green
Positive treatment
Doctrinal family: United States v. American Trucki… ↗
Issue: contours inquiryUT ↗
Issue: absurdity doctrineIA ↗
Issue: absurd result doctrineUT ↗
Issue: includes requirementPA ↗
Quoted verbatim 7×
38.0 score
Quick Summary
General statutory terms should be limited in their application to avoid injustice, oppression, or absurd consequences.
A mail carrier is arrested on a criminal indictment for murder, causing a temporary delay in the delivery of the mail. The court considers whether this arrest constitutes a knowing and willful obstruction of the mail under a federal statute. The court holds that the statute applies only to those who intend to obstruct the mail through unlawful acts. Applying the principle of sensible construction, the court determines that general statutory terms should be limited to avoid injustice or absurd consequences. Because the arrest was based on a felony charge, the carrier's temporary detention of the mail does not violate the statute.
G Cite
cited 7× by 5 distinct cases, last quoted 2003 · 4 courts↓ Fading ·
…that whoever drew blood in the streets should be punished with the utmost severity,
at p. 487
✓
cited 6× by 5 distinct cases, last quoted 2010 · 5 courts↓ Fading ·
…for he is not to be hanged because he would not stay to be burnt.
at p. 487
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cited 3× by 3 distinct cases, 2000–2020 · 3 courts↓ Fading ·
…all laws should receive a sensible construction. general terms should be so limited in their application as not to lead to injustice, oppression, or an absurd consequence.
at p. 486
✓
G Cite: 5 distinguished/criticized. Strongest: Federal Communications Commission v. Nextwave Personal Communications Inc. (Limited)
Treatment trajectory · 1900 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1900
1963
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Fitzgerald Truck Parts & Sales LLC v. United States
all laws should receive a sensible construction. general terms should be so limited in their application as not to lead to . . . an absurd consequence.
examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Sedita v. United States of America
the common sense of man" understands that a statute reading "'whoever drew blood in the streets should be punished with the utmost severity,' does not extend to the surgeon who opened the vein of a person that fell down in the street in a fit.
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Dupuch-Carron v. Secretary of Health and Human Services
all laws should receive a sensible construction. general terms should be so limited in their application as not to lead to injustice, oppression, or an absurd consequence.
examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Federal Communications Commission v. Nextwave Personal Communications Inc.
(2×)
all laws should receive a sensible construction. general terms should be so limited in their application as not to lead to injustice, oppression, or an absurd consequence
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Alberte v. Anew Health Care Services, Inc.
all laws should receive a sensible construction. general terms should be so limited in their application as not to lead to injustice, oppression, or an absurd consequence.
discussed
Cited as authority (quoted)
United States v. Brown
all laws should receive a sensible construction. general terms should be so limited in their application as not to lead to injustice, oppression, or an absurd consequence.
examined
Cited as authority (quoted)
Bourgeois v. Live Nation Entertainment, Inc.
(3×)
general terms should be so limited in their application as not to lead to ... an absurd consequence.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Application of 18 U.S.C. § 209 to Continued Receipt of Standardized Restricted Stock Units Awarded Before Federal Employees Enter Government Service
A policy that has actually been used to grant leave for both federal government service and other public interest work will have the same (if not stronger) effect, regardless of whether it expressly lists federal government service as one of the appropriate uses of leave. 12 Application of 18 U.S.C. § 209 to Continued Receipt of Restricted Stock Units Kirby, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 482, 487 (1869) (explaining that statutes should be read in light of common sense).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Coleman, J. v. Parkland School District, Aplt.
