free exercise clause in California

1996News, at pp. 1892, 1903.) In Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940) 310 U.S. 296 [ 84 L.Ed. 1213 , 60 S.Ct. 900 , 128 A.L.R. 1352 ], the Supreme Court incorporated the free exercise clause into the Fourteenth Amendment, thereby making it subject to the legislative protection afforded under section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.

1996News, at pp. 1892, 1903.) In Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940) 310 U.S. 296 [ 84 L.Ed. 1213 , 60 S.Ct. 900 , 128 A.L.R. 1352 ], the Supreme Court incorporated the free exercise clause into the Fourteenth Amendment, thereby making it subject to the legislative protection afforded under section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.

2018And, the court pointed out that the case was "not one in which any harm to the physical or mental health of the child or to the public safety, peace, order, or welfare has been demonstrated or may be properly inferred," and that a parent's power, "even when linked to a free exercise claim, may be subject to limitation under Prince if it appears that parental decisions will jeopardize the health or safety of the child, or have a potential for significant social burdens." ( Id. at pp. 230, 233-234, 92 S.Ct. 1526 .) Accordingly, plaintiffs' free exercise claim has no merit. ii.

2004We must ask this question because a claim under the free exercise clause must be "rooted in religious belief" and not on "philosophical" choices or "[a] way of life, however virtuous and *313 admirable." ( Wisconsin v. Yoder, supra, 406 U.S. 205, 215, 216 , 92 S.Ct. 1526 .) "Although a determination of what is a `religious' belief or practice entitled to constitutional protection may present a most delicate question, the very concept of ordered liberty precludes allowing every person to make his own standards on matters of conduct in which society as a whole has important interests." ( Id., pp

2026“The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, applicable to the States under the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that ‘Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise’ of religion.” (Fulton v. City of Philadelphia (2021) 593 U.S. 522, 532 .) Nonetheless, an 5 individual’s religious beliefs do not excuse “compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate.” (Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith (1990) 494 U.S. 872 , 878–879 (Smith).) Accordingly, a state may prohibit “religiously inspired” drug use without viol

2010Dept, of Human Res. v. Smith (1990) 494 U.S. 872, 878-882 [ 108 L.Ed.2d 876 , 110 S.Ct. 1595 ], the Supreme Court held that the free exercise clause does not inhibit general enforcement of neutral laws that incidentally burden religious conduct; in response, Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq.); in City of Boerne v. Flores (1997) 521 U.S. 507, 515-516 [ 138 L.Ed.2d 624 , 117 S.Ct. 2157 ], the Supreme Court invalidated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 as it applied to the states; and held Congress, in enacting the Religious Fre

2005Catholic Charities asserts, in other words, that we must interpret the California Constitution the same way the United States Supreme Court interpreted the federal Constitution's free exercise clause in Sherbert, supra, 374 U.S. 398 , 83 S.Ct. 1790 , 10 L.Ed.2d 965 ." ( Id. at p. 559, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 283 , 85 P.3d 67 , fn. omitted.) Saying that in the proper case it would not have hesitated "to declare the scope and proper interpretation of the California Constitution's free exercise clause," Catholic Charities concluded it did not need to do so because the pre- Smith strict scrutiny test [10]

2005Catholic Charities asserts, in other words, that we must interpret the California Constitution the same way the United States Supreme Court interpreted the federal Constitution's free exercise clause in Sherbert, supra, 374 U.S. 398 , 83 S.Ct. 1790 , 10 L.Ed.2d 965 ." ( Id. at p. 559, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 283 , 85 P.3d 67 , fn. omitted.) Saying that in the proper case it would not have hesitated "to declare the scope and proper interpretation of the California Constitution's free exercise clause," Catholic Charities concluded it did not need to do so because the pre- Smith strict scrutiny test [10]

2004Our conclusion that the government may properly distinguish between secular and religious entities and activities for the purpose of accommodating religious exercise does not mean that any given statute purporting to draw such distinctions necessarily passes muster under the free exercise clause. "[A] law targeting religious beliefs as such is never permissible," and a court" `must survey meticulously the circumstances of governmental categories to eliminate, as it were, religious gerrymanders.'" ( Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, supra, 508 U.S. 520, 533-534 , 113 S.Ct. 2217 , qu

