Mousseaux v. United States, 28 F.3d 786 (8th Cir. 1994). · Go Syfert
Mousseaux v. United States, 28 F.3d 786 (8th Cir. 1994). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, 2007–2022 · 2 courts · …the united states is not subject to suit under section 1985(3). at p. 787
cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, last quoted 1999 · …united states is not subject to suit under section 1985(3). at p. 787
19 citation events (11 in the last 25 years) across 11 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Little v. United States Department of Defense (moed, 2022-05-02)
Top citers, strongest first. 12 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Little v. United States Department of Defense
E.D. Mo. · 2022 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
the united states is not subject to suit under section 1985(3).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Cobb v. United States Department of Education Office for Civil Rights
D. Minnesota · 2007 · confidence medium
Mousseaux v. United States, 28 F.3d 786, 787 (8th Cir.1994) (“The United States is not subject to suit under section 1985(3).”) (citation omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Winder v. Glendenning
4th Cir. · 1999 · confidence medium
We affirm the court's judgment, but on different grounds: Because these statutes do not provide a cause of action against the United States, these claims are barred by sovereign immunity. 38 The response to the section 1985 action is straightforward: Since the statute by its terms applies only to "persons," the "United States is not subject to suit under section 1985(3)." Mousseaux v. United States, 28 F.3d 786, 787 (8th Cir.1994).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jersey Heights Neighborhood Ass'n v. Glendening
4th Cir. · 1999 · confidence medium
The response to the section 1985 action is straightforward: Since the statute by its terms applies only to “persons,” the “United States is not subject to suit under section 1985(3).” Mousseaux v. United States, 28 F.3d 786, 787 (8th Cir.1994).
cited Cited "see" CUTLER v. PELOSI
E.D. Pa. · 2020 · signal: see · confidence high
See Mousseaux v. United States, 28 F.3d 786, 787 (8th Cir. 1994).
discussed Cited "see" Dye v. United States
D.D.C. · 2007 · signal: see · confidence high
See Mousseaux v. United States, 28 F.3d 786, 787 (8th Cir.1994); Morpurgo v. Bd. of Higher Ed. in City of New York, 423 F.Supp. 704, 714 (S.D.N.Y.1976) (observing that the federal government may not be sued under Sections 1983 and 1985(3) “both because it is not a ‘person’ and because these provisions do not waive sovereign immunity”).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Archambault
D.S.D. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See Mousseaux v. United States, 806 F.Supp. 1433, 1440-43 (D.S.D.1992) (holding that the 1990 ICRA amendment should be given retroactive effect and that the same defeats the defendant’s claims under Duro), aff’d on other grounds, 28 F.3d 786 (8th Cir.1994).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Robert Lee Weaselhead, Jr. (2×)
8th Cir. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
See Mousseaux v. United States Comm'r of Indian Affairs, 806 F.Supp. 1433, 1441-43 (D.S.D.1992), aff'd in part and remanded in part on other grounds, 28 F.3d 786 (8th Cir.1994) (detailing legislative history of post Duro amendments and intent of Congress to thereby create "legal fiction" that Duro was never decided) 5 See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72-73 , 116 S.Ct. 1114 , 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996) (holding that Eleventh Amendment prevented Congress from authorizing suits by Indian tribes against States to enforce legislation enacted pursuant to Indian Commerce Clau…
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Robert L. Weaselhead
8th Cir. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
See Mousseaux v. United States Comm’r of Indian Affairs, 806 F. Supp. 1433, 1441-43 (D.S.D. 1992), aff’d in part and remanded in part on other grounds, 28 F.3d 786 (8th Cir. 1994) (detailing legislative history of post-Duro amendments and intent of Congress to thereby create “legal fiction” that Duro was -9- legislative enactment purporting to recast history in a manner that alters the Supreme Court’s stated understanding of the organizing principles by which the Indian tribes were incorporated into our constitutional system of government.
discussed Cited "see" Means v. Northern Cheyenne Tribal Court
9th Cir. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
See Mousseaux v. United States Comm’r of Indian Affairs, 806 F.Supp. 1433 (D.S.D.1992) (offering same interpretation of § 1301 and its legislative history) aff'd in part on other grounds and remanded in part, 28 F.3d 786 (8th Cir.1994); see also Nell Jessup Newton, Permanent Legislation to Correct Duro v. Reina, 17 Am.
discussed Cited "see" 98 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6645, 98 Daily Journal D.A.R. 9255 David Means, Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Appellee v. Northern Cheyenne Tribal Court, Glenn Littlebird, Presiding Judge for the Northern Cheyenne Tribal Court, Defendants-Appellees-Cross-Appellants
9th Cir. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
See Mousseaux v. United States Comm'r of Indian Affairs, 806 F.Supp. 1433 (D.S.D.1992) (offering same interpretation of § 1301 and its legislative history) aff'd in part on other grounds and remanded in part, 28 F.3d 786 (8th Cir.1994); see also Nell Jessup Newton, Permanent Legislation to Correct Duro v. Reina, 17 Am.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Archambault
D.S.D. · 2001 · signal: see also · confidence low
No. 102-261, at 3 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 379 (“The Committee of Conference is clarifying an inherent right which tribal governments have always held and was never questioned until the recent Supreme Court decision of Duro v. Reina, [ 495 U.S. 676 ,] 110 S.Ct. 2 [0]53[, 109 L.Ed.2d 693 ] (1990).”); see also, Mousseaux v. United States Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 806 F.Supp. 1433, 1442-43 (D.S.D.1992), aff'd in part and remanded in part on other grounds, 28 F.3d 786 (8th Cir.1994). [¶ 17] It appears that Duro and the 1990 amendments to the ICRA are in direct conflict.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Rolland Richard Mousseaux, Also Known as Rolland Richard Driver
v.
United States of America Commissioner of Indian Affairs Secretary of Department of Interior Cora Jones, Superintendent of Rosebud Agency, Bureau of Indian Affairs Woodrow Starr, Criminal Investigator, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Rosebud Agency Ronald Wilke, Captain, Bureau of Indian Affairs Police, Rosebud Agency Janelle Reynolds, Tribal Judge Sherman Marshall, Tribal Judge Bob Brown, Tribal Court Attorney Virgil Hauf, Tribal Court Attorney Brenda Sitting Bear, Jailer Rosebud Sioux Tribe Dennis Holmes, Assistant United States Attorney Steve Guerue, Bureau of Indian Affairs Police
92-3674.
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
Jul 1, 1994.
28 F.3d 786
1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 16382
Cited by 3 opinions  |  Published

