green
Positive treatment
Issue: free exercise clauseCA ↗
Issue: Smith claimCA ↗
Issue: hybrid standardCA ↗
Issue: First Amendment challengeIN ↗
33.9 score
G Cite
cited 4× by 3 distinct cases, last quoted 2008 ·
…did not explain how the standards under the free exercise clause would change depending on whether other constitutional rights are implicated
at p. 180
⚠ not in text
cited 4× by 4 distinct cases ·
…holding that the legal standard under the free exercise clause depends on whether a free- exercise claim is coupled with other constitutional rights . . . is completely illogical.
⚠ not in text
cited 3× by 3 distinct cases, last quoted 2008 ·
…can think of no good reason for the standard of review to vary simply with the number of constitutional rights that the plaintiff asserts have been violated,
⚠ not in text
Treatment trajectory · 1993 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1993
2009
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
examined
Cited "but see"
Combs v. Homer-Center School District
(8×)
also: Cited as authority (rule), Cited "see", Cited "see, e.g."
See Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 765 (7th Cir.2003) (quoting Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1207-08 (9th Cir.1999)); but see id. (citing Brown, 68 F.3d at 539 and Kissinger, 5 F.3d at 180 ).
discussed
Cited "but see"
City Chapel Evangelical Free Inc. v. City of South Bend Ex Rel. Department of Redevelopment
(2×)
Dist., 976 F.Supp. 659 (S.D.Tex.1997) (finding First Amendment violation by school dress code as hybrid claim of free speech and free exercise); Sixth Circuit: Vandiver v. Hardin County Bd. of Educ., 925 F.2d 927 (6th Cir.1991) (recognizing hybrid right analysis, but requiring that companion right be a cognizable constitutional right); but see Kissinger v. Bd. of Trustees, 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir.1993) (declining to recognize hybrid claim exception until clarified by Supreme Court); Seventh Circuit Hinrichs v. Whitburn, 772 F.Supp. 423 (W.D.Wis.1991) (acknowledging hybrid claim of free exerci…
discussed
Cited "but see"
Swanson Ex Rel. Swanson v. Guthrie Independent School District No. I-L
But see Kissinger v. Board of Trustees, 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1993), in which the Sixth Circuit held that the legal standard applicable to a constitutional claim would not change simply because constitutional principles other than the Free Exercise Clause had been implicated. 5 .
discussed
Cited "but see"
Rader v. Johnston
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
But see Kissinger v. Board of Trustees, 5 F.3d 177 (6th Cir. 1993) (refusing to recognize hybrid-rights claims until further clarification of the issue by the Supreme Court).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Spillane v. Lamont
Ed. 2d 464 (2002); Kissinger v. Board of Trustees of The Ohio State University of Veterinary Medicine, 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1993) (referring to hybrid rights theory as ‘‘completely illogical’’).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Spillane v. Lamont
Ed. 2d 464 (2002); Kissinger v. Board of Trustees of The Ohio State University of Veterinary Medicine, 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1993) (referring to hybrid rights theory as ‘‘completely illogical’’). 0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 27 0 Conn. 1 ,0 29 Spillane v. Lamont death.’’ (Footnote omitted.) Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 , 166–67, 64 S. Ct. 438 , 88 L.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
C.F. v. New York City Dept. of Health & Mental Hygiene
Dist. , 540 F3d at 247 ; Leebaert v Harrington , 332 F3d 134, 143 [2d Cir]; Watchtower Bible & Tract Socy. of N.Y., Inc. v Village of Stratton, Ohio , 240 F3d 553, 561-562 [6th Cir], revd on other grounds 536 US 150 ; Kissinger v Board of Trustees of Ohio State Univ., Coll. of Veterinary Medicine , 5 F3d 177, 180 [6th Cir]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Meriwether v. Hartop
(2×)
The Sixth Circuit has applied a three-part analysis to determine whether application of a statute or policy violates an individual's right to freely exercise his religion: (1) whether the statute or policy was generally applicable; (2) whether the statute or policy was aimed at particular religious practices; and (3) whether the policy contained “a system of particularized exemptions.” Kissinger v. Bd. of Trustees of Ohio State U., College of Veterinary Med., 5 F.3d 177, 179 (6th Cir. 1993) (citing Smith, 494 U.S. at 877-78 ).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Michigan Catholic Conference v. Sebelius
Because the Sixth Circuit has rejected the hybrid rights theory advanced by Plaintiffs, Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs. of Ohio State Univ., 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir.1993), this argument must fail.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Ward v. Members of the Board of Control of Eastern Michigan University
Consistent with this idea of a non-public forum, courts have traditionally given public colleges and graduate schools wide latitude “to create curricula that fit schools’ understandings of their educational missions.” Kissinger v. Bd. of Trustees of Ohio State University, College of Veterinary Medicine, 5 F.3d 177, 181 (6th Cir. 1993) (citing Doherty v. Southern College of Optometry, 862 F.2d 570, 576-77 (6th Cir.1988)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
McTernan v. City of York, Pa.
