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Treatment trajectory · 2004 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2004
2015
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 43 distinct citers.
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examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Famula v. Kiewit-Weeks-Massman AJV
(3×)
However, the small, raised piece of square plywood over which plaintiff tripped, which was fastened to the deck's wood plank surface to cover a hole, was not "dirt," "debris," "scattered tools and materials," or a "sharp projection[ ]" as required by the provision ( see Purcell v Metlife Inc. , 108 AD3d 431, 432 [1st Dept 2013]; Dalanna v City of New York , 308 AD2d 400, 401 [1st Dept 2003]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Russell v. Lenox Hill Hosp.
(2×)
Nor did Lenox Hill supervise or control the means and methods of plaintiff's work so as to impose Labor Law § 200 liability on it, as the loading dock supervisor's actions did not constitute supervision for the purposes of Labor Law liability ( see Dalanna v City of New York, 308 AD2d 400, 400 [1st Dept 2003]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Peralta v. Hunter Roberts Constr. Group LLC
(2×)
To the extent plaintiff contends that the scaffolding constituted a defective or dangerous condition existing on the premises, this argument is unavailing ( see Dalanna v City of New York , 308 AD2d 400, 400 [1st Dept 2003]).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Cucchiarella v. Tishman Interiors Corp.
Condominium, 93 AD3d 578, 579-580 [1st Dept 2012]; Paz v City of New York, 85 AD3d 519, 519-520 [1st Dept 2011]; Dalanna v City of New York, 308 AD2d 400, 400 [1st Dept 2003]).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Cucchiarella v. Tishman Interiors Corp.
Condominium, 93 AD3d 578, 579-580 [1st Dept 2012]; Paz v City of New York, 85 AD3d 519, 519-520 [1st Dept 2011]; Dalanna v City of New York, 308 AD2d 400, 400 [1st Dept 2003]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Cioppa v. ESRT 112 W. 34th St., L.P.
(2×)
Thus, as a matter of law, the plywood board, notwithstanding its hole, could not be described as an "accumulation[] of . . . debris" or as part of a "scatter[ing]" of "tools and materials" ( see Dalanna v City of New York , 308 AD2d 400, 401 [1st Dept 2003] [dismissing the Labor Law § 241(6) claim, predicated on Industrial Code § 23-1.7(e)(2), of a plaintiff who had tripped on a bolt "embedded in the ground," because the bolt "was not 'dirt,' 'debris,' 'scattered tools and materials,' or a 'sharp projection,' as required by the latter provision"]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Brown v. Tishman Constr. Corp. of N.Y.
The court correctly dismissed plaintiff's Labor Law § 241(6) claim predicated on Industrial Code (12 NYCRR) § 23-1.7(e)(1) given that plaintiff's accident occurred in an open working area, not a passageway ( see DePaul v NY Brush LLC , 120 AD3d 1046, 1047 [1st Dept 2014]; Dalanna v City of New York , 308 AD2d 400, 401 [1st Dept 2003]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Brown v. Tishman Constr. Corp. of N.Y.
The court correctly dismissed plaintiff's Labor Law § 241(6) claim predicated on Industrial Code (12 NYCRR) § 23-1.7(e)(1) given that plaintiff's accident occurred in an open working area, not a passageway ( see DePaul v NY Brush LLC , 120 AD3d 1046, 1047 [1st Dept 2014]; Dalanna v City of New York , 308 AD2d 400, 401 [1st Dept 2003]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Valladares v. Henry V. Murray Senior, LLC
County, Apr. 12, 2016]). 12 NYCRR 23-1.7(e)(2), which pertains to tripping and other hazards in working areas, is inapplicable as well because, while the accident did occur in a work area, the hazard at issue, the sheetrock stack, was not “scattered” (see Dalanna v City of New York, 308 AD2d 400, 401 [1st Dept 2003]).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Lindemann v. VNO 100 W. 33rd St. LLC
LLC , 162 AD3d 404 , 406 [1st Dept 2018]; Dalanna v City of New York , 308 AD2d 400, 400 [1st Dept 2003]).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Lindemann v. VNO 100 W. 33rd St. LLC
LLC , 162 AD3d 404 , 406 [1st Dept 2018]; Dalanna v City of New York , 308 AD2d 400, 400 [1st Dept 2003]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Villanueva v. 114 Fifth Ave. Assoc. LLC
Where a defect is not inherent but is created by the manner in which the work is performed, the claim under Labor Law § 200 is one for means and methods and not one for a dangerous condition existing on the premises ( see Cappabianca , [*2] 99 AD3d at 144 ; Dalanna v City of New York , 308 AD2d 400, 400 [1st Dept 2003]).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Cross v. Noble Ellenburg Windpark, LLC
Northeast Inc. , 148 AD3d 619, 620 [1st Dept 2017]; Dalanna v City of New York , 308 AD2d 400, 401 [1st Dept 2003]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
James v. Alpha Painting & Constr. Co., Inc.
