Francis v. State, 817 N.E.2d 235 (Ind. 2004). · Go Syfert
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Francis v. State, 817 N.E.2d 235 (Ind. 2004). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 4× by 4 distinct cases, 2014–2016 · …inherently aware of the fact that a guilty plea is a mitigating circumstance, ✓
106 citation events (106 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Treatment trajectory · 2005 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2005 2015 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 34 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Sherquell Dion Magee v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)
Ind. Ct. App. · 2020 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
a guilty plea demonstrates a defendant's acceptance of responsibility for the crime and extends a benefit to the state and to the victim or the victim's family by avoiding a full-blown trial.
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Heather L. McDaniel v. State of Indiana
Ind. Ct. App. · 2015 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
a sentencing court is inherently aware of the fact that a guilty plea is a mitigating circumstance
cited Cited as authority (rule) Zachary G. Fellers v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)
Ind. Ct. App. · 2020 · confidence medium
Thus, a defendant who pleads guilty deserves to have mitigating weight extended to the guilty plea in return.” Francis v. State, 817 N.E.2d 235, 237-238 (Ind. 2004).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Wilbert T. Sturgis v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)
Ind. Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
Francis v. State, 817 N.E.2d 235, 237 (Ind. 2004).
cited Cited as authority (rule) James L. Cantrell, Jr. v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)
Ind. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
It is well established that “a defendant who pleads guilty deserves to have mitigating weight extended to the guilty plea in return.” Francis v. State, 817 N.E.2d 235, 238 (Ind. 2004).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Jonathon D. Reis v. State of Indiana
Ind. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
Thus, a defendant who pleads guilty deserves to have mitigating weight extended to the guilty plea in return.” Francis v. State, 817 N.E.2d 235, 237-38 (Ind. 2004) (citations omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Todd Barlow v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)
Ind. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
Ackerman v. State, 51 N.E.3d 171, 193 (Ind. 2016) (quotation marks omitted). [8] Barlow’s only argument on this issue is that the trial court failed to take his guilty plea into account when it sentenced him.2 It is well established that “a defendant who pleads guilty deserves to have mitigating weight extended to the guilty plea in return.” Francis v. State, 817 N.E.2d 235, 238 (Ind. 2004).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Taiwan Lundy v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)
Ind. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
Francis v. State, 817 N.E.2d 235, 238 (Ind. 2004). [17] In Hill, the Court stated that, while leniency in sentencing is constitutionally permissible as an incentive for an otherwise proper plea of guilty, a more severe sentence may not be imposed upon a defendant because he foregoes the opportunity to plead guilty and exercises his right to trial by jury. 499 N.E.2d at 1107 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) James Miske, Jr. v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)
Ind. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
We accordingly agree with Miske that the trial court abused its discretion when it found as an aggravating circumstance his high score on the Indiana Risk Assessment. [55] Turning next to the trial court’s finding that Miske’s failure to take responsibility for his offenses by entering a guilty plea was an aggravating factor, we observe that “a defendant who pleads guilty deserves to have mitigating weight extended to the guilty plea in return.” Francis v. State, 817 N.E.2d 235, 238 (Ind. 2004).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Patrick Palmer v. State of Indiana
Ind. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
Although it is well-established that a defendant who pleads guilty deserves to have mitigating weight extended to the guilty plea in return, Francis v. State, 817 N.E.2d 235, 238 (Ind. 2004), a guilty plea is not automatically a significant mitigating factor.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Douglas A. Myers v. State of Indiana (2×)
Ind. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
Although it is well-established that a defendant who pleads guilty deserves to have mitigating weight extended to the guilty plea in return, Francis v. State, 817 N.E.2d 235, 238 (Ind. 2004), a guilty plea is not automatically a significant mitigating factor.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Reuben Garcia v. State of Indiana
