Baez v. Banc One Leasing Corp., 348 F.3d 972 (11th Cir. 2003). · Go Syfert
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Baez v. Banc One Leasing Corp., 348 F.3d 972 (11th Cir. 2003). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
16 citation events (16 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Joseph Norman Brown, III v. Wayne Ivey (ca11, 2022-02-28)
Statutes interpreted (leading-cases list)
#7 15 U.S.C. § 1667b(b) cited 1× in this case · 32 total citations of statute
Top citers, strongest first. 6 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Joseph Norman Brown, III v. Wayne Ivey
11th Cir. · 2022 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Cf. Baez v. Banc One Leasing Corp., 348 F.3d 972, 973 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (“We review for abuse of discretion the district court’s decision to deny the motion for leave to file an amended complaint.”). “[B]efore the district court dismisses [an] action with preju- dice”—and “where a more carefully drafted complaint might state a claim”—it “must” afford “a pro se plaintiff . . . at least one chance to amend the complaint.” Silberman v. Miami Dade Transit, 927 F.3d 1123, 1132 (11th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up) (emphasis added).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Matthew Friedson v. Sheriff David Shoar
11th Cir. · 2021 · confidence medium
Baez v. Banc One Leasing Corp., 348 F.3d 972, 973 (11th Cir. 2003).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Perez v. City of Hialeah (2×)
S.D. Fla. · 2021 · confidence medium
Under Rule 15, the grant or denial of an opportunity to amend “is within the discretion of the District Court.” Baez v. Banc One Leasing Corp., 348 F.3d 972, 974 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Robert Garfield v. NDCHealth Corporation
11th Cir. · 2006 · confidence medium
Baez v. Banc One Leasing Corp., 348 F.3d 972, 973 (11th Cir.2003).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Waldo Coney v. Loren A. Grayer
11th Cir. · 2006 · confidence medium
Baez v. Banc One Leasing Corp., 348 F.3d 972, 973 (11th Cir.2003).
discussed Cited "see" Amoco Oil Co. v. Caroline Gomez
11th Cir. · 2004 · signal: see · confidence high
Partners v. Arnold, 179 F.3d 656, 664 (9th Cir.1999) (holding that “we have held that a district court’s [Rule 8(c)] decisions with regard to the treatment of affirmative defenses is reviewed for an abuse of discretion”); see Baez v. Banc One Leasing Corp., 348 F.3d 972, 973 (11th Cir.2003) (holding that “[w]e review for abuse of discretion the district court’s decision to deny the motion for leave to file an amended complaint” where Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that leave shall be granted freely “when justice so requires”).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Lourdes BAEZ, Personal Representative of the Estate of Alberto Torres, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
BANC ONE LEASING CORPORATION and Banc One Credit Company, Defendants-Appellees
02-16567.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
Oct 24, 2003.
348 F.3d 972
Anne M. Burton, Daniel A. Edelman, Cathleen M. Combs, Edelman and Combs, Chicago, IL, Charles McLeod Baird, Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiff-Appellant., Darryl J. May, Joel E. Tasca, Ballard, Spahr, Andrews & Ingersoll, Philadelphia, PA, Therese G. Franzen, John H. Bedard, Jr., Franzen & Salzano, P.C., Norcross, GA, for Defendants-Appellees.
Edmondson, Cox, Paul.
Cited by 8 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM:

I.INTRODUCTION

Lourdes Baez, the personal representative of Plaintiff Alberto Torres’s estate, appeals the district court’s entry of summary judgment for Banc One Credit Company. We affirm the district court’s order, reported at Torres v. Banc One Leasing Corp., 226 F.Supp.2d 1345 (N.D.Ga.2002), granting summary judgment to Banc One Credit Company and Banc One Leasing Corporation on the original complaint, and we affirm the judgment in favor of Banc One Leasing Corporation. [1] But, we vacate the judgment for Banc One Credit Company and remand the case for the district court to consider Torres’s motion for leave to file an amended complaint against Banc One Credit Company, which was pending at the time the district court entered final judgment.

II.STANDARD OF REVIEW

Baez raises three issues regarding the district court’s grant of Banc One Credit Company’s motion for summary judgment, and one issue regarding the district court’s tacit denial of Torres’s motion for leave to amend his complaint. We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment, applying the same familiar standards as the district court. Hallum v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 326 F.3d 1374, 1375-76 n. 1 (11th Cir.2003). We review for abuse of discretion the district court’s decision to deny the motion for leave to file an amended complaint. Jennings v. BIC Corp., 181 F.3d 1250, 1254 (11th Cir.1999).

III.ISSUES ON APPEAL AND. DISCUSSION

Baez first contends that the district court erred when it concluded that the early termination provision in Torres’s auto lease did not run afoul of § 183(b) of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1667b(b) (2003). The district court concluded that the early termination provision was “reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual harm caused by[*974] the delinquency, default, or early termination, the difficulties of proof of loss, and the inconvenience or nonfeasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy,” as required by § 1667b(b). [2] See Torres, 226 F.Supp.2d at 1350-51. We agree with the district court’s conclusion and its reasoning in support of that conclusion.

Second, Baez contends that the district court erred when it concluded that the early termination provision did not run afoul of Georgia’s Uniform Commercial Code provision requiring liquidated damages to be “reasonable in light of the then anticipated harm caused by the default or other act or omission.” O.C.G.A. § 11-2A-504(1) (2003). We agree with the district court that the provision is reasonable under Georgia law, based on Sun v. Mercedes Benz Credit Corp., 254 Ga.App. 463, 562 S.E.2d 714, 717-18 (Ga.Ct.App.2002), cert. denied (Ga.2002). See Torres, 226 F.Supp.2d at 1351-52.

Third, Baez contends that the district court erred when it concluded that Torres’s right to reimbursement for unused warranty payments was immaterial to his claim that the early termination provision was unreasonable under Federal and Georgia law. See id. at 1352. We find no error in the district court’s conclusion.

Fourth, Baez contends that the district court abused its discretion when it entered final judgment against Torres without addressing Torres’s pending motion to amend his complaint against Banc One Credit Company. We agree. The district court did not comment on the motion, and apparently overlooked it in closing the case. This was an abuse of discretion. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a) (stating that leave to file an amended pleading shall be freely given when justice so requires); Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 230, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962) (“[T]he grant or denial of an opportunity to amend is within the discretion of the District Court, but outright refusal to grant the leave without any justifying reason appearing for the denial is not an exercise of discretion; it is merely abuse of that discretion and inconsistent with the spirit of the Federal Rules.”).

IV. CONCLUSION

The grant of summary judgment to Banc One Credit Company on the original complaint is affirmed. The judgment in favor of Banc One Leasing Corporation is affirmed. The final judgment in favor of Banc One Credit Company is vacated and the case is remanded for the district court to address the motion for leave to amend the complaint against Banc One Credit Company.

AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART.

1

. Baez does not contend that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for Banc One Leasing Corporation.

2

. If Torres had kept the car for the full lease term, he would have paid an amount equal to Banc One's estimation of the car's depreciation during the lease term, plus interest. Under the early termination provision, however, Banc One charged Torres and similarly-situated lessees the amount his leased car actually depreciated during the time he held the car, plus interest.