Smith claim in California

2026At sentencing in October 2024, the trial court heard and denied Smith’s motion under People v. Superior Court (Romero) 13 Cal.4th 497 .

2024At sentencing, the court denied Smith’s motion to reduce the offense to a misdemeanor, but granted the defense motions to strike the strike prior pursuant to People v. Romero (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 , and to strike fines and fees pursuant to People v. Duenas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 .

2014(Ibid.) The Hunter court merely applied the Smith test to demonstrate that even if Smith were applicable, the defendant's case would fail. ( Hunter, supra, at pp. 973-975 .) We do the same here. 11 Smith, supra, 615 F.2d 964 , remained good law and presented binding or persuasive authority, the Smith test would provide Mace no relief.

2014(Ibid.) The Hunter court merely applied the Smith test to demonstrate that even if Smith were applicable, the defendant's case would fail. ( Hunter, supra, at pp. 973-975 .) We do the same here. 11 Smith, supra, 615 F.2d 964 , remained good law and presented binding or persuasive authority, the Smith test would provide Mace no relief.

2008In that case, we explained that “[t]he high court has not, since the decision in Smith, supra, 494 U.S. 872 , determined whether the hybrid rights theory is valid or invoked it to justify applying strict scrutiny to a free exercise claim.” (Catholic Charities, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 557 .) We added, however, that Justice Souter’s concurring opinion in Lukumi, supra, 508 U.S. 520, 567 , was critical of the idea that hybrid rights would give rise to a stricter level of scrutiny: “ ‘[I]f a hybrid claim is simply one in which another constitutional right is implicated, then the hybrid exception w

2008In that case, we explained that “[t]he high court has not, since the decision in Smith, supra, 494 U.S. 872 , determined whether the hybrid rights theory is valid or invoked it to justify applying strict scrutiny to a free exercise claim.” (Catholic Charities, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 557 .) We added, however, that Justice Souter’s concurring opinion in Lukumi, supra, 508 U.S. 520, 567 , was critical of the idea that hybrid rights would give rise to a stricter level of scrutiny: “ ‘[I]f a hybrid claim is simply one in which another constitutional right is implicated, then the hybrid exception w

2022(E.g., People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1159-1160 ; People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 127-128 .) However, in the instant action, we need not determine the precise standard of review to apply to Smith’s claim because the claim fails under any standard, for the reasons stated below.

2013(People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 73 ; People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 436 .) Any error in admitting evidence Ms. Smith was required by agreement to testify truthfully was harmless.

2017The restitution hearing, whether for economic or noneconomic damages, is a criminal sentencing hearing, not a civil trial.” (Smith, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 434 .) Smith’s analysis is consistent with our view of the Victims’ Bill of Rights and we follow it.

2015Based on Smith’s analysis and review of noneconomic restitution orders, we cannot say the court abused its discretion when it ordered defendant to pay noneconomic restitution of $250,000 to Jane because the order does not “shock the conscience or suggest passion, prejudice or corruption on the part of the trial court.” (Smith, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 437 .) DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. _________________________ Poochigian, J.

2014It is thus unlike instances in which it may be inferred that there was a finding that the underlying claim was tenable because of a temporary result favorable to the malicious prosecution defendant, such as where that 36 defendant receives a favorable (1) judgment that is ultimately reversed (see White v. Lieberman (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 210, 218 ); (2) order denying a defense motion for summary judgment (see Hutton v. Hafif (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 527, 550 ); or (3) order granting the issuance of a preliminary injunction (see Paiva, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 1020 ).

2014It is thus unlike instances in which it may be inferred that there was a finding that the underlying claim was tenable because of a temporary result favorable to the malicious prosecution defendant, such as where that defendant receives a favorable (1) judgment that is ultimately reversed (see White v. Lieberman (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 210, 218 ); (2) order denying a defense motion for summary judgment (see Hutton v. Hafif (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 527, 550 ); or (3) order granting the issuance of a preliminary injunction (see Paiva, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 1020 ).

2014It is thus unlike instances in which it may be inferred that there was a finding that the underlying claim was tenable because of a temporary result favorable to the malicious prosecution defendant, such as where that 36 defendant receives a favorable (1) judgment that is ultimately reversed (see White v. Lieberman (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 210, 218 ); (2) order denying a defense motion for summary judgment (see Hutton v. Hafif (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 527, 550 ); or (3) order granting the issuance of a preliminary injunction (see Paiva, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 1020 ).