Ind. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
Francis v. State, 817 N.E.2d 235, 237 (Ind. 2004).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Webb v. State
Ind. Ct. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
Francis v. State, 817 N.E.2d 235, 237-38 (Ind.2004).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Harris v. State
Ind. · 2008 · confidence medium
Francis v. State, 817 N.E.2d 235, 237 (Ind.2004).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cardwell v. State (2×)
Ind. · 2008 · confidence medium
I said, "so what, you lost it, you totally lost it?" He said, "I wouldn't say I totally lost it," he said "I was mad, I was upset, I had been having problems lately with her minding." He said, "I kept her hands under there even though she screamed that it hurt." He said "I am wrong," he said "I need to go to jail and somebody needs to throw away the key." [2] Gauvin v. State, 883 N.E.2d 99, 105 (Ind. 2008); Hollin v. State, 877 N.E.2d 462, 465-66 (Ind.2007); Reid v. State, 876 N.E.2d 1114, 1116-17 (Ind.2007); Krempetz v. State, 872 N.E.2d 605, 616-17 (Ind.2007); McElroy v. State, 865 N.E.2d 58…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Smith v. State (2×)
Ind. · 2008 · confidence medium
Smith seeks transfer on, and we grant transfer to address, the sentencing issue only. [1] Discussion For this case, the standard or "presumptive" sentence for Class A felony child molesting is "a fixed term of thirty (30) years, with not more than twenty (20) years added for aggravating circumstances or not more than ten (10) years subtracted for mitigating circumstances." Ind.Code § 35-50-2-4 (2004). [2] "The legislature has prescribed standard or `presumptive' sentences for each crime, allowing the sentencing court limited discretion to enhance a sentence to reflect aggravating circumstance…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Hughes v. State
Ind. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
Francis v. State, 817 N.E.2d 235, 237 (Ind.2004).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Prickett v. State (2×)
Ind. · 2006 · confidence medium
A When a trial court relies on mitigating or aggravating circumstances in deciding whether to deviate from the statutory presumptive sentence, it is required to: "(1) identify all significant mitigating and aggravating circumstances; (2) state the specific reason why each circumstance has been determined to be mitigating or aggravating; and (3) articulate the court's evaluation and balancing of circumstances." Francis v. State, 817 N.E.2d 235, 237 (Ind.2004).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) McMahon v. State
Ind. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
See, eg., Childress, 848 N.E.2d at 1081 (advisory sentence is "the starting point the Legislature has selected as an appropriate sentence for the crime committed."); Francis v. State, 817 N.E.2d 235, 238-39 (Ind.2004) (whether defendant pled guilty); Serino v. State, 798 N.E.2d 852, 858 (Ind.2003) (evidence of defendant's positive character traits and wishes of victim and/or victim's family regarding sentence); Buchanan v. State, 767 N.E.2d 967, 973 (Ind.2002) (whether weapon was used in commission of offense); Monegan v. State, 756 N.E.2d 499, 504-05 (Ind.2001) (the de fendant's age); Walker,…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gibson v. State
Ind. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
"A guilty plea demonstrates a defendant's acceptance of responsibility for the crime and extends a benefit to the State and to the victim or the victim's family by avoiding a full-blown trial" Francis v. State, 817 N.E.2d 235, 237-38 (Ind.2004).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Davis v. State
Ind. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
Francis v. State, 817 N.E.2d 235, 238 (Ind.2004); Mull v. State, 770 N.E.2d 308, 314 (Ind.2002).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Williams v. State (2×)
Ind. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
A. Guilty Plea "'[A] defendant who willingly enters a plea of guilty has extended a substantial benefit to the state and deserves to have a substantial benefit extended to him in return'" Francis v. State, 817 N.E.2d 235, 237 (Ind.2004) (quoting Scheckel v. State, 655 N.E.2d 506, 511 (Ind.1995)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Scott v. State
Ind. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
In Francis v. State, 817 N.E.2d 235 n. 2 (Ind.2004), our Supreme Court noted that the defendant's failure to argue that his guilty plea should be considered as a mitigating cireumstance is not subject to the normal waiver considerations, inasmuch as the trial court is inherently aware that a guilty plea is a mitigating factor.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Payne v. State
Ind. Ct. App. · 2005 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Cf. Francis v. State, 817 N.E.2d 235, 238 (Ind.2004) (holding trial court's sentencing statement was inadequate because it failed to consider guilty plea a possible mitigating cireumstance).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ray v. State (2×)
Ind. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
Ray cites Francis v. State, 817 N.E.2d 235, 236 (Ind.2004), for the proposition that "when the age of the victim is both a material element of the offense and an aggravator, this aggravator should be given minimal weight .... [and] the use of such an aggravator should not justify the imposition of an enhanced sentence." Appellant's Brief at 25.
examined Cited as authority (rule) Hope v. State (4×) also: Cited "see"
Ind. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
Thus, a defendant who pleads guilty deserves to have mitigating weight extended to the guilty plea in return." Francis v. State, 817 N.E.2d 235, 237-38 (Ind.2004) (citations omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cotto v. State (2×)
Ind. · 2005 · confidence medium
Francis v. State, 817 N.E.2d 235, 238 (Ind.2004) (holding that because defendant pleaded guilty in the early stages of the proceedings, demonstrated remorse, and apologized for his actions, the weight attributable to defendant's plea of guilty was in the high range); Rose v. State, 810 N.E.2d 861 , 367 (Ind.Ct.App.2004) (holding that trial court correctly found defendant's remorse as shown by his plea of guilty was a mitigating circumstance); Cloum v. State, TTO N.E.2d 84, 90 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) (concluding the trial court abused its discretion in not assigning mitigating weight to defendant's d…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Estes v. State
Ind. · 2005 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Ruiz, 818 N.E.2d at 929 ; Francis v. State, 817 N.E.2d 235, 237-838 (Ind.2004).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Neale v. State (2×)
Ind. · 2005 · confidence medium
“If the court relies on aggravating or mitigating circumstances to deviate from the presumptive sentence, it must (1) identify all significant mitigating and aggravating circumstances; (2) state the specific reason why each circumstance has been determined to be mitigating or aggravating; and (3) articulate the court’s evaluation and balancing of circumstances.” Francis v. State, 817 N.E.2d 235, 237 (Ind.2004) (citing Wooley v. State, 716 N.E.2d 919, 929 (Ind.1999)).
discussed Cited "see" Joshua J. Kelp v. State of Indiana
Ind. Ct. App. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
See Spears v. State , 735 N.E.2d 1161 , 1167 (Ind. 2000) (essential element of a conviction was not allowed to be considered as an aggravating circumstance), reh'g denied , distinguished on other grounds by Francis v. State , 817 N.E.2d 235 (Ind. 2004).
discussed Cited "see" Calvin Wayne Howard, Jr. v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)
Ind. Ct. App. · 2016 · signal: see · confidence high
See Francis v. State, 817 N.E.2d 235, 237-38 (Ind. 2004) (recognizing that defendant’s guilty plea extends a benefit to the State and victims by avoiding a full-blown trial).
discussed Cited "see" Derrick Hampsch v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)
Ind. Ct. App. · 2016 · signal: see · confidence high
See Francis v. State, 817 N.E.2d 235, 238-239 (Ind. 2004) (concluding with respect to the defendant’s conviction for child molesting as a class A felony that a sentence of thirty years, rather than the maximum fifty-year sentence imposed by the trial court, was the appropriate sentence in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender where the defendant’s criminal history was minimal, the age of the victim had been taken into account to an extent by the class of the felony, and the defendant pled guilty); Asher v. State, 790 N.E.2d 567, 572 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (hold…
discussed Cited "see" James v. State (2×)
Ind. Ct. App. · 2007 · signal: see · confidence high
See Francis v. State, 817 N.E.2d 235, 238 (Ind.2004) (guilty plea and remorse at an early stage in the proceeding, suggests mitigating weight "in the high range"); see also Widener v. State, 659 N.E.2d 529, 534 (Ind.1995) (seventy-year sentence for felony murder and conspiracy to commit robbery was unreasonable due to defendant's age (seventeen) and his guilty plea).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Espinoza v. State
Ind. Ct. App. · 2006 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Francis v. State, 817 N.E.2d 235, 239 (Ind.2004) (holding that the presumptive sentence of 30 years for child molesting as a class A felony was the appropriate sentence in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Richard L. FRANCIS, Appellant (Defendant Below),
v.
STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below)
46S03-0407-CR-328.
Indiana Supreme Court.
Nov 9, 2004.
817 N.E.2d 235
Donald W. Pagos, Michigan City, IN, Attorney for Appellant., Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Richard C. Webster, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
Sullivan, Shepard, Boehm, Rucker, Dickson.
Cited by 74 opinions  |  Published
2 passages pin-cited by 2 cases
Pinpoint authority: #40,960 of 633,719
Citer courts: Indiana Court of Appeals (2)
SULLIVAN, Justice.

