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Issue: plain errorMN ↗
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Quoted verbatim 5×
73.9 score
G Cite
cited 7× by 7 distinct cases, 2014–2024 · 2 courts ·
…a statute is ambiguous only when the statutory language is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.
at p. 307
⚠ not in text
cited 5× by 4 distinct cases, 2015–2024 · 2 courts ·
…when the statutory language is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.
at p. 307
⚠ not in text
cited 4× by 4 distinct cases, 2014–2022 · 2 courts ·
…the phrase 'with intent to' is commonly used by the legislature to express a specific-intent requirement.
at p. 308
⚠ not in text
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Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
State of Minnesota v. Thomas Joseph Shane
(2×)
also: Cited as authority (rule)
if the legislature intended to require an additional, special mental element, it could have defined assault-harm as 'an act done with the intent to cause bodily harm to another.
examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Amanda Jean Lunzer v. State of Minnesota
mppeals from stays of adjudication in felony cases are to be treated as appeals from senteneings, from which an appeal óf right may be taken as provided in minn. r.crim. p. 28.02, subd. 2, and 28.04, subd. 1
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
State of Minnesota v. Sammy Lee Mays
the phrase 'with intent to' is commonly used by the legislature to express a specific-intent requirement.
examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
State of Minnesota v. Rebecca Brynetta Passon
(6×)
also: Cited as authority (rule)
when a statute simply prohibits a person from intentionally engaging in the prohibited conduct, the crime is considered a general-intent crime
discussed
Cited as authority (quoted)
United States v. Michael Matthews
the phrase 'with intent to' is commonly used by the legislature to express a specific-intent requirement.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State of Minnesota v. Ler Htoo Hshee
The assault-harm offense is a general-intent crime, requiring the state to prove that the defendant “intended to do the physical act” but not that the defendant “meant to violate the law or cause a particular result.” State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 309 (Minn. 2012).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State of Minnesota v. Robert Jon Hill
Assault-fear is a specific-intent crime, as evidenced by the legislature’s use of the words “with intent to.” State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 309 (Minn. 2012). “‘With intent to’ or ‘with intent that’ means that the actor either has a purpose to do the thing or cause the result specified or believes that the act, if successful, will cause that result.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02 , subd. 9(4) (2022).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
State of Minnesota v. Morris Robert Chie Ryan
(3×)
also: Cited "see"
State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 312 (Minn. 2012).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
State of Minnesota v. Me'Darian Ledale McGruder
This is a specific intent crime, which “requires an intent to cause a particular result.” State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 308 (Minn. 2012).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State of Minnesota v. Ahmed Farah Muhumed
(2×)
State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 309 (Minn. 2012).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Michael Benson
A statute is ambiguous “when the statutory language is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.” State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 307 (Minn. 2012).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
State of Minnesota v. Lisa Dawn Oliver
(6×)
also: Cited "see", Cited "see, e.g."
In doing so, this court first determines “whether the statute’s language, on its face, is clear or ambiguous.” State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 307 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State of Minnesota v. Sidney Phillip Monette
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
Fleck, 810 N.W.2d at 308 (discussing assault-harm and quoting Minn. Stat. § 609.02 , subd. 10(2) (2010)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
State of Minnesota v. Mitchell David Johnson
State v. Lampkin, 994 N.W.2d 280 , 291 (Minn. 2023) (citing State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 309-10 (Minn. 2012)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State of Minnesota, Respondent/Cross-Appellant v. David Darnell Jones, Jr., Appellant/Cross-Respondent
The State charged Jones with this crime under an “assault-fear” theory of liability, alleging that Jones committed the assault by acting with the intent to cause A.M. to fear immediate bodily harm or death. 2 See Minn. Stat. § 609.02 , subd. 10(1); State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303 , 2 In an assault-fear crime, “[t]he intent of the [defendant], as contrasted with the effect upon the victim, becomes the focal point for inquiry.” State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 308 (Minn. 2012) (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Thomas Robert Tichich v. State of Minnesota
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
“A statute is ambiguous only when the statutory language is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.” State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 307 (Minn. 2012).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
State of Minnesota v. Keith Alan Powelson
State v. Fleck, 810 N.W. 2d 303, 308 (Minn. 2012).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
State of Minnesota v. Dennis Lee Busse
“An assault-fear offense ‘does not require a finding of actual harm to the victim.’” State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 308 (Minn. 2012) (quoting State v. Hough, 585 N.W.2d 393, 395 (Minn. 1998)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State of Minnesota v. Christopher James Colgrove
State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 308 (Minn. 2012) (interpreting the voluntary intoxication statute and holding that, based on its plain and ordinary meaning, the phrase “particular intent” unambiguously referred to specific-intent crimes, not general-intent crimes); see also State v. Wilson, 830 N.W.2d 849, 853 (Minn. 2013).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Gaddie