2014It is thus unlike instances in which it may be inferred that there was a finding that the underlying claim was tenable because of a temporary result favorable to the malicious prosecution defendant, such as where that defendant receives a favorable (1) judgment that is ultimately reversed (see White v. Lieberman (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 210, 218 ); (2) order denying a defense motion for summary judgment (see Hutton v. Hafif (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 527, 550 ); or (3) order granting the issuance of a preliminary injunction (see Paiva, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 1020 ).

2014It is thus unlike instances in which it may be inferred that there was a finding that the underlying claim was tenable because of a temporary result favorable to the malicious prosecution defendant, such as where that 36 defendant receives a favorable (1) judgment that is ultimately reversed (see White v. Lieberman (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 210, 218 ); (2) order denying a defense motion for summary judgment (see Hutton v. Hafif (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 527, 550 ); or (3) order granting the issuance of a preliminary injunction (see Paiva, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 1020 ).

2014It is thus unlike instances in which it may be inferred that there was a finding that the underlying claim was tenable because of a temporary result favorable to the malicious prosecution defendant, such as where that 36 defendant receives a favorable (1) judgment that is ultimately reversed (see White v. Lieberman (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 210, 218 ); (2) order denying a defense motion for summary judgment (see Hutton v. Hafif (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 527, 550 ); or (3) order granting the issuance of a preliminary injunction (see Paiva, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 1020 ).

2014Rather, he only agreed “to waive all costs 21 related to the Judgment entered in his favor.” Therefore, the principle enunciated by the Supreme Court in Siebel—that a malicious prosecution case may be maintained when the “postjudgment settlement by the parties does not fundamentally change the parties’ relationship established by the underlying judgment on the merits” (Siebel, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 744 )—on its face supports Smith’s claim that the negligence suit was terminated on the merits in his favor.

2014Rather, he only agreed “to waive all costs related to the Judgment entered in his favor.” Therefore, the principle enunciated by the Supreme Court in Siebel—that a malicious prosecution case may be maintained when the “postjudgment settlement by the parties does not fundamentally change the parties’ relationship established by the underlying judgment on the merits” (Siebel, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 744 )—on its face supports Smith’s claim that the negligence suit was terminated on the merits in his favor.

2008In that case, we explained that “[t]he high court has not, since the decision in Smith, supra, 494 U.S. 872 , determined whether the hybrid rights theory is valid or invoked it to justify applying strict scrutiny to a free exercise claim.” (Catholic Charities, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 557 .) We added, however, that Justice Souter’s concurring opinion in Lukumi, supra, 508 U.S. 520, 567 , was critical of the idea that hybrid rights would give rise to a stricter level of scrutiny: “ ‘[I]f a hybrid claim is simply one in which another constitutional right is implicated, then the hybrid exception w

2008In that case, we explained that “[t]he high court has not, since the decision in Smith, supra, 494 U.S. 872 , determined whether the hybrid rights theory is valid or invoked it to justify applying strict scrutiny to a free exercise claim.” (Catholic Charities, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 557 .) We added, however, that Justice Souter’s concurring opinion in Lukumi, supra, 508 U.S. 520, 567 , was critical of the idea that hybrid rights would give rise to a stricter level of scrutiny: “ ‘[I]f a hybrid claim is simply one in which another constitutional right is implicated, then the hybrid exception w

2004Moreover, it is clear beyond argument that Reed, supra, 33 Cal.3d 914 , misapplied the Mendoza-Martinez factors to conclude otherwise.” (Alva, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 280 .) The California Supreme Court further determined section 290 does not constitute “ ‘punishment’ [assuming] some ‘broader’ test . . . applies to the cruel and/or unusual punishment clauses in particular.” (Alva, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 280 .) Again focusing on the purpose of the statute, as the United States Supreme Court has indicated is appropriate, the Alva court reasoned, “the acts mandated by California’s registration l

2004Moreover, it is clear beyond argument that Reed, supra, 33 Cal.3d 914 , misapplied the Mendoza-Martinez factors to conclude otherwise.” (Alva, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 280 .) The California Supreme Court further determined section 290 does not constitute “ ‘punishment’ [assuming] some ‘broader’ test . . . applies to the cruel and/or unusual punishment clauses in particular.” (Alva, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 280 .) Again focusing on the purpose of the statute, as the United States Supreme Court has indicated is appropriate, the Alva court reasoned, “the acts mandated by California’s registration l