Defendant Richard L. Francis was charged with and pled guilty to child molesting. The sentencing court enhanced the presumptive sentence of 30 years applicable here by an additional 20, for a total sentence of 50 years. Finding that Francis's guilty plea and other mitigating circumstances balance the aggravating circumstances, we revise Francis's sentence to the presumptive sentence of 30 years.

Background

In August, 2002, Richard Francis, who at the time was 28-years-old, committed deviate sexual conduct with a child. As part of a plea agreement, Francis pled guilty to one count of child molesting, a Class A felony, [1] and agreed to argue sentencing before the LaPorte Superior Court. Although the plea agreement did not include a specified amount of jail time, the court was to take Francis's guilty plea under advisement when sentencing.

The court, however, sentenced Francis to the maximum 50 years for a Class A felony-the 30-year presumptive sentence enhanced by 20 years for aggravating circumstances. A majority of a panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence in an unpublished opinion. Francis v. State, No. 46A03-0305-CR-176, slip op. at 6, 797 N.E.2d 1189 (Ind.Ct.App. Oct.15, 2003). Judge Sullivan dissented. Francis sought and we granted transfer. Francis v. State, 2004 Ind. LEXIS 649 (Ind. July 23, 2004).

Discussion

Francis argues that his sentence is excessive as a result of the sentencing court's failure to consider his guilty plea a mitigating cireumstance. Finding that there were aggravating cireumstances, but no[*237] mitigating cireumstances, the court sentenced Francis to 20 years more than the presumptive 30-year sentence, for a total of 50 years in the Indiana Department of Correction.

The Legislature has prescribed standard or "presumptive" sentences for each crime, allowing the sentencing court limited discretion to enhance a sentence to reflect aggravating circumstances or to reduce a sentence to reflect mitigating circumstances. In this case, the applicable statute reads, "A person who commits a Class A felony shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of thirty (80) years, with not more than twenty (20) years added for aggravating circumstances or not more than ten (10) years subtracted for mitigating circumstances. ..." Ind.Code § 85-50-24 (2004)..

I

If the court relies on aggravating or mitigating circumstances to deviate from the presumptive sentence, it must (1) identify all significant mitigating and aggravating cireumstances; (2) state the specific reason why each circumstance has been determined to be mitigating or aggravating; and (8) articulate the court's evaluation and balancing of cireumstances. Wooley v. State, 716 N.E.2d 919, 929 (Ind. 1999) (citing Harris v. State, 659 N.E.2d 522, 527-28 (Ind.1995)). When a sentence more severe than the presumptive is challenged on appeal, the reviewing court will examine the record to insure that the sentencing court explained its reasons for selecting the sentence it imposed. Lander v. State, 762 N.E.2d 1208, 1215 (Ind.2002).

At Francis's sentencing proceeding, the court identified two aggravating cireum-stances: (1) Francis had a prior criminal history, and (2) the age of the victim was less than 12-years-old. The court found no mitigating circumstances. The trial court in this case satisfied its obligation to explain its reasons for selecting the sentence it imposed.

H

Francis contends that the sentencing court erred when it did not find that his guilty plea was a mitigating cireum-stance. [2] Francis notes that because he pled guilty before his case was even scheduled for trial, his plea saved the State and the court from expending valuable resources. He also notes that his plea prevented further family trauma because the victim did not have to testify.

This Court has recognized before that "a defendant who willingly enters a plea of guilty has extended a substantial benefit to the state and deserves to have a substantial benefit extended to him in return." Scheckel v. State, 655 N.E.2d 506, 511 (Ind.1995) (quoting Williams v. State, 430 N.E.2d 759, 764 (1982), reh'g denied, 459 U.S. 808, 103 S.Ct. 33, 74 LEd.2d 47 (1982)). A guilty plea demonstrates a defendant's acceptance of responsibility for the crime and extends a benefit to the State and to the victim or the victim's[*238] family by avoiding a full-blown trial. Id. See also Sensback v. State, 720 N.E.2d 1160, 1164 (Ind.1999); Trueblood v. State, 715 N.E.2d 1242, 1257 (Ind.1999). Thus, a defendant who pleads guilty deserves to have mitigating weight extended to the guilty plea in return. [3] - Scheckel, 655 N.E.2d at 511; Widener v. State, 659 N.E.2d 529, 534 (Ind.1995). We find that the court erred in not considering the guilty plea to be a mitigating cireumstance.