The term “specific intent” is generally used to “designate a special mental element which is required above and beyond any mental state required with respect to the actus reus of the crime.” State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 308 (Minn. 2012) (quoting 1 Wayne R.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Gaddie
The term “specific intent” is generally used to “designate a special mental element which is required above and beyond any mental state required with respect to the actus reus of the crime.” State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 308 (Minn. 2012) (quoting 1 Wayne R.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Jose Ortiz v. William P. Barr
State v. Serrano, No. A14-0887, 2015 WL 2456982 , at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. May 26, 2015) (citing State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 308 (Minn. 2012)); State v. Dodds, No. A08-0261, 2009 WL 1046356 , at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 21, 2009) (“Obstructing legal process is a general-intent crime because the only intent required is the intent to do the very act which is prohibited—acting in a manner that obstructs, resists, or interferes with a peace officer while the officer is engaged in the performance of official duties.”).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Jama
A specific-intent crime "requires an intent to cause a particular result." Id. (quotation omitted). "[R]egardless of whether an offense is described as a specific- or general-intent crime, a defendant must voluntarily do an act or voluntarily fail to perform an act." Id. at 309 (quotation omitted).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Boecker
“A statute is ambiguous only when the statutory language is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.” State v. Jones, 848 N.W.2d 528, 535 (Minn. 2014) (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 307 (Minn. 2012)), Here, Boecker pleaded guilty to first-degree DWI, which is defined as: Subdivision 1.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Muccio
And because of its specific-intent requirement, see State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 308 (Minn. 2012), the statute does not target broad categories of speech.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State of Minnesota v. Cynthia Marie Buhs
Domestic assault – intent to cause fear – is a specific-intent crime, requiring that the defendant have an intent to cause a particular result: the state must “prove the defendant committed an act with an additional special mental element—specifically an act done with intent to cause fear in another of immediate bodily harm or death.” State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 309 (Minn. 2012) (quotation and emphasis omitted).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
State of Minnesota v. Aaron Bernard Zuckman
State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 309 (Minn. 2012).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
State of Minnesota v. Alie Christine Theodore Dorn
In Fleck , we concluded that assault-harm requires only genferal intent. 810 N.W.2d at 309, 312 .
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Michael Lindsey
Part (1) of the statutory provision defining assault is known as “assault-fear” while Part (2) is known as “assault-harm.” See State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 308 (Minn. 2012).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State of Minnesota v. Areial Jean Stoecker
Minn. Stat. §§ 609.02 , subd. 10(2) (defining assault), .2231, subd. 2(1) (defining fourth-degree assault) (2012). “[A]ssault-harm, as defined by Minn. Stat. § 609.02 , subd. 10(2), is a general-intent crime.” State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 309-10 (Minn. 2012).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
State of Minnesota v. John Charles Kotten
State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 310 (Minn. 2012).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State of Minnesota v. Daniel Lee Bender
In State v. Fleck, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that “assault-harm, Minn. Stat. § 609.02 , subd. 10(2) (prohibiting the intentional infliction of bodily harm), is a general- 2 intent crime” and that “assault-fear, Minn. Stat. § 609.02 , subd. 10(1) (prohibiting an act done with the intent to cause fear in another of immediate bodily harm or death) is a specific-intent crime.” 810 N.W.2d 303, 312 (Minn. 2012).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State of Minnesota v. Luis Daniel Ruiz-Oliva
Minn. Stat. § 609.02 , subds. 9, 10 (2010); State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 309 (Minn. 2012) (stating that assault-harm is a general intent crime, meaning that “[a]lthough the definition of assault-harm requires the State to prove that the defendant intended to do the physical act, nothing in the definition requires proof that the defendant meant to violate the law or cause a particular result”).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
State of Minnesota v. Jesus Armando Puente
State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 309 (Minn. 2012).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State of Minnesota v. Alexander Kenton Edmondson
Appellant relies on State v. Fleck to support his argument that assault-fear, in contrast to assault-harm, is a specific-intent crime “requir[ing] the State to prove the defendant committed an act with an additional special mental element—specifically: ‘an act done with intent to cause fear in another of immediate bodily harm or death.’” 810 N.W.2d 303, 309 (Minn. 2012) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Minn. Stat. § 609.02 , subd. 10(1).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State of Minnesota v. Nathan Edward Palmer
Both are general-intent crimes, requiring only that a defendant “intended to do the physical act, 4 [not] . . . that the defendant meant to violate the law or cause a particular result.” State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 309-10 (Minn. 2012).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State of Minnesota v. Timothy John Bakken
While district courts are given “considerable latitude” in selecting the language of jury instructions, “[j]ury instructions that confuse, mislead, or materially misstate the law are erroneous.” Davis, 864 N.W.2d at 176 (quotation omitted). “[F]ailure to properly instruct the jury on all elements of the offense charged is plain error.” State v. Vance, 734 N.W.2d 650, 658 (Minn. 2007), overruled on other grounds by State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 311 (Minn. 2012).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