2004Our conclusion that the government may properly distinguish between secular and religious entities and activities for the purpose of accommodating religious exercise does not mean that any given statute purporting to draw such distinctions necessarily passes muster under the free exercise clause. "[A] law targeting religious beliefs as such is never permissible," and a court" `must survey meticulously the circumstances of governmental categories to eliminate, as it were, religious gerrymanders.'" ( Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, supra, 508 U.S. 520, 533-534 , 113 S.Ct. 2217 , qu

2004In other cases, both before and after Sherbert , the court had upheld laws and governmental actions challenged under the free exercise clause without applying strict scrutiny. [7] Eight years before Smith, supra, 494 U.S. 872 , 110 S.Ct. 1595 , Justice Stevens wrote that most of the court's holdings were better explained not by the strict scrutiny test of Sherbert, supra, 374 U.S. 398 , 83 S.Ct. 1790 , as by "a standard that places an almost insurmountable burden on any individual who objects to a valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescrib

2004In other cases, both before and after Sherbert , the court had upheld laws and governmental actions challenged under the free exercise clause without applying strict scrutiny. [7] Eight years before Smith, supra, 494 U.S. 872 , 110 S.Ct. 1595 , Justice Stevens wrote that most of the court's holdings were better explained not by the strict scrutiny test of Sherbert, supra, 374 U.S. 398 , 83 S.Ct. 1790 , as by "a standard that places an almost insurmountable burden on any individual who objects to a valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescrib

2010Dept, of Human Res. v. Smith (1990) 494 U.S. 872, 878-882 [ 108 L.Ed.2d 876 , 110 S.Ct. 1595 ], the Supreme Court held that the free exercise clause does not inhibit general enforcement of neutral laws that incidentally burden religious conduct; in response, Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq.); in City of Boerne v. Flores (1997) 521 U.S. 507, 515-516 [ 138 L.Ed.2d 624 , 117 S.Ct. 2157 ], the Supreme Court invalidated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 as it applied to the states; and held Congress, in enacting the Religious Fre

2010Dept, of Human Res. v. Smith (1990) 494 U.S. 872, 878-882 [ 108 L.Ed.2d 876 , 110 S.Ct. 1595 ], the Supreme Court held that the free exercise clause does not inhibit general enforcement of neutral laws that incidentally burden religious conduct; in response, Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq.); in City of Boerne v. Flores (1997) 521 U.S. 507, 515-516 [ 138 L.Ed.2d 624 , 117 S.Ct. 2157 ], the Supreme Court invalidated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 as it applied to the states; and held Congress, in enacting the Religious Fre

2004Because a legislative accommodation benefits religion, it is tested not under the free exercise clause but under the establishment clause. ( Amos, supra, *303 483 U.S. 327, 334-336 , 107 S.Ct. 2862 .) To comply with the establishment clause, a law must among other things serve a "`secular legislative purpose.'" ( Id., at p. 335, 107 S.Ct. 2862 , quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, 403 U.S. 602, 612 , 91 S.Ct. 2105 .) In this context, the requirement of a secular legislative purpose "does not mean that the law's purpose must be unrelated to religion — that would amount to a requirement `that the

2004Because a legislative accommodation benefits religion, it is tested not under the free exercise clause but under the establishment clause. ( Amos, supra, *303 483 U.S. 327, 334-336 , 107 S.Ct. 2862 .) To comply with the establishment clause, a law must among other things serve a "`secular legislative purpose.'" ( Id., at p. 335, 107 S.Ct. 2862 , quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, 403 U.S. 602, 612 , 91 S.Ct. 2105 .) In this context, the requirement of a secular legislative purpose "does not mean that the law's purpose must be unrelated to religion — that would amount to a requirement `that the

1996As the plurality opinion in Smith v. Fair Employment & Housing Com., supra, stated, “[a]n economic cost, however, does not equate to a substantial burden for purposes of the free exercise clause.” ( 12 Cal.4th at p. 1172 .) The plurality cited, among other authorities, Braunfeld v. Brown (1961) 366 U.S. 599 [ 81 S.Ct. 1144 , 6 L.Ed.2d 563 ], in which Orthodox Jewish shopkeepers argued that a law requiring shops to close on Sunday violated their free exercise rights.