Health, 275 F.3d 156 , 167 (2d Cir.2001) (describing hybrid rights theory as dicta and not binding on this court); Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs. of Ohio State Univ., 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1993) (describing doctrine as "completely illogical” and declining to recognize it until Supreme Court expressly does so itself); Littlefield v. Forney Indep.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
McTernan v. York
Health, 275 F.3d 156 , 167 (2d Cir. 2001) (describing hybrid rights theory as dicta and not binding on this court); Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs. of Ohio State Univ., 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1993) (describing doctrine as “completely illogical” and declining to recognize it until Supreme Court expressly does so itself); Littlefield v. Forney Indep.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
McCullen v. Coakley
Therefore, at least until the Supreme Court holds that legal standards under the Free Exercise Clause vary depending on whether other constitutional rights are implicated, we will not use a stricter legal standard to evaluate hybrid claims.”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); Kissinger v. Bd. of Trustees of Ohio State Univ., 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir.1993) ("We do not see how a state regulation would violate the Free Exercise Clause if it implicates other constitutional rights but would not violate the free Exercise Clause if it did not implicate other constitutional rights.�…
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Combs v. Homer Ctr Sch Dist
(3×)
also: Cited "see", Cited "see, e.g."
Health, 275 F.3d 156 , 167 (2d Cir. 2001)); Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of New York, Inc. v. Stratton, 240 F.3d 553 , 561-62 (6th Cir. 2001), rev’d on other grounds, 536 U.S. 150 (2002); Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs. of Ohio State Univ., Coll. of Veterinary Med., 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1993).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Combs v. Homer Ctr Sch Dist
(3×)
also: Cited "see", Cited "see, e.g."
Health, 275 F.3d 156 , 167 (2d Cir. 2001)); Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of New York, Inc. v. Stratton, 240 F.3d 553 , 561-62 (6th Cir. 2001), rev’d on other grounds, 536 U.S. 150 (2002); Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs. of Ohio State Univ., Coll. of Veterinary Med., 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1993).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Chabad of Nova, Inc. v. City of Cooper City
See Warner, 64 F.Supp.2d at 1288 n. 12; Midrash Sephardi 2000 WL 35633163 , at *14; see also Lukumi 508 U.S. at 567 , 113 S.Ct. 2217 (“If a hybrid claim is simply one in which another constitutional right is implicated, then the hybrid exception would probably be so vast as to swallow the Smith rule.”) (Souter, J., concurring); Kissinger v. Bd. of Trustees of Ohio State Univ., College of Veterinary Medicine, 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir.1993) (“We do not see how a state regulation would violate the Free Exercise Clause if it implicates other constitutional rights but would not violate the fr…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Jacobs v. Clark County School District
(2×)
The "hybrid rights" doctrine has been widely criticized, see, e.g., City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 566-67 , 113 S.Ct. 2217 (Souter, J., dissenting) (explaining why doctrine is "ultimately untenable"); Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs. of Ohio State Univ., 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1993) (calling doctrine "completely illogical" and declining to recognize doctrine until Supreme Court expressly does so itself); Littlefield v. Forney Indep.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Jacobs v. Clark County
The “hybrid rights” doctrine has been widely criticized, see, e.g., City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 566-67 (Souter, J., dissenting) (explaining why doctrine is “ulti- mately untenable”); Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs. of Ohio State Univ., 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1993) (calling doctrine “completely illogical” and declining to recognize doctrine until Supreme Court expressly does so itself); Littlefield v. Forney Indep.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Parker v. Town of Lexington
See, e.g., Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 143-44 (2d Cir.2003); Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs., 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir.1993); see also Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 567 , 113 S.Ct. 2217 (Souter, J., concurring) (describing the hybrid distinction drawn by Smith as “ultimately untenable”).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne
Health, 275 F.3d 156 , 167 (2d Cir.2001); criticized as illogical, Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs. of Ohio State Univ., 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir.1993); and dismissed as untenable. 2 Courts are also divided on the strength of the independent constitutional right claim that is required to assert a cognizable hybrid rights claim, with a number of courts, including this circuit, expressing the view that a litigant is required to assert at least a “colorable” claim to an independent constitutional right to survive summary judgment.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Grace United Methodist Church v. City Of Cheyenne