State of Minnesota v. Derik Chester Rekdal
A statute is ambiguous “when the statutory language is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.” State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 307 (Minn. 2012).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
State of Minnesota v. Thomas Raymond Struzyk
(4×)
also: Cited "see"
It is easy to envision a situation in which a person could intentionally transfer bodily fluids onto a peace officer without either intending that the officer fear immediate bodily harm or death (assault-féar) or intending to inflict bodily harm on the officer (assault-harm). 1 See generally State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 309 (Minn.2012) (defining assault-fear and assault-harm).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
State of Minnesota v. Vennie Jerome Williams
“A statute is ambiguous only when the statutory language is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.” State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 307 (Minn. 2012).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
In re the Matter of: Dakota County, Lorinda Elaine Floding, Below v. Darrell Ray Gillespie
(2×)
A statute is ambiguous “when the statutory language is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.” State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 307 (Minn.2012).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
State of Minnesota v. Brian J. Machacek
(3×)
also: Cited "see"
But subsequently in State v. Fleck, the supreme court held that the intentional infliction of bodily harm upon another (assault-harm) is a general-intent crime, while an act done with intent to cause fear in another of immediate bodily harm or death (assault- fear) is a specific-intent crime. 810 N.W.2d 303, 312 (Minn. 2012).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State of Minnesota v. Christopher Thomas Wenthe
(2×)
A general-intent crime requires only that the defendant “intentionally engag[ed] in the prohibited conduct,” whereas a specific-intent crime “requires an 'intent to cause a particular result.’ ” State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 308 (Minn.2012) (quoting 9 Henry W.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State of Minnesota v. Cole Lyle Kjellberg
(2×)
State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 312 (Minn. 2012). “[R]egardless of whether an offense is described as a specific- or general-intent crime, a defendant must voluntarily do an act or voluntarily fail to perform an act.” Id. at 309 (quotaton omitted).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State of Minnesota v. Brian Kenneth Moore
Moore relies on State v. Vance, 734 N.W.2d 650 (Minn.2007), overruled on other grounds by State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 311 (Minn.2012), for the proposition that “jury instructions must define the crime charged and explain the elements of the offense to the jury.” Id. at 656; see also State v. Milton, 821 N.W.2d 789, 806 (Minn.2012).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
State of Minnesota v. Carl Lee Nodes
A statute is ambiguous “when the statutory language is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.” State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 307 (Minn. 2012).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State of Minnesota v. David Muniz Bustos
(2×)
State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 308 (Minn.2012); State v. Hough, 585 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Minn.1998).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State of Minnesota v. Spidel Wayne Browder
“When a statute simply prohibits a person from intentionally engaging in the prohibited conduct, the crime is considered a general-intent crime.” State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 308 (Minn. 2012). “[A] specific-intent crime requires an intent to cause a particular result.” Id. (quotation omitted). “[T]he most common usage of ‘specific intent’ is to designate a special mental element which is required above and beyond any mental state required with respect to the actus reus of the crime.” Id. (quotation omitted).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
State of Minnesota v. Rosalind Rae Loggin
State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 308 (Minn. 2012).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State of Minnesota v. Devon Scott Martin
The assault charged is a specific intent offense, State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 309 (Minn. 2012), so the state must prove that Martin intended to cause C.W. to fear immediate bodily harm or death, see Minn. Stat. § 609.02 , subd. 10(1) (2012).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
STATE of Minnesota
v.
Shea Lamar MANNS
v.
Shea Lamar MANNS
No. A06-478.
Supreme Court of Minnesota.
May 24, 2006.
Anderson.
Cited by 1 opinion | Published
Citer courts: Eighth Circuit (1) · Court of Appeals of Minnesota (1)
ORDER
In this case, petitioner State of Minnesota appealed to the court of appeals from the district court’s stay of adjudication of respondent’s guilty plea to felony theft. The court of appeals, citing our opinion in State v. Lee, 706 N.W.2d 491, 493 (Minn.2005), dismissed the appeal as untimely on grounds that appeals from stays of adjudication are appeals from pretrial orders that must be filed within five days after the service of notice of entry of the order or notification on the record. We here clarify that our holding in State v. Lee, that stays of adjudication are to be treated as pretrial orders for purposes of appeal, applies only to stays of adjudication in misdemeanor cases. Appeals from stays of adjudication in felony cases are to be treated as appeals from sentencings, from which an appeal may be taken as provided in Minn. R.Crim. P. 28.02, subd. 2, and 28.04, subd. 1, as the court of appeals correctly held prior to Lee in State v. Wright, 699 N.W.2d 782 (Minn.App.2005).
Based upon all the files, records and proceedings herein,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition of the State of Minnesota for review of the decision of the court of appeals be, and the same is, granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the order of the court of appeals filed April 11, 2006, be, and the same is, reversed and the matter is remanded to the court of appeals for briefing and argument on the merits of petitioner’s appeal.
BY THE COURT:
/s/_ Russell A. Anderson Chief Justice