United States v. Frank Grasso, 6 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 1993). · Go Syfert
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United States v. Frank Grasso, 6 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 1993). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
5 citation events (3 in the last 25 years) across 4 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Quintez Talley v. Gilmore (ca3, 2023-04-10)
Top citers, strongest first. 5 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Quintez Talley v. Gilmore
3rd Cir. · 2023 · confidence medium
(ECF 28, at 4.) Later, in granting CRPN Ankrom’s motion for summary judgment in part, the District Court held that Talley failed to exhaust because he did not raise his non-retaliation claims in his 6 F.3d 87, 97 (2d Cir. 2013) (stating that the law of the case “doctrine would not preclude a district court from granting summary judgment based on evidence after denying a motion to dismiss based only on the plaintiff’s allegations”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Genevieve Lawal, Francis Wiredu, Augustina Erskine, Hannah Nemo, Agnes Anane, Constance Hagan, and Osman El-Alana, Adu Gyanfi Wiredu
2d Cir. · 1994 · confidence medium
Thus no statement of reasons is required if the district court refuses to downwardly depart at all, because that exercise of discretion is unappealable unless it results from the district court’s misunderstanding of its own authority, see United States v. Grasso, 6 F.3d 87, 88 (2d Cir.1993); United States v. Ritchey, 949 F.2d 61, 63 (2d Cir.1991).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Osaren Ekhator
2d Cir. · 1994 · confidence medium
See, e.g., United States v. Whittaker, 999 F.2d 38, 43 (2d Cir.1993); United States v. Miller, 993 F.2d 16, 21 (2d Cir.1993); United States v. Grasso, 6 F.3d 87, 88 (2d Cir.1993) (per curiam); United States v. Ritchey, 949 F.2d 61, 63 (2d Cir.1991) (per curiam).
cited Cited "see" Sun v. Cuomo
N.D.N.Y. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
See ATSI Commc'ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 6 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).
cited Cited "see" United States v. Darby
1st Cir. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See U.S.S.G. § 7 B1.4, p.s.” United States v. Grasso, 6 F.3d 87, 88 (2d Cir.1993).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,
v.
Frank GRASSO, Defendant-Appellant
191 Docket 93-1227.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Sep 29, 1993.
6 F.3d 87
1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 25114
1993 WL 389344
Deirdre A. Keating, Albany, NY, for defendant-appellant., George A. Yanthis, Asst. U.S. Atty., N.D. New York, Albany, NY (Gary L. Sharpe, U.S. Atty., N.D. New York, of counsel), for appellee.
Oakes, Pratt, Mahoney.
Cited by 5 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM:

Defendant-appellant Frank Grasso appeals from a judgment of conviction and resulting sentence imposed March 19, 1993 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York, Thomas J. MeA-voy, Judge, following Grasso’s plea of guilty to three specifications of a petition alleging that he violated the conditions of his supervised release. The court sentenced Grasso to an eight-month term of imprisonment.

Violations of probation and supervised release are not subject to the adjustments of offense level for which provision is made in chapter three of the Sentencing Guidelines. See U.S.S.G. ch. 7, pt. A. Indeed, an entirely separate “Revocation Table,” rather than the generally applicable “Sentencing Table,” is provided for violations of probation and supervised release, and the Revocation Table does not employ offense levels. See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4, p.s. Accordingly, we shall construe Grasso’s appeal as challenging the district court’s refusal to depart downwardly from the range of imprisonment specified in § 7B1.4, rather than as seeking a reduction in offense level, for Grasso’s acceptance of responsibility.

The district court’s refusal to depart downwardly, however, is not cognizable on appeal as long as the court recognized that it had the authority to depart. We have so decided with respect to downward departures from sentencing ranges set forth in the Sentencing Table. See United States v. Ritchey, 949 F.2d 61, 63 (2d Cir.1991) (collecting cases). Perceiving no basis for a distinction, we now extend this rule to sentencing ranges set forth in the Revocation Table. In the instant case, the district court clearly acknowledged that it had the authority to depart from the guideline range; it simply declined to do so.

Grasso argues in effect that it is a violation of equal protection to allow an adjustment of the offense level for acceptance of responsibility with respect to the Sentencing Table, but not to employ offense levels with respect to the Revocation Table. He contends that as a result, a defendant sentenced under the Revocation Table for a violation of probation or supervised release is consigned to a plea for a downward departure, rather than an adjustment of his offense level, for acceptance of responsibility. We discern no irrationality in the Sentencing Commission’s choice of different structures and approaches for the Sentencing Table and Revocation Table. Indeed, there is a world of difference between sentencing in the first instance and revoking probation or supervised release.

We accordingly affirm the judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the district court.