Harold Henderson v. Larry Norris, Dir., Arkansas Dep't of Corr. David Guntharp, Assistant Dir., Arkansas Dep't of Corr., 129 F.3d 481 (8th Cir. 1997). · Go Syfert
Harold Henderson v. Larry Norris, Dir., Arkansas Dep't of Corr. David Guntharp, Assistant Dir., Arkansas Dep't of Corr., 129 F.3d 481 (8th Cir. 1997). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
Quick Summary

A court should assess a reasonable partial filing fee based on the information available when a prisoner cannot provide a certified copy of a prison account statement.

An inmate appeals the summary dismissal of a § 1983 complaint as frivolous. The court addresses whether a prisoner denied in forma pauperis status by a district court due to a good faith certification may still seek to proceed under § 1915 by filing a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a). The court holds that such a motion allows the prisoner to seek relief under § 1915, and the filing of this motion triggers the prisoner's responsibility to pay the full amount of appellate filing fees through installment payments, unless the prisoner must pay the full amount upfront due to the three-strikes provision.

1,048 citation events (1,025 in the last 25 years) across 22 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Bryce Lanear v. Joe Taylor, et al. (moed, 2026-02-18)
Treatment trajectory · 1997 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1997 2011 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Bryce Lanear v. Joe Taylor, et al. (2×) also: Cited "see"
E.D. Mo. · 2026 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
when a district court receives a prisoner's notice of appeal in a prisoner's civil action, it shall assess the . . . appellate filing fees and process the appeal in ordinary course.
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Hightower v. State of Missouri (3×) also: Cited "see"
E.D. Mo. · 2025 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
when a district court receives a prisoner's notice of appeal in a prisoner's civil action, it shall assess the . . . appellate filing fees and process the appeal in ordinary course.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Harris v. Harris
E.D. Mo. · 2025 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
the assessment of appellate filing fees occurs upon the filing of a notice of appeal ....
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Dutcher v. Foley
E.D. Mo. · 2025 · signal: see also · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
when a district court receives a prisoner's notice of appeal in a prisoner's civil action, it shall assess the . . . appellate filing fees and process the appeal in ordinary course.
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Moll v. Lamb
E.D. Mo. · 2025 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
failure to file the prison account information will result in the assessment of an initial appellate partial fee of 35 or such other amount that is reasonable, based on whatever information the court has about the prisoner's finances.
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Perkins v. Daniels (2×) also: Cited as authority (rule)
D. Minnesota · 2023 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
if the district court does not receive a certified copy of the prisoner's account within 30 days of the notice of appeal, it shall calculate the initial appellate filing fee at 35 or such other reasonable amount warranted by available information.
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Losee v. Maschner (5×) also: Cited as authority (rule), Cited "see"
S.D. Iowa · 1998 · signal: compare · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
failure to file prison account information will result in the assessment of an initial appellate partial fee of 35 or such other amount that is reasonable, based on whatever information the court has about the prisoner's finances
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Carlos Ponce v. Dr. S. Moats, K. Pavel, and M. Zavadil
D.S.D. · 2026 · confidence medium
Find an Inmate, Federal Bureau of Prisons, https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (last visited June 10, 2026). entire fee at the initiation of the proceeding or over a period of time under an installment plan.” Henderson v. Norris, 129 F.3d 481, 483 (8th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (alteration in original) (quoting McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Damion Lee Williams v. Kannesha Nept, Lt. and OIC at Jameson Annex, individual capacity; Kelli Wasko, Secretary of Corrections-Supervisor at SD DOC, individual capacity; Tabatha Benting, Warden-Supervisor at Jameson, individual capacity; Sims, DOC Employee at Jameson; Sgt. Marshall, Supervisor of Staff, OIC at Jameson; Major Rodriguez, SD Employee Supervisor of Staff at Jameson; and Unknown Officers, Jameson
D.S.D. · 2026 · confidence medium