(2×)
Corp., 40 AD3d 305, 306-307 [1st Dept 2007]; Cahill v Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Auth., 31 AD3d 347, 350 [1st Dept 2006]; Dalanna v City of New York, 308 AD2d 400, 400 [1st Dept 2003]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Albericci v. Port Authority of New York & New Jersey
Accordingly, under Labor Law § 200, in addition to liability for a dangerous condition arising from the methods employed by a subcontractor, over which the owner or general contractor exercised supervision and/or control (Comes at 877 ; Allen at 299 ; Dalanna v City of New York, 308 AD2d 400, 400 [1st Dept 2003]), liability can also arise when the accident is caused by a dangerous condition at the work site that was either created by the owner or general contractor or about which they had prior notice (see Mitchell v New York Univ., 12 AD3d 200, 201 [2004]; Ortega v Pueda, 57 AD3d 54, 61-62 […
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Pereira v. New School
Plaintiff’s and the work site superintendent’s conflicting testimony presents issues of fact whether the accident occurred in a “passageway” (see Lois, 137 AD3d at 447; Dalanna v City of New York, 308 AD2d 400, 401 [1st Dept 2003]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Maddox v. Tishman Construction Corp.
Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, the double-stacking of the sand and cement bags at the work site was not an inherently dangerous condition of the work site but a result of the means and methods of the injury-producing work (see Dalanna v City of New York, 308 AD2d 400, 401 [1st Dept 2003]).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Ramade v. C.B. Contracting Corp.
Dalanna v City of New York, 308 AD2d 400, 400 [1st Dept 2003]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
MITCHELL, MARGUERITE v. NRG ENERGY, INC.
“There is no evidence that defendant^] gave anything more than general instructions on what needed to be done, not how to do it, and monitoring and oversight of the timing and quality of the work is not enough to impose liability under section 200” or under the common law (Dalanna v City of New York, 308 AD2d 400, 400 [2003]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
DePaul v. NY Brush LLC
The accident occurred in an open working area, notwithstanding evidence that workers traversed the plank to get from the street to the job site (see Dalanna v City of New York, 308 AD2d 400, 401 [1st Dept 2003]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
DePaul v. Coastal Electric Construction Corp.
Insofar as the Labor Law § 241 (6) claim is based on a violation of Industrial Code (12 NYCRR) § 23-1.7 (e) (1), it should be dismissed because the accident occurred in an open working area, the evidence that workers traversed the plank to get from the street to the job site notwithstanding (see Dalanna v City of New York, 308 AD2d 400, 401 [1st Dept 2003]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
DePaul v. Coastal Electric Construction Corp.
Insofar as the Labor Law § 241 (6) claim is based on a violation of Industrial Code (12 NYCRR) § 23-1.7 (e) (1), it should be dismissed because the accident occurred in an open working area, the evidence that workers traversed the plank to get from the street to the job site notwithstanding (see Dalanna v City of New York, 308 AD2d 400, 401 [1st Dept 2003]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Purcell v. Metlife Inc.
Moreover, plaintiff’s accident did not take place in a “passageway” within the meaning of that provision; rather, it occurred in an open-work area on the eighth-floor roof setback of the work site (see Dalanna v City of New York, 308 AD2d 400, 401 [1st Dept 2003]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Purcell v. Metlife Inc.
Moreover, plaintiff’s accident did not take place in a “passageway” within the meaning of that provision; rather, it occurred in an open-work area on the eighth-floor roof setback of the work site (see Dalanna v City of New York, 308 AD2d 400, 401 [1st Dept 2003]).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Rodriguez v. Dormitory Authority
Partners, 50 AD3d 260, 260 [1st Dept 2008]; Dalanna v City of New York, 308 AD2d 400, 401 [1st Dept 2003]).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Rodriguez v. Dormitory Authority
Partners, 50 AD3d 260, 260 [1st Dept 2008]; Dalanna v City of New York, 308 AD2d 400, 401 [1st Dept 2003]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Johnson v. 923 Fifth Avenue Condominium
The area of the sidewalk where plaintiff was unloading materials was not a “passageway” within the meaning of 12 NYCRR 23-1.7 (e) (1) (see Dalanna v City of New York, 308 AD2d 400, 401 [1st Dept 2003]). 12 NYCRR 23-1.7 (e) (2) is not applicable because even if the sidewalk may be construed as a floor, platform or similar area where people “work or pass,” plaintiff did not trip over loose or scattered material.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Johnson v. 923 Fifth Avenue Condominium
The area of the sidewalk where plaintiff was unloading materials was not a “passageway” within the meaning of 12 NYCRR 23-1.7 (e) (1) (see Dalanna v City of New York, 308 AD2d 400, 401 [1st Dept 2003]). 12 NYCRR 23-1.7 (e) (2) is not applicable because even if the sidewalk may be construed as a floor, platform or similar area where people “work or pass,” plaintiff did not trip over loose or scattered material.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Zieris v. City of New York
Even assuming that the area plaintiff traversed could be deemed a “passageway” within the meaning of section 23-1.7 (e), plaintiff testified that he tripped on the rivet after he entered the common, open work area (see Dalanna v City of New York, 308 AD2d 400, 401 [2003]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Foley v. Consolidated Edison Co.
