UNITED STATES of Am., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Terry Norman TAYLOR, Defendant-Appellant, 66 F.3d 254 (9th Cir. 1995). · Go Syfert
Search
UNITED STATES of Am., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Terry Norman TAYLOR, Defendant-Appellant, 66 F.3d 254 (9th Cir. 1995). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
G Cite
cited 2× by 1 distinct case, last quoted 1996 · …exception has been section 1001 cases, in which we have held that it is an element of the crime that must be determined by the jury at p. 255 ✓
24 citation events (3 in the last 25 years) across 9 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: United States v. Newell (ca1, 2011-07-11)
Treatment trajectory · 1996 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1996 2011 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 14 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Newell
1st Cir. · 2011 · confidence medium
See United States v. Upton, 91 F.3d 677, 685 (5th Cir.1996); United States v. Taylor, 66 F.3d 254, 255 (9th Cir.1995); United States v. Parsons, 967 F.2d 452, 455 (10th Cir.1992); United States v. Elkin, 731 F.2d 1005, 1009-10 (2d Cir.1984), overruled on *17 other grounds by United States v. Ali, 68 F.3d 1468 (2d Cir.1995).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Allen
10th Cir. · 2004 · confidence medium
Jury Prac. & Instr. § 30.03 (5th ed.) (2004) (citing Parsons , as well as United States v. Upton, 91 F.3d 677, 685 (5th Cir.1996), United States v. Taylor, 66 F.3d 254, 255 (9th Cir.1995), and United States v. Elkin, 731 F.2d 1005, 1009-10 (2d Cir.1984), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Ali, 68 F.3d 1468 (2d Cir.1995)). 5 Since our decisions in Irwin and Parsons , the Supreme Court has reiterated *216 that materiality is an element of an offense under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 — a measure that was originally part of the same statute as 18 U.S.C. § 287 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Edward M. Nash
6th Cir. · 1999 · confidence medium
See United States v. Upton, 91 F.3d 677, 685 (5th Cir.1996); United States v. Taylor, 66 F.3d 254, 255 (9th Cir.1995); United States v. Parsons, 967 F.2d 452, 455 (10th Cir.1992); United States v. Elkin, 731 F.2d 1005, 1009 (2d Cir.1984), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Ali, 68 F.3d 1468, 1474-75 (2d Cir.1995).
cited Cited as authority (rule) UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SERVICE DELI INC., Defendant-Appellant
9th Cir. · 1998 · confidence medium
See Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 522-23 , 115 S.Ct. 2310 ; United States v. Taylor, 66 F.3d 254, 255 (9th Cir.1995) (per curiam), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 1105 , 137 L.Ed.2d 307 (1997).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Harold H. Uchimura
9th Cir. · 1997 · confidence medium
Nash, 115 F.3d at 1435 ( 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (False Statement to FDIC); U.S. v. Taylor, 66 F.3d 254, 255 (9th Cir.1995), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 1105 , 137 L.Ed.2d 307 (1997) ( 18 U.S.C. § 287 (False Claims Against the U.S.)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Harold H. Uchimura (2×)
9th Cir. · 1997 · confidence medium
U.S. v. Taylor, 66 F.3d 254, 255 (9th Cir.1995) ( 18 U.S.C. § 287 (False Claims Against the U.S.)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Pascal Ballistrea (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
2d Cir. · 1996 · confidence medium
Indeed, the Court explicitly noted that although the issue of materiality in many statutes is a question of law for the judge, the " 'exception has been section 1001 cases, in which we have held that it is an element of the crime that must be determined by the jury.’ ” Id. at 60 (quoting United States v. Taylor, 66 F.3d 254, 255 (9th Cir.1995)); see also Taylor, 66 F.3d at 255 ("[W]hen the element of materiality requires a *835 factual finding, as it does in section 1001 prosecutions, that element must be submitted to the jury.”) (quotations and citations omitted). 5 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Nazon
N.D. Ind. · 1996 · confidence medium
E.g., United States v. Taylor, 66 F.3d 254, 255 (9th Cir.1995); United States v. Wells, 63 F.3d 745, 750 (8th Cir.1995), cert. granted, -U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 1540 , 134 L.Ed.2d 645 (1996); United States v. Parsons, 967 F.2d 452, 455 (10th Cir.1992); Elkin, 731 F.2d at 1009 ; United States v. Pruitt, 702 F.2d 152, 155 (8th Cir.1983); United States v. Adler, 623 F.2d 1287 , 1291 n. 5 (8th Cir.1980); United States v. Snider, 502 F.2d 645 , 652 n. 12 (4th Cir.1974). 4 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Antony Michael Upton, Santa Barbara Castle Development Corp., A/K/A Castle Construction Corp., and Ronald R. Barrick
5th Cir. · 1996 · confidence medium
Four Circuit Courts have addressed this issue reaching two different conclusions. 12 Compare United States *685 v. Wells, 63 F.3d 745, 750 (8th Cir.1995) (holding that materiality is an essential element of a § 287 charge), cert. granted, — U.S.-, 116 S.Ct. 1540 , 134 L.Ed.2d 645 (1996), and United States v. Snider, 502 F.2d 645 , 652 n. 12 (4th Cir.1974) (same) with United States v. Taylor, 66 F.3d 254, 255 (9th Cir.1995) (holding that while § 1001 expressly makes materiality an element of the offense, § 287 does not and Gaudin does not apply to a § 287 conviction), United States v. Par…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. ANTONY MICHAEL UPTON, SANTA BARBARA CASTLE DEVELOPMENT CORP., a/k/a Castle Construction Corp., and RONALD R. BARRICK
unknown court · confidence medium
Four Circuit Courts have addressed this issue reaching two different conclusions.12 Compare United States v. Wells, 63 F.3d 745, 750 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that materiality is an essential element of a § 287 charge), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1540 (1996), and United States v. Snider, 502 F.2d 645 , 652 n.12 (4th Cir. 1974) (same) with United States v. Taylor, 66 F.3d 254, 255 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that while § 1001 expressly makes materiality an element of the offense, § 287 does not and Gaudin does not apply to a § 287 conviction), United States v. Parsons, 967 F.2d 452, 455 (10th Ci…
discussed Cited "see" United States v. St. Luke's Subacute Care Hospital, Inc.
9th Cir. · 2006 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Taylor, 66 F.3d 254 (9th Cir.1995) (per curiam) (implicitly rejecting, without affirmatively holding, that there is no materiality requirement under § 287), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1103 , 117 S.Ct. 1105 , 137 L.Ed.2d 307 (1997); see also Li v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 892 (9th Cir.2004) (stating, without affirmatively holding, that there is no materiality requirement under § 287). 2 Conse quently, there is no “known right” that appellants could possibly have waived.
examined Cited "see" United States v. Julius Klausner (4×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
2d Cir. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Taylor, 66 F.3d 254, 255 (9th Cir.1995) (stating that "the issue of materiality in most [criminal perjury and false statement] statutes is a question of law for the judge" and that the "exception has been section 1001 cases, in which we have held that it is an element of the crime that must be determined by the jury" (alteration in original and quotation omitted)). 25 In order to establish a violation of § 7206(2), the government must prove that a tax return is false as to a material matter.
cited Cited "see, e.g." United States v. McGuire
5th Cir. · 1996 · signal: compare · confidence low
Compare, United States v. Taylor, 66 F.3d 254 (9th Cir.1995) (distinguishing Gaudin on the basis that materiality is neither an express nor an implicit element of 18 U.S.C. § 287 ).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Jimmy D. McGuire (2×)
5th Cir. · 1996 · signal: compare · confidence low
Compare, United States v. Taylor, 66 F.3d 254 (9th Cir.1995) (distinguishing Gau-din on the basis that materiality is neither an express nor an implicit element of 18 U.S.C. § 287 ).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
95 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 7510, 95 Daily Journal D.A.R. 12,841 United States of America
v.
Terry Norman Taylor
93-30434.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Sep 26, 1995.
66 F.3d 254
95 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 7510
1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 27318
1995 WL 571863
Dennis N. Balske, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Portland, OR, for defendant-appellant., Michael W. Mosman, Assistant United States Attorney, Portland, OR, for plaintiff-appellee.
Browning, Goodwin, O'Scannlain, Per Curiam.
Cited by 20 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM:

