Brown v. State, 412 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). · Go Syfert
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Brown v. State, 412 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, last quoted 1983 · …the question involved here is ... whether the tender of a bad check ... constituted such a material breach ... as to justify ... termination ... ⚠ not in text
6 citation events across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Friedman v. Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc. (fladistctapp, 1990-07-11)
Top citers, strongest first. 4 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited "see, e.g." Friedman v. Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1990 · signal: see also · confidence low
See Burger King Corporation v. Mason, 710 F.2d 1480 (11th Cir.1983); see also Callins v. Abbatecola, 412 So.2d 58 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982).
cited Cited "see, e.g." McNeil v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1983 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Brown v. State, 412 So.2d 58 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Burger King Corp. v. Mason
11th Cir. · 1983 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Callins v. Abbatecola, 412 So.2d 58 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1982) (when a party sought to terminate a real estate contract on the ground that the purchaser’s cheek was returned for insufficient funds, the court stated that “the question involved here is ... whether [the tender of a bad check] ... constituted such a material breach ... as to justify ... termination ... ”.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Burger King Corporation, Cross-Appellant v. Gerald A. Mason, Cross-Appellees. Burger King Corporation, a Florida Corporation, Counter- Cross-Appellant v. Gerald A. Mason, Counter-Plaintiffs, Cross
11th Cir. · 1983 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Callins v. Abbatecola, 412 So.2d 58 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1982) (when a party sought to terminate a real estate contract on the ground that the purchaser's check was returned for insufficient funds, the court stated that "the question involved here is ... whether [the tender of a bad check] ... constituted such a material breach ... as to justify ... termination ...".
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Eric Anthony BROWN
v.
STATE of Florida
No. 81-30.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
Apr 7, 1982.
412 So. 2d 58
1982 Fla. App. LEXIS 21061
Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, and Robert E. Adler, Asst. Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant., Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Stewart J. Bellus, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.
Anstead, Dell, Downey.
Cited by 1 opinion  |  Published
DELL, Judge.

Eric Anthony Brown appeals from his conviction for burglary with an assault. Appellant has demonstrated no reversible error with respect to his conviction, but we must remand this cause for resentencing.

Appellant was seventeen at the time of the offense. The trial judge determined that since appellant had been indicted, he was not transferred for prosecution to the criminal division of the circuit court pursuant to Chapter 39, and thus did not qualify as a youthful offender. § 958.04(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (1979). Since the time of the trial of this case the Supreme Court has since held that a minor initially proceeded against by indictment is to be considered “transferred” for purposes of Section 958.04(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1979). State v. Goodson, 403 So.2d 1337 (Fla.1981).

The State argues that the term “life felony” in Section 958.04(l)(c) means all crimes punishable by life imprisonment, and that appellant does not qualify for mandatory youthful offender treatment. This is incorrect. A life felony is different from a felony in the first degree punishable by life imprisonment. Trent v. State, 403 So.2d 1131 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). Therefore we remand this cause for resentencing under Section 958.04, Florida Statutes (1979).

REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.

DOWNEY and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur.