Lindberg v. J & D Enter., 543 N.W.2d 90 (Minn. 1996). · Go Syfert
Lindberg v. J & D Enter., 543 N.W.2d 90 (Minn. 1996). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“what is required is proof of the actual existence of a disability during the period of time for which benefits are claimed.”
2 citation events across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: David J. Mach, Jr. v. Wells Concrete Products Co., and CCMSI, Relators, and Blue Cross Blue Shield, Operating Engineers Local 49 Health & Welfare Fund, Intervenors. (minn, 2015-07-22)
Top citers, strongest first. 2 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) David J. Mach, Jr. v. Wells Concrete Products Co., and CCMSI, Relators, and Blue Cross Blue Shield, Operating Engineers Local 49 Health & Welfare Fund, Intervenors.
Minn. · 2015 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
what is required is proof of the actual existence of a disability during the period of time for which benefits are claimed.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mach v. Wells Concrete Products Co.
Minn. · 2015 · confidence medium
These principles did not, however, “preclude [the] employee from showing that since that date he has become totally disabled and that at some point after [the previous date], but prior to becoming totally disabled he decided again to obtain gainful employment.” Id.; 4 see also Lindberg v. J & D Enters., 543 N.W.2d 90, 90 (Minn.1996) (“[W]hat is required is proof of the actual existence of a disability during the period of time for which benefits are claimed.”).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Rick J. LINDBERG, Relator
v.
J & D ENTERPRISES and Royal Insurance Company, and Minnesota Dept. of Labor & Industry/VRU, HMO of Minnesota/Blue Plus, Intervenors
No. C0-95-2058.
Supreme Court of Minnesota.
Jan 25, 1996.
543 N.W.2d 90
Falsani, Balmer, Berglund & Peterson, Robert C. Falsani, Cynthia L. Evenson, Duluth, for Relator., Castor, Klukas, Logren & Grove, Mark J. Padgett, Minneapolis, for Respondent., Paul Moe, St. Paul, for Minn. Dept, of Labor & Industry/VRU., Thomas Gilde, St. Paul, for HMO of Minnesota/Blue Plus.
Alan.
Cited by 2 opinions  |  Published
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 84%
Citer courts: Supreme Court of Minnesota (1)

ORDER

Based upon all the files, records and proceedings herein,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals, filed September 18, 1995, reversing an award of temporary partial compensation be, and the same is, reversed and the matter remanded. The employee sustained a com-pensable back injury for which he sought temporary partial compensation from August 4, 1992, and continuing. The compensation judge denied the claim. Subsequently, a second claim was made for temporary partial compensation from November 26, 1992, and this claim was granted following a hearing before a different compensation judge. On appeal, the WCCA reversed, concluding that to prove a second claim for the same type of benefits, even though for a different time period, an employee must have evidence of some material change in condition or circumstances. The WCCA then remanded the case for further findings consistent with its decision. In Hirt v. Leader Hardware & Furniture Store, 309 Minn. 572, 244 N.W.2d 269 (1976), however, we rejected the argument that on a second claim for the same kind of benefits, the employee had to prove a substantial change in condition or circumstances. We said that the “evidence needed to prove the likelihood of a disability continuing indefinitely into the future is far different than that required as part of a claim made sometime in the future to prove the actual existence of the same disability during the interim period.” Hirt, 309 Minn, at 574, 244 N.W.2d at 271. Consequently, under Hirt, what is required is proof of the actual existence of a disability during the period of time for which benefits are claimed. As a practical matter, this may entail new evidence covering the subsequent period of time, but it is not necessarily the same as evidence of a material change in condition which is commonly associated with re-opening an award. We therefore remand this case to the WCCA which has the option, in its discretion, to[*91] remand to the compensation judge for rehearing, or it may, as seems more likely, consider the record sufficient for review on the issue.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Alan C. Page ALAN C. PAGE Associate Justice