At page 51 “having obtained an enforceable judgment, consent decree, or settlement giving some of the legal relief sought”46 citing cases
- E.S. Ex Rel. Mr. & Mrs. S. v. Ashford Bd. of Educ., 134 F. Supp. 2d 462 (D. Conn. 2001). (rejecting catalytic theory)
- Marbley v. Bane, 57 F.3d 224 (2d Cir. 1995). Bd. of Educ., 985 F.2d 255, 257-58 (6th Cir.1993); but see S-1 and S-2 v. State Bd. of Educ. of N.C., 21 F.3d 49, 51 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 205 , 130 L.Ed.2d 135 (1994).
- Marbley v. Bane, 57 F.3d 224 (2d Cir. 1995). Bd. of Educ., 985 F.2d 255, 257-58 (6th Cir.1993); but see S-1 and S-2 v. State Bd. of Educ. of N.C., 21 F.3d 49, 51 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 205 , 130 L.Ed.2d 135 (1994). 53 We now expressly state what…
- Clark v. Sims, 894 F. Supp. 868 (D. Md. 1995).(The fact that a lawsuit may operate as a catalyst for postlitigation changes in a defendant’s conduct cannot suffice to establish plaintiff as a prevailing party.)
- v. v. Cherry Hill Bd. of Educ., No. 1:24-cv-07333 (D.N.J. Apr. 21, 2025).This additional judicial element, often described as “judicial imprimatur,” entails “obtain[ing] an enforceable judgment, consent decree, or settlement giving some of the legal relief sought.” Id. at 602 (quoting S–1 and S–2 v. State Bd. o…
- Bone v. Univ. of North Carolina Health Care Sys., No. 1:18-cv-00994 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 8, 2024). “except by virtue of having obtained an enforceable judgment, consent decree, or settlement giving some of the legal relief sought”
- Reyazuddin v. Montgomery Cnty., Maryland, No. 8:11-cv-00951 (D. Md. Sept. 30, 2022).Before that holding, a plaintiff could only be a prevailing party if she had “obtained an enforceable judgment, consent decree, or settlement.” S–1 and S–2 v. State Bd. of Ed. of N.C., 21 F.3d 49, 51 (4th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
- Overbey v. Mayor & City Council Baltimore, No. 1:17-cv-01793 (D. Md. July 19, 2021).The City correctly argues that because the “Brew was dismissed from the action without any judicial rulings in their favor . . . [it] is not a prevailing party” and “[a]ny request for fees on behalf of this Plaintiff must be dismissed out…
- Feldman's Med. Ctr. Pharmacy, Inc. v. CareFirst, Inc., 898 F. Supp. 2d 883 (D. Md. 2012).Bonnes was overruled by the Fourth Circuit in S-1 by & Through P-1 v. State Bd. of Educ., 21 F.3d 49, 51 (4th Cir.1994), which held, as Buckhannon did seven years later, that the catalyst theory was not available under prevailing party sta…
- Proj. Vote/Voting for Am., Inc. v. Dickerson, 444 F. App'x 660 (4th Cir. 2011).“by virtue of having obtained an enforceable ... settlement giving some of the legal relief sought in a § 1983 action”
Show 36 more citing cases
- Doe v. Kidd, 419 F. App'x 411 (4th Cir. 2011).“A person may not be a ‘prevailing party’ plaintiff under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 except by virtue of having obtained an enforceable judgment, consent decree, or settlement giving some of the legal relief sought in a § 1983 action.” S-l and S-2 B…
- In Re Volkswagen & Audi Warranty Extension Litig., 784 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D. Mass. 2011). In Buckhannon, the Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit’s holding that "[a] person may not be a ‘prevailing party' ... except by virtue of having obtained an enforceable judgment, consent decree, or settlement giving some of the legal…
- Armstrong v. Mayor of Baltimore, 976 A.2d 349 (Md. 2009).See Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 694 , 103 S.Ct. 3274 , 77 L.Ed.2d 938 (1983) (holding that, with respect to the plaintiff's claim for attorney’s fees in the plaintiff's action under the Clean Air Act, "absent some degree of s…
- Dillard v. Colbert Cnty. Comm'n, 494 F. Supp. 2d 1297 (M.D. Ala. 2007).See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605-06 , 121 S.Ct. 1835 (“We have only awarded attorney’s fees where the plaintiff has received a judgment on the' merits or obtained a court-ordered consent decree — we have not awarded attorney’s fees where th…
- Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 101 P.3d 140 (Cal. 2005). "Attorneys' fees awarded to a public entity pursuant to this section shall not be increased or decreased by a multiplier based upon extrinsic circumstances, as discussed in Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal.3d 25, 49 [ 141 Cal.Rptr. 315 , 569 P.2d…
- Lazarus v. Cnty. of Sullivan, 269 F. Supp. 2d 419 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).Although the majority of the Circuits accepted the catalyst theory, as noted above, the Fourth Circuit rejected the theory in S-l and S-2 v. State Bd. of Ed. of N. C„ 21 F.3d 49, 51 (4th Cir.1994) (en banc).