Thus, “[w]hen an inmate seeks pauper status, the only issue is whether the inmate pays the entire fee at the initiation of the proceeding or over a period of time under an installment plan.” Henderson v. Norris, 129 F.3d 481, 483 (8th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (alteration in original) (quoting McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Richard Wolf Guts v. M. County, Case Manager USP Tucson Arizona, individual capacity; Mr. Shied, Lieutenant at USP Tucson AZ, individual capacity; USP Tucson Federal Agency, USDOJ at Tucson Arizona, individual capacity; and Dr. Licata, Psychologist at USP Tucson AZ, individual capacity; Richard Wolf Guts v. Mr. Shied, FBOP, Lieutenant at USP Tucson, AZ, individual capacity; Federal Officers, March 9, 2018, at USP Tucson AZ; Dr. Licata, FBOP Doctors at USP Tucson AZ; and M. County, USDOJ, Case Manager at Tucson AZ, individual capacity.
D.S.D. · 2026 · confidence medium
Therefore, “[w]hen an inmate seeks pauper status, the only issue is whether the inmate pays the entire fee at the initiation of the proceeding or over a period of time under an installment plan.” Henderson v. Norris, 129 F.3d 481, 483 (8th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (alteration in original) This Court will refer to each of these cases by the last four digits of their civil case filing number, followed by the corresponding docket number. 3 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (h), a prisoner means “any person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adju…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Robert M. Pratt v. United States Department of Justice, Selective Service Act, Federal Aviation Administration, Government to Passengers Flight 232 Sioux City Iowa
D.S.D. · 2026 · confidence medium
This obligation arises “the moment the prisoner ... files an appeal.” Henderson v. Norris, 129 F.3d 481, 483 (8th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (omission in original) (quoting In re Tyler, 110 F.3d 528, 529-30 (8th Cir. 1997)). “[W]hen an inmate seeks pauper status, the only issue is whether the inmate pays the entire fee at the initiation of the proceeding or over a period of time underan installment plan.” Id. (quoting McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Robert Patnaude v. South Dakota Department of Corrections, Kellie Wasko, Secretary of Corrections, Alejandro Reyes, Warden, Mike Durfee
D.S.D. · 2026 · confidence medium
Therefore, “[w]hen an inmate seeks pauper status, the only issue is whether the inmate pays the entire fee at the initiation of the proceeding or over a period of time under an installment plan.” Henderson v. Norris, 129 F.3d 481, 483 (8th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (alteration in original) (quoting McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cody Maynard v. M2127 Director of Nursing, Medical Director at Minnehaha County Jail, official capacity
D.S.D. · 2026 · confidence medium
Therefore, “[w]hen an inmate seeks pauper status, the only issue is whether the inmate pays the entire fee at the initiation of the proceeding or over a period of time under an installment plan.” Henderson v. Norris, 129 F.3d 481, 483 (8th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (alteration in original) (quoting McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Thomas Earl Two Bulls, Sr. v. Jonathan Mamminham, Police Officer at Sioux Falls Police Department, in his individual capacity
D.S.D. · 2026 · confidence medium
This obligation arises “the moment the prisoner . . . files an appeal.” Henderson v. Norris, 129 F.3d 481, 483 (8th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (omission in original) (quoting In re Tyler, 110 F.3d 528 , 529–30 (8th Cir. 1997)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Randall William Church Cornett v. Donna (Mental Health), Mental Health Counselor at Minnehaha County Jail, Individual and Official Capacity; Sheriff Milstead, Management at Minnehaha County Jail, Official Capacity; Correctional Medical Management at Minnehaha County Jail, Official Capacity; and Anthony Helland, Director of Operations at Minnehaha County Jail, Individual and Official Capacity
D.S.D. · 2026 · confidence medium
Therefore, “[w]hen an inmate seeks pauper status, the only issue is whether the inmate pays the entire fee at the initiation of the proceeding or over a period of time under an installment plan.” Henderson v. Norris, 129 F.3d 481, 483 (8th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (alteration in original) (quoting McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Robert M. Pratt v. United States Department of Justice Selective Service Act Entitled; Federal Aviation Administration; and Government to Passengers Flight 232 Sioux City Iowa
D.S.D. · 2026 · confidence medium
