United States v. Madkins, 14 F.3d 277 (5th Cir. 1994). · Go Syfert
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United States v. Madkins, 14 F.3d 277 (5th Cir. 1994). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 3× by 2 distinct cases, last quoted 2008 · …our circuit colleagues addressing this issue have all held that the standards governing guideline sentences should apply to the statutory minimums in drug conspiracy cases at p. 279 ✓
33 citation events (13 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: United States v. Damien Foxx (ca8, 2008-10-22)
Treatment trajectory · 1995 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1995 2010 2026
Statutes interpreted (leading-cases list)
#11 28 U.S.C. § 124 cited 1× in this case · 522 total citations of statute
Top citers, strongest first. 21 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) United States v. Damien Foxx
8th Cir. · 2008 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
our circuit colleagues addressing this issue have all held that the standards governing guideline sentences should apply to the statutory minimums in drug conspiracy cases
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Foxx (2×)
8th Cir. · 2008 · confidence medium
United States v. Madkins, 14 F.3d 277, 279 (5th Cir.1994) ("[o]ur circuit colleagues addressing this issue have all held that the standards governing guideline sentences should apply to the statutory minimums in drug conspiracy cases").
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Harrison
5th Cir. · 2004 · confidence medium
See 18 U.S.C. § 3231 ("The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction, exclusive of the Courts of the States, of all offenses against the laws of the United States.”); United States v. Madkins, 14 F.3d 277, 279 (5th Cir.1994) (argument that federal courts do not have jurisdiction over crimes committed in sovereign state of Texas is frivolous). 6 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Jackson
5th Cir. · 1999 · confidence medium
United States v. Madkins, 14 F.3d 277, 279 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Cates, 952 F.2d 149, 152 (5th Cir. 1992).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. James Anderson and Dean Hodge
5th Cir. · 1999 · confidence medium
Hodge relies on United States v. Madkins, 14 F.3d 277, 279 (5th Cir.1994), for the proposition that "conduct occurring before the defendant joined the conspiracy typically cannot be included in the relevant conduct inquiry.” Based on this proposition, Hodge argues that conduct occurring before February' 1996, the beginning of the conspiracy alleged in the superseding indictment, cannot be attributed to him for sentencing purposes.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. McPhail (2×)
5th Cir. · 1997 · confidence medium
Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1424 (5th Cir.1996) (en banc)) 7 E.g., United States v. Samuels, 59 F.3d 526, 529-30 (5th Cir.1995) ("Short of a miscarriage of justice, we may not consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal of a section 2255 motion."); United States v. Madkins, 14 F.3d 277, 279 (5th Cir.1994) ("[T]his assignment of error is being raised for the first time on appeal; it was not presented to the district court.
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Samuels
5th Cir. · 1995 · confidence medium
United States v. Madkins, 14 F.3d 277, 279 (5th Cir.1994); United States v. Cates, 952 F.2d 149, 152 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 962 , 112 S.Ct. 2319 , 119 L.Ed.2d 238 (1992). 14 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. JAMES ANDERSON and DEAN HODGE
unknown court · confidence medium
We conclude that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the above incidents were sufficiently connected to the offense conduct to constitute relevant conduct for purposes of § 1B1.3(a)(2).4 4 Hodge relies on United States v. Madkins, 14 F.3d 277, 279 (5th Cir. 1994), for the proposition that “conduct occurring before the defendant joined the conspiracy typically cannot be included in the relevant conduct inquiry.” Based on this proposition, Hodge argues that conduct occurring before February 1996, the beginning of the conspiracy alleged in the superseding indictment, canno…