1996(Id. at p. 322, fn. 5 [ 636 N.E.2d at p. 236 ].) Professor Tribe has described in these terms the ways in which Sherbert, supra, 374 U.S. 398 , superseded Braunfeld, supra, 366 U.S. 599 : “Two years after Braunfeld , [in Sherbert] the Supreme Court took a major step beyond these precedents, extending and solidifying the principles latent in its previous holdings. . . . [H Sherbert went well beyond the precedents in two important ways, the combination of which made the free exercise clause a vastly more powerful instrument for generating government accommodations of religion. [<HJ First, Sherbe

2008In that case, we explained that “[t]he high court has not, since the decision in Smith, supra, 494 U.S. 872 , determined whether the hybrid rights theory is valid or invoked it to justify applying strict scrutiny to a free exercise claim.” (Catholic Charities, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 557 .) We added, however, that Justice Souter’s concurring opinion in Lukumi, supra, 508 U.S. 520, 567 , was critical of the idea that hybrid rights would give rise to a stricter level of scrutiny: “ ‘[I]f a hybrid claim is simply one in which another constitutional right is implicated, then the hybrid exception w

2004Our conclusion that the government may properly distinguish between secular and religious entities and activities for the purpose of accommodating religious exercise does not mean that any given statute purporting to draw such distinctions necessarily passes muster under the free exercise clause. "[A] law targeting religious beliefs as such is never permissible," and a court" `must survey meticulously the circumstances of governmental categories to eliminate, as it were, religious gerrymanders.'" ( Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, supra, 508 U.S. 520, 533-534 , 113 S.Ct. 2217 , qu

2025The CRD’s Neutrality Defendants maintain the CRD violated its obligation under the free exercise clause to “proceed in a manner neutral toward and tolerant of [Miller’s] religious beliefs.” (Masterpiece, supra, 584 U.S. at p. 638.) The trial court concluded the CRD’s administrative investigation and prosecution did not amount to hostility: “While [the CRD] may have stepped on the line at times, it did not commit a personal foul sufficient to constitute a [free exercise] defense in this case.” Defendants argue this was error.

2025The CRD’s Neutrality Defendants maintain the CRD violated its obligation under the free exercise clause to “proceed in a manner neutral toward and tolerant of [Miller’s] religious beliefs.” (Masterpiece, supra, 584 U.S. at p. 638.) The trial court concluded the CRD’s administrative investigation and prosecution did not amount to hostility: “While [the CRD] may have stepped on the line at times, it did not commit a personal foul sufficient to constitute a [free exercise] defense in this case.” Defendants argue this was error.

1988I, § 4.) (6) The religion clauses protect only claims rooted in religious belief. ( Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972) 406 U.S. 205, 215 [ 32 L.Ed.2d 15, 25 , 92 S.Ct. 1526 ].) The free exercise clause protects religious beliefs absolutely. ( Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra, 310 U.S. at pp. 303-304 [84 L.Ed.2d at pp. 1217-1218].) While a court can inquire into the sincerity of a person's beliefs, it may not judge the truth or falsity of those beliefs. ( United States v. Ballard (1944) 322 U.S. 78, 86-88 [ 88 L.Ed. 1148, 1153-1155 , 64 S.Ct. 882 ].) The government may neither compel affirmation of a reli

1988I, § 4.) (6) The religion clauses protect only claims rooted in religious belief. ( Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972) 406 U.S. 205, 215 [ 32 L.Ed.2d 15, 25 , 92 S.Ct. 1526 ].) The free exercise clause protects religious beliefs absolutely. ( Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra, 310 U.S. at pp. 303-304 [84 L.Ed.2d at pp. 1217-1218].) While a court can inquire into the sincerity of a person's beliefs, it may not judge the truth or falsity of those beliefs. ( United States v. Ballard (1944) 322 U.S. 78, 86-88 [ 88 L.Ed. 1148, 1153-1155 , 64 S.Ct. 882 ].) The government may neither compel affirmation of a reli