28 F.3d 786

Rolland Richard MOUSSEAUX, also known as Rolland Richard
Driver, Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES of America; Commissioner of Indian Affairs;
Secretary of Department of Interior; Cora Jones,
Superintendent of Rosebud Agency, Bureau of Indian Affairs;
Woodrow Starr, Criminal Investigator, Bureau of Indian
Affairs, Rosebud Agency; Ronald Wilke, Captain, Bureau of
Indian Affairs Police, Rosebud Agency; Janelle Reynolds,
Tribal Judge; Sherman Marshall, Tribal Judge; Bob Brown,
Tribal Court Attorney; Virgil Hauf, Tribal Court Attorney;
Brenda Sitting Bear, Jailer; Rosebud Sioux Tribe; Dennis
Holmes, Assistant United States Attorney; Steve Guerue,
Bureau of Indian Affairs Police, Appellees.

No. 92-3674.

United States Court of Appeals,
Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Nov. 11, 1993.
Decided July 1, 1994.

Wayne F. Gilbert, Rapid City, SD, argued, for appellant.

Terry L. Pechota, Rapid City, SD, argued, for appellee.

Before FAGG and WOLLMAN, Circuit Judges, and WRIGHT,[*] District Judge.

WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

[*~786]1

Rolland Richard Mousseaux appeals from the district court's[1] dismissal of his claims brought under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1985(3) against numerous defendants. We affirm in part and remand for dismissal of the complaint as against those defendants who have not been served.

2

Mousseaux, who alleges that he is not an enrolled member of the Rosebud Sioux Tribe, was arrested by Bureau of Indian Affairs police officers on the Rosebud Indian Reservation on a tribal charge of assault on February 25, 1990, and was held in the Rosebud Tribal Jail in default of posting the required $500 bond until May 2, 1990, when he was arrested on an April 20, 1990, federal indictment charging him with assault with a dangerous weapon. (The tribal charges were dismissed on April 24, 1990.) Following his conviction and imprisonment on the federal charge, Mousseaux brought this pro se action against the United States, the Secretary of the Interior, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, the Rosebud Sioux Tribe, and a number of named individual defendants, both tribal and federal. Mousseaux's original complaint alleged causes of action based upon some fifteen separate federal statutes. He filed an amended complaint alleging two additional statutory violations and naming two additional federal defendants. The district court analyzed each claim and dismissed the complaint. 806 F.Supp. 1433 (D.S.D.1992). On appeal, Mousseaux (now represented by counsel) asks that we remand this action so that he may proceed under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1985(3).

[*787]3

The United States is not subject to suit under section 1985(3). Savage v. United States, 450 F.2d 449, 450 n. 1 (8th Cir.1971), aff'g 322 F.Supp. 33 (D.Minn.1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1043, 92 S.Ct. 1327, 31 L.Ed.2d 585 (1972). Similarly, the Rosebud Sioux Tribe is protected by tribal immunity from such a suit. Means v. Wilson, 522 F.2d 833, 838 (8th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 958, 96 S.Ct. 1436, 47 L.Ed.2d 364 (1976). We need not consider whether the Secretary of the Interior and the Commissioner of Indian Affairs are potential defendants, for Mousseaux has not alleged that they engaged in any conduct which would violate section 1985(3). Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed the section 1985(3) claims as against these defendants.

4

The individual tribal defendants argue that the action should have been dismissed as against them for lack of service of process. Likewise, the United States alleges that no service had been made upon the named individual federal defendants. In response to our questions at oral argument, Mousseaux's counsel responded that he could not tell us whether service had been made upon the individual defendants, tribal and federal. Our review of the record indicates that the individual defendants named in the original complaint were mailed a summons and a copy of the complaint. Apparently, none of the defendants acknowledged service, however, thus requiring personal service. Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(c)(2)(C)(ii).[2] None of these defendants was personally served, however. The two defendants named in the amended complaint also were not served. Accordingly, we remand the case to the district court with directions that the complaint be dismissed as against the named individual tribal and federal defendants for lack of service of process. As to the defendants who were served, the district court's judgment of dismissal is affirmed for the reasons set forth in this opinion.

*

The HONORABLE SUSAN WEBBER WRIGHT, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Arkansas, sitting by designation

1

The Honorable Richard H. Battey, United States District Judge for the District of South Dakota

2

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was extensively amended, effective December 1, 1993. Our citation is to Rule 4 as in effect on the date this action was commenced