Welch, Gibbes Graves, Shannon Clark, Laurel, for appellant. I. The verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence, and was not supported by the evidence in the case. Flournoy v. Brown, 200 Miss. 171 , 26 So.2d 351 ; Montgomery Ward Co. v. Windham, 195 Miss. 848 , 16 So.2d 622 ; Pullin v. Nabors, 240 Miss. 864 , 128 So.2d 117 ; Universal Truck Loading Co. v. Taylor, 178 Miss. 143 , 172 So. 756 . A. The evidence presented by the appellee was so inconsistent and ambiguous that it became unreasonable, improbable and incredible. B. There was a fatal variance between pleading and proof of the appellee both as to the alleged facts of the accident and the alleged injury received. Trunzler v. Shanks, 234 Miss. 735 , 107 So.2d 110 . C. The testimony of the appellee could not raise a jury question since it had to yield to undisputed Page 384 physical facts. Davidian v. Wendell, 227 Miss. 19 , 37 So.2d 570; Hardaway Contracting Co. v. Rivers, 181 Miss. 727 , 180 So. 800 ; Mobile Ohio R. Co. v. Bryant, 159 Miss. 528 , 132 So. 539 ; Russell v. Mississippi Central R. Co., 239 Miss. 741 , 125 So.2d 283 ; S.H. Kress Co. v. Sharp, 156 Miss. 693 , 126 So. 650 , 68 A.L.R. 167. D. Defendant's driver effectively and lawfully responded to a sudden emergency situation to which he neither contributed nor caused. Carlisle v. Cobb Bros. Construction Co., 238 Miss. 681 , 119 So.2d 918 ; Ivey v. Sconier, 234 Miss. 390 , 106 So.2d 399 . E. The lower court erred in refusing to grant a peremptory instruction to the appellant, or in refusing to enter a judgment for the appellant, notwithstanding the verdict, or in refusing to grant a new trial to the appellant. Williams v. Hood, 237 Miss. 355 , 114 So.2d 854 . II. The lower court erred in allowing appellee to amend his declaration over the objection of appellant because of surprise and prejudice to appellant. Delta Motors v. Childs, 233 Miss. 125 , 101 So.2d 527 ; Secs. 1511, 1512, Code 1942. III. The jury should have been instructed that the appellee was guilty of contributory negligence. Secs. 8192-8196, 8217, Code 1942. IV. The jury's verdict was unwarranted and so excessive that it evinced bias, passion and prejudice on the part of the jury against the appellant. Beard v. Williams, 172 Miss. 880 , 161 So. 750 ; McMahan v. Herring, 236 Miss. 442 , 110 So.2d 617 ; Prisock v. Piatt, 238 Miss. 524 , 119 So.2d 279 ; Walker v. Ferris, 241 Miss. 63 , 128 So.2d 865 . A.S. Scott, Jr., Lampkin Butts, Laurel, for appellee. I. All questions of negligence and contributory negligence shall be for the jury to determine. Schumpert v. Watson, 241 Miss. 199 , 129 So.2d 628; Sec. 1455, Code 1942. Page 385 II. Apparently the basis of appellant's feeling that it was entitled to a peremptory instruction was its conclusion that June Evans violated an undesignated statute either by failing to give a proper left turn signal, or by stopping upon the highway. These acts, or one of them, the appellant assumes to have been negligence per se. Of course, mere violations of a traffic rule need not constitute actionable negligence unless such acts actually contribute to the accident. It would be error to give a peremptory instruction on a point on which the testimony is conflicting, as was the testimony relative to June Evans' actions. Moore v. Herman Guy Auto Parts, Inc., 230 Miss. 189 , 92 So.2d 373 . III. Amendments are liberally allowed at any time before verdict by statute, on such terms as the trial court finds proper. Secs. 1511, 1512, Code 1942. IV. In actions for damages of the character of the one here, the only legal measure thereof which the law knows, is the sound discretion of the jury, and the Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the jury, unless the damages awarded are so great, when viewed in the light of the injury sustained, as to clearly indicate that, in awarding them, the jury was controlled by passion, prejudice, or corruption. J.C. Penny Co. v. Evans, 172 Miss. 900 , 160 So. 779 .

Ethridge, Lee, Kyle, Arrington, Gillespie.

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