Moreover, there is no evidence that Con Edison “gave anything more than general instructions on what needed to be done, not how to do it, and monitoring and oversight of the timing and quality of the work is not enough to impose liability under [Labor Law § ] 200” (Dalanna v City of New York, 308 AD2d 400, 400 [2003]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Homola v. Praxair, Inc.
Instead, where, for example, an employee trips over a bolt embedded in the ground, the New York courts have made clear that such an object is not “ ‘dirt,’ ‘debris,’ ‘scattered tools and materials,’ or a ‘sharp projection [ ],’ as required by [this provision of the Industrial Code].” Dalanna v. City of New York, 308 A.D.2d 400 , 764 N.Y.S.2d 429, 429 (1st Dep’t 2003); see also Adams v. Glass Fab, Inc., 212 A.D.2d 972 , 624 N.Y.S.2d 705, 708 (4th Dep’t 1995) (holding that wire mesh set into concrete could “[u]nder no reasonable view ... be considered the equivalent of …
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Delaney v. City of New York
We also reject plaintiffs argument that because the Jersey barrier over which he had to step to get to the roadway had no breaks to allow for safe passage and because there were no signs, traffic controls or flagmen to protect workers from oncoming traffic, the barrier was an inherently dangerous condition of the workplace itself for which defendant can be held liable even in the absence of supervisory control (compare Dalanna v City of New York, 308 AD2d 400, 400 [2003], with Urban v No. 5 Times Sq.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
McCormick v. 257 W. Genesee, LLC
Accordingly, defendants cannot be held liable under section 200 [or for common-law negligence] even if they had constructive notice of the protruding [pin]” (Dalanna v City of New York, 308 AD2d 400, 400 [2003]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Cook v. Orchard Park Estates, Inc.
Oil & Gas Co., LLC, 68 AD3d 1220, 1222-1223 [2009]; Weinberg v Alpine Improvements, LLC, 48 AD3d at 918-919 ; Gadani v Dormitory Auth. of State of N.Y., 43 AD3d at 1221 ; Wolfe v KLR Mech., Inc., 35 AD3d at 919 ; Nelson v Sweet Assoc., Inc., 15 AD3d at 715 ; cf. Dalanna v City of New York, 308 AD2d 400, 400 [2003]; Blysma v County of Saratoga, 296 AD2d at 639 ).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Passaro v. 163-15 Northern Flushing Corp.
Corp. of N.Y., 36 AD3d 417, 417 [2007]; Dalanna v City of New York, 308 AD2d 400, 401 [2003]; see generally Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]; cf. Lenard v 1251 Ams.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Enriquez v. B & D Development, Inc.
Co., 2 AD3d 619, 622 [2003]; Dalanna v City of New York, 308 AD2d 400, 401 [2003]; Alvia v Teman Elec.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Kagan v. BFP One Liberty Plaza
In any event, the fact that representatives of defendants gave general instructions as to what needed to be done and performed monitoring and oversight of the timing and quality of the work is insufficient to support these claims (see Dalanna v City of New York, 308 AD2d 400, 400 [2003]).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Ragone v. Spring Scaffolding, Inc.
Co., 2 AD3d 619, 622 [2003]; Dalanna v City of New York, 308 AD2d 400, 401 [2003]; Singleton v Citnalta Constr.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Burkoski v. Structure Tone, Inc.
