plaintiff’s strict liability claim. Here, defendant met his initial burden by establishing that he lacked actual or constructive knowledge that the dog had any vicious propensities (see Doerr v Goldsmith, 25 NY3d 1114, 1116 [2015]), and plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact in that respect (see id.; see also Collier v Zambito, 1 NY3d 444, 447 [2004]; Buicko v Neto, 112 AD3d 1046, 1047 [2013]). Present — Scudder, P.J., Centra, Garni, Valentino and BeJoseph, JJ.