- Pitchford v. Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc., 212 F. Supp. 2d 613 (W.D. Va. 2002).(A person may not be a 'prevailing party' ... except by virtue of having obtained an enforceable judgment, consent decree, or settlement giving some of the legal relief sought.)
- Smyth ex rel. Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d 268 (4th Cir. 2002).(stating that “an enforceable judgment, consent decree, or settlement giving some of the relief sought” is necessary for prevailing party status)
- Smyth, Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d 268 (4th Cir. 2002).(stating that "an enforceable judgment, consent decree, or settlement giving some of the relief sought" is necessary for prevailing party status)
- Thayer v. Principi, 15 Vet. App. 204 (Vet. App. 2001). Id. at 1839 (emphasis added) (quoting S-l and S-2 v. State Bd. of Ed. of N. C., 21 F.3d 49, 51 (1994) (en banc)).
- Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health & Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (2001). Although *602 most Courts of Appeals recognize the "catalyst theory," [3] the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected it in S-1 and S-2 v. State Bd. of Ed. of N. C., 21 F. 3d 49, 51 (1994) (en banc) ("A person may not be a `prevai…
- Richardson v. City of Boston, 135 F. Supp. 2d 60 (D. Mass. 2001).S-1 & S-2 v. State Bd. of Educ., 21 F.3d 49, 51 (4th Cir.1994) (en banc).
- Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 233 F.3d 232 (4th Cir. 2001).“an enforceable judgment, consent decree, or settlement”
- Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env't Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000). In the decision under review, the Court of Appeals noted that its Circuit precedent construed our decision in Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U. S. 103 (1992), to require rejection of that theory. 149 F. 3d, at 307, n. 5 (citing S-1 & S-2 v. State Bd…
- Cavanagh v. Grasmick, 75 F. Supp. 2d 446 (D. Md. 1999). See id.; S — 1, 21 F.3d at 51.
- Virginia Soc'y v. Caldwell, No. 98-2565 (4th Cir. Aug. 10, 1999). Sitting en banc, a majority of this court in S-1 and S-2 examined Farrar and concluded that in order for a plaintiff to obtain prevailing party status under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 , there would have to be a "mate- rial alteration of the legal re…
- Doe v. Bd. of Educ. of Baltimore Cnty., 165 F.3d 260 (4th Cir. 1998).Courts have universally recognized that this “special circumstances” exception is very “narrowly limited.” See, e.g., Bonnes v. Long, 599 F.2d 1316 , 1318 (4th Cir.1979), overruled on other grounds by S-1 & S-2 v. State Bd. of Educ., 21 F.…
- Erickson v. Bd. of Educ., 162 F.3d 289 (4th Cir. 1998).Courts have universally recognized that this “special circumstances” exception is very “narrowly limited.” See, e.g., Bonnes v. Long, 599 F.2d 1316 , 1318 (4th Cir.1979), overruled on other grounds by S-1 & S-2 v. State Bd. of Educ., 21 F.…
- Pope v. Hunt, 154 F.3d 161 (4th Cir. 1998).The Supreme Court has held that, in order to qualify as a “prevailing party” within § 1988, a plaintiff must have “obtained] an enforceable judgment against the defendant from whom fees are sought, or comparable relief through a consent de…
- Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env't Servs. (TOC), Inc., 149 F.3d 303 (4th Cir. 1998).Plaintiffs’ failure to obtain relief on the merits of their claims precludes any recovery of attorneys’ fees or other litigation costs because such an award is available only to a "prevailing or substantially prevailing party.” 33 U.S.C.A.…
- Moncrieffe-Taylor v. Vance, 945 F. Supp. 106 (D. Md. 1996).In S-1 and S-2 By and Through P-1 and P-2 v. State Board of Educ. of North Carolina, 21 F.3d 49, 51 (4th Cir.), the Fourth Circuit sitting en bane rejected the “catalyst” theory of causation in determining prevailing party status.
