Floyd v. Waiters, 171 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir. 1999). · Go Syfert
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Floyd v. Waiters, 171 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir. 1999). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 4× by 4 distinct cases, 2010–2023 · 3 courts · …high enough up the chain-of-command that his acts constitute an official decision by the school district itself not to remedy the misconduct. at p. 1264 ✓
82 citation events (70 in the last 25 years) across 19 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Rachael DeMarcus v. University of South Alabama (ca11, 2025-04-10)
Treatment trajectory · 1999 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1999 2012 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 25 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rachael DeMarcus v. University of South Alabama (2×)
11th Cir. · 2025 · confidence medium
First, it “reinstate[d its] prior decision and opinion.” Floyd v. Waiters, 171 F.3d 1264, 1264 (11th Cir. 1999) (Floyd II) (emphasis added).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Doe v. New College of Florida
M.D. Fla. · 2023 · confidence medium
The school official must be “high enough up the chain-of-command that his acts constitute an official decision by the school district itself not to remedy the misconduct.” Floyd v. Waiters, 171 F.3d 1264, 1264 (11th Cir. 1999). a.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Danvers v. Loudoun County School Board
E.D. Va. · 2022 · confidence medium
But contrary to the School Board’s arguments, an official need not be “high enough up the chain-of-command” so that “his acts constitute an official decision by the school district itself . . . .” Dkt. 17 at 13 (quoting Floyd v. Waiters, 171 F.3d 1264, 164 (11th Cir. 1999)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Doe v. Fulton County School District
N.D. Ga. · 2021 · confidence medium
The Eleventh Circuit has described an “appropriate person,” as a “school official … high enough up the chain-of-command that his acts constitute an official decision by the school district itself not to remedy the misconduct.” Hill v. Cundiff, 797 F.3d at 970–71 (quoting Floyd v. Waiters, 171 F.3d 1264, 1264 (11th Cir. 1999)). “[T]he ultimate question of who is an appropriate person is necessarily a fact-based inquiry because officials' roles vary among school districts.” Doe v. Sch.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lauren Kesterson v. Kent State Univ.
6th Cir. · 2020 · confidence medium
In considering whether a teacher’s aide was an “appropriate person,” the Eleventh Circuit examined the aide’s position and authority to discipline students, and found that an aide “had to answer to a teacher, the assistant principals, and the principal, and [] was not high enough on the chain-of-command at [the school] for her acts to ‘constitute an official decision by the school district itself not to remedy the misconduct.’” Id. at 971 (quoting Floyd v. Waiters, 171 F.3d 1264, 1264 (11th Cir. 1999)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jane Doe v. Edgewood Indep School District
5th Cir. · 2020 · confidence medium
And myriad courts have recognized that the power to institute corrective measures must include the power to terminate or discipline.35 As discussed, 32 See 524 U.S. at 290 . 33 Rosa H., 106 F.3d at 660 ; see also Baynard v. Malone, 268 F.3d 228 , 238–39 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing Rosa H., 106 F.3d at 660 ) (explaining the “appropriate person” inquiry should elucidate “whether a supervisory employee may be viewed as the proxy of the school district”); Floyd v. Waiters, 171 F.3d 1264, 1264 (11th Cir. 1999) (concluding that an “appropriate person” for purposes of Title IX liability is …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Walker v. Tuscaloosa County School Board
N.D. Ala. · 2019 · confidence medium
Bd. of Broward Cty, Fla., 604 F.3d 1248, 1256 (11th Cir. 2010). “[T]he official with notice . . . must be ‘high enough up the chain-of-command that his [or her] acts constitute an official decision by the school district itself not to remedy the misconduct.’” Id. at 1255 (quoting Floyd v. Waiters, 171 F.3d 1264, 1264 (11th Cir. 1999)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) J.S. Ex Rel. J.S. v. Houston County Board of Education
11th Cir. · 2017 · confidence medium
“An ‘appropriate person’ ... is, at a minimum, an official of the recipient entity with authority to take corrective action to end the discrimination.” Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290, 118 , S.Ct. 1989. “[T]he official with notice .., must be ‘high enough up the chain-off command that his [or her] acts constitute an official decision by the school district itself not to remedy the misconduct.’ ” Broward Cty., 604 F.3d at 1255 (quoting Floyd *988 v. Waiters, 171 F.3d 1264, 1264 (11th Cir. 1999)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) James Hill v. Jeanne Dunaway
11th Cir. · 2015 · confidence medium
In Floyd v. Waiters, 171 F.3d 1264, 1264 (11th Cir. 1999), this Court elaborated on the “appropriate person” requirement, stating the school official must be “high enough up the chain-of- command that his acts constitute an official decision by the school district itself not to remedy the misconduct.” Applying this standard, this Court held a school security guard was not an appropriate person.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) James Hill v. Madison County School Board
11th Cir. · 2015 · confidence medium
In Floyd v. Waiters, 171 F.3d 1264, 1264 (11th Cir.1999), this Court elaborated on the “appropriate person” requirement, stating the school official must be “high enough up the chain-of-command that his acts constitute an official decision by the school district itself not to remedy the misconduct.” Applying this standard, this Court held a school security guard was not an appropriate person.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Susan Liese v. Indian River County Hospital District