Health, 275 F.3d 156 , 167 (2d Cir.2001); criticized as illogical, Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs. of Ohio State Univ., 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir.1993); and dismissed as untenable. 2 Courts are also divided on the strength of the independent constitutional right claim that is required to assert a cognizable hybrid rights claim, with a number of courts, including this circuit, expressing the view that a litigant is required to assert at least a "colorable" claim to an independent constitutional right to survive summary judgment.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Grace United Methodist Church v. City Of Cheyenne
Health, 275 F.3d 156 , 167 (2d Cir.2001); criticized as illogical, Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs. of Ohio State Univ., 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir.1993); and dismissed as untenable. 2 Courts are also divided on the strength of the independent constitutional right claim that is required to assert a cognizable hybrid rights claim, with a number of courts, including this circuit, expressing the view that a litigant is required to assert at least a "colorable" claim to an independent constitutional right to survive summary judgment.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne
Health, 275 F.3d 156 , 167 (2d Cir.2001); criticized as illogical, Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs. of Ohio State Univ., 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir.1993); and dismissed as untenable. 2 Courts are also divided on the strength of the independent constitutional right claim that is required to assert a cognizable hybrid rights claim, with a number of courts, including this circuit, expressing the view that a litigant is required to assert at least a “colorable” claim to an independent constitutional right to survive summary judgment.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Douglas County v. Anaya
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
Kissinger v. Board of Trustees, 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1993).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Axson-Flynn v. Johnson
Health, 275 F.3d 156 , 167 (2d Cir.2001) (characterizing Smith's hybrid rights language as "dicta and not binding on this court” and declining to apply hybrid rights ■ analysis); Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs. of Ohio State Univ., 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir.1995) (characterizing the hybrid rights exception as "completely illogical” and stating, "We do not see how a state regulation would violate the Free Exercise Clause if it implicates other constitutional rights but would not violate the [F]ree Exercise Clause if it did not implicate other constitutional rights”).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Civil Liberties for Urban Believers, Christ Center, Christian Covenant Outreach Church v. City of Chicago
(2×)
Accord, e.g., Swanson v. Guthrie Independent School District, 135 F.3d 694, 700 (10th Cir.1998); Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Productions, Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 539 (1st Cir.1995); Kissinger v. Board of Trustees, 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir.1993).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Civil Liberties v. City of Chicago
Accord, e.g., Swanson v. 20 No. 01-4030 Guthrie Independent School District, 135 F.3d 694, 700 (10th Cir. 1998); Brown v. Hot, Sexy, and Safer Products, Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 539 (1st Cir. 1995); Kissinger v. Board of Trustees, 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1993).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Vineyard Christian Fellowship of Evanston, Inc. v. City of Evanston
Kissinger v. Board of Trustees of Ohio State University, 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir.1993) (“We do not see how a state regulation would violate the Free Exercise Clause if it implicates other constitutional rights but would not violate the Free Exercise Clause if it did not implicate other constitutional rights....
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Blakely v. Blakely
See Knight v. Connecticut Dept. of Health, 275 F.3d 156 , 157 (2nd Cir.2001); Kissinger v. Bd. *548 of Trustees of Ohio State Univ., 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir.1993).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Axson-Flynn v. Johnson
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
College of Veterinary Med., 5 F.3d 177, 179-181 (6th Cir.1993) (holding that student could not be exempted on free exercise grounds from curricular requirement of performing surgery on live animals); Mozert v. Hawkins Co. Bd. of Ed., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir.1987) (holding that students could not be exempted from general reading requirements because of parents’ religious objections to school’s reading curriculum), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 , 108 S.Ct. 1029 , 98 L.Ed.2d 993 (1988).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc. v. Village of Stratton
Further, as we held in Kissinger v. Board of Trustees of the Ohio State University, 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir.1993), aside from the fact that the Smith Court did not hold that a hybrid rights claim subjects a law to a higher level of scrutiny, the Court did not explain how a hybrid rights claim would alter the level of scrutiny (we note that the one probably had a lot to do with the other).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc. Wellsville, Ohio, Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc., (99-4087)/appellees v. Village of Stratton, Ohio John M. Abdalla, Mayor of the Village of Stratton, Ohio, in His Official Capacity, Defendants-Appellees/appellants (00-3325)