LL

Where we find an irregularity in the lower court's sentencing decision, we have the option to remand to the trial court for a clarification or new sentencing determination, to affirm the sentence if the error is harmless, or to reweigh the proper aggravating and mitigating cireumstances independently at the appellate level. Sherwood v. State, 749 N.E.2d 36, 39-40 (Ind.2001). We elect appellate reweighing here. See Ind. Const. art. VII, § 4.

For the reasons discussed above, the fact that the defendant pled guilty is a mitigating cireumstance entitled to weight in the high range. Our reading of the record here indicates that the defendant pled guilty at an early stage of the proceedings, demonstrated remorse, and apologized for his actions. These factors increase the weight attributable to this mitigator.

The record also indicates that defendant himself had been molested as a child. Because we are provided little information on this factor, we assign it weight in the low range.

As noted before, the sentencing court identified two aggravating circumstances: (1) Francis had a prior criminal history, and (2) the age of the victim was less than 12-years-old. However, the trial court did not elaborate on either factor.

As to the defendant's eriminal history, the record suggests that it is minimal. His only prior adult offenses were a public intoxication violation and a eriminal conversion conviction. However, his juvenile record includes a delinquency adjudication for an offense that would have constituted child molesting if committed by an adult. We therefore assign the defendant's criminal history weight in the low to medium range.

As to the age of the victim being less than 12-years-old, we note that the charging information used by the State here alleged that the defendant had molested a child "under twelve (12) years of age." Appellant's App. at 5. As this aggravating cireumstance does no more than set forth the allegation of the charging information, we find that it does not support enhancing the defendant's sentence. However, the record does show that the victim was 6-years-old. Although the age of the victim has been taken into account to some extent by the fact that the offense is a Class A felony, the young age of the victim is an aggravating circumstance to which we assign weight in the low to medium range.

Finally, we note Judge Sullivan's conclusion in dissent in the Court of Appeals opinion:

The only factor which qualifies the offense to which [defendant] pleaded guilty as a Class A felony is that [he][*239] was over the age of twenty-one. See Ind.Code § 85-42-4-3. Were it otherwise, and notwithstanding the arguable aggravating cireumstances and arguable lack of substantial mitigating cireum-stances, the crime would be a Class B felony for which the maximum sentence would be twenty years. Ind.Code § 35-50-2-5.
For this reason I find the maximum fifty-year sentence inappropriate and would reduce the sentence to the presumptive thirty years.

Francis, No. 46A083-0305-CR-176, slip op. at 8 (emphasis omitted).

Because we find the guilty plea to be a weighty mitigating cireumstance, which, with other mitigating circumstances, balances the aggravating circumstances that the court identified, we conclude that the presumptive sentence of 80 years is the appropriate sentence in light of the nature of this offense and the character of this offender. See Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B).

Conclusion

We reverse Francis's sentence of 50 years and remand to the sentencing court with instructions to issue an amended sentencing order and to issue or make any other documents or docket entries necessary to impose a sentence of 30 years, without a hearing.

SHEPARD, C.J., and BOEHM and RUCKER, JJ., concur. DICKSON, J., dissents without opinion.
1

. Ind.Code § 35-42-4-3(a)(1) (2004).

2

. The State argues that Francis forfeited his opportunity to claim on appeal that the court should have considered his guilty plea a mitigating circumstance when he failed to assert this claim at sentencing. To support this proposition, the State relies upon Spears v. State, 735 N.E.2d 1161, 1167 (Ind.2000) ("If the defendant does not advance a factor to be mitigating at sentencing, this Court will presume that the factor is not significant and the defendant is precluded from advancing it as a mitigating circumstance for the first time on appeal."). However, the defendant in Spears did not plead guilty, and so the mitigating circumstance at issue in the present case was not the subject of our focus in Spears. Because a sentencing court is inherently aware of the fact that a guilty plea is a mitigating circumstance, the language from Spears upon which the State relies is not applicable.

3

. Of course, the significance of this mitigating factor will vary from case to case. Where the guilty plea neither demonstrated a defendant's acceptance of responsibility for the crime nor extended a benefit to the State or to the victim or the victim's family by avoiding a full-blown trial, we concluded that the court did not abuse its discretion in declining to find the guilty plea a mitigating circumstance. Sensback v. State, 720 N.E.2d 1160, 1165, 1165 n. 4 (Ind.1999).