Bruce Paul Caton v. Harold W. Clarke, 70 F.3d 64 (8th Cir. 1995). · Go Syfert
Bruce Paul Caton v. Harold W. Clarke, 70 F.3d 64 (8th Cir. 1995). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
5 citation events (2 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Alan Jeffrey Bannister v. Paul K. Delo (ca8, 1997-01-22)
Top citers, strongest first. 4 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Alan Jeffrey Bannister v. Paul K. Delo (2×)
8th Cir. · 1997 · confidence medium
Caton v. Clarke, 70 F.3d 64, 65 (8th Cir.1995) (per curiam), cert. denied, - U.S.-, 116 S.Ct. 1579 , 134 L.Ed.2d 676 (1996). .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Alan J. Bannister v. Paul K. Delo
8th Cir. · 1996 · confidence medium
Caton v. Clarke, 70 F.3d 64, 65 (8th Cir. 1995) (per curiam), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1579 (1996). -17- amendment challenges to the admission of his August 23 statement.
discussed Cited "see" Ybarra v. State of Arkansas
W.D. Ark. · 2024 · signal: see · confidence high
See Caton v. Clarke, 70 F.3d 64, 65 (8th Cir.1995) (per curiam), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1173 (1996). 1 On June 3, 2024, the Parties consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge to conduct all proceedings in this case, including conducting the trial, ordering the entry of a final judgment, and conducting all post-judgment proceedings.
cited Cited "see" Robinson v. Payne
W.D. Ark. · 2024 · signal: see · confidence high
See Caton v. Clarke, 70 F.3d 64, 65 (8th Cir.1995) (per curiam), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1173 (1996).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Bruce Paul CATON, Appellant,
v.
Harold W. CLARKE, Appellee
95-1684.
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
Dec 18, 1995.
70 F.3d 64
David R. Stickman and Mary H. Buckley, Omaha, NE, for appellant., J. Kirk Brown, Lincoln, NE, for appellee.
Beam, Heaney, Arnold.
Cited by 5 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM.

Bruce Paul Catón appeals the denial of his second 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for abuse of the writ. [1] We affirm.

Caton’s original petition for a writ of habe-as corpus contained five claims, three of which were unexhausted. The magistrate who initially considered the petition informed Catón that his petition contained unexhaust-ed claims, which might be barred from subsequent consideration if Catón proceeded with his petition. The magistrate offered to dismiss the entire petition without prejudice to enable Catón to exhaust his state court remedies and then return to federal court and receive full consideration of all his listed claims. Catón declined, despite the magistrate’s repeated warnings and instead amended his petition to present only his exhausted claims. When the magistrate again warned Catón of the consequences of his course of action and requested clarification, Catón specifically stated that he understood that by proceeding he risked dismissal of any subsequent federal habeas petition attempting to resubmit the withdrawn claims.

The magistrate then considered the two claims properly before it and found that Ca-tón had procedurally defaulted each in the state courts. Because Caton’s unexeused default constituted independent and adequate state grounds for denial of relief, the magistrate recommended that the district court deny the petition. After de novo review, the district court denied the writ.

Later, after exhausting his state court remedies, Catón returned to federal court to reassert the withdrawn claims. The district court, after de novo review, agreed with the magistrate’s recommendation that Caton’s petition be denied for abuse of the writ. Catón attempts to argue that his petition is really successive rather than abusive, an argument which review of the decisions rendered in this case shows to be without merit. Even were it meritorious, the district court’s dismissal would be appropriate as Caton’s previous claims were determined to be procedurally barred. A determination of an unexeused state procedural bar is a final determination on the merits for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b).

Caton’s attempts, on appeal, to show cause and prejudice or actual innocence to excuse his abuse of the writ are too little too late, and are without merit. The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the petition and we affirm its well-reasoned opinion. See 8th Cir.R. 47B.

1

. Catón has moved to supplement the record on appeal. We grant that motion and have considered the materials submitted in making our decision.