Board of Trustees of the Ohio State University, 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1993), aside from the fact that the Smith Court did not hold that a hybrid rights claim subjects a law to a higher level of scrutiny, the Court did not explain how a hybrid rights claim would alter the level of scrutiny (we note that the one probably had a lot to do with the other).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Martin S. McKay United States of America, Intervenor v. Brook Thompson, Individually and as Coordinator of Elections, State of Tennessee Riley C. Darnell, Secretary of State, State of Tennessee, Carolyn Jackson, Individually and as Administrator of Elections, Hamilton County, Tennessee Claude Ramsey, County Executive, Hamilton County, Tennessee
See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877-78 (1990); Kissinger v. Board of Trustees, 5 F.3d 177, 179 (6th Cir. 1993).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
McKay v. Thompson
See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877-78 , 110 S.Ct. 1595 , 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990); Kissinger v. Board of Trustees, 5 F.3d 177, 179 (6th Cir.1993).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Commission
(2×)
No. I-L, 135 F.3d 694, 700 (10th Cir.1998) (requiring that a free exercise claim based on the hybrid rights exception must include at least a colorable claim of infringement of a companion right); EEOC v. Catholic University of America, 83 F.3d 455, 467 (D.C.Cir.1996) (requiring that a free exercise claim based on the hybrid rights exception must include an independently viable claim of infringement of a companion right); Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods. , 68 F.3d 525, 539 (1st Cir.1995) (same); Kissinger v. Board of Trustees, 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir.1993) (declining to apply the hybrid righ…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Kevin Thomas and Joyce Baker v. Anchorage Equal Rights Commission and the Municipality of Anchorage v. Paula Haley in Her Official Capacity as the Executive Director of the Alaska State Commission for Human Rights, Kevin Thomas and Joyce Baker v. Anchorage Equal Rights Commission and the Municipality of Anchorage v. Paula Haley in Her Official Capacity as the Executive Director of the Alaska State Commission for Human Rights
(2×)
Cir. 1996) (requiring that a free exercise claim based on the hybrid rights exception must include an independently viable claim of infringement of a companion right); Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., 68 F.3d 525, 539 (1st Cir. 1995) (same); Kissinger v. Board of Trustees, 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1993) (declining to apply the hybrid rights exception entirely).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Miller v. Reed
No. I-L, 135 F.3d 694, 700 (10th Cir.1998) (“Whatever the Smith hybrid-rights theory may ultimately mean, we believe that it at least requires a colorable showing of infringement of recognized and specific constitutional rights, rather than the mere invocation of a general right such as the right to control the education of one’s child.”); Brown v. Hot, Sexy, & Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 539 (1st Cir.1995) (concluding that the hybrid-rights exception was not triggered because the plain tiffs had not shown interference with an independently protected constitutional right); Kissinger…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
99 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 3882, 1999 Daily Journal D.A.R. 4962 Donald S. Miller v. Sally R. Reed, California Department of Motor Vehicles Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General
No. I-L, 135 F.3d 694, 700 (10th Cir.1998) ("Whatever the Smith hybrid-rights theory may ultimately mean, we believe that it at least requires a colorable showing of infringement of recognized and specific constitutional rights, rather than the mere invocation of a general right such as the right to control the education of one's child."); Brown v. Hot, Sexy, & Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 539 (1st Cir.1995) (concluding that the hybrid-rights exception was not triggered because the plaintiffs had not shown interference with an independently protected constitutional right); Kissinger v. Boa…
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
99 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 414, 99 Daily Journal D.A.R. 1005, 99 Daily Journal D.A.R. 506, 99 Daily Journal D.A.R. 611 Kevin Thomas and Joyce Baker v. Anchorage Equal Rights Commission and the Municipality of Anchorage, and Paula Haley in Her Official Capacity as the Executive Director of the Alaska State Commission for Human Rights, Kevin Thomas and Joyce Baker v. Anchorage Equal Rights Commission and the Municipality of Anchorage, and Paula Haley in Her Official Capacity as the Executive Director of the Alaska State Commission for Human Rights
(3×)
also: Cited "see"
The Sixth Circuit did not ignore Smith, but instead found that "the Smith court did not explain how the standard under the Free Exercise Clause would change depending on whether other constitutional rights were implicated." Kissinger v. Board of Trustees of the Ohio State Univ., College of Veterinary Medicine, 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir.1993).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Commission
(3×)
also: Cited "see"
The Sixth Circuit did not ignore Smith, but instead found that “the Smith court did not explain how the standard under the Free Exercise Clause would change depending on whether other constitutional rights were implicated.” Kissinger v. Board of Trustees of the Ohio State Univ., College of Veterinary Medicine, 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir.1993).
cited
Cited "see"
We the Patriots USA, Inc. v. Conn. Office of Early Childhood Dev.
Id.; see 65 also Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs. of Ohio State Univ., Coll. of Veterinary Med., 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1993).
discussed
Cited "see"
Neustadter v. Holy Cross Hospital of Silver Spring, Inc.
