Kenneth E. FRANCIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Ronald H. BROWN, Sec'y U.S. Dep't of Com., Defendant-Appellee, 58 F.3d 191 (5th Cir. 1995). · Go Syfert
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Kenneth E. FRANCIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Ronald H. BROWN, Sec'y U.S. Dep't of Com., Defendant-Appellee, 58 F.3d 191 (5th Cir. 1995). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, last quoted 1997 · …new and material evidence is available that was not readily available when the previous decision was issued; at p. 193 ⚠ not in text
25 citation events (7 in the last 25 years) across 6 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Derek Thomas v. Janet Napolitano (ca5, 2011-11-09)
Treatment trajectory · 1997 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1997 2011 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 11 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Derek Thomas v. Janet Napolitano (2×)
5th Cir. · 2011 · confidence medium
Francis v. Brown, 58 F.3d 191, 192 (5th Cir.1995).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Merriman v. Potter
5th Cir. · 2007 · confidence medium
Francis v. Brown, 58 F.3d 191, 192 (5th Cir.1995) (citing Brown v. Gen.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Taylor v. Dam
S.D. Tex. · 2003 · confidence medium
Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 832 , 96 S.Ct. 1961 , 48 L.Ed.2d 402 (1976) (“Initially, the complainant must seek relief in the agency that has allegedly discriminated against him”)); accord Fitzgerald v. Secretary, U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 121 F.3d 203, 206 (5th Cir.1997); Jackson v. Widnall, 99 F.3d 710, 716 (5th Cir.1996); Francis v. Brown, 58 F.3d 191, 192 (5th Cir.1995); Pacheco v. Rice, 966 F.2d 904, 905 (5th Cir.1992); Hampton v. IRS, 913 F.2d 180, 182 (5th Cir.1990).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Eugene v. Rumsfeld
S.D. Tex. · 2001 · confidence medium
Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 832 , 96 S.Ct. 1961 , 48 L.Ed.2d 402 (1976) (“Initially, the complainant must seek relief in the agency that has allegedly discriminated against him”)); accord Fitzgerald v. Secretary, U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 121 F.3d 203, 206 (5th Cir.1997); Francis v. Brown, 58 F.3d 191, 192 (5th Cir.1995); Pacheco v. Rice, 966 F.2d 904, 905 (5th Cir.1992).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Carol Briley v. John W. Carlin
8th Cir. · 1999 · confidence medium
Affairs, 918 F.2d 1073, 1078 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 977 (1991); Francis v. Brown, 58 F.3d 191, 192 (5th Cir. 1995).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Carol Briley v. John W. Carlin, Archivist of the United States
8th Cir. · 1999 · confidence medium
Affairs, 918 F.2d 1073, 1078 (2d Cir.1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 977 , 111 S.Ct. 1625 , 113 L.Ed.2d 721 (1991); Francis v. Brown, 58 F.3d 191, 192 (5th Cir.1995).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Michael FITZGERALD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SECRETARY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, Defendant-Appellee (7×) also: Cited "see"
5th Cir. · 1997 · confidence medium
As we noted in Francis, 58 F.3d at 193, a claimant “is not entitled to relief outside the scope of his claim.” Our review of the record discloses that Fitzgerald made no effort to notify either the VA or the EEOC of the particular circumstances of his Title VII claim that might warrant an offer of compensatory damages.
examined Cited as authority (rule) Fitzgerald v. Sec US Dept of Vets (6×) also: Cited "see"
5th Cir. · 1997 · confidence medium
As we noted in Francis, 58 F.3d at 193, a claimant "is not entitled to relief outside the scope of his claim." Our review of the record discloses that Fitzgerald made no effort to notify either the VA or the EEOC of the particular circumstances of his Title VII claim that might warrant an offer of compensatory damages.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Boswell v. DEPT. OF TREASURY, OFFICE OF COMP.
N.D. Tex. · 1997 · confidence medium
As Defendant accurately points out, “[a] federal employee must exhaust his administrative remedies against Ms federal employer before bringing suit under Title VII in federal court.” Francis v. Brawn, 58 F.3d 191,192 (5th Cir.1995) (citing Brown v. General Sews.
cited Cited "see" Dunn v. Folgers Coffee Company
E.D. La. · 2022 · signal: see · confidence high
See Francis v. Brown, 58 F.3d 191, 192 (5th Cir. 1995); Brown v. General Servs.
cited Cited "see, e.g." Velten v. Brown
4th Cir. · 1998 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See 29 C.F.R. § 1613.220 (b) (1997); see also Francis v. Brown, 58 F.3d 191, 193 (5th Cir. 1995).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
68 Fair empl.prac.cas. (Bna) 555, 67 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 43,754 Kenneth E. Francis
v.
Ronald H. Brown, Secretary U.S. Department of Commerce
94-11146.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
Jul 17, 1995.
58 F.3d 191
1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 18094
1995 WL 384943
Kenneth E. Francis, Dallas, TX, pro se., Jon L. Gant, Asst. U.S. Atty., Paul E. Coggins, U.S. Atty., Joe C. Lockhart, Asst. U.S. Atty., Dallas, TX, for appellee.
Duhé, Wiener, Stewart.
Cited by 12 opinions  |  Published
DUHÉ, Circuit Judge:

Kenneth E. Francis appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor Defendant Ronald H. Brown, Secretary of the U.S. Department of Commerce. Francis, a federal employee, alleged discrimination against his supervisors and the Department of Commerce under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The district court granted summary judgment because Francis failed to accept the agency’s settlement offer of full relief during the administrative process. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Francis asked his supervisor, Melda Cabrera, if he could have three hours of leave to donate blood. Cabrera denied the request, but told Francis that he could take a reasonable amount of time to participate in the blood drive. Francis agreed. That afternoon, however, Francis left work at 2:00 p.m. and did not return. - Two of his fellow employees left the office about the same time to participate in the blood drive, but they returned to the office later that afternoon. As a result, Cabrera charged Francis with seventy-five minutes of absence without leave.

Francis filed a discrimination complaint with his agency alleging that Cabrera’s action amounted to intentional discrimination. In support, Francis cited a provision in his agency personnel handbook that allowed him up to four hours of leave to donate blood. To settle his complaint, the agency offered Francis compensation for his lost wages, withdrawal of the absence without leave charge against him, and removal from his personnel file all references to the incident. Francis rejected the agency’s offer without giving any reason. The agency then dismissed his complaint, and Francis filed suit in federal district court.

DISCUSSION

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Weyant v. Acceptance Ins. Co., 917 F.2d 209, 212 (5th Cir.1990). The district court held that an employee fails to exhaust his administrative remedies when he rejects a settlement offer constituting full relief for the claims he asserts. The court then granted summary judgment to the agency because its settlement offer constituted full relief for Francis’s discrimination claim.

A federal employee must exhaust his administrative remedies against his federal employer before bringing suit under Title VII in federal court. Brown v. General Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 832-33, 96 S.Ct. 1961, 1967-68, 48 L.Ed.2d 402 (1976). To satisfy the exhaustion requirement, the employee must cooperate in good faith with the agency and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in the administrative proceedings. Munoz v. Aldridge, 894 F.2d 1489, 1493 (5th Cir.1990).

[*193] The Second Circuit has applied the good faith requirement to dismiss a federal employee’s claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act when the employee rejected his agency’s settlement offer during the administrative proceedings. Wrenn v. Secretary, Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 918 F.2d 1073, 1078 (2d Cir.1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 977, 111 S.Ct. 1625, 113 L.Ed.2d 721 (1991). The Second Circuit reasoned:

The purpose of the good faith participation requirement is to give the administrative process an opportunity to work and to enhance the chances of an administrative resolution. It follows that a claimant who is offered full relief in the administrative process must either accept the relief offered or abandon the claim.

Id.; see also Frye v. Aspin, 997 F.2d 426, 428 (8th Cir.1993) (applying Wrenn to dismiss a federal employee’s claim under the Rehabilitation Act). The Second Circuit’s reasoning is persuasive. Therefore, we hold that a federal employee fails to exhaust his administrative remedies when he rejects a settlement offer for full relief on the specific claims he asserts.

The district court held that the agency’s settlement offer constituted full relief for Francis’s claim. We agree. The agency’s offer would have compensated Francis fully for receiving absence without leave. [1] Francis is not entitled to relief outside the scope of his claim nor is he entitled to punitive damages. “[Ljitigation is not a sport in which the hunter may release a trapped quarry for the thrill of further chase.” Wrenn, 918 F.2d at 1078-79. Because the agency’s settlement offer constituted full relief, we conclude that Francis failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The district court properly granted summary judgment for the agency.

AFFIRMED.

1

. The district court’s de novo review of whether the offer constituted full relief satisfies the requirement that an employment discrimination plaintiff receive a de novo adjudication in district court. See Wrenn, 918 F.2d at 1079 n. 3.