At page 96 However, ‘the “in custody” requirement for federal habeas jurisdiction’ is satisfied when a pro se petition, liberally construed, ‘can be read as asserting a challenge to a current sentence, as enhanced by an allegedly invalid prior conviction.’11 citing cases
- State v. Boskind, 807 A.2d 358 (Vt. 2002). (However, ‘the “in custody” requirement for federal habeas jurisdiction’ is satisfied when a pro se petition, liberally construed, ‘can be read as asserting a challenge to a current sentence, as enhanced by an allegedly…)
- United States of Am. v. Stephen Aguiar, No. 2:25-cv-00719 (D. Vt. Dec. 23, 2025). (ECF No. 29) (quoting Williams v. Edwards, 195 F.3d 95, 96 (2d Cir. 1999)).
- Aguiar, No. 2:25-cv-00720 (D. Vt. Dec. 23, 2025). The court further found “[h]owever, [that] the district court may consider Aguiar’s petition to be ‘asserting a challenge to the current (Aguiar III) sentence, as enhanced by an allegedly invalid prior conviction.’” ECF No. 110 at 2 (quoti…
- Simmonds v. Upstate Corr. Facility, No. 1:23-cv-08325 (E.D.N.Y June 20, 2024).And while the “in custody” requirement “is satisfied when a pro se petition, liberally construed, ‘can be read as asserting a challenge to [a current] sentence[ ], as enhanced by [an] allegedly invalid prior conviction,’” Williams v. Edwar…
- Albritton v. Smith, No. 1:21-cv-03300 (E.D.N.Y Oct. 26, 2021).Petitioner may be able to challenge his prior conviction indirectly, on the basis that his current sentence was “enhanced by [an] allegedly invalid prior conviction.” Williams v. Edwards, 195 F.3d 95, 96 (2d Cir. 1999).
- Cantey v. Jacobsen, No. 9:19-cv-01235 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2020).Williams v. Edwards, 195 F.3d 95, 96 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing Maleng, 40 U.S. at 491-94).
- Lasky v. McHugh, 668 F. App'x 369 (2d Cir. 2016).See 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (c)(1), (3); Williams v. Edwards, 195 F.3d 95, 96 (2d Cir. 1999).
- Valdez v. Hulihan, 640 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).While a petitioner’s serving an unrelated sentence does not alone satisfy the “in custody” requirement for challenging a prior conviction, the Second Circuit has held that the “in custody” requirement is satisfied “when a pro se petition,…
- Mclaurin v. New Rochelle Police Officers, 379 F. Supp. 2d 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).See Williams v. Edwards, 195 F.3d 95, 96 (2d Cir.1999) (per curiam).
- Samper v. Greiner, 74 F. App'x 79 (2d Cir. 2003).See Williams v. Edwards, 195 F.3d 95, 96 (2d Cir.1999) (per curiam) (pro se pleadings are liberally construed).
Show 1 more citing case
- Granger v. Gill Abstract Corp., 566 F. Supp. 2d 323 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).See, e.g., Williams v. Edwards, 195 F.3d 95, 96 (2d Cir.1999).
Other citing cases
- Spencer v. United States, 748 A.2d 940 (D.C. 2000).
v.
Ernest EDWARDS, Respondent-Appellee
George Williams appeals from Judge Parker’s order dismissing his pro se habe-as corpus petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Appellant’s habeas petition challenged a prior state conviction, for which the sentence had already expired. The district court determined that there was no jurisdiction because appellant was not “in custody” under the challenged conviction, as required by Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 491-92, 109 S.Ct. 1923, 104 L.Ed.2d 540 (1989).
On January 8, 1999, we granted appellant’s motion for a certificate of appealability. On appeal, Williams argues that because his current sentence was enhanced by his allegedly unconstitutional prior conviction, there is subject matter jurisdiction. The district court correctly observed that a petitioner is not deemed “ ‘in custody’ under a conviction after the sentence imposed for it has fully expired.” Maleng, 490 U.S. at 492-93, 109 S.Ct. 1923; see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c), 2254(a). However, “the ‘in custody’ requirement for federal habeas jurisdiction” is satisfied when a pro se petition, liberally construed, “can be read as asserting a challenge to [a current] sentence! ], as enhanced by [an] allegedly invalid prior conviction,” Maleng, 490 U.S. at 493-94, 109 S.Ct. 1923. Appellant is currently incarcerated in New York under a state manslaughter conviction entered pursuant to a plea agreement, and appellee concedes that appellant’s allegedly invalid prior conviction “form[ed] the legal basis for the current enhanced sentence.” Because appellant’s petition makes sense only as “an attempt to end or reduce his current incarceration,” Malik v. Brennan, No. 93 Civ. 786(DC), 1995 WL 510047, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.29, 1995), we remand to the district court to permit appellant to amend his petition to challenge explicitly his current sentence’s allegedly illegal enhancement, see Taylor v. Armontrout, 877 F.2d 726, 727 (8th Cir.1989).
We do not address the merits of appellant’s petition.