United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. 482, 486-87 (1868).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Bruckner Truck Sales v. Guzman
We do not lightly embrace interpretations of legal texts that result in “absurd consequences,” United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. 482, 486 (1868), or “create[] a massive loophole,” County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund, 590 U.S. 165, 179 (2020).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Sharmake Abdullahi
(2×)
Nearly 50 years ago, the Third Circuit abandoned “the literal meaning” of a local kidnapping statute in favor of “a [more] sensible construction.” Gov’t of the Virgin Islands v. Berry, 604 F.2d 221, 225 (3d Cir. 1979) (quoting United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 482, 486 (1868)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Powers
For example, “[a]n escapee who flees from a jail that is in the process of burning to the ground” may be entitled to the defense, id. at 415 , “for he is not to be hanged because he would not stay to be burnt,” United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 482, 487 (1868); see also United States v. Schoon, 971 F.2d 193, 196 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing United States v. Dorrell, 758 F.2d 427, 432 (9th Cir. 1985)) (explaining that the necessity defense “justifies criminal acts taken to avert a greater harm, maximizing social welfare by allowing a crime to be committed where the social benefits …
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Montano
(2×)
However, a federal statute made it a crime to “‘knowing and willfully’ obstruct or retard the passage of the mail, or of its carrier.” Id. at 485 (citation omitted).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Montano
However, a 18 federal statute made it a crime to “‘knowing and willfully’ obstruct or retard the 19 passage of the mail, or of its carrier.” Id. at 485 (citation omitted).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Biden v. Nebraska
Consider the classic example of a statute imposing criminal penalties on “ `whoever drew blood in the streets.' ” United States v. Kirby, 7 Wall. 482, 487 (1869).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Biden v. Nebraska
Consider the classic example of a statute imposing criminal penalties on “ ‘whoever drew blood in the streets.’ ” United States v. Kirby, 7 Wall. 482, 487 (1869).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Secura Supreme Insurance Company v. The Estate of Daniel Keith Huck
United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. 482, 487 (1868). ¶75 To equate the Estate receiving $189,000 instead of $199,000 with the two archetypal examples of absurdity would be, well, absurd.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Trinity Phillips
Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (providing “the benefit of prejudice-weighing to civil defendants and not civil plaintiffs”); United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. 482, 487 (1868) (charging a prisoner who breaks out of prison “when the prison is on fire”); Pub.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
In the Matter of the Guardianship of Yuk Lan Moylan, Ward, Richard E. Moylan v. Lina Lelialoha Moylan Alston
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 461 (1892) (quoting United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. 482, 486-87 (1868)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Papa Air LLC v. Cal-Mid Properties L P
However, in the limited situations such as the present case when a non-[resident] defendant removes a case also involving a [resident] defendant, it is necessary to only consider properly served defendants so as to not allow a plaintiff to thwart removal rights of diverse, non[-resident] state defendants by not serving the [resident] defendant. 8 The classic example of absurdity is sanctioning a surgeon “who opened the vein of a person that fell down in the street in a fit” for violating a law requiring “that whoever drew blood in the streets should be punished with the utmost severity[.…
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Amended August 22, 2017 Tom Brakke and Rhonda Brakke D/B/A/ Pine Ridge Hunting Lodge, and McBra, Inc. Vs. Iowa Department of Natural Resources and Iowa Natural Resource Commission
In United States v. Kirby, the Supreme Court had occasion to ponder the absurdity doctrine. 74 U.S. 482, 486 (1868).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Tom Brakke and Rhonda Brakke D/B/A/ Pine Ridge Hunting Lodge, and McBra, Inc. v. Iowa Department of Natural Resources and Iowa Natural Resource Commission
(2×)
In United States v. Kirby, the Supreme Court had occasion to ponder the absurdity doctrine. 74 U.S. 482, 486 (1868).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Courtney Douglass v. Convergent Outsourcing
Where the plain meaning of a statute would lead to an absurd result, we presume “the legislature intended exceptions to its language [that] would avoid results of this character.” Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Berry, 604 F.2d 221, 225 (3d Cir. 1979) (quoting United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 482, 487 (1868)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Richie Fontaine
Id. at 225 (quoting United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. 482, 486-87, 19 L.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Linda F. Seals v. H & F, Inc.
