“a motion for jnov may be granted only if no reasonable jury could have reached the challenged verdict.”
Treatment trajectory · 2013 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
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Top citers, strongest first. 17 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Martinez v. Spartanburg County
proximate cause is normally a question of fact . . . .
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Schumacher v. Hoover
a motion for jnov may be granted only if no reasonable jury could have reached the challenged verdict.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Montre Stewart, The Estate of Montre Stewart by and through her Personal Representative, Dana Stewart v. Katherine Burleson, Clay Burleson, GEICO, and Progressive Northern Insurance Company
“Whether the family purpose doctrine applies is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury, but where no factual issue is created, the question becomes one of law, properly decided by the [trial] court.” Gause v. Smithers, 742 S.E.2d 644, 648 (S.C. 2013).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Edmonds v. City of Columbia
"On appeal from a circuit court's denial of a motion for a directed verdict or a JNOV, we apply the same standard as the circuit court by viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Gause v. Smithers, 403 S.C. 140, 149 , 742 S.E.2d 644, 649 (2013). "[This] court will reverse the trial court's ruling on a JNOV motion only when there is no evidence to support the ruling or where the ruling is controlled by an error of law." Law v. S.C.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Rice v. United States of America, The
“When the evidence is susceptible to only one inference, legal cause becomes a matter of law for the court.” Id. (cleaned up) (citing Matthews v. Porter, 124 S.E.2d 321, 323 (S.C. 1962); Gause v. Smithers, 742 S.E.2d 644, 649 (S.C. 2013) (discussing foreseeability, and stating “in rare or exceptional cases . . . the issue of proximate cause [may] be decided as a matter of law”)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Ward v. Morlock
The trial court determined that 1 The South Carolina Supreme Court has explained that the Family Purpose Doctrine arises from the law of agency and is derived from the notion that one “who has made it his business to furnish a car for the use of his family is liable as principal or master when such business is being carried out by a family member using the vehicle for its intended purpose, the family member thereby filling the role of agent or servant.” Gause v. Smithers, 742 S.E.2d 644, 648 (S.C. 2013) (quoting Campbell v. Paschal, 347 S.E. 2d 892, 897 (S.C.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Graham v. Town of Latta
“The touchstone of proximate cause is foreseeability which is determined by looking to the natural and probable consequences of the defendant’s conduct.” Gause v. Smithers, 403 S.C. 140, 150 , 742 S.E.2d 644, 649 (2013).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Russell
As to whether the circuit court erred in allowing the rebuttal testimony of the courtroom deputy: Gause v. Smithers, 403 S.C. 140, 151 , 742 S.E.2d 644, 650 (2013) (holding that an "issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but must have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial judge to be preserved for appellate review"); State v. Wise, 359 S.C. 14, 21 , 596 S.E.2d 475, 478 (2004) ("The admission or exclusion of evidence is a matter addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and its ruling will not be disturbed in the absence of a manifest abuse of discretion accompanie…
discussed
Cited "see"
Pratt v. Amisub of SC, Inc.
See Gause v. Smithers, 403 S.C. 140, 151 , 742 S.E.2d 644 , 650 (2013) (finding verdict form issue unpreserved because "Father did not object to the caption form until after the verdict had been read"); Johnson v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 317 S.C. 415, 421 , 453 S.E.2d 908, 912 (Ct. App. 1995) (holding that by failing to object to a verdict form until after the verdict had been reached, a party failed to preserve any issue related to the verdict form).
discussed
Cited "see"
Glenn v. 3M Company
See Gause v. Smithers, 403 S.C. 140, 150 , 742 S.E.2d 644 , 649 (2013) ("Only in rare or exceptional cases may the issue of proximate cause be decided as a matter of law." (quoting Bailey v. Segars, 346 S.C. 359, 367 , 550 S.E.2d 910, 914 (Ct. App. 2001))).
discussed
Cited "see"
Dawkins v. Sell
Proximate cause is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury and "requires proof of: (1) causation-in-fact, and (2) legal cause." Id. at 369 , 635 S.E.2d at 101 ; see Gause v. Smithers, 403 S.C. 140, 150 , 742 S.E.2d 644 , 649 (2013) ("Only in rare or exceptional cases may the issue of proximate cause be decided as a matter of law." (quoting Bailey v. Segars, 346 S.C. 359, 367 , 550 S.E.2d 910, 914 (Ct. App. 2001))).
discussed
Cited "see"
Stephens v. CSX Transportation, Inc.
