In re Nagy, 970 N.E.2d 140 (Ind. 2012). · Go Syfert
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In re Nagy, 970 N.E.2d 140 (Ind. 2012). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 3× by 3 distinct cases, 2016–2019 · …a right, title, or legal share of real property arising out of a binding agreement between two or more parties. ⚠ not in text
76 citation events (76 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Thomas P. Donovan v. Hoosier Park, LLC d/b/a Hoosier Park, Racing & Casino, Centaur, Inc., Hoosier Park, L.P., Centaur Holdings, LLC, and Terrance Sollars (indctapp, 2017-09-26)
Treatment trajectory · 2012 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2012 2019 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 21 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Thomas P. Donovan v. Hoosier Park, LLC d/b/a Hoosier Park, Racing & Casino, Centaur, Inc., Hoosier Park, L.P., Centaur Holdings, LLC, and Terrance Sollars
Ind. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
Thus, as a matter of law, Donovan was trespassing. 8 See Lyles v. State, 970 N.E.2d 140, 143 (Ind. 2012) (evidence was sufficient defendant committed criminal trespass where defendant was neither an owner nor employee of bank, and bank manager had asked defendant to leave bank premises, but defendant refused to leave bank premises).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Melvin Wolf v. State of Indiana
Ind. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
Lyles v. State, 970 N.E.2d 140, 142 (Ind. 2012).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Corey Brown v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)
Ind. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
Lyles v. State, 970 N.E.2d 140, 142-43 (Ind. 2012) (citing Ind. Code § 35-43-2-2 ).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Devell L. Coleman v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)
Ind. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
Lyles, 970 N.E.2d at 143 (defendant lacking a contractual interest held to be trespasser).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gerald Rachell v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) (2×)
Ind. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
The offense has seven elements: “the defendant (1) knowingly or intentionally (2) refused to leave (3) the real property (4) of another person (5) after having been asked to leave (6) by the person or the person’s agent (7) when such defendant lacked a contractual interest in the real property.” Lyles v. State, 970 N.E.2d 140, 142-43 (Ind. 2012).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Jessi Apollos v. State of Indiana
Ind. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
Lyles v. State, 970 N.E.2d 140, 143 (Ind.2012).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Anthony Bozzo v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)
Ind. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
Taylor v. State, 836 N.E.2d 1024, 1026 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (citing A.E.B. v. State, 756 N.E.2d 536, 540 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001)), trans. denied.” Lyles, 970 N.E.2d at 144 (Rucker, J. dissenting).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Blake John Drapeau v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Ind. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
Taylor v. State, 836 N.E.2d 1024, 1026 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. “[T]he State need not ‘disprove every conceivable Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 82A01-1506-CR-616 | February 16, 2016 Page 8 of 19 contractual interest’ that a defendant might have obtained in the real property at issue.” Lyles v. State, 970 N.E.2d 140, 143 (Ind. 2012) (quoting Fleck v. State, 508 N.E.2d 539, 541 (Ind. 1987)). “[T]he State satisfies its burden when it disproves those contractual interests that are reasonably apparent from the context and circumstances under which the tresp…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hans Gunther Oberth v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) (2×) also: Cited "see"
Ind. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
Lyles v. State, 970 N.E.2d 140, 142 (Ind. 2012); Taylor v. State, 836 N.E.2d 1024, 1026 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Meridian Horton v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)
Ind. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
In Lyles v. State, 970 N.E.2d 140, 143 (Ind. 2012), the Court held that the State met its burden of proof by presenting evidence showing the defendant was “irate Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1411-CR-806 | July 21, 2015 Page 4 of 6 and disrespectful.” “The defendant was neither an owner nor an employee of the bank, [and] the bank manager had authority to ask customers to leave the bank premises.” Id.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Tony R. Shipley, II v. State of Indiana
Ind. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
“Contractual interest,” as used in the criminal trespass statute, refers to “the right to be present on another’s property, arising out of an agreement between at least two parties that creates an obligation to do or not to do a particular thing.” Semenick v. State, 977 N.E.2d 7, 10 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. “[T]he State need not ‘disprove every conceivable 3 contractual interest’ that a defendant might have obtained in the real property at issue.” Lyles v. State, 970 N.E.2d 140, 143 (Ind. 2012) (quoting Fleck v. State, 508 N.E.2d 539, 541 (Ind. 1987)). “[T]he St…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Eddie Hughes v. State of Indiana
Ind. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
As our supreme court explained in Lyles v. State, 970 N.E.2d 140, 143 (Ind. 2012), [i]n proving the lack of a contractual interest, the State need not “disprove every conceivable contractual interest” that a defendant might have obtained in the real property at issue.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Timothy R. Thacker v. State of Indiana
Ind. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
“If a reasonable finder of fact could determine from the evidence that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, then we will uphold the verdict.” Lyles v. State, 970 N.E.2d 140, 142 (Ind. 2012) (internal citations omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gregory Leech v. State of Indiana
Ind. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
However, direct evidence of a defendant’s lack of a contractual interest in a property is not required because “the State satisfies its burden when it disproves those contractual interests that are reasonably apparent from the context and circumstances under which the trespass is alleged to have occurred.” Lyles v. State, 970 N.E.2d 140, 143 (Ind. 2012).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Steven Hook, Sr. v. State of Indiana
Ind. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
Lyles v. State, 970 N.E.2d 140, 142 (Ind. 2012). 3 We consider only the evidence most favorable to the State together with all reasonable and logical inferences that may be drawn from that evidence.
examined Cited as authority (rule) Paul R. Semenick v. State of Indiana (6×)
Ind. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
Taylor v. State, 836 N.E.2d 1024, 1026 (Ind.Ct.App.2005), trans. denied. “[T]he State need not ‘disprove every conceivable contractual interest’ that a defendant might have obtained in the real property at issue.” Lyles v. State, 970 N.E.2d 140, 143 (Ind.2012) (quoting Fleck v. State, 508 N.E.2d 539, 541 (Ind.1987)). “[T]he State satisfies its burden when it disproves those contractual interests that are reasonably apparent from the context and circumstances under which the trespass is alleged to have occurred.” Id.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Robert Brandon v. State of Indiana
Ind. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
Lyles v. State, 970 N.E.2d 140, 142 (Ind. 2012).
discussed Cited "see" Shemata Chatman v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)
Ind. Ct. App. · 2017 · signal: see · confidence high
See Lyles, 970 N.E.2d at 141-143 (observing that the defendant was an account holder of a bank, not an owner or employee of the bank, and asked for a free printout of his account, that a manager explained the bank’s policy of offering a statement for a fee, that the defendant persisted in his request and became irate and disrespectful, and that the manager asked the defendant to leave and called the police when the defendant refused and holding that the evidence taken together “refuted each of the most reasonably apparent sources from which a person in the defendant’s circumstances might…
cited Cited "see" Jeffrey Murto v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)
Ind. Ct. App. · 2016 · signal: see · confidence high
See Lyles v. State, 970 N.E.2d 140, 142-43 (Ind. 2012). [9] It is undisputed that Murto did not have a contractual interest in the Library.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Joy Thornton v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)
Ind. Ct. App. · 2020 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See Olsen v. State, 663 N.E.2d 1194, 1196 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (finding that the evidence was sufficient to prove that the defendant did not have a contractual interest in a hotel lobby because the hotel had revoked his invitation to be there); see also Lyles v. State, 970 N.E.2d 140, 143 (Ind. 2012) (finding that the evidence was sufficient to prove that the defendant lacked a contractual interest in his bank’s property because he was “neither an owner nor an employee of the bank” and “the bank manager had authority to ask customers to leave the bank premises”).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Michael J. Lock v. State of Indiana
Ind. · 2012 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Lyles v. State, 970 N.E.2d 140 , 142-43 n. 3 (Ind.2012) (citing Russell v. State, 50 Ind. 174, 174 (1875)). "[I]n determining whether a statutory exception is a material element or an affirmative defense, we assess the location of the exception relative to the location of the definition of the principal offense.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
In the Matter of Sarah L. NAGY
Nos. 49S00-1202-DI-104, 29S00-1205-DI-247, 29S00-1205-DI-280.
Indiana Supreme Court.
Jun 28, 2012.
970 N.E.2d 140
2012 WL 2681297
2012 Ind. LEXIS 530
Published

