Warren v. State, 760 N.E.2d 608 (Ind. 2002). · Go Syfert
Warren v. State, 760 N.E.2d 608 (Ind. 2002). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
49 citation events (49 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Norman Thomas, II v. State of Indiana (indctapp, 2025-05-05)
Treatment trajectory · 2002 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2002 2014 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 12 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Norman Thomas, II v. State of Indiana
Ind. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
The purpose of the particularity requirement is to assure that law enforcement officers “do not have ‘unbridled discretion’ to rummage through people’s belongings.” Membres v. State, 889 N.E.2d 265, 276 (Ind. 2008) (quoting Warren v. State, 760 N.E.2d 608, 610 (Ind. 2002)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Robert J Plato, Jr. v. State of Indiana
Ind. Ct. App. · 2023 · confidence medium
“The problem posed by the general warrant is not that of intrusion per se, but of a general, Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PC-452 | September 25, 2023 Page 11 of 14 exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings . . . .” Warren v. State, 760 N.E.2d 608, 610 (Ind. 2002) (cleaned up).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Davis v. State
Ind. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
In Warren v. State, our Supreme Court held that the ending phrase to the description of items to be seized was a catchall phrase that granted unbridled discretion to conduct a general exploratory search. 760 N.E.2d 608, 610 (Ind.2002).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Membres v. State (4×) also: Cited "see"
Ind. · 2008 · confidence medium
Warren v. State, 760 N.E.2d 608, 610 (Ind.2002).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Levenduski v. State (2×) also: Cited "see"
Ind. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
Warren v. State, 760 N.E.2d 608, 610 (Ind.2002).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Figgures (2×)
Ind. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
This requirement prohibits general warrants, which prevents "'a general, exploratory rummaging in a person's belongings'" and " 'the seizure of *777 one thing under a warrant describing another."" Warren v. State, 760 N.E.2d 608, 610 (Ind.2002) (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 408 U.S. 448 , 467, 91 S.Ct. 2022 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 , 85 S.Ct. 506 , 13 L.Ed.2d 481 (1965).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Allen v. State (2×)
Ind. Ct. App. · 2003 · confidence medium
IV; Warren v. State, 760 N.E.2d 608, 610 (Ind.2002).
discussed Cited "see" Nicholas Ray Eugene Brummett v. State of Indiana
Ind. Ct. App. · 2024 · signal: see · confidence high
See White v. State, 772 N.E.2d 408, 411 (Ind. 2002) (“Because the defendant does not argue that the search and seizure provision in the Indiana Constitution requires a different analysis than the federal Fourth Amendment, his state constitutional claim is waived, and we consider only the federal claim.”) (citing Warren v. State, 760 N.E.2d 608 , 610 n.3 (Ind. 2002); Williams v. State, 724 N.E.2d 1093 , 1097 n.5 (Ind. 2000); Brown v. State, 703 N.E.2d 1010 , 1015 n.4 (Ind. 1998); Fair v. State, 627 N.E.2d 427 , 430 n.1 (Ind. 1993)).
cited Cited "see" Kevin B. Streete v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)
Ind. Ct. App. · 2018 · signal: see · confidence high
See Warren v. State, 760 N.E.2d 608 , 610 n.3 (Ind. 2002).
discussed Cited "see" Lee v. State
Ind. Ct. App. · 2011 · signal: see · confidence high
See Warren v. State, 760 N.E.2d 608, 610 (Ind.2002) (holding that “catchall language does not doom the entire warrant, ... but rather only requires the suppression of the evidence seized pursuant to that part of the warrant but not the suppression of the evidence obtained pursuant to the valid specific portions of the warrant”).
cited Cited "see" State v. Foy
Ind. Ct. App. · 2007 · signal: see · confidence high
See Warren v. State, 760 N.E.2d 608 ; U.S. v. Robinson, 287 F.Supp. 245 .
cited Cited "see" Sisk v. State
Ind. Ct. App. · 2003 · signal: see · confidence high
See Warren v. State, 760 N.E.2d 608, 610 (Ind.2002).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Andrew L. WARREN, Defendant-Appellant,
v.
STATE of Indiana, Plaintiff-Appellee
49S00-0011-CR-634.
Indiana Supreme Court.
Jan 10, 2002.
760 N.E.2d 608
2002 Ind. LEXIS 24
2002 WL 24586
Kurt A. Young, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant., Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Monika Prekopa Talbot, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
Dickson, Shepard, Sullivan, Boehm, Rucker.
Cited by 18 opinions  |  Published
DICKSON, Justice.