1988I, § 4.) (6) The religion clauses protect only claims rooted in religious belief. ( Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972) 406 U.S. 205, 215 [ 32 L.Ed.2d 15, 25 , 92 S.Ct. 1526 ].) The free exercise clause protects religious beliefs absolutely. ( Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra, 310 U.S. at pp. 303-304 [84 L.Ed.2d at pp. 1217-1218].) While a court can inquire into the sincerity of a person's beliefs, it may not judge the truth or falsity of those beliefs. ( United States v. Ballard (1944) 322 U.S. 78, 86-88 [ 88 L.Ed. 1148, 1153-1155 , 64 S.Ct. 882 ].) The government may neither compel affirmation of a reli

1988I, § 4.) (6) The religion clauses protect only claims rooted in religious belief. ( Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972) 406 U.S. 205, 215 [ 32 L.Ed.2d 15, 25 , 92 S.Ct. 1526 ].) The free exercise clause protects religious beliefs absolutely. ( Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra, 310 U.S. at pp. 303-304 [84 L.Ed.2d at pp. 1217-1218].) While a court can inquire into the sincerity of a person's beliefs, it may not judge the truth or falsity of those beliefs. ( United States v. Ballard (1944) 322 U.S. 78, 86-88 [ 88 L.Ed. 1148, 1153-1155 , 64 S.Ct. 882 ].) The government may neither compel affirmation of a reli

2004The high court has not "required that legislative categories make no explicit reference to religion." ( Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock (1989) 489 U.S. 1, 10 , 109 S.Ct. 890 , 103 L.Ed.2d 1 (plur. opn. of Brennan, J.).) A rule barring religious references in statutes intended to relieve burdens on religious exercise would invalidate a large number of statutes.

2004The high court has not "required that legislative categories make no explicit reference to religion." ( Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock (1989) 489 U.S. 1, 10 , 109 S.Ct. 890 , 103 L.Ed.2d 1 (plur. opn. of Brennan, J.).) A rule barring religious references in statutes intended to relieve burdens on religious exercise would invalidate a large number of statutes.

2002(Wisconsin v. Yoder, supra, 406 U.S. at pp. 207, 234-236 [92 S.Ct. at pp. 1529, 1542-1544]; Welsh v. United States, supra, 398 U.S. at pp. 335, 343-344 [90 S.Ct. at pp. 1794, 1798-1799]; United States v. Seeger, supra, 380 U.S. at p. 174 [ 85 S.Ct. at p. 858 ].) Moreover, Malnak and its progeny are efforts to define religion in the context of the free exercise clause.

2002(Wisconsin v. Yoder, supra, 406 U.S. at pp. 207, 234-236 [92 S.Ct. at pp. 1529, 1542-1544]; Welsh v. United States, supra, 398 U.S. at pp. 335, 343-344 [90 S.Ct. at pp. 1794, 1798-1799]; United States v. Seeger, supra, 380 U.S. at p. 174 [ 85 S.Ct. at p. 858 ].) Moreover, Malnak and its progeny are efforts to define religion in the context of the free exercise clause.

2008In that case, we explained that “[t]he high court has not, since the decision in Smith, supra, 494 U.S. 872 , determined whether the hybrid rights theory is valid or invoked it to justify applying strict scrutiny to a free exercise claim.” (Catholic Charities, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 557 .) We added, however, that Justice Souter’s concurring opinion in Lukumi, supra, 508 U.S. 520, 567 , was critical of the idea that hybrid rights would give rise to a stricter level of scrutiny: “ ‘[I]f a hybrid claim is simply one in which another constitutional right is implicated, then the hybrid exception w

2005Superior Court, supra, 32 Cal.4th 527 , 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 283 , 85 P.3d 67 with a claim that the pre- Smith test applies to California's free exercise clause because its language differs from the federal free exercise clause. [9] "Catholic Charities' final argument for applying strict scrutiny invokes the free exercise clause of the California Constitution. [Citation.] That clause, Catholic Charities contends, forbids the state to burden the practice of religion, even incidentally, through a neutral, generally applicable law, unless the law in question serves a compelling governmental interest an