Terry N. Taylor appeals his conviction of five counts of filing false claims against the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 287, and one count of making false statements in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm, in part, and vacate and remand, in part.

Taylor contends that the district court erred by refusing to submit materiality, an essential element of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, to the jury. This contention has merit.

[*255] Section 1001 makes it a crime knowingly and willfully to falsify, conceal or cover up a material fact in any matter within the jurisdiction of the United States. In United States v. Gaudin, 28 F.3d 943 (9th Cir.1994), affd, — U.S. —, 115 S.Ct. 2310, 132 L.Ed.2d 444 (1995), we reaffirmed the law of the circuit “that when the element of materiality requires a factual finding, as it does in section 1001 prosecutions, that element must be submitted to the jury.” Id. at 951. We held, furthermore, that a district court’s determination of materiality as a matter of law in an 18 U.S.C. § 1001 prosecution is reversible error. Id.

Here, the district court stated that it did not believe that materiality was an element of either 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001 or 287, but ruled that, in any event, materiality had been established as a matter of law and thus did not need to be submitted to the jury. Because materiality is an essential element of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, the district court erred in removing that question from the jury, and Taylor’s conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 must be reversed.

Taylor also contends that the same logic applied by the court in Gaudin to 18 U.S.C. § 1001 applies to 18 U.S.C. § 287, and thus the district court’s refusal to submit the materiality question to the jury mandates reversal of his convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 287. The reasoning of Gaudin does not support its extension to 18 U.S.C. § 287.

First, 18 U.S.C. § 1001 explicitly makes materiality an element of the offense, 18 U.S.C. § 287 does not. [1] Second, this court has never held that materiality is an implicit element of 18 U.S.C. § 287. Finally, Gaudin makes clear that “the issue of materiality in most [criminal perjury and false statement] statutes is a question of law for the judge. The exception has been section 1001 cases, in which we have held that it is an element of the crime that must be determined by the jury.” Gaudin, 28 F.3d at 945.

Accordingly, we affirm Taylor’s convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 287, and reverse his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1001.

AFFIRMED, in part, VACATED and REMANDED, in part.

1

. Section 287 provides that:

Whoever makes or presents to any person or officer in the civil, military, or naval service of the United States, or to any department or agency thereof, any claim upon or against the United States, or any department or agency thereof, knowing such claim to be false, fictitious, or fraudulent, shall be imprisoned not more than five years and shall be subject to a fine in the amount provided in this title.

18 U.S.C. § 287.