For a June 1999 incident involving two deaths, Andrew Warren was convicted of two counts of murder [1] and one count of conspiracy to commit robbery. [2] In this appeal he argues that the trial court committed reversible error by denying his motion to suppress predicated on a faulty search warrant.

After finding two victims of fatal gunshot wounds, the police concluded that the crime scene was the result of a captive getting free and shooting his attacker. Evidence at the scene also led police to believe another person was involved. The police identified the deceased attacker as Christopher Fox and sought a warrant for his residence to gather evidence of the scheme that resulted in the deaths of the two men. Fox's apartment lease also listed Aaron Warren as an occupant of the apartment. While executing the warrant the police discovered identification cards and driver's licenses in the names of both Aaron and Andrew Warren. These documents bore the pictures of the same person. After learning that Aaron Warren could not have lived in the apartment in 1999, the police investigation focused on[*610] Andrew Warren, eventually resulting in his convictions and this appeal.

The defendant contends that the search was improper because it was executed pursuant to a general warrant which granted unbridled discretion to the police regarding the items sought in violation of the search and seizure clauses of the United States and Indiana Constitutions. [3] The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires search warrants to "particularly describfe]l the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. Const. amend. IV. The United States Supreme Court has stated:

General warrants, of course, are prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. "[The problem [posed by the general warrant] is not that of intrusion per se, but of a general, exploratory rummaging in a person's belongings.... [The Fourth Amendment addresses the problem] by requiring a 'particular description' of the things to be seized." Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467[, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2038-39, 29 L.Ed.2d 564, 583] (1971). This requirement " 'makes general searches ... impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another. As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant." Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485[, 85 S.Ct. 506, 512, 13 L.Ed.2d 431, 437] (1965), quoting Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. [192, 196, 48 S.Ct. 74, 76, 72 L.Ed. 231, 237 (1927) ].

Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480, 96 S.Ct. 2737, 2748, 49 L.Ed.2d 627, 642 (1976). A warrant that leaves the executing officer with discretion is invalid. Hester v. State, 551 N.E.2d 1187, 1190 (Ind.Ct.App.1990).

In this case the warrant listed the items to be seized as "guns, aanmunition, gun parts, lists of acquaintances, blood, microseopOic [sic] or trace evidence, silver duct tape, white cord and any other indicia of eriminal activity including but not limited to books, records, documents, or any other such items." Supp. Record at 20. The defendant argues that this warrant is "without any practical limit as to the items for which a search may be conducted." Br. of Appellant at 16. We agree that the phrase "any other indicia of criminal activity including but not limited to books, records, documents, or any other such items" grants an officer unlawful unbridled discretion to conduct a general exploratory search. The infirmity of this catchall language does not doom the entire warrant, however, but rather only requires the suppression of the evidence seized pursuant to that part of the warrant but not the suppression of the evidence obtained pursuant to the valid specific portions of the warrant. See United States v. Greene, 250 F.3d 471, 477 (6th Cir.2001); United States v. Reed, 726 F.2d 339, 342 (7th Cir.1984).

The defendant argues that the identification cards and driver's licenses were seized pursuant to the catchall language. We disagree. Because they contained photos depicting the same person as Fox's roommate, the identification cards are within the "lists of acquaintances" description on the search warrant. The police properly seized these items because they were particularly described in the warrant.

[*611] We discern no error in the denial of the defendant's motion to suppress.

Conclusion

The defendant's convictions are affirmed.

SHEPARD, C.J., and SULLIVAN, BOEHM and RUCKER, JJ., concur.
3

. Because Warren does not argue that the search and seizure provision in the Indiana Constitution requires a different analysis than the federal Fourth Amendment, his state constitutional claim is waived, and we consider only the federal claim. Williams v. State, 724 N.E.2d 1093, 1097 n. 5 (Ind.2000); Brown v. State, 703 N.E.2d 1010, 1015 n. 4 (Ind.1998); Fair v. State, 627 N.E.2d 427, 430 n. 1 (Ind.1993).