Ikomoni v. Bank of Am., N.A., 769 S.E.2d 527 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015). · Go Syfert
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Ikomoni v. Bank of Am., N.A., 769 S.E.2d 527 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
17 citation events (17 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: Ag Resource Management, LLC v. Mundy, Inc. (gactapp, 2025-09-10)
Top citers, strongest first. 6 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ag Resource Management, LLC v. Mundy, Inc.
Ga. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
The “purported failure to allege certain elements of [a] cause[ ] of action set forth in the complaint does not mandate dismissal because it is no longer necessary for a complaint to set forth all of the elements of a cause of action in order to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.” Ikomoni v. Bank of America, 330 Ga. App. 776, 777-778 ( 769 SE2d 527 ) (2015) (citation and punctuation omitted).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Francis Clouthier v. the Medical Center of Central Georgia, Inc.
Ga. Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
(Citation omitted.) Ikomoni v. Bank of America, N.A., 330 Ga. App. 776, 776-777 ( 769 SE2d 527 ) (2015).
discussed Cited "see" Zephaniah v. Georgia Clinic, P.C. (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
Wesley Ed. Found. v. State Election Bd. , 282 Ga. 707 , 713-14, 654 S.E.2d 127 (2007) (holding that the Civil Practice Act requires only that a complaint "give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and a general indication of the type of litigation involved; the discovery process bears the burden of filling in details" (punctuation and footnote omitted)). 14 Procter , 312 Ga. App. at 487 (1), 718 S.E.2d 860 ; see Babalola v. HSBC Bank, USA, N.A. , 324 Ga. App. 750 , 750, 751 S.E.2d 545 (2013) (noting that this Court construes "the pleadings in the light most favorable to the plaintiff…
discussed Cited "see" Wolters Kluwer Health, Inc. v. Dorothy Tanner (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2015 · signal: see · confidence high
Ore. 2013) (allowing claims arising from PLIVA’s alleged failure to update warning label, as not arising from violations of FDCArequirements). 29 See generally Chrysler Corp., supra at 724 (1) (under Georgia negligence law, a product manufacturer has a duty to exercise reasonable care in manufacturing its products so as to make products that are reasonably safe for intended or foreseeable uses); Banks v. ICI Americas, 264 Ga. 732, 733 (1) ( 450 SE2d 671 ) (1994) (with respect to product manufacturers, Georgia law recognizes causes of action based on three general categories of product defect…
discussed Cited "see" Wolters Kluwer Health, Inc. v. Dorothy Tanner (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2015 · signal: see · confidence high
GENERICS BIDCO I, LLC. v. DEMENT 31 Simmons v. Brady, 251 Ga. App. 717, 718 (1) ( 555 SE2d 94 ) (2001); see Ikomoni v. Bank of America, 330 Ga. App. 776 ( 769 SE2d 527 ) (2015). 32 Ikomoni, supra. 33 See id. at 778 . 34 Division 3, supra. 35 Supra. 16 6.
examined Cited "see, e.g." Joe Rogers, Jr. v. Hylton B. Dupree (4×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2019 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Ikomoni v. Bank of America , 330 Ga. App. 776 , 769 S.E.2d 527 (2015).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
IKOMONI
v.
BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.
A14A1842.
Court of Appeals of Georgia.
Feb 25, 2015.
769 S.E.2d 527
Mack & Harris, Robert L. Mack, Jr., for appellant., McGuireWoods, Jarrod S. Mendel, for appellee.
McFadden.
Cited by 7 opinions  |  Published
McFadden, Judge.

This appeal is from a trial court order granting a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim. Because it does not appear with certainty that the plaintiff would be entitled to no relief under any set of facts that could be proven in support of his claims, we reverse.