Realty Corp., 15 AD3d 158, 158, 159-160 [2005] [no violation of IC § 23-1.7 (e) (1) or IC § 23-2.1 (a) (1) where plaintiff was injured while working in a room, “not a passageway”]; Dalanna v City of New York, 308 AD2d 400, 400, 401 [2003] [no violation of IC § 23-1.7 (e) (1) where plaintiff “tripped over a protruding bolt while carrying a pipe across an outdoor 50-foot-long concrete slab,” which, “although regularly traversed to bring pipes to the tanks” for installation, was not a “passageway”]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Smith v. 499 Fashion Tower, LLC
Contrary to the plaintiffs contention, the mere fact that the building superintendent told the decedent which windows to clean and directed the time he was to perform the work did not raise a triable issue of fact as to the defendants’ supervision and control over the decedent’s work (see Carty v Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 32 AD3d 732, 732 [2006]; Dalanna v City of New York, 308 AD2d 400, 400 [2003]; Loiacono v Lehrer McGovern Bovis, 270 AD2d 464, 465 [2000]).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Carty v. Port Authority of New York & New Jersey
Mere “monitoring and oversight of the timing and quality of the work is not enough to impose liability under section 200” (Dalanna v City of New York, 308 AD2d 400, 400 [2003]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
O'Sullivan v. IDI Construction Co.
If it was clearly established that the unsafe condition “was not a defect inherent in the property, but rather was created by the manner in which plaintiffs employer performed its work,” the owner and general contractor would be entitled to dismissal of the section 200 claim (see Dalanna v City of New York, 308 AD2d 400, 400 [2003]; see also Reilly v Newireen Assoc., 303 AD2d 214, 219 [2003], lv denied 100 NY2d 508 [2003]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Brennan v. 42nd Street Development Project, Inc.
However, it is well settled that such responsibility to oversee site safety, including its authority to stop unsafe work practices by any of the trades, did not rise to the level of supervision and control necessary to hold it liable under Labor Law § 200 (see Vasiliades v Lehrer McGovern & Bovis, 3 AD3d 400, 401-402 [2004]; Dalanna v City of New York, 308 AD2d 400, 400 [2003]).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Darrell Dalanna
v.
City of New York
v.
City of New York
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
Sep 25, 2003.
Cited by 71 opinions | Published
—Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Louise Gruner Gans, J.), entered on or about March 20, 2003, which granted the motion of defendants construction site owner and general contractor for summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs causes of action under Labor Law §§ 200 and 241 (6), unanimously affirmed, without costs.
Plaintiff, a plumber, was directed to install pipes on a tank and was injured when he tripped over a protruding bolt while carrying a pipe across an outdoor 50-foot-long concrete slab. The IAS court correctly dismissed plaintiffs cause of action under Labor Law § 200 on the ground that defendants had no supervisory control over this injury-producing work (see Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 NY2d 494, 505 [1993]). There is no evidence that defendant general contractor gave anything more than general instructions on what needed to be done, not how to do it, and monitoring and oversight of the timing and quality of the work is not enough to impose liability under section 200 (see Gonzalez v United Parcel Serv., 249 AD2d 210, 210-211 [1998]). Nor is a general duty to ensure compliance with safety regulations or the authority to stop work for safety reasons (see Buccini v 1568 Broadway Assoc., 250 AD2d 466, 468-469 [1998]).
We reject plaintiffs argument that a showing of supervisory control is not necessary since the accident was caused not by a contractor’s methods but by a defect in the premises itself of which defendants had constructive notice. The record shows that the bolt was one of many that had been put down to temporarily anchor the tank to the concrete slab prior to its installation, and that when the tank was taken off the slab several months prior to the accident, plaintiffs employer was instructed to cut down the protruding bolts so they would be level with the surrounding surface, but it apparently missed the one on which plaintiff tripped. Thus, the protruding bolt was not a defect inherent in the property, but rather was created by the manner in which plaintiffs employer performed its work. Accordingly, defendants cannot be held liable under section 200 even if they had constructive notice of the protruding bolt (see Wright v Belt Assoc., 14 NY2d 129, 134 [1964]; McParland v Travelers Ins. Co., 302 AD2d 328 [2003]).
[*401] Nor can plaintiff recover under section 241 (6). The slab, although regularly traversed to bring pipes to the tanks, remained a common, open area between the job site and the street, and thus was not “passageway” covered by 12 NYCRR 23-1.7 (e) (1), and at best was a “working area” covered by 12 NYCRR 23-1.7 (e) (2) (see Lenard v 1251 Ams. Assoc., 241 AD2d 391, 392, 393 [1997], appeal withdrawn 90 NY2d 937 [1997]; Canning v Barney’s N.Y., 289 AD2d 32, 34 [2001]). However, the bolt, which was embedded in the ground, was not “dirt,” “debris,” “scattered tools and materials,” or a “sharp projection [ ],” as required by the latter provision.
We have considered plaintiffs other arguments and find them unavailing. Concur — Saxe, J.P., Rosenberger, Williams, Lerner and Friedman, JJ.