Lyons v. Lyons, 526 N.E.2d 1063 (Mass. 1988). · Go Syfert
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Lyons v. Lyons, 526 N.E.2d 1063 (Mass. 1988). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 2× by 1 distinct case, last quoted 1994 · …like the interest of a litigant in a pending lawsuit, the interest of an attorney in a contingent fee arrangement constitutes property under 34. ✓
21 citation events (3 in the last 25 years) across 7 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Baccanti v. Morton (mass, 2001-08-13)
Treatment trajectory · 1991 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1991 2008 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 4 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Baccanti v. Morton
Mass. · 2001 · confidence medium
Instead, we have held a number of intangible interests (even those not within the complete possession or control of their holders) to be part of a spouse’s estate for purposes of § 34.” Lauricella v. Lauricella, 409 Mass. 211, 214 (1991), citing Dewan v. Dewan, 399 Mass. 754, 755 (1987) (unvested pension rights); Hanify v. Hanify, 403 Mass. 184, 186-190 (1988) (rights in pending lawsuits); Lyons v. Lyons, 403 Mass. 1003, 1003 (1988) (rights under contingent fee agreement).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Roberts v. Roberts (3×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1997 · confidence medium
Although it appears that at least one court allowed the trial court to value pending contingency cases at the time of dissolution, see Lyons, 526 N.E.2d at 1063 (remanding case for judge to consider equitable distribution of pending contingent fee case), most are reluctant to do so until and unless the cases have progressed to a point that a recovery is probable.
cited Cited "see" Dalessio v. Dalessio
Mass. · 1991 · signal: see · confidence high
See Lyons v. Lyons, *826 403 Mass. 1003, 1003 (1988); Hanify v. Hanify, 403 Mass. 184, 186-190 (1988).
discussed Cited "see" Lauricella v. Lauricella
Mass. · 1991 · signal: see · confidence high
See Lyons v. Lyons, 403 Mass. 1003 (1988) (assuming that question whether attorney’s interest under a contingent fee agreement is divisible property under § 34 is a question of law); Hanify v. Hanify, 403 Mass. 184, 186-190 (1988) (assuming that question whether party’s interest in a pending lawsuit is divisible property under § 34 is a question of law). 2 Our starting point in analyzing the question is the statute itself.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Marie E. Lyons
v.
Joseph N. Lyons, Jr.
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.
Aug 9, 1988.
526 N.E.2d 1063
1988 Mass. LEXIS 235
The case was submitted on briefs., Wendy Sibbison for Marie E. Lyons., Peter Roth for Joseph N. Lyons, Jr.
Cited by 13 opinions  |  Published

The husband, Joseph N. Lyons, Jr., appealed from certain aspects of the marital property settlement under G. L. c. 208, § 34 (1986 ed.). We transferred the case to this court on our own motion.

The husband alleged that the judge erred in not considering, as part of the marital estate, the wife’s interest in a contingent fee agreement of a pending lawsuit. The wife is an attorney. We believe that this case is governed by our decision today in Hanify v. Hanify, ante 184 (1988). A majority of the court concludes that, like the interest of a litigant in a pending lawsuit, the interest of an attorney in a contingent fee arrangement constitutes property under § 34. We therefore reverse the judge’s exclusion of this interest from the property settlement, and remand the case for the judge to consider an equitable division of the contingent fee in light of Hanify v. Hanify, supra.

The husband also claimed an abuse of discretion for failure to make findings concerning the husband’s financial and other contributions to the wife’s legal education and for failure to determine the amount of compensation due to the husband for such contributions. At the time of trial, the judge did not have the benefit of our decision in Drapek v. Drapek, 399 Mass. 240, 246-247 (1987). There, we held that a judge may consider the financial contributions of one spouse toward the attainment of a professional degree by the other, both in the assignment of the parties’ estates and in the awarding of alimony. The court also may consider, for these purposes, “the increased earning potential engendered by a professional degree.” Id. at 246. Neither the degree nor the increased earning capacity itself is an asset subject to assignment. Id.

The case was submitted on briefs. Wendy Sibbison for Marie E. Lyons. Peter Roth for Joseph N. Lyons, Jr.

We believe, however, that the judge implicitly considered these factors in his meticulous findings and conclusions. The settlement was a nearly even distribution of the marital estate. The judge explicitly considered the future potential earnings of both parties. He also noted the depletion of family resources due to the wife’s law school education, as well as the family’s increased standard of living due to her new practice. Except for the exclusion of the unliquidated contingent fee, the settlement was eminently fair. We therefore remand the case on the sole issue of equitable division of that asset. The remainder of the judgment is affirmed.

So ordered.