(2×)
See Gause v. Smithers, 403 S.C. 140, 150 , 742 S.E.2d 644, 649 (2013) (“To exculpate a negligent defendant, the intervening cause must be one which breaks the sequence or causal connection between the defendant’s negligence and the injury alleged.” (citation omitted)); Matthews v. Porter, 239 S.C. 620, 628 , 124 S.E.2d 321, 325 (1962) (“In order to relieve the defendant of responsibility for the event, the intervening cause must be a superseding cause.
discussed
Cited "see"
First South Bank v. South Causeway, LLC
See Gause v. Smithers, 403 S.C. 140, 151 , 742 S.E.2d 644, 650 (2013) (stating an issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal); Wilder Corp. v. Wilke, 330 S.C. 71, 76 , 497 S.E.2d 731, 733 (1998) (noting the first step in preserving an issue for appellate review is to raise it to the lower court).
discussed
Cited "see"
Washington v. Rhett
See Gause v. Smithers, 403 S.C. 140, 151 , 742 S.E.2d 644, 650 (2013) (stating 'an issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but must have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial judge to be preserved for appellate review' (quoting Elam v. S.C.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Wickersham v. Ford Motor Company
In the first instance, however, legal cause is just what its name suggests—a question of law. “[W]hen the evidence is susceptible to only one inference . . . [legal cause] become[s] a matter of law for the court.” Id. (citing Matthews v. Porter, 124 S.E.2d 321, 323 (S.C. 1962)); see also Gause v. Smithers, 742 S.E.2d 644, 649 (S.C. 2013) (discussing foreseeability, and stating “in rare or exceptional cases . . . the issue of proximate cause [may] be decided as a matter of law”).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Wickersham v. Ford Motor Company
In the first instance, however, legal cause is just what its name suggests—a question of law. "[W]hen the evidence is susceptible to only one inference . . . [legal cause] become[s] a matter of law for the court." Id. (citing Matthews v. Porter, 239 S.C. 620, 625 , 124 S.E.2d 321, 323 (1962)); see also Gause v. Smithers, 403 S.C. 140, 150 , 742 S.E.2d 644 , 649 (2013) (discussing foreseeability, and stating "in rare or exceptional cases . . . the issue of proximate cause [may] be decided as a matter of law" (quoting Bailey v. Segars, 346 S.C. 359, 367 , 550 S.E.2d 910, 914 (Ct. App. 2001))).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Wickersham v. Ford Motor Co
S.C. 620, 625, 124 S.E.2d 321, 323 (1962)); see also Gause v. Smithers, 403 S.C. 140, 150 , 742 S.E.2d 644 , 649 (2013) (discussing foreseeability, and stating "in rare or exceptional cases . . . the issue of proximate cause [may] be decided as a matter of law" (quoting Bailey v. Segars, 346 S.C. 359, 367 , 550 S.E.2d 910, 914 (Ct. App. 2001))).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
In the Matter of M. Scott TAYLOR
Appellate Case No. 2013-000257.
Supreme Court of South Carolina.
Feb 8, 2013.
Toal.
Cited by 1 opinion | Published
ORDER
The Office of Disciplinary Counsel asks this Court to place respondent on interim suspension pursuant to Rule 17(b) of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement (RLDE) contained in Rule 413 of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules (SCACR). Respondent consents to the issuance of an order of interim suspension in this matter.
IT IS ORDERED that respondent’s license to practice law in this state is suspended until further order of this Court.
/s/Jean H. Toal, C.J.