Petion v. Bradshaw, 961 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007). · Go Syfert
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Petion v. Bradshaw, 961 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
5 citation events (5 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Sosa v. SAFEWAY PREMIUM FINANCE CO. (fla, 2011-07-07)
Top citers, strongest first. 4 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Sosa v. SAFEWAY PREMIUM FINANCE CO. (2×)
Fla. · 2011 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Cole v. Echevarria, McCalla, Raymer, Barrett & Frappier, 965 So.2d 1228, 1231 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007); Sonic Auto., Inc. v. Galura, 961 So.2d 961, 964 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007); United Auto.
cited Cited "see" Clark v. Alan Vester Auto Group, Inc.
N.C. Bus. Ct. · 2009 · signal: see · confidence high
See Galura v. Sonic Automotive, Inc. (order granting plaintiffs’ motion for class certification, dated June 3, 2005, 13th Judicial Circuit, Hillsborough County, aff’d in part, 961 So. 2d 961 (Fl.
cited Cited "see, e.g." BJ'S WHOLESALE CLUB, INC., etc. v. LAURA BUGLIARO, etc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2021 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Sonic Automotive, Inc. v. Galura, 961 So. 2d 961, 965 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). 6 appealed the certification order and the Department of Revenue joined in the appeal.
cited Cited "see, e.g." Alderwoods Group, Inc. v. Garcia
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2013 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See e.g., Sonic Auto., Inc. v. Galura, 961 So.2d 961 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Jemberson PETION
v.
Ric L. BRADSHAW, Sheriff of Palm Beach County
No. 4D07-625.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
Mar 5, 2007.
961 So. 2d 961
2007 Fla. App. LEXIS 3658
2007 WL 2108988
Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, Carol Bickerstaff and Daniel Cohen, Assistant Public Defenders, West Palm Beach, for petitioner., Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Myra J. Fried, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for respondent.
Hazouri, Stone, Warner.
Published
PER CURIAM.

When petitioner was arrested for possession of cocaine and possession with intent to sell, the first appearance magistrate set a bond amount based on the bond schedule of $5,000 for the charge of possession of cocaine with intent to sell, multiplied by the number of small packets that contained the cocaine, thirty-nine in all, or $195,000. The weight of the cocaine is unknown at this time. Because it was legally wrong to consider each packet as a separate charge, the amount of the bond was an abuse of discretion. The petition for habeas corpus is granted and we direct that the $195,000 bond for appellant’s charge for possession of cocaine be reduced to a reasonable bond in accordance with the crime charged.

Under section 893.13, Florida Statutes, the degree of the crime of possession of cocaine is determined by the weight of the cocaine possessed at a given time, not the number of containers holding it. See also Lundy v. State, 596 So.2d 1167 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992), receded from, on other grounds, Gibbs v. State, 676 So.2d 1001 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), decision quashed, 698 So.2d 1206 (Fla.1997). In Lundy, we said,

[T]o hold that a separate possessory crime is committed for each packet or package of the controlled substance within an offender’s possession at a given time and place goes well beyond the statutory elements of the crime. To allow such an arrest would lead to absurd scenarios, including the state’s charging more counts for the same amount of narcotics only due to the increased number of small packages of that illegal substance.

Id. at 1168.

Petition granted.

STONE, WARNER and HAZOURI, JJ., concur.