cited Cited as authority (rule) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. ROBERT GARY JONES
unknown court · confidence medium
United States v. Madkins, 14 F.3d 277, 279 (5th Cir. 1994).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Matter of: MARSHA LYNN DEISON, Debtor. AT&T UNIVERSAL CARD SERVICES CORPORATION v. MARSHA LYNN DEISON
unknown court · confidence medium
Corp. v. Rembert, 14 F. 3d 277, 282 (6th Cir. 1998). 4 Reading the record in the light most many of the ways in which others have favorable to the finding, we conclude that attempted to determine whether fraudulent Deison, a relatively unsophisticated consumer, intent exists suggest that Deison has shown had always paid at least the minimum balance none.
cited Cited "see" United States v. Alaniz
5th Cir. · 2005 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Madkins, 14 F.3d 277, 278-79 (5th Cir.1994); Koch v. Puckett, 907 F.2d 524, 527 (5th Cir.1990).
cited Cited "see" United States v. Wilbert
5th Cir. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Madkins, 14 F.3d 277, 279 (5th Cir. 1994); Leverette v. Louisville Ladder Co., 183 F.3d 339, 342 (5th Cir. 1999).
cited Cited "see" United States v. Linda Ruiz
5th Cir. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Madkins, 14 F.3d 277, 279 (5th Cir.1994).
cited Cited "see" UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. LINDA RUIZ
unknown court · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Madkins, 14 F.3d 277, 279 (5th Cir. 1994).
cited Cited "see" UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. JOHN THOMPSON
unknown court · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Madkins, 14 F.3d 277, 279 (5th Cir. 1994).
discussed Cited "see" UNITED STATES of America v. Ruben ROCHA
unknown court · signal: see · confidence high
See Rocha, 916 F.2d at 227-32 . 4 See, e.g., United States v. Madkins, 14 F.3d 277, 279 (5th Cir.1994); United States v. Cates, 952 F.2d 149, 152 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 962 , 112 S.Ct. 2319 , 119 L.Ed.2d 238 (1992). 5 We express no view on the merits of such a successive motion.
cited Cited "see" UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. FRANK IVY
unknown court · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Madkins, 14 F.3d 277, 279 (5th Cir. 1994).
cited Cited "see" UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. S. PATRICK PHILLIPS
unknown court · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Madkins, 14 F.3d 277, 279 (5th Cir. 1994).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Ludevina Ayala Cervantes
5th Cir. · 1998 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., United States v. Madkins, 14 F.3d 277, 279 (5th Cir.1994) (citing cases); United States v. Cates, 952 F.2d 149, 152 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 962 , 112 S.Ct. 2319 , 119 L.Ed.2d 238 (1992).
cited Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Ruben Rocha
5th Cir. · 1997 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., United States v. Madkins, 14 F.3d 277, 279 (5th Cir.1994); United States v. Cates, 952 F.2d 149, 152 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 962 , 112 S.Ct. 2319 , 119 L.Ed.2d 238 (1992). 5 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." UNITED STATES of America v. Ludevina Ayala CERVANTES
unknown court · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., United States v. Madkins, 14 F.3d 277, 279 (5th Cir.1994) (citing cases); United States v. Cates, 952 F.2d 149, 152 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 962 , 112 S.Ct. 2319 , 119 L.Ed.2d 238 (1992).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Elizabeth MADKINS, A/K/A Elizabeth Richardson, Defendant-Appellant
93-04954.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
Feb 17, 1994.
14 F.3d 277
1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 2606
1994 WL 26347
Elizabeth Madkins, pro se., John M. Bales, Asst. U.S. Atty., Bob Wort-ham, U.S. Atty., Beaumont, TX, for U.S.
Politz, Higginbotham, Demoss.
Cited by 28 opinions  |  Published
POLITZ, Chief Judge:

Elizabeth Madkins appeals the district court’s denial of her 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition. For the reasons assigned we affirm.

Background

Madkins was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to distribute 5 kilograms or more of cocaine and 50 grams or more of cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846, and for money laundering, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1)(B)® and (2). Because the statutory minimum sentence of 120 months was greater than the maximum applicable guidelines range, [1] the mandatory minimum became the guideline sentence. [2] The district court sentenced Madkins to 120 months imprisonment and 5 years supervised release. Madkins did not appeal her conviction or sentence but filed a pro se 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition claiming that the district court did not have jurisdiction over the crimes committed, that venue was improper, and that she received ineffective assistance of counsel. The section 2255 petition was denied; Mad-kins timely appealed.

Analysis

Madkins raises numerous issues on appeal, first contending that the district court did not have jurisdiction and that venue was improper. [3] Madkins argues that federal[*279] courts do not have jurisdiction over crimes against the United States that occur in the “Sovereign State of Texas.” This argument is frivolous. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, “[district courts have jurisdiction over offenses against the laws of the United States.” [4] Madkins was indicted for violating federal laws prohibiting conspiring to distribute cocaine [5] and money laundering. [6] The district court had jurisdiction over her prosecution. The suggestion that because the offense occurred within the State of Texas the federal government is rendered powerless requires no response.

Madkins’ venue challenge is also mer-itless. Criminal defendants have a constitutional right to be tried in the state and district where the crime was committed. [7] Here, the government charged Madkins with performing acts in furtherance of the conspiracy and of engaging in money laundering in Nacogdoches, Texas. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas encompasses Nacogdoches County, Texas. [8] Venue was proper.

Madkins raises another issue which, in a proper setting, would have substantial persuasive force. She points out that the conspiracy for which she was convicted and sentenced began in 1988 and involved five kilograms of cocaine and 50 grams of cocaine base. She did not enter the conspiracy until 1990 and the PSR reflects that “the only amount of drugs that can be attributed to [Madkins] is jé ounce of cocaine base,” and that there is no proof she had knowledge of the other transactions. We very recently have held that the reasonable foreseeability requirement of U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 is prospective only for purposes of determining relevant conduct in conspiracy cases. [9] Consequently, conduct occurring before the defendant joined the conspiracy typically cannot be included in the relevant conduct inquiry. [10] Further, our circuit colleagues addressing this issue have all held that the standards governing guideline sentences should apply to the statutory mínimums in drug conspiracy cases. [11]

The immediate problem Madkins encounters is that this assignment of error is being raised for the first time on appeal; it was not presented to the district court. We may not consider it. [12] We also are mindful of the difficulty that Madkins may face in raising any issue in a section 2255 habeas petition which could have been raised on direct appeal and which is not of constitutional or jurisdictional magnitude. [13]

Madkins included in her brief a motion to appoint counsel and to supplement the record on appeal. In light of today’s disposition, we find that the interests of justice do[*280] not require granting those motions, and they accordingly are DENIED. [14]

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

1

. The PSR computed Madkins’ total offense level at 26 with a criminal history of I, resulting in a sentencing range of 63 to 78 months.

2

. U.S.S.G. § 5Gl.l(b).

3

.Although Madkins claimed in the district court that she was rendered ineffective assistance of counsel, she does not raise this issue in her appellate brief. That claim is therefore abandoned. Hobbs v. Blackburn, 752 F.2d 1079 (5th[*279] Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 838, 106 S.Ct. 117, 88 L.Ed.2d 95 (1985).

4

. United States v. Drobny, 955 F.2d 990, 997 (5th Cir.1992).

5

. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846.

6

. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(l)(B)(i) and (2).

7

. United States v. Davis, 666 F.2d 195 (5th Cir.1982).

9

. United States v. Carreon, 11 F.3d 1225 (5th Cir.1994).

10

. Id. The relevant inquiry is to determine the foreseeable object to which the individual conspirator agreed. Earlier transactions of a conspiracy before a conspirator joins may, in certain settings, be relevant. See United States v. O’Campo, 973 F.2d 1015 (1st Cir.1992).

11

. United States v. Irvin, 2 F.3d 72 (4th Cir.1993); United States v. Young, 997 F.2d 1204 (7th Cir.1993); United States v. Martinez, 987 F.2d 920 (2d Cir.1993) (explaining that in a conspiracy case the issue is not whether the defendant knew what drugs he was dealing or what amounts he was dealing, but whether he knew about the amounts of drugs that his cocon-spirator was dealing up to two years before they ever met); and United States v. Iones, 965 F.2d 1507 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 346, 121 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992).

12

. United States v. Cates, 952 F.2d 149 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, -U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 2319, 119 L.Ed.2d 238 (1992).

13

. United States v. Prince, 868 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 932, 110 S.Ct. 321, 107 L.Ed.2d 312 (1989); United States v. Perez, 952 F.2d 908 (5th Cir.1992).

14

. See, e.g., Schwander v. Blackburn, 750 F.2d 494 (5th Cir.1985).