- Statewide Reapportionment Advisory Comm. William Gibson, Doctor Frederick Calhoun James, Bishop Herbert Williams, Reverend Willie B. Owens South Carolina Conf. of the Naacp Branches v. David M. Beasley, in His Off. Capacity as Governor of South Carolina David H. Wilkins, in His Off. Capacity as Speaker of the South Carolina House of Representatives, the South Carolina Senate, Intervenor. Michael G. Burton, as Exec. Dir. on Behalf of the Repub. Party William P. Collins, III Earl Copeland William Patrick Flack Frank E. Gibson, III Nancy D. Hawk Gus Roberts v. David M. Beasley, in His Off. Capacity as Governor of South Carolina David H. Wilkins, in His Off. Capacity as Speaker of the South Carolina House of Representatives, the South Carolina Senate, Intervenor, 99 F.3d 134 (4th Cir. 1996).The court held that "[t]here is no way ... that Farrar and a broad 'catalyst theory' of attorneys' fees recovery can be reconciled." 6 F.3d at 168-69 (Wilkinson, J., dissent) (adopted by majority opinion in S-1 and S-2, 21 F.3d at 51).
- Statewide Reapportionment Advisory Comm. v. Beasley, 99 F.3d 134 (4th Cir. 1996). The court held that "[t]here is no way . . . that Farrar and a broad `catalyst theory' of attorneys' fees recovery can be reconciled." 6 F.3d at 168-69 (Wilkin- son, J., dissent) (adopted by majority opinion in S-1 and S-2, 21 F.3d at 51).
- Kirk Kilgour v. City Of Pasadena, 53 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 1995).Accordingly, the court sanctioned the City under Fed.R.Civ.P. 11, and awarded Kilgour $12,970 for having to oppose the City's motion 2 S-1 and S-2 v. State Bd. of Educ. of N.C., 21 F.3d 49, 51 (4th Cir.1994) (en banc) (adopting dissenting…
- Kilgour v. City of Pasadena, 53 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 1995).S-1 and S-2 v. State Bd. of Educ. of N.C., 21 F.3d 49, 51 (4th Cir.1994) (en banc) (adopting dissenting opinion of Judge Wilkinson in S-1 and S-2 v. State Bd. of Educ. of N.C., 6 F.3d 160, 168-72 (4th Cir.1993), cert. denied, -U.S. -, 115…
- Billy Hooper v. Demco, Inc., 37 F.3d 287 (7th Cir. 1994). I agree with the court that Hooper is not a prevailing party, but write separately to emphasize that Farrar v. Hobby, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 566, 573 , 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992) appears to have limited "prevailing party" status to par…
- Zinn ex rel. Blankenship v. Shalala, 35 F.3d 273 (7th Cir. 1994). Dist., No. 1, 17 F.3d 260 , 263 n. 2 (8th Cir.1994); American Council of the Blind of Colo., Inc. v. Romer, 992 F.2d 249 , 250-51 (10th Cir.1993). 1 The Fourth Circuit, in a divided en banc decision, S-1 and S-2 v. State Bd. of Educ. of N.…
- Zinn v. Shalala, 35 F.3d 273 (7th Cir. 1994). Dist., No. 1, 17 F.3d 260 , 263 n. 2 (8th Cir.1994); American Council of the Blind of Colo., Inc. v. Romer, 992 F.2d 249 , 250-51 (10th Cir.1993). 1 The Fourth Circuit, in a divided en banc decision, S-1 and S-2 v. State Bd. of Educ. of N.…
- Arvinger v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 31 F.3d 196 (4th Cir. 1994).If this were an open question, I would take the position of the dissent in the en banc decision in S-1, for the reasons stated therein. 21 F.3d at 51; see also Baumgartner v. Harrisburg Hous.
- Kenneth Grabarczyk v. Joshua Stein, 32 F.4th 301 (4th Cir. 2022).See S-1 and S-2, 21 F.3d at 51.