United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. 482, 487 (1868). -15- cremation is a minor: the death of the child of a minor parent.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
People v. Hanna
The same common sense accepts the ruling, cited by Plowden, that the statute of 1st Edward II, which enacts that a prisoner who breaks prison shall be guilty of felony, does not extend to a prisoner who breaks out when the prison is on fire–‘for he is not to be hanged because he would not stay to be burnt.’” United States v. Kirby , 74 U.S. 482, 487 , 19 L.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
People v. Hanna
The same common sense accepts the ruling, cited by Plowden, that the statute of 1st Edward II, which enacts that a prisoner who breaks prison shall be guilty of felony, does not extend to a prisoner who breaks out when the prison is on fire — ‘for he is not to be hanged because he would not stay to be burnt.’ ” United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. 482, 487 , 19 L.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Professional Engineers in California Government v. State Personnel Board
(See Ex parte Lorenzen (1900) 128 Cal. 439 -440, quoting Justice Field’s decision in United States v. Kirby (1868) 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 482, 486-487 [ 19 L.Ed. 278, 280 ].) We eschew an interpretation creating a constitutional doubt, if possible.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Terence D. Hughey v. Jms Development Corporation, Terrence D. Hughey v. Jms Development Corporation, Cross-Appellee
(2×)
For instance, common sense says that a law making it a felony for a prisoner to escape from jail “does not extend to a prisoner who breaks out when the prison is on fire — ‘for he is not to be hanged be cause he would not stay to be burnt.’ ” United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 482, 487 , 19 L.Ed. 278, 280 (1869).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Hughey v. JMS Development Corp.
For instance, common sense says that a law making it a felony for a prisoner to escape from jail "does not extend to a prisoner who breaks out when the prison is on fire—"for he is not to be hanged because he would not stay to be burnt.' " United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 482, 487 , 19 L.Ed. 278, 280 (1869).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Rowland v. California Men's Colony, Unit II Men's Advisory Council
(2×)
See, e. g., Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U. S. 504, 510-511 (1989); Trans Alaska Pipeline Rate Cases, 436 U. S. 631, 643 (1978); Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U. S. 563, 571 (1965); Helvering v. Hammel, 311 U. S. 504, 510-611 (1941); United States v. Katz, 271 U. S. 354, 357 (1926); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U. S. 470, 490 (1917); United States v. Kirby, 7 Wall. 482, 486-487 (1869).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Pueblo v. Medina Lugo
Hace más de un siglo el Tribunal Supremo de Estados Unidos, en United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. 482, 487 (1868), señaló, en relación a un convicto que escapó de la prisión debido a un fuego, que éste no debía ser responsable ante la ley: “he is not to be hanged because he would not stay to be burnt.” Bajo este razonamiento varios tribunales comenzaron a condonar la fuga de un convicto cuando éste se veía en la necesidad ele escapar ante la inminencia de un peligro en la prisión.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Jeffress
General terms should be so limited in their application as not to lead to injustice, oppression, or an absurd consequence.” Quoting from United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 482, 486 , 19 L.Ed. 278, 280 (1868).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Commonwealth v. Iguel
E.g., Government of the Virgin Islands v. Berry, 604 F.2d 221, 225 (3d Cir. 1979) ("All laws should receive a sensible construction.") (quoting United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 482, 486-87 (1868 )).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.
(2×)
The same common sense accepts the ruling, cited by Plowden, that the statute of 1st Edward II, which enacts that a prisoner who breaks prison shall be guilty of felony, does not extend to a prisoner who breaks out when the prison is on fire — ‘for he is not to be hanged because he would not stay to be burnt.’” United States v. Kirby, 7 Wall. 482, 487 (1869) (citations omitted).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Marrero v. State
The same common sense accepts the ruling, cited by Plowden, that the statute of 1st Edward II, which enacts that a prisoner who breaks prison shall be guilty of felony, does not extend to a prisoner who breaks out when the prison is on fire — `for he is not to be hanged because he would not stay to be burnt.' And we think that a like common sense will sanction the ruling we make, that the act of Congress which punishes the obstruction or retarding of the passage of the mail, or of its carrier, does not apply to a case of temporary detention of the mail caused by the arrest of the carrier upo…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Minahan v. Commissioner
As the courts of old held, rather pragmatically it seems to me, a statute which provides that a prisoner who escapes commits a felony “does not extend to a prisoner who breaks out when the prison is on fire — ‘for he is not to be hanged because he would not stay to be burnt.’ ” Zelenak, supra at 632, quoting United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 482, 487 (1868).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Dorothy Schankowski
Id. 74 U.S. at 485-86 (emphasis added).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Albertini
(2×)
The reason of the law in such cases should prevail over its letter." United States v. Kirby, 7 Wall. 482, 486-487 (1869).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Phinpathya
The reason of the law in such cases should prevail over its letter.” United States v. Kirby, 7 Wall. 482, 486-487 (1869).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Michael Alan Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms
(4×)
also: Cited "see"
See United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns., supra, 310 U.S. at 544 , 60 S.Ct. at 1064 (Justice Reed); United States v. Kirby, supra, 74 U.S. at 487 (Justice Field) (“The reason of the law in such cases should prevail over its letter”); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 26 , 3 S.Ct. 18, 32 , 27 L.Ed. 835 (1883) (Justice Harlan) (“It is not the words of the law but the internal sense of it that makes the law: the letter of the law is the body; the sense and reason of the law is the soul”); Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States 143 U.S. 457, 472 , 36 L.Ed. 226 (1892) (Justice Brew…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Bailey
(2×)
An escapee who flees from a jail that is in the process of burning to the ground may well be entitled to an instruction on duress or necessity, "`for he is not to be hanged because he would not stay to be burnt.'" United States v. Kirby, 7 Wall. 482, 487 (1869).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Government of the Virgin Islands v. Warren P. Berry. Appeal of Warren Berry. Appeal of Guillermo Brignoni
We begin by invoking a settled principle of statutory interpretation — first announced more than a century ago in United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 482, 486-87 (1868) — which we believe is particularly applicable with regard to statutes making kidnapping a crime: All laws should receive a sensible construction.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Green
(2×)
The reason of the law in such cases should prevail over its letter." (United States v. Kirby (1868) 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 482, 486-487 [ 19 L.Ed. 278, 279 ]; accord, People v. Oliver (1961) 55 Cal.2d 761, 767 [ 12 Cal.Rptr. 865 , 361 P.2d 593 ], and cases cited.) People v. Daniels, supra at 1130 .
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Estate of Pfeifer v. Commissioner
In United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 482, 487 (1868), the Supreme Court pointed out that such an issue arose in old Bolognia: The common sense of man approves the judgment mentioned by Puffendorf, that the Bolognian law which enacted, “that whoever drew blood in the streets should be punished with the utmost severity,” did not extend to the surgeon who opened the vein of a person that fell down in the street in a fit. * * * In that case, the Court also declared at pages 486-487: All laws should receive a sensible construction.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
International Trading Co. v. Commissioner
As the United States Supreme Court said in United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. 482, 486 (1868): All laws should receive a sensible construction.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
People v. Cohen
The reason of the law in such cases should prevail over the letter.’ ” (United States v. Kirby (1869) 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 482, 486-487 [ 19 L.Ed. 278, 280 ]; accord, People v. Oliver (1961) 55 Cal.2d 761, 767 [ 12 Cal. Rptr. 865 , 361 P.2d 593 ], and cases cited.) (Italics added.) *101 The words “offensive conduct” have stood the test of time and have a commonly accepted meaning.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
People v. Daniels
(2×)
The reason of the law in such cases should prevail over its letter." ( United States v. Kirby (1868) 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 482, 486-487 [ 19 L.Ed.2d 278 , 279]; accord, People v. Oliver (1961) 55 Cal.2d 761 , 767 [ 12 Cal.Rptr. 865 , 361 P.2d 593 ], and cases cited.) Turning to the kidnaping statute, we explained that "To us, it does not seem reasonable that the California Legislature, in enacting Penal Code section 207 , intended the statute to apply to a case of assault or riot such as occurred in the case now engaging our attention.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
American Dredging Company v. Local 25
(2×)
Rep. 451." (emphasis supplied) 22 It is of compelling significance here that in Northern Securities, the Supreme Court reversed the denial of remand below on the ground that the removed action did not "really and substantially involve a dispute or controversy within the jurisdiction of the circuit court for the purposes of a final decree * * *" and, "That being the case, the circuit court, following the mandate of the statute [predecessor of the present § 1447 (c)], should not have proceeded therein, but should have remanded the cause to the state court." (emphasis supplied) 23 In the instant…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
United States
v.