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), a prisoner who “brings a civil action or files an appeal in forma pauperis . . . shall be required to pay the full amount of a filing fee.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (b)(1). “[T]he assessment of appellate filing fees occurs upon the filing of a notice of appeal . . . and fixes responsibility for payment sooner rather than later of the fees in full.” Henderson v. Norris, 129 F.3d 481, 484 (8th Cir. 1997) (per curiam).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Joshua John Nelson v. Correctional Medical Management; Mental Health Correctional Officers; and Minnehaha County Jail Medical Staff, in their individual and official capacities
D.S.D. · 2026 · confidence medium
Offender Locator, South Dakota Department of Corrections, https://docadultlookup.sd.gov/adult/lookup/details/?id=mjN2PoZyAgo= (last visited Apr. 15, 2026). □ Because a prisoner seeking in forma pauperis status must pay the full filing fee under the PLRA, “the only issue is whether the inmate pays the entire fee at the initiation of the proceedings or over a period of time under an installment plan.” Henderson v. Norris, 129 F.3d 481, 483 (8th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (quoting McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rochelle Rowane Bordeaux v. Jacab Carson, Public Defender, Minnehaha Co. Public Defender; and Does, Public Defender, Minnehaha Co. Public Defender; Rochelle Rowane Bordeaux v. State of South Dakota; and Does, Officers, Judges, Minnehaha County; Pennington Co. Jail; Rochelle Rowane Bordeaux v. South Dakota State Women’s Prison, Women’s Prison; Lachara Maire Bordeaux v. South Dakota State Women’s Prison
D.S.D. · 2026 · confidence medium
Thus, “[w]hen an inmate seeks pauper status, the only issue is whether the inmate pays the entire fee at the initiation of the proceedings or over a period of time under an installment plan.” Henderson v. Norris, 129 F.3d 481, 483 (8th Cir. 1997) (alteration in original) (quoting McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rochelle Rowane Bordeaux v. Jacab Carson, Public Defender, Minnehaha Co. Public Defender; and Does, Public Defender, Minnehaha Co. Public Defender; Rochelle Rowane Bordeaux v. State of South Dakota; and Does, Officers, Judges, Minnehaha County; Pennington Co. Jail; Rochelle Rowane Bordeaux v. South Dakota State Women’s Prison, Women’s Prison; Lachara Marie Bordeaux v. South Dakota State Women’s Prison
D.S.D. · 2026 · confidence medium
Thus, “[w]hen an inmate seeks pauper status, the only issue is whether the inmate pays the entire fee at the initiation of the proceedings or over a period of time under an installment plan.” Henderson v. Norris, 129 F.3d 481, 483 (8th Cir. 1997) (alteration in original) (quoting McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rochelle Rowane Bordeaux v. Jacab Carson, Public Defender, Minnehaha Co. Public Defender; and Does, Public Defender, Minnehaha Co. Public Defender; Rochelle Rowane Bordeaux v. State of South Dakota; and Does, Officers, Judges, Minnehaha County; Pennington Co. Jail; Rochelle Rowane Bordeaux v. South Dakota State Women’s Prison, Women’s Prison; LaChara Marie Bordeaux v. South Dakota State Women’s Prison
D.S.D. · 2026 · confidence medium
Thus, “[w]hen an inmate seeks pauper status, the only issue is whether the inmate pays the entire fee at the initiation of the proceedings or over a period of time under an installment plan.” Henderson v. Norris, 129 F.3d 481, 483 (8th Cir. 1997) (alteration in original) (quoting McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Robert Allan West v. Gustafson, Sgt. Jailer O.1-C. Minnihaha County Jail, individual capacity; and Charge Nurse M2013, RN Nurse M2013 Minnihaha County Jail, individual capacity
D.S.D. · 2026 · confidence medium
Thus, “[w]hen an inmate seeks pauper status, the only issue is whether the inmate pays the entire fee at the initiation of the proceedings or over a period of time under an installment plan.” Henderson v. Norris, 129 F.3d 481, 483 (8th Cir. 1997) (alteration in original)’ (quoting McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Shawn P. Willis v. Correctional Medical Management, Anthony Helland, Stacy, and Meghan
D.S.D. · 2026 · confidence medium
Because a prisoner seeking in forma pauperis status must pay the full filing fee under the PLRA, “the only issue is whether the inmate pays the entire fee at the initiation of the proceedings or over a period of time under an installment plan.” Henderson v. Norris, 129 F.3d 481, 483 (8th Cir. 1997) (alteration in original) (quoting McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997)). https://web.minnehahacounty.gov/dept/so/jaillnmateInfo/jailInmateInfoSearchResults.php?g- recaptcha-response=&action=search&txtLastName=willis&btnSearch=Search (last visited Mar. 20, 2026). ?
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Easton Lloyd Mercy v. Weston Bettelyoun, Correctional Officer Pennington County Jail, official capacity
D.S.D. · 2026 · confidence medium