Alexander Ikomoni filed a pro se complaint against Bank of America, N.A., asserting counts for wrongful foreclosure, mental anguish and punitive damages. In support of these counts, he alleged as operative facts that he had acquired interests in two properties by quitclaim deed; that the deeds were recorded; that the bank knew or should have known of his ownership from conversations with him and his repeated calls informing it of his interest; that the bank foreclosed on the properties without giving him any notice of the foreclosure or advertising the foreclosure as required by law; that the price realized at the foreclosure sale was inadequate; and that he has suffered extreme mental anguish as a result of the bank’s wanton, reckless, extreme and outrageous conduct.

The bank filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (6), for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. Ikomoni appeals.

A trial court should not grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted unless:

(1) the allegations of the complaint disclose with certainty that the claimant would not be entitled to relief under any state of provable facts asserted in support thereof; and (2) the movant establishes that the claimant could not possibly introduce evidence within the framework of the complaint sufficient to warrant a grant of the relief sought. In deciding[*777] a motion to dismiss, all pleadings are to be construed most favorably to the party who filed them, and all doubts regarding such pleadings must be resolved in the filing party’s favor. In other words, a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should not be granted unless it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would be entitled to no relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of his claim. If, within the framework of the complaint, evidence may be introduced which will sustain a grant of relief to the plaintiff, the complaint is sufficient.

Webb v. Bank of America, 328 Ga. App. 62, 63 (761 SE2d 485) (2014) (citation omitted). Moreover, “[a] pro se complaint[, such as Ikomoni’s,] is not held to stringent standards of formal pleadings.” Johnson v. Jones, 178 Ga. App. 346, 349 (343 SE2d 403) (1986) (citations omitted).

In this case, the allegations of the complaint do not disclose with certainty that Ikomoni would not be entitled to relief under any set of provable facts. On the contrary, within the framework of the complaint, he may be able to introduce evidence supporting his allegations, including that the bank acknowledged his ownership of the property, which he used as a dwelling place, so that he was entitled to notice under OCGA § 44-14-162.1 and then-applicable § 44-14-162.3,[1] yet the bank did not notify him of the foreclosure as required by OCGA § 44-14-162.2. Such a state of provable facts could warrant a grant of the relief sought for wrongful foreclosure and the other counts. Webb, 328 Ga. App. at 63. Amotion to dismiss addressed to an entire complaint, such as the bank’s, should not be granted if the complaint sets forth at least one claim. Walker v. Gowen Stores, 322 Ga. App. 376, 378 (745 SE2d 287) (2013).

Ikomoni’s purported failure to allege certain elements of the various causes of action set forth in the complaint does not mandate dismissal because

[i]t is no longer necessary for a complaint to set forth all of the elements of a cause of action in order to survive a motion[*778] to dismiss for failure to state a claim. If, within the framework of the complaint, evidence may be introduced which will sustain a grant of relief to the plaintiff, the complaint is sufficient. Likewise, the bank’s own factual allegations, such as its claim that [Ikomoni was not a debtor as defined in the statute and thus was not entitled to notice], do not require dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a claim. This is factual evidence which may or may not be developed during discovery and can be considered on a subsequent motion for summary judgment. Because it cannot be said with certainty that within the framework of the complaint no evidence could be introduced that would support the claims for relief, the motion to dismiss should have been denied.
Decided February 25, 2015. Mack & Harris, Robert L. Mack, Jr., for appellant. McGuireWoods, Jarrod S. Mendel, for appellee.

Webb, 328 Ga. App. at 64 (citations and punctuation omitted).

Judgment reversed.

Andrews, P. J., and Ray, J., concur.
1

Under the version of OCGA § 44-14-162.3 applicable to this case, a secured creditor was required to give OCGA § 44-14-162.2 (a) notice only for foreclosed properties “ ‘used as a dwelling place by the debtor,’ . . . but the General Assembly removed this limitation in an amendment effective July 1, 2012.” Peters v. CertusBank Nat. Assn., 329 Ga. App. 29, 31 (2) (763 SE2d 498) (2014) (citation omitted) (physical precedent only). Under the amended version of the statute, the secured creditor must give notice to all debtors, regardless of whether the property is used as a dwelling place. See id.