Kirby
v.
Kirby
Supreme Court of the United States.
Apr 15, 1869.
Mr: Ashton, Assistant Attorney-(General, for the United States:
,
No opposing counsel.
Field, Miller.
Cited by 469 opinions | Published
Citer courts: D. Maryland (3) · Tenth Circuit (1)
Mr. Justice FIELD,
after stating the case, delivered the opiuion of the court, as follows:
There can be but one answer, in our judgment, to the questions certified to us. The statute of Congress by its terms applies only to persons who “ knowingly and wilfully” obstruct or retard the passage of the mail, or of its carrier; •that is, to those who know that the acts performed will have[*486] that, effect, and perform them with the intention that such shall be their operation. When the acts which create the obstruction are in themselves unlawful, the intention to obstruct will be imputed to their author, although the attainment of other ends may have been his primary object. The statute has no reference to acts lawful in themselves, from tire execution of which a temporary delay to the mails unavoidably follows. All persons in the public service are exempt, as a matter of public policy, from arrest upon civil, process w’hile thus engaged. Process of that kind can, therefore, furnish no justification for the arrest of a carrier of the mail. This is all that is decided by the case of the' United States v. Harvey, * to which we are referred by the counsel of the government. The-rule is different when the process is issued upon a charge of felony. No officer or employee of the United States is placed by his position, or the services he is called to perform, above responsibility to the legal tribunals of the country, and to the ordinary processes for his arrest and detention, when accused of felouy, in the forms prescribed by the Constitution and laws. The public inconvenience which may occasionally follow from the temporary delay in the transmission of the mail caused ■ by. the arrest of its carriers upon such charges, is far less than that which would arise from extending to them the immunity for which the counsel of the government contends. Indeed, it may be doubted whether it is competent for Congress to exempt the employees of the United States from arrest on criminal process from the State courts, when the crimes charged against them are not merely míala prohibita, but are mala in se. But whether legislation of that character be constitutional or not, no intention to extend such exemption should be attributed to Congress unless clearly manifested by its language. All laws should receive, a sensible construction. General terms should be so limited in their application as not to lead to injustice, oppression, or an absurd consequence. It will always, therefore,' be presumed[*487] that the legislature intended exceptions to its language, which would avoid results of this character. The reason of the law in such cases should prevail over its letter.
The common sense of man approves the judgment mentioned by Puftendorf, that the Bologniau law which enacted, “that whoever drew blood in the streets should be punished with the utmost severity,” did not extend to the surgeon who opened the vein of a person that fell down in the street iu. a fit. The same common sense accepts the ruling, cited by Plowden, that the statute of 1st Edward II, which enacts that a prisoner who breaks prison shall be guilty of felony, does not extend to a prisoner who breaks out when the prison is on fire — “ for he is not to be hanged because he would not stay to be burnt.” And we think that a like common sense will sanction the ruling we make, that the act of Congress which punishes the obstruction or retarding of the passage of the mail, or of its carrier, does not apply to a case of temporary detention of the mail caused by the arrest of the carrier upon au indictment for murder. *
The questions certified to us must be answered in. the negative ; and it is So ordered!
Mr. Justice MILLER, having been absent at the hearing, took no part in this order.