This obligation arises “the moment the prisoner . . . files an appeal.” Henderson v. Norris, 129 F.3d 481, 483 (8th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (quoting In re Tyler, 110 F.3d 528, 529-30 (8th Cir. 1997)). “[W]hen an inmate seeks pauper status, the only issue is whether the inmate pays the entire fee at the initiation of the proceeding or over a period of time under an installment plan.” Id. (quoting McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997)). “[P]risoners who appeal judgments in civil cases must sooner or later pay the appellate filing fees in full.” Id. (footnote and …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Chaske Rockboy v. Charles Mix County; Randy Thaler, Officially and Individually; Derik Rolston, Officially and Individually; Jan Budavich, Officially and Individually
D.S.D. · 2026 · confidence medium
This obligation arises “the moment the prisoner . . . files an appeal.” Henderson v. Norris, 129 F.3d 481, 483 (8th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (quoting In re Tyler, 110 F.3d 528, 529-30 (8th Cir. 1997)). “[W]hen an inmate seeks pauper status, the only issue is whether the inmate pays the entire fee at the initiation of the proceeding or over a period of time under an installment plan.” Id. (quoting McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997)). “[P]risoners who appeal judgments in civil cases must sooner or later pay the appellate filing fees in full.” Id. (footnote and …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Abdul Waheed Mohammed v. Wade Anderson, Jail Captain, Pennington County Jail, official capacity; Casey Munsch, Jail Captain, Pennington County Jail, official capacity; Taylor Muhlbeier, Jail Lieutenant, Pennington County Jail, official capacity; Andy Diro, Religious Accommodation Officer, Pennington County Jail, official capacity; Corey Brubakken, Jail Commander, Pennington County Jail, official capacity; and Kathleen Houston, Jail Lieutenant, Pennington County Jail, official capacity
D.S.D. · 2026 · confidence medium
Thus, “[w]hen an inmate seeks pauper status, the only issue is whether the inmate pays the entire fee at the initiation of the proceeding or over a period of time under an installment plan.” Henderson v. Norris, 129 F.3d 481, 483 (8th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (alteration in original) (quoting McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Joshua Thompson v. Clay County Sheriffs, et al.
D. Minnesota · 2026 · confidence medium
Henderson v. Norris, 129 F.3d 481, 484 (8th Cir. 1997).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) James Reese and Leisa Reese v. Washoe Investments LLC; Wyndham Hotels and Resorts Inc.; Days Inn of Rapid City; and Does 1-10
D.S.D. · 2026 · confidence medium
Thus, “[wJhen an inmate seeks pauper status, the only issue is whether the inmate pays the entire fee at the initiation of the proceeding or over a period of time under an installment plan.” Henderson v. Norris, 129 F.3d 481, 483 (8th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (alteration in original) (quoting McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Thomas Earl Two Bulls, Sr. v. Jonathan Mamminham, Police Officer at Sioux Falls Police Department, in his individual capacity
D.S.D. · 2026 · confidence medium
Thus, “[w]hen an inmate seeks pauper status, the only issue is whether the inmate pays the entire fee at the initiation of the proceeding or over a period of time under an installment plan.” Henderson v. Norris, 129 F.3d 481, 483 (8th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (alteration in original) (quoting McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) James Reese v. Washoe Investments LLC; Wyndham Hotels and Resorts Inc.; Days Inn of Rapid City; and Does 1-10
D.S.D. · 2026 · confidence medium
Mo. Jan. 9, 2007)). plan.” Henderson v. Norris, 129 F.3d 481, 483 (8th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (alteration in original) (quoting McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Tony Anthony Day v. Correctional Health Management LLC, Health Care Provider (MCJ), individual and official capacity; Minnehaha County, Caretaker of MCJ, individual and official capacity; Minnehaha County Jail, County Jail, individual and official capacity; and Federal Bureau of Investigations, Jurisdiction of Detainee, individual and official capacity
D.S.D. · 2026 · confidence medium
Therefore, “[w]hen an inmate seeks pauper status, the only issue is whether the inmate pays the entire fee at the initiation of the proceeding or over a period of time under an installment plan.” Henderson v. Norris, 129 F.3d 481, 483 (8th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (alteration in original) (quoting McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997)). .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Adam Elliott Sr. v. J. Russell Derr, Judge, in his Official Capacity
D. Neb. · 2026 · confidence medium
