Allen Leroy Peterson v. Chase Riveland, 34 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 1994). · Go Syfert
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Allen Leroy Peterson v. Chase Riveland, 34 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 1994). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
41 citation events (3 in the last 25 years) across 11 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Signia, Ltd. (cob, 2024-01-29)
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1994 2010 2026
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discussed Cited as authority (rule) Signia, Ltd.
Bankr.D. Colo. · 2024 · confidence medium
Stock v. Harbicht Rsch., Inc. (In re Stock), 34 F.3d 1073, at *2 (Table) (9th Cir. 1994) (unpublished) (“the court should grant an extension [under Section 1221] only if the debtor’s inability to file a timely plan is due to circumstances beyond the debtor’s control.”); Davis v. U.S. Bank, N.A.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." People v. Stansbury
Cal. · 1995 · signal: see also · confidence low
(Compare People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 678 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 564 , 828 P.2d 705 ] [question of custody primarily one of fact, subject to review for substantial evidence], and People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 649 [ 286 Cal.Rptr. 801 , 818 P.2d 84 ] [same, relying on United States v. Poole (9th Cir. 1986) 806 F.2d 853 ] with United States v. Humphrey (7th Cir. 1994) 34 F.3d 551, 554 , and fn. 1 [ultimate question of whether there was a custodial interrogation is subject to independent review]; United States v. Jones (7th Cir. 1994) 21 F.3d 165, 169, fn. 5 [noting discord among circui…
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Allen Leroy Peterson
v.
Chase Riveland
94-35113.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Aug 29, 1994.
34 F.3d 1073
1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 32120
1994 WL 465848
Unpublished

34 F.3d 1073

NOTICE: Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 provides that dispositions other than opinions or orders designated for publication are not precedential and should not be cited except when relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.
Allen Leroy PETERSON, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Chase RIVELAND; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 94-35113.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Aug. 23, 1994.[*]
Decided Aug. 29, 1994.

Before: WALLACE, Chief Judge, Hug and Rymer, Circuit Judges.

1

MEMORANDUM[**]

2

Leroy Allen Peterson, a Washington state prisoner, appeals pro se, the district court's denial of his appeal from the decision of the magistrate judge as untimely. The magistrate judge denied Peterson's motion for a default judgment against defendants. We dismiss Peterson's appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

3

After Peterson filed his complaint in district court, the district judge referred the action to Magistrate Judge Franklin D. Burgess, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Secs. 636(b)(1)(A) & (B). On July 12, 1993, Peterson filed a motion for entry of default against defendants which the magistrate judge denied on September 1, 1993. Peterson filed objections to the magistrate judge's order on September 13, 1993. These objections were interpreted by the magistrate judge as an attempt to make Peterson's position clear for the record and were not ruled upon. On November 17, 1993, Peterson filed a notice of an out of time appeal from the magistrate judge's September 1, 1993 decision denying his motion for default. The district court denied this appeal as untimely, finding that the notice of appeal had not been filed within fifteen days of the magistrate judge's entry of decision as required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 74(a). Peterson then filed an "appeal of District Court's order denying appeal or Notice of Appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court," which the district court construed as a notice of appeal to this court.

4

On appeal, Peterson contends that the district court erred by dismissing his appeal from the decision of the magistrate judge as untimely. Thus, he contends that his objections to the magistrate judge's decision should have been construed as a notice of appeal to the district court. Peterson also contends that the magistrate judge erred by denying his motion for entry of default.

5

We lack jurisdiction over this appeal because the district court's denial of Peterson's appeal as untimely was neither a final, appealable order, see 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291, nor an appealable collateral order, see Kuster v. Block, 773 F.2d 1048, 1049 (9th Cir.1985). Moreover, the denial of a motion for entry of default is not an appealable order, see Bird v. Reese, 875 F.2d 256, 256 (9th Cir.1989), and the district court did not certify the matter for appeal pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). Accordingly, we dismiss Peterson's appeal for lack of jurisdiction.[1]

6

DISMISSED.

*

The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. Fed.R.App.P. 34(a); 9th Cir.R. 34-4

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir.R. 36-3

1

We deny Peterson's request for a "verba[t]im report of appellee's verbal request for extension of time."