PUBLISHED ORDER SUSPENDING RESPONDENT FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW DUE TO DISABILITY AND DISMISSING SHOW CAUSE PROCEEDINGS WITHOUT PREJUDICE

Pursuant to Indiana Admission and Discipline Rule 23, Section 25, the Disciplinary Commission has filed a “Verified Petition to Determine Disability” in Cause No. 29S00-1205-DI-280, requesting this Court to suspend Respondent from the practice of law in this state due to physical disability. Along with that petition, Respondent has submitted an “Affidavit of Consent to Disability Suspension.” The Commission also requests that two show cause proceedings for noncooperation with the Commission pending against Respondent, Cause Nos. 49S0O-12O2-DI-104 and 29S00-1205-DI-247, be dismissed without prejudice if the petition to determine disability is granted.

Being duly advised, the Court GRANTS the Commission’s petition and ORDERS that Respondent be suspended from the practice of law in this state, effective immediately, due to disability, pursuant to Admission and Discipline Rule 23(25). Respondent may petition for reinstatement upon termination of the disability pursuant to Admission and Discipline Rule 23(4) and (18). The Court further ORDERS that Cause Nos. 49S00-1202-DI-104 and 29S00-1205-DI-247 be dismissed without prejudice.

The Clerk is directed to forward a copy of this Order to the parties or their respective attorneys and to all other entities entitled to notice under Admission and Discipline Rule 23(3)(d). The Clerk is further directed to post this order to the Court’s website, and Thomson Reuters is directed to publish a copy of this order in the bound volumes of this Court’s decisions.

All Justices concur.