Instead, “the whole of the . . . filing fees are to be collected and paid by the installment method contained in § 1915(b)(2).” Henderson v. Norris, 129 F.3d 481, 484 (8th Cir. 1997).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ethan Joshua Charles Robertson v. Jamira Devlin, South Dakota Department of Corrections; Tabatha Benting, Warden, South Dakota Department of Corrections
D.S.D. · 2026 · confidence medium
Thus, “[w]hen an inmate seeks pauper status, the only issue is whether the inmate pays the entire fee at the initiation of the proceeding or over a period of time under an installment plan.” Henderson v. Norris, 129 F.3d 481, 483 (8th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (alteration in original) (quoting McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Adam Elliott, Sr. v. Reception Treatment Center
D. Neb. · 2026 · confidence medium
Instead, “the whole of the... filing fees are to be collected and paid by the installment method contained in § 1915(b)(2).” Henderson v. Norris, 129 F.3d 481, 484 (8th Cir. 1997).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mark Anthony Christians v. Michael Joe Hanvey, Physician Assistant at SDSP-Jameson, in his individual and official capacity; Kellie Wasko, Secretary of Corrections at South Dakota State, in her official capacity; Alyssa Welbig, Nurse Practitioner at SDSP-Jameson, in her individual and official capacity; Dan Sullivan, Former Warden at SDSP-Jameson, in his individual capacity; Aramark Correctional Services, LLC, Contract Food Service Provider at SDSP-Jameson, in its individual and official capacity; Sgt. Steven Swygert, Sgt. for SDSP/Jameson, in his individual and official capacity; Timothy Schneider, Unit Manager at Jameson, in his individual and official capacity; Melissa Maturan, Admin
D.S.D. · 2026 · confidence medium
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), a prisoner who “brings a civil action or files an appeal in forma pauperis . . . shall be required to pay the full amount of a filing fee.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (b)(1). “[T]he assessment of appellate filing fees occurs upon the filing of a notice of appeal . . . and fixes responsibility for payment sooner rather than later of the fees in full.” Henderson v. Norris, 129 F.3d 481, 484 (8th Cir. 1997) (per curiam).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Christopher Bald Eagle v. Richard Gray, in his individual capacity; and Anthony Padilla, in his individual capacity
D.S.D. · 2026 · confidence medium
Therefore, “[w]hen an inmate seeks pauper status, the only issue is whether the inmate pays the entire fee at the initiation of the proceeding or over a period of time under an installment plan.” Henderson v. Norris, 129 F.3d 481, 483 (8th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (alteration in original) (quoting McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Easton Lloyd Mercy v. Weston Bettelyoun, Correctional Officer Pennington County Jail, official capacity
D.S.D. · 2026 · confidence medium
Thus, “[w]hen an inmate seeks pauper status, the only issue is whether the inmate pays the entire fee at the initiation of the proceeding or over a period of time under an installment plan.” Henderson v. Norris, 129 F.3d 481, 483 (8th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (alteration in original) (quoting McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Kevin L. Ballard v. Shane Thurman and Dr. Daniel Danaher
D. Neb. · 2026 · confidence medium
Henderson v. Norris, 129 F.3d 481, 485 (8th Cir. 1997).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Karla Wooten v. Kelly Wasko, SDOC Secretary, in individual capacity; Nick Lamb, Secretary of Corrections, in official capacity; and Aaron Miller, Warden, in individual capacity and official capacity
D.S.D. · 2025 · confidence medium
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), a prisoner who “brings a civil action or files an appeal in forma pauperis . . . shall be required to pay the full amount of a filing fee.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (b)(1). “[T]he assessment of appellate filing fees occurs upon the filing of a notice of appeal . . . and fixes responsibility for payment sooner rather than later of the fees in full.” Henderson v. Norris, 129 F.3d 481, 484 (8th Cir. 1997) (per curiam).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Michael Ammons v. Sioux Falls Police Department; Burlington Stores, Inc., d/b/a Burlington Store
D.S.D. · 2025 · confidence medium
Therefore, “[w]hen an inmate seeks pauper status, the only issue is whether the inmate pays the entire fee at the initiation of the proceeding or over a period of time under an installment plan.” Henderson v. Norris, 129 F.3d 481, 483 (8th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (alteration in original) (quoting McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jeremias Hernandez v. Kellie Wasko, Secretary of Corrections at South Dakota D.O.C., in individual and official capacity; Dr. Aaron Hayes, Correctional Health at South Dakota D.O.C., in individual and official capacity; Stephanie Hamilton, MDSP, in individual and official capacity; NP Elizabeth Paul, Nurse Practitioner at MDSP, in individual and official capacity; Rachel Tycz, Nurse Supervisor at MDSP; Angie Watson, Travel Nurse at MDSP; Abbe Dickes, Unit Coordinator, (AKA, Unit Sergeant) at MDSP; and Nichole McDaniel, Scheduling Person at MDSP