11th Cir. · 2012 · confidence medium
Bd. of Broward Cnty., Fla., 604 F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir.2010) (commenting that an official must be someone “high enough up the chain-of-command that his acts constitute an official decision ... not to remedy the misconduct” (quoting Floyd v. Waiters, 171 F.3d 1264, 1264 (11th Cir.1999))).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Susan Liese v. Indian River County Hospital District
11th Cir. · 2012 · confidence medium
Bd. of Broward Cnty., Fla., 604 F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 2010) (commenting that an official must be someone “high enough up the chain-of-command that his acts constitute an official decision . . . not to remedy the misconduct” (quoting Floyd v. Waiters, 171 F.3d 1264, 1264 (11th Cir. 1999))).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ross v. Corporation of Mercer University
M.D. Ga. · 2007 · confidence medium
The Court recognizes that generally an “appropriate individual” for purposes of Title IX liability is a "supervisor” or a “school official high enough up the chain-of-command that his acts constitute an official decision.” Floyd v. Waiters, 171 F.3d 1264, 1264 (11th Cir.1999).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Theriault v. UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN MAINE
D. Me. · 2004 · confidence medium
That language does not establish the members of the Committee as individuals within the UMS hierarchy holding sufficient authority to redress Nye’s alleged discrimination against the plaintiff, such “that [their] acts constitute an official decision by the school ... itself not to remedy the misconduct.” Floyd v. Waiters, 171 F.3d 1264, 1264 (11th Cir.1999).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Baynard v. Lawson (2×) also: Cited "see"
E.D. Va. · 2000 · confidence medium
Because we find the reasoning in Rosa H. to be sound, in light of Gebser , we adopt its standard for the “appropriate person.” See Floyd v. Waiters, 171 F.3d at 1264 (post-Gebser decision endorsing two-part test to establish Title IX liability against a school district: (1) some supervisor with authority to take corrective action was placed on notice of bad conduct, and (2) that supervisor was an official sufficiently high up in the chain-of-command that his acts constitute an official decision by the school district itself not to remedy the misconduct).
discussed Cited "see" Colbert v. University of South Alabama (2×)
S.D. Ala. · 2024 · signal: see · confidence high
See Floyd v. Waiters, 171 F.3d 1264, 1264 (llth Circuit. 1999).
discussed Cited "see" DeMarcus v. University of South Alabama (2×)
S.D. Ala. · 2023 · signal: see · confidence high
See Floyd v. Waiters, 171 F.3d 1264, 1264 (llth Circuit. 1999).
cited Cited "see" Weis v. Board of Trustees of Florida Gulf Coast University
M.D. Fla. · 2020 · signal: see · confidence high
See Floyd v. Waiters, 171 F.3d 1264, 1264 (11th Cir. 1999).
cited Cited "see" K.B. v. Daleville City Board of Education
11th Cir. · 2013 · signal: see · confidence high
See Floyd v. Waiters, 171 F.3d 1264, 1264 (11th Cir.1999).
discussed Cited "see" L.N. v. Monroe County Board of Education (2×)
Ala. · 2013 · signal: see · confidence high
See Floyd v. Waiters, 171 F.3d 1264, 1264 (11th Cir.1999).
cited Cited "see" Doe v. School Bd. of Broward County, Fla.
11th Cir. · 2010 · signal: see · confidence high
See Floyd v. Waiters, 171 F.3d 1264, 1264 (11th Cir.1999).
cited Cited "see" Smith v. Allen
11th Cir. · 2007 · signal: see · confidence high
See Floyd v. Waiters, 133 F.3d 786, 789 (11th Cir.1998) (citation omitted), vacated on other grounds, 525 U.S. 802 , 119 S.Ct. 33 , 142 L.Ed.2d 25 , reinstated at 171 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir.1999).
cited Cited "see" Litman v. George Mason University
E.D. Va. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See Floyd v. Waiters, 171 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir.1999).
discussed Cited "see" Hartley v. Washington Cty. School
11th Cir. · 1999 · signal: see · confidence high
See Floyd v. Waiters, 133 F.3d 786 , 789 (11th Cir.) (“[A] Title IX claim can only be brought against a grant recipient--that is, a local school district--and not an individual.”) (citations and quotations omitted) vacated, --- U.S. ---, 119 S. Ct. 33 (1998), reinstated, 171 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir. 1999) petition for cert. filed (U.S. July 6, 1999) (No. 99-5197).
discussed Cited "see" Hartley Ex Rel. Hartley v. Parnell (2×)
11th Cir. · 1999 · signal: see · confidence high
See Floyd v. Waiters, 133 F.3d 786, 789 (11th Cir.) ("[A] Title IX claim can only be brought against a grant recipient—that is, a local school district—and not an individual.") (citations and quotations omitted) vacated, --- U.S. ----, 119 S.Ct. 33 , 142 L.Ed.2d 25 (1998), reinstated, 171 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir.1999) petition for cert. filed (U.S. July 6, 1999) (No. 99-5197).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Carol Floyd, Carla Floyd, Mary Ann Drake
v.
Iris Waiters, Security Chief, Board of Public Education and Orphanage for Bibb County, William Decker Booker, Security Guard, Board of Public Education and Orphanage for Bibb County, Kenneth Bronson, Security Guard, Board of Public Education and Orphanage for Bibb County, John Nicholson, Head of Operations, Board of Public Education and Orphanage for Bibb County, Stephen Massey, President, Board of Public Education and Orphanage for Bibb County, Thomas Hagler, Superintendent, Board of Public Education and Orphanage for Bibb County, Harry Tinker
94-8667.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
Apr 5, 1999.
171 F.3d 1264
1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 6068
Cited by 12 opinions  |  Published

