64 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1880–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Cotto v. Stategreen2 sentences2016Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 90A05-1604-CR-931 | November 23, 2016 Page 10 of 14 [18] Moreover, even if we believed that the court’s failure to identify Riddle’s participation in these programs as a mitigator was an irregularity constituting an abuse of discretion, “we have the option to remand to the trial court for clarification or new sentencing determination, to affirm the sentence if the error is harmless, or to reweigh the proper aggravating and mitigating circumstances independently at the appellate level.” McElfresh v. State, 51 N.E.3d 103, 112 (Ind. 2016) (quoting 2016“Where we find an irregularity in a trial court’s sentencing decision, we have the option to remand to the trial court for clarification or new sentencing determination, to affirm the sentence if the error is harmless, or to reweigh the proper aggravating and mitigating circumstances independently at the appellate level.” McElfresh v. State, 51 N.E.3d 103, 122 (Ind.2016),(quoting Cotto v. State, 829 N.E.2d 520, 525 (Ind.2005)). | 7 | 11 |
Merlington v. Stategreen2 sentences2020Ramos v. State, 869 N.E.2d 1262, 1264 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (citing Merlington v. State, 814 N.E.2d 269, 273 (Ind. 2004)). 2017Indiana Appellate Rule 66(A) provides, “No error or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the trial court or by any of the parties is ground for granting relief or reversal on appeal where its probable impact, in light of all the Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 09A02-1605-CR-1148 | February 21, 2017 Page 6 of 8 evidence in the case, is sufficiently minor so as not to affect the substantial rights of the parties.” “When we find an irregularity in the trial court’s sentencing decision, we may remand to the trial court for a clarification or a new sente | 5 | 6 |
Bivins v. Stategreen2 sentences2004Brown, 783 N.E.2d at 1129 ; Bivins v. State, 642 N.E.2d 928, 957 (Ind. 1994). 2004Brown, 783 N.E.2d at 1129 ; Bivins v. State, 642 N.E.2d 928, 957 (Ind.1994). | 5 | 6 |
Rios v. Stategreen2 sentences2020See id. [43] “When we find an irregularity in the trial court’s sentencing decision, we may remand to the trial court for a clarification or a new sentencing determination, or affirm the sentence if the error is harmless, or impose a proper sentence.” Rios v. State, 930 N.E.2d 664 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). 2019Accordingly, the order sentencing Boger to serve consecutive sentences is reversed. [50] “When we find an irregularity in the trial court’s sentencing decision, we may remand to the trial court for a clarification or a new sentencing determination, or affirm the sentence if the error is harmless, or impose a proper sentence.” Rios, 930 N.E.2d at 669 . | 3 | 5 |
Newland McElfresh v. State of Indianagreen2 sentences2020We have the authority to “affirm the sentence if the error is harmless.” McElfresh v. State, 51 N.E.3d 103, 112 (Ind. 2016). 2016Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 90A05-1604-CR-931 | November 23, 2016 Page 10 of 14 [18] Moreover, even if we believed that the court’s failure to identify Riddle’s participation in these programs as a mitigator was an irregularity constituting an abuse of discretion, “we have the option to remand to the trial court for clarification or new sentencing determination, to affirm the sentence if the error is harmless, or to reweigh the proper aggravating and mitigating circumstances independently at the appellate level.” McElfresh v. State, 51 N.E.3d 103, 112 (Ind. 2016) (quoting | 3 | 3 |
Sherwood v. Stategreen2 sentences2004See Means, 807 N.E.2d at 776 ; see also Sherwood v. State, 749 N.E.2d 36, 39-40 (Ind.2001) ("'Where we find an irregularity in a trial court's decision, we have the option to remand to the trial court for a clarification or new sentencing determination; to affirm the sentence if the error is harmless; or to weigh the proper aggravating and mitigating circumstances independently at the appellate level."). 2004See Means, 807 N.E.2d at 776 ; see also Sherwood v. State, 749 N.E.2d 36, 39-40 (Ind.2001) ("Where we find an irregularity in a trial court's decision, we have the option to remand to the trial court for a clarification or new sentencing determination; to affirm the sentence if the error is harmless; or to weigh the proper aggravating and mitigating circumstances independently at the appellate level."). | 3 | 3 |
Abron v. Stategreen2 sentences2004The felony murder conviction should have been vacated instead of merged. 7 See also Abron v. State, 591 N.E.2d 634, 637 (Ind.Ct.App.1992) (conviction even without a sentence is in violation of double jeopardy and must be vacated). 2000Abron v. State, 591 N.E.2d 634, 636-37 (Ind.Ct.App.1992). | 2 | 4 |
Steven Clippinger v. State of Indianagreen2 sentences2020“Where we find an irregularity in a trial court’s sentencing decision, we have the option to remand to the trial court for clarification or new sentencing determination, to affirm the sentence if the error is harmless, or to reweigh the proper aggravating and mitigating circumstances Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-387 | November 5, 2020 Page 6 of 7 independently at the appellate level.” Clippinger v. State, 54 N.E.3d 986, 992 (Ind. 2016). 2018Clippinger v. State, 54 N.E.3d 986, 992 (Ind. 2016). [9] At the start of the sentencing hearing, the trial court recognized that Britain had “entered a plea of guilty to Count 1, Fraud, a Level 6 Felony.” Tr. | 2 | 2 |
Fechter v. Shirokygreen2 sentences2002See Bivins v. State, 642 N.E.2d 928, 957 (Ind.1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1077 , 116 S.Ct. 783 , 133 L.Ed.2d 734 (1996). 2001See Bivins v. State, 642 N.E.2d 928, 957 (Ind. 1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1077 , 116 S.Ct. 783 , 133 L.Ed.2d 734 (1996). | 2 | 2 |
Bivins v. Indianagreen2 sentences2002See Bivins v. State, 642 N.E.2d 928, 957 (Ind.1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1077 , 116 S.Ct. 783 , 133 L.Ed.2d 734 (1996). 2001See Bivins v. State, 642 N.E.2d 928, 957 (Ind.1994), ce rt. denied, 516 U.S. 1077 , 116 S.Ct. 788 , 133 L.Ed.2d 734 (1996). | 2 | 2 |
Brown v. Stategreen2 sentences2018There are three options, then, that we must consider: "(1) remand the matter to the trial court for clarification or a new sentencing determination; (2) affirm the sentence if the error is harmless; or (3) independently reweigh the proper aggravating and mitigating circumstances." Id. 2018Brown v. State, 783 N.E.2d 1121, 1129 (Ind. 2003). | 1 | 4 |
Williams v. Stategreen2 sentences2020Id. 2020See id. [43] “When we find an irregularity in the trial court’s sentencing decision, we may remand to the trial court for a clarification or a new sentencing determination, or affirm the sentence if the error is harmless, or impose a proper sentence.” Rios v. State, 930 N.E.2d 664 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). | 1 | 2 |
Kimble v. Stategreen2 sentences2002The post-conviction relief process is also open to the "raising [of] issues not known at the time of the original trial and appeal or for some reason not available to the defendant at that time." Kimble v. State, [ 451 N.E.2d 302, 303-304 (Ind.1983)]. 1985The post-conviction relief process is also open to the "raising [of] issues not *1263 known at the time of the original trial and appeal or for some reason not available to the defendant at that time." Kimble v. State, (1983) Ind., 451 N.E.2d 302, 308-804 . | 1 | 2 |
Ramos v. Stategreen1 sentence2020Ramos v. State, 869 N.E.2d 1262, 1264 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (citing Merlington v. State, 814 N.E.2d 269, 273 (Ind. 2004)). | 1 | 1 |
Michael Norris v. State of Indianagreen1 sentence2020See App. R. 7(B); Norris v. State, 113 N.E.3d 1245, 1255 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). | 1 | 1 |
Blakely v. Washingtongreen1 sentence2019If the reviewing court found “irregularity in the lower court’s sentencing decision,” the court could elect among options, including “to remand to the trial court for a clarification or new sentencing determination, to affirm the sentence if the error is harmless, or to reweigh the proper aggravating and mitigating circumstances independently at the appellate level.” Id. at 238 . 2 On June 24, 2004, the Supreme Court of the United States handed down Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301 (2004), holding that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial required that “[o]ther than the fact of a | 1 | 1 |
Mitchell v. Stategreen1 sentence2019Treece v. State, 10 N.E.3d 52, 59 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied 1 (citing Mitchell v. State, 619 N.E.2d 961, 964 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993)). | 1 | 1 |
Floyd William Treece v. State of Indianagreen1 sentence2019Treece v. State, 10 N.E.3d 52, 59 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied 1 (citing Mitchell v. State, 619 N.E.2d 961, 964 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993)). | 1 | 1 |
Bandini v. Bandinigreen1 sentence2018It is unclear how Pond’s motion fits within any of these conditions, and Pond has not clarified this matter. [20] Moreover, even if we address this issue, Pond’s argument fails. “[A] clear and unequivocal admission of fact, or a formal stipulation that concedes any element of a claim or defense, is a binding judicial admission.” Bandini v. Bandini, 935 N.E.2d 253, 265 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). | 1 | 1 |
Steven M. Sandleben v. State of Indianagreen1 sentence2017See Sandleben v. State, 29 N.E.3d 126, 136 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (concluding that Sandleben waived inappropriate sentence argument by failing to present cogent argument on that issue), trans. denied. | 1 | 1 |
Taylor v. Finnangreen1 sentence2014See Pizano I, 33A01-1302-MI-65 *2 (citing Taylor v. Finnan, 955 N.E.2d 785, 789 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (citing to Hawkins v. Jenkins, 268 Ind. 137, 140-41 , 374 N.E.2d 496, 498-99 (1978) for the proposition that when a person is not entitled to immediate release, a sentence challenge is properly considered one for post-conviction relief and not habeas corpus)). 3 We note that our review of the instant matter is somewhat hampered by Pizano’s failure to include a 3 awarded all credit time to which he was entitled and dismissed the action as moot. | 1 | 1 |
Hawkins v. Jenkinsgreen2 sentences2014See Pizano I, 33A01-1302-MI-65 *2 (citing Taylor v. Finnan, 955 N.E.2d 785, 789 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (citing to Hawkins v. Jenkins, 268 Ind. 137, 140-41 , 374 N.E.2d 496, 498-99 (1978) for the proposition that when a person is not entitled to immediate release, a sentence challenge is properly considered one for post-conviction relief and not habeas corpus)). 3 We note that our review of the instant matter is somewhat hampered by Pizano’s failure to include a 3 awarded all credit time to which he was entitled and dismissed the action as moot. 2014See Pizano I, 33A01-1302-MI-65 *2 (citing Taylor v. Finnan, 955 N.E.2d 785, 789 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (citing to Hawkins v. Jenkins, 268 Ind. 137, 140-41 , 374 N.E.2d 496, 498-99 (1978) for the proposition that when a person is not entitled to immediate release, a sentence challenge is properly considered one for post-conviction relief and not habeas corpus)). 3 We note that our review of the instant matter is somewhat hampered by Pizano’s failure to include a 3 awarded all credit time to which he was entitled and dismissed the action as moot. | 1 | 1 |
Baber v. Stategreen1 sentence2006"Where we find an irregularity in a trial court's sentencing decision, we have the option to remand to the trial court for a clarification or new sentencing determination, to affirm the sentence if the error is harmless, or to reweigh the proper aggravating and mitigating circumstances independently at the appellate level." Baber v. State, 842 N.E.2d 343, 345 (Ind.2006), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 128 , 166 L.Ed.2d 95 (2006). | 1 | 1 |
Means v. Stategreen2 sentences2004See Means, 807 N.E.2d at 776 ; see also Sherwood v. State, 749 N.E.2d 36, 39-40 (Ind.2001) ("'Where we find an irregularity in a trial court's decision, we have the option to remand to the trial court for a clarification or new sentencing determination; to affirm the sentence if the error is harmless; or to weigh the proper aggravating and mitigating circumstances independently at the appellate level."). 2004See Means, 807 N.E.2d at 776 ; see also Sherwood v. State, 749 N.E.2d 36, 39-40 (Ind.2001) ("Where we find an irregularity in a trial court's decision, we have the option to remand to the trial court for a clarification or new sentencing determination; to affirm the sentence if the error is harmless; or to weigh the proper aggravating and mitigating circumstances independently at the appellate level."). | 1 | 1 |