2004Moreover, it is clear beyond argument that Reed, supra, 33 Cal.3d 914 , misapplied the Mendoza-Martinez factors to conclude otherwise.” (Alva, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 280 .) The California Supreme Court further determined section 290 does not constitute “ ‘punishment’ [assuming] some ‘broader’ test . . . applies to the cruel and/or unusual punishment clauses in particular.” (Alva, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 280 .) Again focusing on the purpose of the statute, as the United States Supreme Court has indicated is appropriate, the Alva court reasoned, “the acts mandated by California’s registration l

2004Moreover, it is clear beyond argument that Reed, supra, 33 Cal.3d 914 , misapplied the Mendoza-Martinez factors to conclude otherwise.” (Alva, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 280 .) The California Supreme Court further determined section 290 does not constitute “ ‘punishment’ [assuming] some ‘broader’ test . . . applies to the cruel and/or unusual punishment clauses in particular.” (Alva, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 280 .) Again focusing on the purpose of the statute, as the United States Supreme Court has indicated is appropriate, the Alva court reasoned, “the acts mandated by California’s registration l

1996On the contrary, according to our Supreme Court, ‘“[t]o be an abettor the accused must have instigated or advised the commission of the crime or been present for the purpose of assisting in its commission.” ’ (People v. Durham [1969] 70 Cal.2d [171,] 181 [ 74 Cal.Rptr. 262 , 449 P.2d 198 ], quoting People v. Villa (1957) 156 Cal.App.2d 128, 133 [ 318 P.2d 828 ], italics in Durham; accord, People v. Francis (1969) 71 Cal.2d 66, 72 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 199 , 450 P.2d 591 ].) ‘ “[T]he test is whether the accused in any way, directly or indirectly, aided the perpetrator by acts or encouraged him by word

1996On the contrary, according to our Supreme Court, ‘“[t]o be an abettor the accused must have instigated or advised the commission of the crime or been present for the purpose of assisting in its commission.” ’ (People v. Durham [1969] 70 Cal.2d [171,] 181 [ 74 Cal.Rptr. 262 , 449 P.2d 198 ], quoting People v. Villa (1957) 156 Cal.App.2d 128, 133 [ 318 P.2d 828 ], italics in Durham; accord, People v. Francis (1969) 71 Cal.2d 66, 72 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 199 , 450 P.2d 591 ].) ‘ “[T]he test is whether the accused in any way, directly or indirectly, aided the perpetrator by acts or encouraged him by word

2025(Branner, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 1048 .) Here, while there is not a separate affidavit or declaration of counsel supporting Smith’s motion, Smith submitted a request for order, which she signed under penalty of perjury.

2025(Branner, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 1048 .) Here, while there is not a separate affidavit or declaration of counsel supporting Smith’s motion, Smith submitted a request for order, which she signed under penalty of perjury.

2025Nor did the probation report specify residential treatment.” (Ibid.) And of particular importance to Smith’s analysis was the fact that “the parties negotiated a disposition that would allow Smith to remain out of custody in part because she had a young daughter for whom she cared at home.” (Ibid.) The People, meanwhile, rely on People v. Penoli (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 298 , which discerned no improper delegation of judicial authority in a probation condition requiring the defendant “to enter a residential drug treatment program ‘as approved by the Probation Officer’” and “‘remain there until sh

2025(People v. Viramontes (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1256, 1262 .) It is “for the jury sitting as the trier of fact to decide whether appellant actually feared serious injury or death . . . .” (People v. Vasquez (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1176, 1179 .) “When imperfect self-defense is at issue, the malice element of murder requires the People to show the absence of that circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237 , 243, citing People v. Rios (2000) 23 Cal.4th 450, 463 .) Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, the evidence at trial was suffici

2025(People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 837 .) The lack of any prejudice is also fatal to Smith’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

2025The record lacks any evidence of Smith’s actual fear of imminent death or bodily harm. ( Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 133–134.) 7 He “did not testify, and there is no evidence he ever told anyone that he had acted out of fear.” (Id. at p. 134.) Smith argues that the evidence showed he felt the need to defend himself.