2004Because a legislative accommodation benefits religion, it is tested not under the free exercise clause but under the establishment clause. ( Amos, supra, *303 483 U.S. 327, 334-336 , 107 S.Ct. 2862 .) To comply with the establishment clause, a law must among other things serve a "`secular legislative purpose.'" ( Id., at p. 335, 107 S.Ct. 2862 , quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, 403 U.S. 602, 612 , 91 S.Ct. 2105 .) In this context, the requirement of a secular legislative purpose "does not mean that the law's purpose must be unrelated to religion — that would amount to a requirement `that the

2004Because a legislative accommodation benefits religion, it is tested not under the free exercise clause but under the establishment clause. ( Amos, supra, *303 483 U.S. 327, 334-336 , 107 S.Ct. 2862 .) To comply with the establishment clause, a law must among other things serve a "`secular legislative purpose.'" ( Id., at p. 335, 107 S.Ct. 2862 , quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, 403 U.S. 602, 612 , 91 S.Ct. 2105 .) In this context, the requirement of a secular legislative purpose "does not mean that the law's purpose must be unrelated to religion — that would amount to a requirement `that the

2005We rely on federal cases in this context because (1) before Smith was decided, both the federal and the California free exercise clauses were analyzed under the compelling state interest test (see Walker v. Superior Court (1988) 47 Cal.3d 112, 138-141 , 253 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 763 P.2d 852 ), and (2) we have found no California cases involving free exercise clause claims in a grand jury context.

2005We rely on federal cases in this context because (1) before Smith was decided, both the federal and the California free exercise clauses were analyzed under the compelling state interest test (see Walker v. Superior Court (1988) 47 Cal.3d 112, 138-141 , 253 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 763 P.2d 852 ), and (2) we have found no California cases involving free exercise clause claims in a grand jury context.

2004What might be the proper standard of review for challenges to neutral, generally applicable laws under the state Constitution's free exercise clause is a question we left open in Smith v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1996) 12 Cal.4th 1143, 1177-1179 , 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 700 , 913 P.2d 909 ( Smith v. FEHC ).

2004What might be the proper standard of review for challenges to neutral, generally applicable laws under the state Constitution's free exercise clause is a question we left open in Smith v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1996) 12 Cal.4th 1143, 1177-1179 , 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 700 , 913 P.2d 909 ( Smith v. FEHC ).

2000Relying in part on Rowe v. Superior Court (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1711, 1731-1732 , 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 625 , it held that the Legislature may act to alleviate a burden that rationally can be perceived as posing a significant deterrent to the free exercise of religion, and that "given uncertainty over whether local historic preservation laws adopted pursuant to sections 25373 and 37361 would impinge upon the free exercise rights of religious entities, the state could rationally conclude action was necessary to avert a free exercise claim." The court acknowledged that its conclusion differed from the

2000Relying in part on Rowe v. Superior Court (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1711, 1731-1732 , 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 625 , it held that the Legislature may act to alleviate a burden that rationally can be perceived as posing a significant deterrent to the free exercise of religion, and that "given uncertainty over whether local historic preservation laws adopted pursuant to sections 25373 and 37361 would impinge upon the free exercise rights of religious entities, the state could rationally conclude action was necessary to avert a free exercise claim." The court acknowledged that its conclusion differed from the

2005Thus, although it may incidentally burden petitioners’ religious practices, it does not offend the First Amendment’s free exercise clause so long as it is a rational means of achieving a legitimate governmental end.” (Brunson v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1251, 1255 [85 Cal. Rtpr. 2d 710] (Brunson); 5 see Bowen v. Roy, supra, 467 U.S. at pp. 700-708 [government’s administrative interest in requiring all federal food stamp beneficiaries to provide Social Security numbers prevails against free exercise challenge based on Native American’s sincerely held religious belief t

2004The subject of Justice Mosk's concurring opinion was his view that RFRA was unconstitutional; he did not address the state Constitution. ( Smith v. FEHC, at pp. 1179-1192, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 700 , 913 P.2d 909 (conc. opn. of Mosk, J.).) Justice Kennard, who also wrote separately, would have held that the challenged law violated RFRA; she, too, did not address the state Constitution. ( Id., at pp. 1192-1218, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 700 , 913 P.2d 909 (conc. & dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).) Justice Baxter, who otherwise agreed with Justice Kennard, wrote separately to emphasize the point we now make, namely, th