D.S.D. · 2025 · confidence medium
Thus, “[w]hen an inmate seeks pauper status, the only issue is whether the inmate pays the entire fee at the initiation of the proceeding or over a period of time under an installment plan.” Henderson v. Norris, 129 F.3d 481, 483 (8th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (alteration in original) (quoting McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) THOMAS SPOTTED BEAR v. DARWIN LONG, AOF Administrator; JEAN WHIRLWIND HORSE, Director of Corrections; RONDA BELILE, Sargent of Corrections; and C-O IRINE RONE EAGLE
D.S.D. · 2025 · confidence medium
Therefore, “[w]hen an inmate seeks pauper status, the only issue is whether the inmate pays the entire fee at the initiation of the proceeding or over a period of time under an installment plan.” Henderson v. Norris, 129 F.3d 481, 483 (8th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (alteration in original) (quoting McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mark Christians v. Darin Young, Troy Ponto, Jessica Cook, Brent Fluke, Rebecca Schieffer, Alex Reyes, Seth Hughes, Nancy Christensen, Deb Eilers, Laurie Stratman, Julie Stevens, Angela Pechous, Greasman, a/k/a Adam Sims, Bryan Marjama, Kendrick Winters, Angel Padilla, Matthew Hulscher, Jennifer Dreiske, Jordan Becker, Preston Perret
D.S.D. · 2025 · confidence medium
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), a prisoner who “brings a civil action or files an appeal in forma pauperis . . . shall be required to pay the full amount of a filing fee.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (b)(1). “[T]he assessment of appellate filing fees occurs upon the filing of a notice of appeal . . . and fixes responsibility for payment sooner rather than later of the fees in full.” Henderson v. Norris, 129 F.3d 481, 484 (8th Cir. 1997) (per curiam).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Diallio Jones v. Hendrix, Officer, et al.
E.D. Ark. · 2025 · confidence medium
Thus, when an application to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) is filed in such a case, ‘the only issue is whether the inmate pays the entire fee at the initiation of the proceeding or over a period of time under an installment plan.’”) (citations omitted) (quoting Henderson v. Norris, 129 F.3d 481, 483 (8th Cir.1997)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Marcel Boyd v. United States of America, Isiah Crow, and Oglala Public Safety
D.S.D. · 2025 · confidence medium
Therefore, “[w]hen an inmate seeks pauper status, the only issue is whether the inmate pays the entire fee at the initiation of the proceeding or over a period of time under an installment plan.” Henderson v. Norris, 129 F.3d 481, 483 (8th Cir. 1997) (alteration in original) (quoting McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Dan v. State of Nebraska
D. Neb. · 2025 · confidence medium
Henderson v. Norris, 129 F.3d 481, 485 (8th Cir. 1997).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Johnson v. Jensen
D.S.D. · 2025 · confidence medium
The Eighth Circuit granted his request to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis and remanded to this Court for calculation and collection of the appellate filing fee. “(T]he assessment of appellate filing fees occurs upon the filing of a notice of appeal or the filing of a motion to proceed in forma pauperis . . . and fixes responsibility for payment sooner or later of the fees in full.” Henderson v. Norris, 129 F.3d 481, 484 (8th Cir. 1997).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bell v. Brown
D.S.D. · 2025 · confidence medium
Thus, “[w]hen an inmate seeks pauper status, the only issue is whether the inmate pays the entire fee at the initiation of the proceeding or over a period of time under an installment plan.” Henderson v. Norris, 129 F.3d 481, 483 (8th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (alteration in original) (quoting McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Dan v. State of Nebraska
D. Neb. · 2025 · confidence medium
Henderson v. Norris, 129 F.3d 481, 485 (8th Cir. 1997).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Harold HENDERSON, Appellant,
v.
Larry NORRIS, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction; David Guntharp, Assistant Director, Arkansas Department of Correction, Appellees
97-1813.
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
Nov 19, 1997.
129 F.3d 481
1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 32756
1997 WL 716118
Harold Henderson, Appellant, pro se., No appearances for the appellees.
Beam, Hansen, Arnold.
Cited by 837 opinions  |  Published
Reporter's Syllabus editorial summary, not part of the Court's opinion

