United States of Am., Plaintiff—appellee v. Tydarryl Griffin, Defendant—appellant, 418 F.3d 881 (8th Cir. 2005). · Go Syfert
Search
United States of Am., Plaintiff—appellee v. Tydarryl Griffin, Defendant—appellant, 418 F.3d 881 (8th Cir. 2005). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
G Cite
cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, last quoted 2006 · …once the sentencing court determines that a prior conviction exists, it is a legal question for the court whether the crime meets the 'crime of violence' definition of u.s.s.g. 4b1.2. ⚠ not in text
4 citation events across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: United States v. Quirindongo-Collazo (ca1, 2007-01-23)
Top citers, strongest first. 4 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Quirindongo-Collazo
1st Cir. · 2007 · confidence medium
Soto-Cruz, 449 F.3d at 262 (citing United States v. Griffin, 418 F.3d 881, 882 (8th Cir.2005) (“The fact that [the defendant] did not anticipate the Blakely or Booker rulings does not place the issue outside the scope of the waiver.”)).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Lester Dale Perry, Also Known as Duane Thomas Stamps
8th Cir. · 2006 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Griffin, 418 F.3d 881 , 882 n. 2 (8th Cir.2005) (per curiam) (noting Booker did not “alter[ ] the rule that both the fact and the nature of a prior conviction are issues for the sentencing court, not the jury”); cf. United States v. Marcussen, 403 F.3d 982, 984 (8th Cir.2005) (“Once the sentencing court determines that a prior conviction exists, it is a legal question for the court whether the crime meets the ‘crime of violence’ definition of [U.S.S.G.] § 4B1.2.”). *787 Perry also claims the district court erred by enhancing his sentence based on his two prior…
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Lester Dale Perry
8th Cir. · 2006 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Griffin, 418 F.3d 881 , -5- 882 n.2 (8th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (noting Booker did not “ alter[] the rule that both the fact and the nature of a prior conviction are issues for the sentencing court, not the jury”); cf. United States v. Marcussen, 403 F.3d 982, 984 (8th Cir. 2005) (“Once the sentencing court determines that a prior conviction exists, it is a legal question for the court whether the crime meets the ‘crime of violence’ definition of [U.S.S.G.] § 4B1.2.”).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Soto-Cruz
1st Cir. · 2006 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., United States v. Griffin, 418 F.3d 881, 882 (8th Cir.2005) (“The fact that [the defendant] did not anticipate the Blakely or Booker rulings does not place the issue outside the scope of his waiver.” (internal marks omitted)); United States v. Cardenas, 405 F.3d 1046, 1048 (9th Cir.2005) (rejecting a claim that an appeal waiver entered in 2000 was invalidated by Booker’s change in the sentencing laws because “a change in the law does not make a plea involuntary and unknowing”).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff—Appellee,
v.
TyDarryl GRIFFIN, Defendant—Appellant
04-3361.
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
Aug 15, 2005.
418 F.3d 881
2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 17135
2005 WL 1939341
JoAnn Trog, St. Louis, MO, for appellant., Reginald L. Harris, Asst. U.S. Atty., St. Louis, MO, for appellee.
Loken, Wollman, Beam.
Cited by 4 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM.

A few days before the Supreme Court decided Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), TyDarryl Griffin pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). In the plea agreement, Griffin admitted a prior felony drug conviction and waived “all rights to appeal all non-jurisdictional issues including, but not limited to ... whatever sentence is imposed,” except departure issues. At sentencing, Griffin argued that Blakely rendered the Guidelines unconstitutional and precluded the district court from considering his prior conviction because the government did not plead and[*882] prove it. The district court [1] overruled these objections and sentenced Griffin to 64 months in prison and two years of supervised release. Griffin appeals. Applying our appeal waiver decisions in light of the subsequent controlling decision in United States v. Booker, — U.S. -, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), we dismiss the appeal.

Griffin argues that we should ignore the appeal waiver in his plea agreement because he entered into the agreement prior to the unexpected decision in Blakely. However, “[t]he fact that [Griffin] did not anticipate the Blakely or Booker rulings does not place the issue outside the scope of his waiver.” United States v. Killgo, 397 F.3d 628, 629 n. 2 (8th Cir.2005). The non-jurisdictional sentencing issue Griffin seeks to raise on appeal falls within the scope of the appeal waiver. Griffin does not challenge the appeal waiver as not knowing and voluntary or as a miscarriage of justice. See United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 890-92 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 997, 124 S.Ct. 501, 157 L.Ed.2d 398 (2003). Therefore, we must enforce the appeal waiver and dismiss the appeal. [2]

The appeal is dismissed.

1

. The HONORABLE DONALD L STOHR, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri.

2

. We note that Griffin's sentencing argument also fails on the merits. Neither Booker nor Shepard v. United States, - U.S. -, 125 S.Ct. 1254, 161 L.Ed.2d 205 (2005), altered the rule that both the fact and the nature of a prior conviction are issues for the sentencing court, not the jury. United States v. Marcussen, 403 F.3d 982, 984 (8th Cir.2005). Moreover, Griffin admitted the prior felony drug conviction in his plea agreement; the district court may rely on a defendant's admissions in sentencing. Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 756.