aggravating and mitigating factors in Indiana

2026“An abuse occurs only if the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Schuler v. State, 132 N.E.3d 903 , 904 (Ind. 2019) (citing Rice v. State, 6 N.E.3d 940, 943 (Ind. 2014)). [20] A trial court abuses its discretion in a number of ways, including: (1) “failing to enter a sentencing statement at all”; (2) entering a sentencing statement in which the aggravating and mitigating factors are not supported by the record; (3) entering a sentencing statement that does no

2024Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-2187 | June 10, 2024 Page 5 of 20 is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Schuler v. State, 132 N.E.3d 903 , 904 (Ind. 2019). [11] An abuse of discretion occurs in a number of ways, including when the trial court: (1) fails “to enter a sentencing statement at all”; (2) enter[s] a sentencing statement in which the aggravating and mitigating factors are not supported by the record; (3) enter[s] a sentencing statement that does no

2026“An abuse occurs only if the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Schuler v. State, 132 N.E.3d 903 , 904 (Ind. 2019) (citing Rice v. State, 6 N.E.3d 940, 943 (Ind. 2014)). [20] A trial court abuses its discretion in a number of ways, including: (1) “failing to enter a sentencing statement at all”; (2) entering a sentencing statement in which the aggravating and mitigating factors are not supported by the record; (3) entering a sentencing statement that does no

2024Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-2187 | June 10, 2024 Page 5 of 20 is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Schuler v. State, 132 N.E.3d 903 , 904 (Ind. 2019). [11] An abuse of discretion occurs in a number of ways, including when the trial court: (1) fails “to enter a sentencing statement at all”; (2) enter[s] a sentencing statement in which the aggravating and mitigating factors are not supported by the record; (3) enter[s] a sentencing statement that does no

2014Clara v. State, 899 N.E.2d 733, 736 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).

2014Clara v. State, 899 N.E.2d 733, 736 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).

2020“While we review the aggravating and mitigating factors considered by the trial court for abuse of discretion, we do not review the relative weight or value assigned to each factor.” Deloney v. State, 938 N.E.2d 724, 732 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. [10] An allegation that the trial court failed to identify a particular mitigating factor requires the defendant to establish that the mitigating evidence is both Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-62 | July 13, 2020 Page 5 of 8 significant and clearly supported by the record.

2013See Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d at 491 ; see also Deloney v. State, 938 N.E.2d 724, 732 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (“While we review the aggravating and mitigating factors considered by the trial court for abuse of discretion, we do not review the relative weight or value assigned to each factor.”) Hargrow also argues that the trial court failed to consider his medical condition as a mitigator.2 The trial court found that Hargrow’s medical condition was not a mitigating factor because “[t]he defendant, if he did have these medical conditions, with his kidneys, his prostate, and his heart” used dr

1998Sentencing is conducted within the “discretion of the trial court and will be reversed only upon a showing of abuse of that discretion.” Sims v. State, 585 N.E.2d 271, 272 (Ind.1992).

1994He thirdly asserts that the trial court failed to properly consider the aggravating and mitigating factors, ignoring most of the latter and neglecting to specify why each cireumstance listed as aggravating was so, as per Sims v. State (1992), Ind., 585 N.E.2d 271 .

2019See Lopez v. State, 869 N.E.2d 1254, 1258-59 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied.

2016Thus, a trial court may find that the aggravating and mitigating factors balance for purposes of the length of a sentence and then find an additional, free-standing aggravator justifying the imposition of consecutive sentences, e.g., Lopez v. State, 869 N.E.2d 1254, 1258 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied, or find that one of the same aggravators used in determining the length of the sentence justifies imposing consecutive sentences, Frentz, 875 N.E.2d at 472 . [9] Moreover, “our supreme court has ‘emphasized that[,] before a trial court can impose a consecutive sentence, it must articulate,

2019Appellant’s Br. at 13-14. [22] Kimbrell cites to Marcum v. State, 725 N.E.2d 852, 864 (Ind. 2000) as support for his claim that “[c]onsecutive sentences are improper where the trial court explicitly finds that the aggravating and mitigating factors balance.” Appellant’s Br. at 13 (citing Marcum, 725 N.E.2d at 863-64 ).

2019Appellant’s Br. at 13-14. [22] Kimbrell cites to Marcum v. State, 725 N.E.2d 852, 864 (Ind. 2000) as support for his claim that “[c]onsecutive sentences are improper where the trial court explicitly finds that the aggravating and mitigating factors balance.” Appellant’s Br. at 13 (citing Marcum, 725 N.E.2d at 863-64 ).

2007See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 728 N.E.2d 147, 155 (Ind.2000) (finding that the Court could not determine from the sentencing statement whether the trial court “properly weighed” the aggravating and mitigating factors); Morgan v. State, 675 N.E.2d 1067, 1073-74 (Ind.1996) (finding that the Court could not conclude that the aggravating and mitigating factors were “properly weighed” where the sentencing statement did not, in part, explain its balancing process).

2000Crawley v. State, 677 N.E.2d 520, 521-22 (Ind.1997); Morgan v. State, 675 N.E.2d 1067, 1073 (Ind. 1996).

2004Brown v. State, 760 N.E.2d 243, 245 (Ind.Ct.App.2002), trans. denied.

2003Brown v. State, 760 N.E.2d 243, 245 (Ind.Ct.App.2002), trans. denied.

1999Id. at 909 (citing Lambert v. State, 675 N.E.2d 1060, 1065 (Ind.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1255 , 117 S.Ct. 2417 , 138 L.Ed.2d 181 (1997)).

1998Id. at 909 (citing Lambert v. State , 675 N.E.2d 1060, 1065 (Ind. 1996), cert. denied , 117 S. Ct. 2417 (1997)).

1998Jones v. State, 675 N.E.2d 1084, 1087 (Ind.1996) (citing Henderson v. State, 489 N.E.2d 68, 71 (Ind.1986)).

1995An adequate explanation contains 1) a list of the aggravating and mitigating factors, 2) a statement of the specific reasons why each factor is considered to be aggravating or mitigating, and 3) an evaluation and balancing of the factors. *319 Henderson v. State (1986), Ind., 489 N.E.2d 68, 71 .

2021Id. (citing Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491 ).

2014Id. at 1128-29 . “[T]he trial court is not required to give the same weight to the proffered mitigating factors as the defendant does, nor is it obligated to explain why it did not find a factor to be significantly mitigating.” Williams v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1154, 1163-64 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).

2019Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2660 | July 23, 2019 Page 7 of 17 [14] One aggravating factor alone can be sufficient to justify increasing Theriot’s sentence above the advisory guideline. 3 See Bacher v. State, 722 N.E.2d 799, 804 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that “[b]ecause a single valid aggravating factor is adequate to justify a sentence enhancement, the sentencing court did not abuse its discretion in enhancing the defendant’s sentence”). [15] When evaluating the nature of the offense, “the trial court may properly consider the particularized circumstances of th

2007However, “[w]hen a trial court enhances a presumptive sentence, it must state its reasons for doing so, identifying all significant aggravating and mitigating factors; stating the facts and reasons that lead the court to find the existence of each such circumstance; and demonstrating that the court has evaluated and balanced the aggravating and mitigating factors in determining the sentence.” Id.

2012In light of our role to “leaven the outliers,” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d at 1222 , and the relative equipoise of the trial court’s assessment of the aggravating and mitigating factors, we exercise our independent power under Appellate Rule 7(B) to revise Merida’s sentences.

2012In light of our role to “leaven the outliers,” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d at 1222 , and the relative equipoise of the trial court’s assessment of the aggravating and mitigating factors, we exercise our independent power under Appellate Rule 7(B) to revise Merida’s sentences.

2012See Webb v. State, 941 N.E.2d 1082, 1088 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (“[t]he relative weight given to the aggravating and mitigating factors is not subject to review”), trans denied.

2012“The relative weight given to the aggravating and mitigating factors is not subject to review.” Id. at 1088 .

1997The Supreme Court expressly approved the use of this mitigating factor in Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 , 96 S.Ct. 2960 , 49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976). 21 The petitioner in Prof-fitt argued that the aggravating and mitigating factors in Florida’s capital sentencing scheme were overly broad, and that neither judge nor jury could determine whether a defendant had a “significant history of prior criminal activity.” 22 The Court acknowledged that making this decision is difficult, but that it “require[s] no more line drawing than is commonly required of a factfinder in a lawsuit.” Proffitt, 428 U.S.

1997The Supreme Court expressly approved the use of this mitigating factor in Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 , 96 S.Ct. 2960 , 49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976). 21 The petitioner in Prof-fitt argued that the aggravating and mitigating factors in Florida’s capital sentencing scheme were overly broad, and that neither judge nor jury could determine whether a defendant had a “significant history of prior criminal activity.” 22 The Court acknowledged that making this decision is difficult, but that it “require[s] no more line drawing than is commonly required of a factfinder in a lawsuit.” Proffitt, 428 U.S.

2026“An abuse occurs only if the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Schuler v. State, 132 N.E.3d 903 , 904 (Ind. 2019) (citing Rice v. State, 6 N.E.3d 940, 943 (Ind. 2014)). [20] A trial court abuses its discretion in a number of ways, including: (1) “failing to enter a sentencing statement at all”; (2) entering a sentencing statement in which the aggravating and mitigating factors are not supported by the record; (3) entering a sentencing statement that does no

2020Wells v. State, 836 N.E.2d 475, 479 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).

2019Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2660 | July 23, 2019 Page 7 of 17 [14] One aggravating factor alone can be sufficient to justify increasing Theriot’s sentence above the advisory guideline. 3 See Bacher v. State, 722 N.E.2d 799, 804 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that “[b]ecause a single valid aggravating factor is adequate to justify a sentence enhancement, the sentencing court did not abuse its discretion in enhancing the defendant’s sentence”). [15] When evaluating the nature of the offense, “the trial court may properly consider the particularized circumstances of th

2019Walters v. State, 68 N.E.3d 1097, 1101 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied.

2018Clippinger v. State, 54 N.E.3d 986, 992 (Ind. 2016). [9] At the start of the sentencing hearing, the trial court recognized that Britain had “entered a plea of guilty to Count 1, Fraud, a Level 6 Felony.” Tr.

2017Ackerman v. State, 51 N.E.3d 171, 193 (Ind. 2016) (quotation marks omitted). [8] Barlow’s only argument on this issue is that the trial court failed to take his guilty plea into account when it sentenced him.2 It is well established that “a defendant who pleads guilty deserves to have mitigating weight extended to the guilty plea in return.” Francis v. State, 817 N.E.2d 235, 238 (Ind. 2004).