- Prison Legal News v. Stolle, 129 F. Supp. 3d 390 (E.D. Va. 2015).Standard for Attorney’s Fee Award A. Right to Fees The instant civil case was filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking to remedy the-alleged depravation of constitutional rights, and it is undisputed that: (1) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 198…
- Union of Needletrades, Indus. & Textile Employees, Afl-Cio, Clc v. United States Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 336 F.3d 200 (2d Cir. 2003). See id. at 602 , 121 S.Ct. 1835 (citing S-l & S-2 v. State Bd. of Educ. of N.C., 21 F.3d 49, 51 (4th Cir.1994)).
- Yates v. Charles Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 212 F. Supp. 2d 470 (D. Md. 2002).See S-l & S-2 v. State Bd. of Educ., 21 F.3d 49, 51 (4th Cir. 1994). 2 .
- Former Employees of Motorola Ceramic Prods. v. United States, 176 F. Supp. 2d 1370 (Ct. Intl. Trade 2001).See S —1 and S-2 v. State Bd. of Ed. of N.C., 21 F.3d 49, 51 (4th Cir.1994) (en banc) (per curiam). 2 .
- Brickwood Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 148 (Fed. Cl. 2001).See S-l & S-2 v. State Bd. of Educ. of N.C., 21 F.3d 49, 51 (4th Cir.1994) (en banc).
- Am. Council of the Blind v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 133 F. Supp. 2d 66 (D.D.C. 2001).See S-1 & S-2 v. State Bd. of Ed., 21 F.3d 49, 51 (4th Cir.1994) (en banc).
At page 50 cited at this page1 citing case
- Virginia Soc'y for Human Life, Inc. v. Caldwell, 26 F. Supp. 2d 868 (D. W.Va. 1998).See Smith, 632 F.2d at 346-52 (finding that plaintiff was not a prevailing party where she obtained a preliminary injunction but did not ultimately prevail on the merits); cf. S-1 and S-2, 21 F.3d at 50-52 (finding that summary judgment wa…
Other citing cases
- Sumbry v. Russell Cnty., Ala., 993 F. Supp. 1439 (M.D. Ala. 1998).
- Union of Needletrades, Indus. & Textile Employees v. United States Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 202 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
- Luke C. Miley, Claimant-Appellant v. Anthony J. Principi, Sec'y of Vets. Affairs, 242 F.3d 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
v.
The State Board of Education of North Carolina Barbara Tapscott, Chairman, State Board of Education of North Carolina, and C.D. Heidgerd, Hearing Officer, Asheboro City Board of Education the Asheboro City Board of Education Mary Smitherman
90 Ed. Law Rep. 1006
S-1 AND S-2, By and Through their parents and Guardians Ad
Litem, P-1 AND P-2; P-1 and P-2, Individually,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
The STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF NORTH CAROLINA; Barbara
Tapscott, Chairman, State Board of Education of
North Carolina, Defendants-Appellants,
and
C.D. Heidgerd, Hearing Officer, Asheboro City Board of
Education; The Asheboro City Board of Education;
Mary Smitherman, Defendants.
No. 92-1525.
United States Court of Appeals,
Fourth Circuit.
Argued March 8, 1994.
Decided April 4, 1994.
ARGUED: Edwin Marion Speas, Jr., Sr. Deputy Atty. Gen., North Carolina Dept. of Justice, Raleigh, NC, for appellants. A. Frank Johns, Jr., Booth, Harrington, Johns & Campbell, Greensboro, NC, for appellees. ON BRIEF: Lacy H. Thornburg, Atty. Gen. of NC, North Carolina Dept. of Justice, Raleigh, NC, for appellants.
Before ERVIN, Chief Judge, and RUSSELL, WIDENER, HALL, PHILLIPS, MURNAGHAN, WILKINSON, WILKINS, NIEMEYER, HAMILTON, LUTTIG, WILLIAMS, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, sitting en banc.
Reversed by published per curiam opinion. Judges RUSSELL, WIDENER, WILKINSON, WILKINS, NIEMEYER, LUTTIG, and WILLIAMS voted to reverse the district court. Chief Judge ERVIN and Judges K.K. HALL, PHILLIPS, MURNAGHAN, HAMILTON, and MICHAEL voted to affirm the district court.
OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiffs, parents of handicapped students enrolled in the Asheboro, North Carolina schools, filed this 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 action in 1986 against the Asheboro City Board of Education, the State Board of Education of North Carolina, and the chairman of the State Board, C.D. Spangler, Jr. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants had violated the Education of the Handicapped Act ("EHA"), 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1400 et seq., by refusing to authorize hearing officers to decide tuition reimbursement claims and to order reimbursement in appropriate cases. Plaintiffs therefore sought tuition reimbursement and injunctive and declaratory relief. In December 1986, the district court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on their claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against all the defendants, reasoning that the EHA required that state hearing officers possess the authority to decide tuition reimbursement claims. See S-1 v. Spangler, 650 F.Supp. 1427 (M.D.N.C.1986).
While the appeal of the district court's ruling was pending, plaintiffs and the City Board reached a settlement agreement under which the City Board would pay the parents' tuition expenses for their children and also pay plaintiffs' attorneys' fees. The State Board and Spangler were not parties to this settlement agreement; accordingly, the parents did not dismiss any of their claims against the state defendants. Nonetheless, on appeal, a panel of this court held for prudential reasons that the settlement mooted the appeal because it gave plaintiffs the reimbursement they sought. See S-1 v. Spangler, 832 F.2d 294, 296 (4th Cir.1987). This court therefore vacated the district court's summary judgment order and remanded for a determination of plaintiffs' entitlement, if any, to attorneys' fees from the state defendants. Id. at 298 and note 3.
After this court directed the district court to "dismiss the remainder of the action as moot," id. at 298, the Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services of the United States Department of Education ("OSERS") informed the State that federal education funds would be withdrawn if the State did not amend its law to authorize hearing officers to decide parents' reimbursement claims. Although the State had amended its special education law in 1988 to permit hearing officers to recommend tuition reimbursement decisions to the State Board, OSERS objected to the 1988 amendments on the ground that hearing officers still lacked the authority to make binding decisions regarding reimbursements. In July 1990, almost three years after plaintiffs' claims had been declared moot, the State responded to OSERS' threat by enacting legislation giving administrative law judges the authority to make binding decisions, subject to appeal, regarding a child's special education needs. See 1990 N.C.Sess.Laws ch. 1058 (July 28, 1990).
Shortly after North Carolina's amendment of its hearing procedure, the district court considered the propriety of awarding attorneys' fees to plaintiffs. On March 30, 1992, the district court assessed $30,143.18 in attorneys' fees against the state defendants under 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1415(e) and 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988. On appeal, a panel of this court affirmed the district court's award of attorneys' fees. See S-1 & S-2 v. State Bd. of Educ., 6 F.3d 160 (4th Cir.1993). Judge Wilkinson dissented. See S-1, 6 F.3d at 168-72.
On October 21, 1993, the court granted the state defendants' petition for rehearing en banc. Upon a review of the record and the briefs, and following oral argument, a majority of the court voted to reverse the district court's award of attorneys' fees. The court holds the following:
1. A person may not be a "prevailing party" plaintiff under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988 except by virtue of having obtained an enforceable judgment, consent decree, or settlement giving some of the legal relief sought in a Sec. 1983 action. Farrar v. Hobby, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 566, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992).
2. The fact that a lawsuit may operate as a catalyst for post-litigation changes in a defendant's conduct cannot suffice to establish plaintiff as a prevailing party. "Catalyst theory," allowing that result, is no longer available for that purpose, see Farrar, --- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 573-74, and cases such as Bonnes v. Long, 599 F.2d 1316 (4th Cir.1979), which applied that theory, are overruled.
3. Here, the dismissal on appeal of an action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 for prudential reasons as moot operates to vacate the judgment below, see United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 71 S.Ct. 104, 95 L.Ed. 36 (1950), and prevents the plaintiffs from being found prevailing parties by virtue of post-dismissal events. The plaintiffs therefore are not entitled to an award of attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988.
The court adopts as its own the dissenting panel opinion of Judge WILKINSON. S-1, 6 F.3d at 168-72. Judges RUSSELL, WIDENER, WILKINSON, WILKINS, NIEMEYER, LUTTIG, and WILLIAMS agree to the foregoing parts of this opinion and its holding to reverse the district court.
Chief Judge ERVIN and Judges HALL, PHILLIPS, MURNAGHAN, HAMILTON, and MICHAEL respectfully dissent. They would hold that the district court properly awarded attorneys' fees in this case for the reasons expressed in the majority opinion of the panel. They therefore adopt Judge PHILLIPS' majority opinion of the panel as their own and would adopt it as the opinion of the en banc court. S-1, 6 F.3d at 160-68.
The judgment of the district court is accordingly
REVERSED.