| Holsinger v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Cua v. Ramosgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Kharrat v. Immigration & Naturalization Servicegreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Quincy J. Conwaygreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Rodriguezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Arterogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Tiller v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Nashgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| Lane v. Browngreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hope v. State
green
2 sentences2006Id. at 718 . 2005Id. at 718 . | 2 | 2005–2006 |
Francis v. State
green
1 sentence2019If the reviewing court found “irregularity in the lower court’s sentencing decision,” the court could elect among options, including “to remand to the trial court for a clarification or new sentencing determination, to affirm the sentence if the error is harmless, or to reweigh the proper aggravating and mitigating circumstances independently at the appellate level.” Id. at 238 . 2 On June 24, 2004, the Supreme Court of the United States handed down Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301 (2004), holding that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial required that “[o]ther than the fact of a | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Smylie v. State
green
1 sentence2019If the reviewing court found “irregularity in the lower court’s sentencing decision,” the court could elect among options, including “to remand to the trial court for a clarification or new sentencing determination, to affirm the sentence if the error is harmless, or to reweigh the proper aggravating and mitigating circumstances independently at the appellate level.” Id. at 238 . 2 On June 24, 2004, the Supreme Court of the United States handed down Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301 (2004), holding that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial required that “[o]ther than the fact of a | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Collins v. State
green
1 sentence2009Collins v. State, 817 N.E.2d 230 (Ind.2004). 1 In the instant case, at the hearing on his P-C.R. 1 petition for post-conviction relief, Olvera orally moved to amend his P-C.R. 1 petition to include a sentence challenge. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Samuels v. State
green
1 sentence2007Pursuant to Indiana PosWConviction Rule l(l)(a), post-conviction relief is available if the petitioner claims one of the following: “(1) that the conviction or the sentence was in violation of the Constitution of the United States or the constitution or laws of this state; (2) that the court was without jurisdiction to impose sentence; (3) that the sentence exceeds the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise erroneous; (4) that there exists evidence of material facts, not previously presented and heard, that requires vacation of the conviction or sentence in the interest of justice; (5) tha | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Members v. State
green
1 sentence2007Pursuant to Indiana PosWConviction Rule l(l)(a), post-conviction relief is available if the petitioner claims one of the following: “(1) that the conviction or the sentence was in violation of the Constitution of the United States or the constitution or laws of this state; (2) that the court was without jurisdiction to impose sentence; (3) that the sentence exceeds the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise erroneous; (4) that there exists evidence of material facts, not previously presented and heard, that requires vacation of the conviction or sentence in the interest of justice; (5) tha | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Davies v. State green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Chandler v. State green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Huffman v. State green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Fowler v. State green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Powers v. State green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Royal Crown Cola Co. v. Coca-Cola Co. green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| State v. Palmer green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Surratt v. Petrol, Inc. green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Waldo v. Wallace green | 1 | 1896–1896 |
| St. Louis & South-Eastern Railway Co. v. Valirius neutral | 1 | 1880–1880 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.