(2×)
See Kissinger v. Bd. of Trustees of Ohio State Univ., 5 F.3d 177, 179 (6th Cir.1993) (employing a "three-part analysis": whether the governmental action "was generally applicable, was not aimed at particular religious practices, and did not contain a system of particularized exemptions").
cited
Cited "see"
Hansen v. Ann Arbor Public Schools
See Kissinger v. Board of Trustees of the Ohio State University, College of Veterinary Medicine, 5 F.3d 177 (6th Cir.1993). 34 .
cited
Cited "see"
Leebaert Ex Rel. Leebaert v. Harrington
See Kissinger v. Bd. Of *499 Trustees of Ohio State Univ., 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir.1993).
examined
Cited "see"
Hyman v. City of Louisville
(3×)
also: Cited "see, e.g."
See Kissinger, supra, 5 F.3d at 180 .
discussed
Cited "see"
Hicks Ex Rel. Hicks v. HALIFAX COUNTY BD. EDUC.
See Kissinger v. Board of Trustees, 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir.1993) ("We do not see how a state regulation would violate the Free Exercise Clause if it implicates other constitutional rights but would not violate the Free Exercise Clause if it did not implicate other constitutional rights.”). 8 .
discussed
Cited "see"
McCready v. Hoffius
See Kissinger v Ohio State Univ Bd of Trustees, 5 F3d 177, 180 (CA 6, 1993), Equal Employment Opportunity Comm v Catholic Univ of America, 317 US App DC 343; 83 F3d 455 (1996), and Brown v Hot, Sexy & Safer Productions, Inc, 68 F3d 525 (CA 1, 1995).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Hampsmire v. City of Santa Cruz
Dist., 526 F.3d 419 , 440 n. 45 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs. of Ohio State Univ., 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir.1993) (“We do not see how a state regulation would violate the Free Exercise Clause if it implicates other constitutional rights but would not violate the Free Exercise Clause if it did not implicate other constitutional rights.”); City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 566-67 , 113 S.Ct. 2217 (Souter, J., dissenting) (explaining why doctrine is “ultimately untenable” because it would create an exception “so vast as to swallow the ... rule”).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Combs v. Homer Center School District
See also Kissinger v. Bd. of Trustees of the Ohio State Univ., Coll, of Veterinary Med., 5 F.3d 177 (6th Cir.1993) (where free exercise of religion combined with various other First Amendment claims, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit explicitly rejected the more stringent “hybrid rights” legal standard suggested by the dictum in Smith , explaining that it did not see how a state regulation would violate the Free Exercise Clause if it implicates other constitutional rights but would not violate the Free Exercise Clause if it did not implicate other constitutional rights).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Jo Ann Knight v. State of Connecticut Department of Public Health and Stephen Harriman, Commissioner, in Tandem With Nicolle Quental v. State of Connecticut Commission on the Deaf and Hearing Impaired and Stacey Eusko Mawson, Individually and in Her Official Capacity as Executive Director
See, e.g., Kissinger v. Bd. of Trustees of Ohio State Univ., 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1993) ("[A]t least until the Supreme Court holds that legal standards under the Free Exercise Clause vary depending on whether other constitutional rights are implicated, we will not use a stricter legal standard... to evaluate generally applicable, exceptionless state regulations under the Free Exercise Clause."). 34 In this Circuit, we have not yet addressed generally whether hybrid claims require a greater governmental justification than each component of the hybrid claim taken separately and we need not …
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
United States
v.
Robert Paul Kaplansky
v.
Robert Paul Kaplansky
92-3744.
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
Nov 29, 1993.
Cited by 3 opinions | Published
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Robert Paul KAPLANSKY, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 92-3744.
United States Court of Appeals,
Sixth Circuit.
Nov. 29, 1993.
Before MERRITT, Chief Judge; and KEITH, KENNEDY, MARTIN, JONES, MILBURN, GUY, NELSON, RYAN, BOGGS, NORRIS, SUHRHEINRICH, SILER and BATCHELDER, Circuit Judges.
ORDER
[*~177]1
A majority of the Judges of this Court in regular active service have voted for rehearing of this case en banc. Sixth Circuit Rule 14 provides as follows:
[*~178]2
The effect of the granting of a hearing en banc shall be to vacate the previous opinion and judgment of this court, to stay the mandate and to restore the case on the docket sheet as a pending appeal.
[*~179]3
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the previous decision and judgment of this court is vacated, the mandate is stayed and this case is restored to the docket as a pending appeal.
[*~180]4
The Clerk will direct the parties to file supplemental briefs and will schedule this case for oral argument as soon as possible.