This case presents the question whether an action for fraud accrues under MCL 600.5827 at the time the wrong was done, or whether it accrues on the date the plaintiff knew or should have known of the fraud or misrepresentation. The Court of Appeals reversed summary disposition for defendants, holding that a discovery rule of accrual applies to fraud actions. 250 Mich App 499; 655 NW2d 233 (2002). We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the order of the circuit court because MCL 600.5827 clearly applies and because prior decisions by this Court rejecting a discovery rule in fraud cases have never been overruled. ^[1]

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Plaintiff Patricia Boyle took over an existing car dealership in September 1988. The dealership went out of business in September 1992. Plaintiffs claim that they learned in September 1995 that the dealership was undercapitalized, even though plaintiffs raised the amount of money defendants said was sufficient to run the business. Plaintiffs also claim that in 1995 they learned that defendants falsely represented[*228] that a “rent factor” in a proposed agreement to sell the dealership did not conform with defendants’ standards, as a result of which the sale was not completed.

Plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging two counts of fraud in August 1999. Defendants filed a motion for summary disposition, arguing that plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the six-year period of limitation in MCL 600.5813. ^[2] Defendants argued that plaintiffs’ claims accrued under MCL 600.5827 at the time the wrongs on which the claims are based were done. Plaintiffs responded that a discovery rule applies to the accrual of a fraud action, i.e., a fraud action does not accrue until a plaintiff discovers, or should have discovered by the exercise of reasonable care, the cause of action, citing Fagerberg v LeBlanc, 164 Mich App 349; 416 NW2d 438 (1987). Defendants replied that there is no discovery rule in fraud cases, relying on Thatcher v Detroit Trust Co, 288 Mich 410; 285 NW 2 (1939). The circuit court determined that it was bound by the Thatcher decision and granted defendants’ motion for summary disposition.

On appeal as of right, the Court of Appeals reversed. The Court noted that in Thatcher and Ramsey v Child, Hulswit & Co, 198 Mich 658; 165 NW 936 (1917), this Court rejected application of a discovery rule to fraud cases. However, the Court noted that Fagerberg held that the discovery rule applies in actions for fraud or misrepresentation without any discussion of the apparent conflict with the decisions in Thatcher and Ramsey. The Court of Appeals con-[*229] eluded that Fagerberg was correctly decided and that the subsequent adoption of the discovery rule in Michigan undercut the precedential value of Thatcher and Ramsey.

While it is trae that our Supreme Court declined to apply the discovery rale in Thatcher and Ramsey, it is also true that Thatcher predated the adoption of the discovery rale in Michigan. See Johnson [v Caldwell, 371 Mich 368, 378-379; 123 NW2d 785 (1963)]. Moreover, in a case involving negligent misrepresentation by an abstract company, our Supreme Court in Williams v Polgar, 391 Mich 6, 25, n 18; 215 NW2d 149 (1974), quoted with approval a case involving fraud, Hillock v Idaho Title & Trust Co, 22 Idaho 440, 449; 126 P 612 (1912), that had been quoted with approval in the Court of Appeals opinion in Williams [v Polgar], 43 Mich App 95, 98; 204 NW2d 57 (1972): “ ‘ “If the statute runs in favor of the abstractor from the delivery of the abstract, the company would be released long before the falsity of the abstract could reasonably be discovered by the purchaser. This would not be justice, and ought not to be the law.” ’ ” The Supreme Court’s approval of Hillock supports the argument that there is no bar to the use of the discovery rale in fraud actions. Further, the Fagerberg panel was aware of and quoted the Supreme Court’s decision in Williams in concluding that the discovery rale applies. Thus, we conclude that Fagerberg is good law and, therefore, we reverse the decision of the trial court. [250 Mich App 504-505.]

Defendants have applied for leave to appeal.

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We review de novo the interpretation and application of a statute as a question of law. If the language of the statute is clear, no further analysis is necessary or allowed. Pohutski v City of Allen Park, 465 Mich 675, 683; 641 NW2d 219 (2002). In the absence of disputed facts, the question whether a cause of action is[*230] barred by the statute of limitations is also a question of law. Moll v Abbott Laboratories, 444 Mich 1, 26; 506 NW2d 816 (1993).

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This is not the first time that this Court has considered the question whether a cause of action for fraud accrues when it is or should have been discovered. The discovery rule was rejected in Ramsey, which held that the Legislature effected a compromise between the rule at law, under which the period of limitations begins to run from the time the fraud is perpetrated, and the rule at equity, under which the period begins to run when the fraud is discovered. In addition to the six-year statute of limitations applicable to frauds, the Legislature provided that if the cause of action was fraudulently concealed, it could be brought two years after it was discovered or should have been discovered. ^[3]

[*231] Subsequently, in Thatcher, this Court again rejected the claim that a cause of action for fraud accrues when it is discovered or should have been discovered, basing that conclusion on Ramsey and the statutes then in effect. ^[4]

The discovery rule has been adopted for certain cases. For example, in Johnson v Caldwell, the Court held that the discovery rule applies to actions for medical malpractice. This Court has not, however, overruled Ramsey and Thatcher, or held that the discovery rule applies to actions for fraud or intentional misrepresentation. Moreover, after Ramsey and Thatcher were decided the Legislature enacted MCL 600.5827, which provides:

Except as otherwise expressly provided, the period of limitations runs from the time the claim accrues. The claim accrues at the time provided in sections 5829 to 5838, and in cases not covered by these sections the claim accrues at the time the wrong upon which the claim is based was done regardless of the time when damage results.

Under MCL 600.5827 a claim accrues when the wrong is done, ^[5] unless §§ 5829 to 5838 apply. ^[6] Plaintiff does not claim that any of those sections apply.

The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the discovery rule applies to the accrual of actions for fraud.[*232] That holding directly contradicts Ramsey and Thatcher and ignores the plain language of MCL 600.5813 and 600.5827.

Plaintiffs’ cause of action accrued when the wrong was done, and they had six years thereafter to file a complaint. Because plaintiffs failed to do so, their cause of action is barred. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the order of the circuit court granting summary disposition for defendants. MCR 7.302(G)(1).