171 F.3d 1264

133 Ed. Law Rep. 717, 12 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 675

Carol FLOYD, Carla Floyd, Mary Ann Drake,
Plaintiffs-Appellants, Cross-Appellees,
v.
Iris WAITERS, Security Chief, Board of Public Education and
Orphanage for Bibb County, William Decker Booker,
Security Guard, Board of Public
Education and Orphanage for
Bibb County, Defendants,
Kenneth Bronson, Security Guard, Board of Public Education
and Orphanage for Bibb County, John Nicholson, Head of
Operations, Board of Public Education and Orphanage for Bibb
County, Stephen Massey, President, Board of Public Education
and Orphanage for Bibb County, Thomas Hagler,
Superintendent, Board of Public Education and Orphanage for
Bibb County, Harry Tinker, Defendants-Appellees, Cross-Appellants.

No. 94-8667.

United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.

April 5, 1999.

Sandra J. Popson, Brown, Katz, Flatau & Hasty, Macon, GA, for Plaintiffs-Appellants, Cross-Appellees.

Jerry A. Lumley, Wallace Warren Plowden, Jr., Macon, GA, for Waiters, Booker, Bronson, Nicholson, Hagler, Massy and John Doe Security.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia (No. 91-CV-47-2-MAC (WDO)), Wilbur D. Owens, Jr., Judge.

ON REMAND FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

Before EDMONDSON and COX, Circuit Judges, and FAY, Senior Circuit Judge.

EDMONDSON, Circuit Judge:

1

We earlier decided this case in Floyd v. Waiters, 133 F.3d 786 (11th Cir.1998). The Supreme Court vacated our judgment and instructed us to reconsider the case in the light of its decision in Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 118 S.Ct. 1989, 141 L.Ed.2d 277 (1998). We have done so. We reinstate our prior decision and opinion.

2

Briefly stated, in Floyd, we wrote that a Title IX plaintiff must establish two things to survive summary judgment in a cause of action against a school district like Bibb County's for the discriminatory acts of its employees. First, some supervisor with authority to take corrective action was placed on notice of the bad conduct. See id. at 792 & n. 13. Second, the supervisor possessing this authority was a school official high enough up the chain-of-command that his acts constitute an official decision by the school district itself not to remedy the misconduct. See id. at 790-792. Given the circumstances of this case, we held that there could be no Title IX liability.

3

In Gebser, the Supreme Court faced a sexual-harassment-by-a-teacher case under Title IX. The Court pointed out the contractual nature of Title IX and rejected school district liability based on either respondeat superior or constructive notice. See Gebser, 118 S.Ct. at 1997. Then the Court tied school district liability to an official decision by the school district not to remedy a known act of misconduct. For school district liability, the Court stressed that some "appropriate person" in the school district must have actual notice of the misconduct. See id. at 1999.

4

The Court did not go into detail about who would be an appropriate person; it did not need to do so to decide Gebser: in Gebser no one in the pertinent school district other than the offending teacher himself knew of his misconduct. See id. at 1993. The Court did say, however, that the appropriate person must necessarily be an "official" of the school district and must have the authority to end the discrimination. See id. at 1999. But these preconditions were set out in the context of "at a minimum"--a minimum which was not met in Gebser--and not set out as a fully developed, complete standard.[*]

5

In our view, our decision in this case is consistent with the Supreme Court's decision (and reasoning) in Gebser. The judgment of the district court is again AFFIRMED.

*

By the way we, given the record before us, also conclude as a matter of law that Mr. Waiters and Mr. Tinker (the two district employees who have been especially singled-out by plaintiffs) were not school district officials and that they also lacked authority to end the pertinent discrimination