Harold Henderson, Appellant, pro se.

No appearances for the appellees.

Before BEAM, HANSEN and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Lead Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Arkansas prisoner Harold Henderson appeals from the district court’s[1] summary dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint as frivolous. Henderson sued the director and assistant director of the Arkansas Department of Correction, alleging due process violations in the defendants’ (1) failure to timely and properly process unspecified grievances and (2) failure to allow Henderson to participate in establishing a grievance policy. Upon preliminary review, the district court dismissed the complaint without prejudice and certified any appeal would not be in good faith. The district court clerk and the clerk of this court notified Henderson of the fee requirements under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA).[2] Henderson persisted in his appeal, arguing his notice of appeal was timely but ignoring the fee requirements. We require Henderson to pay appellate fees in accord with 28 U.S.C. § 1915, as amended by the PLRA, determine the procedure to be used to assess, calculate, and collect the fees he owes, and summarily affirm the district court.

I

We have stated that the PLRA “makes prisoners responsible for their filing fees the moment the prisoner ... files an appeal.” In re Tyler, 110 F.3d 528, 529-30 (8th Cir.1997). The Sixth Circuit has held that “[w]hen an inmate seeks pauper status, the only issue is whether the inmate pays the entire fee at the initiation of the proceeding or over a period of time under an installment plan.” See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir.1997). Thus, prisoners who appeal judgments in civil cases must sooner or later pay the appellate filing fees in full.[3] Newlin v. Helman, 123 F.3d 429, 432 (7th Cir.1997). However, the provisions of § 1915(b)(4) permit a' prisoner to appeal if the prisoner has no assets and no means to pay the initial partial appellate filing fee. In[*484] such a case, the whole of the appellate fihng fees are to be collected and paid by the installment method contained in § 1915(b)(2).

The McGore court reasoned that the introductory clauses of subsections (a)(1) and (b)(1) of § 1915 excluded the good faith certification provision of subsection (a)(3) from the prisoner appeal process. See id. at 610-11. On the other hand, the Fifth Circuit in Baugh v. Taylor, 117 F.3d 197, 199 (1997), reconciled the coexistence of subsections (a)(1), (b)(1), and (a)(3) by using Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a) and its thirty-year history of implementation. Id. at 201; accord Newlin, 123 F.3d at 432. Our own history of the implementation of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a), see Perry v. Ralston, 635 F.2d 740 (8th Cir.1980), puts us more in line with the Baugh v. Taylor court than with the McGore court. Consequently, we hold that civil action prisoner-appellants who have been denied the right to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis by the district court because the district court has certified under § 1915(a)(3) that the appeal would not be taken in good faith, may still, by separate motion filed with this court pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a), seek to proceed in this court under the provisions of § 1915. We further hold that the fihng of such a motion with this court triggers the prisoner-appellant’s responsibility to pay the full amount of the appellate fihng fees pursuant to the installment payment provisions of § 1915(b), see Baugh at 202, unless the appellant must pay the full amount up front in cash because he has acquired the requisite “three strikes” under § 1915(g).

In implementing the PLRA, we believe it useful to distinguish the “assessment,” “calculation,” and “collection” of appehate fihng fees. As indicated above, the assessment of appehate fihng fees occurs upon the fihng of a notice of appeal or the fihng of a motion to proceed in forma pauper-is with this court pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a), and fixes responsibility for payment sooner or later of the fees in full. The calculation of the initial partial appellate fihng fee occurs upon the availability of the certification of a prisoner-appellant’s prison account and leads to an order to prison officials to deduct the initial partial appellate fee and installment payments from a prisoner-appellant’s account. The collection of the initial payment and the later instahment payments (the latter to be calculated and remitted by prison officials pursuant to § 1915(b)(2)) occurs over whatever time is needed for the payment of the assessed fees. The calculation and collection steps do not delay the court’s resolution of the merits of the appeal. Once appellate fihng fees are assessed, the court may proceed as appropriate to consider the particular case, for example, to dismiss the appeal as frivolous or maheious under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), to summarily dispose of the appeal in accord with the pleadings and district court record, or to order briefing, argument, and full submission. Irrespective of the court’s approach to the merits of the appeal, the prisoner’s habihty for the full payment of the appellate fihng fees under the PLRA continues until full payment has been made which may be long after we have disposed of the appeal.

With regard to this case, and to implement the congressional intent of requiring prisoner-appellants to pay appellate filing fees in full, we establish the following procedures:

(1) When the district court notifies the prisoner htigant in a civil action of its judgment, the court shall notify the prisoner that: (a) the fihng of a notice of appeal by the prisoner makes the prisoner hable for payment of the full $105 appellate fihng fees regardless of the outcome of the appeal; (b) by fihng a notice of appeal the prisoner consents to the deduction of the initial partial appellate fihng fee and the remaining installments from the prisoner’s prison account by prison officials; (c) the prisoner must submit to the clerk of the district court a certified copy of the prisoner’s prison account for the last six months within 30 days of fihng the notice of appeal; and (d) failure to file the prison account information will result in the assessment of an initial appellate partial fee of $35 or such other amount that is reasonable, based on whatever information the court has about the prisoner’s finances.

[*485] (2) When a district court receives a prisoner’s notice of appeal in a prisoner’s civil action, it shall assess the $105 appellate filing fees and process the appeal in ordinary course.

(3) When the district court receives the certified copy of the prisoner’s prison account, it shall: (a) calculate the initial appellate partial filing fee as provided by § 1915(b)(1), or determine that the provisions of § 1915(b)(4) apply. ’ In such event the whole of the appellate filing fees shall be paid pursuant to the installment payment provisions of § 1915(b)(2); (b) notify the prison officials to pay the initial appellate partial fee from the prisoner’s account to the clerk of the district court and to calculate and pay the remaining installments to the clerk of the district court until the whole of the appellate filing fees has been paid in full as provided by § 1915(b)(2); and (c) send a copy of the collection order to the prisoner.

(4) If the district court does not receive a certified copy of the prisoner’s prison account within 30 days of the notice of appeal, it shall calculate the initial appellate partial filing fee at $35 or such other reasonable amount warranted by available information and proceed as in paragraph 3, above.

(5) Upon a prisoner’s showing of good cause for delay in providing a certified copy of the prison account, the district court may extend the time for providing the copy.

District courts should continue to certify pursuant to § 1915(a)(3) and Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a) whether or not an appeal by any appellant who has moved in the district court to proceed in forma pauper-is on appeal is or is not taken in good faith. If the district court concludes that such an appeal is not taken in good faith, it shall, pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a), “state in writing the reasons for the denial.” Such a denial remains reviewable under the appellate motion practice provided for in Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a), but, as we have indicated, the filing of such a motion by a prisoner-appellant results in the immediate assessment of the full appellate filing fees under § 1915(b).

In this case — processed before our establishment of procedures — we assess Henderson’s appellate filing fees at $105 and notify him that he has 30 days to submit to the district court' a certified copy of his prison account for the six months immediately before the filing of his appeal. We leave it to the district court to calculate Henderson’s initial partial appellate filing fee and to order collection of that fee and the remaining installments from him in accord with § 1915 and the procedures outlined above.

II

We now consider Henderson’s appeal. We agree with Henderson that his notice of appeal was timely under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(c) (notice is filed when deposited in institution’s internal mail system). Upon our review of the district court record, however, we affirm the judgment of the district court under Eighth Circuit Rule 47A(a), conclude that Henderson’s appeal is frivolous,[4] and notify him that the dispositions of both his complaint and his appeal are ‘‘strikes” under § 1915(g). Newlin, 123 F.3d at 433.

MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judge,
1

The Honorable George Howard, Jr., United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Arkansas, adopting the report and recommendation of the Honorable Jerry W. Cavaneau, United States Magistrate Judge for the Eastern District of Arkansas.

2

Pub.L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915 (West Supp.1997)).

3

A $5 filing fee is required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and a $100 docketing fee is required by the Judicial Conference of the United Slates. We refer to the total $105 as "appellate filing fees” in this opinion.

4

We are mindful that the affirmance of a district court's dismissal of a complaint as frivolous does nol automatically make the appeal frivolous.

Concurrence in Part

concurring and dissenting.

I concur in so much of the court’s opinion as holds that a prisoner in a civil action may file a motion to proceed under § 1915 despite the fact that the district court has certified that the appeal is not taken in good faith, and that the filing of such a motion triggers the prisoner’s duty to pay the filing fees, subject to certain exceptions. With respect, however, I cannot locate in any statute or common-law principle the authority that the court evidently asserts to promulgate rules for the district courts in cases like the present one, or, indeed, in any other kind of case. The court engages not in adjudication, but in rule-making, and rule-making, moreover, of a kind for which the court does not even purport to find a warrant. I therefore respeet-[*486] fully dissent from the portion of the court’s judgment that derives from the part of its opinion regulating the district courts’ handling of eases under the PLRA.