G Cite
Treatment trajectory · 2008 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2008
2017
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 46 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Brandon Williams v. Megan Nabila Mitchell
App. P. 26.3; Houser v. McElveen, 243 S.W.3d 646, 646 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Sidni Campbell v. John Campbell, Jr.
App. P. 26.1(a)(2), (d), 26.3; Houser v. McElveen, 243 S.W.3d 646, 646 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Justin Miller and Chiptarmil LLC v. Elisa Rios
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
App. P. 26.3; Houser v. McElveen, 243 S.W.3d 646, 646 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Justin Miller and Chiptarmil LLC v. Elisa Rios
We abate this cause for 10 days and order Miller and Chiptarmil to provide us with their “plausible statement of circumstances indicating that failure to file within the [specified] period was not deliberate or intentional, but was the result of inadvertence, mistake, or mischance.’” See Houser v. McElveen, 243 S.W.3d 646, 647 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam) (quoting Meshwert v. Meshwert, 549 S.W.2d 383, 384 (Tex. 1977)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
In the Interest of A.C.T.M., a Child v. the State of Texas
Again and again, the supreme court has reiterated that “[r]ather than disposing of appeals based on harmless procedural defects, ‘[we] should reach the merits of an appeal whenever reasonably possible.’” Horton v. Stovall, 591 S.W.3d 567 , 567 (Tex. 2019) (per curiam) (citing Perry v. Cohen, 272 S.W.3d 585, 587 (Tex. 2008)); see, e.g., Mitschke, 645 S.W.3d at 266 (holding that a motion for new trial was effective to extend time to perfect appeal, even though it was filed in the wrong cause number); CMH Homes v. Perez, 340 S.W.3d 444, 454 (Tex. 2011) (instructing an appellate court to t…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Fernando Haffid Camero v. Samantha Jo Camero
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
Houser v. McElveen, 243 S.W.3d 646, 646-47 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam); see also Verburgt v. Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615 , 617–18 (Tex. 1997).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Vick v. Floresville Independent School District
App. P. 26.1; Houser v. McElveen, 243 S.W.3d 646, 646 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Galveston County Judge Mark Henry and County Commissioners Ryan Dennard, Joe Guisti, Stephen Holmes and Ken Clark, in Their Official Capacity as the Galveston County Commissioners Court v. Kimberly Sullivan, Judge Probate Court of Galveston County
Houser v. McElveen, 243 S.W.3d 646, 647 (Tex. 2008); Miller v. Greenpark Surgery Ctr.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Fernando Haffid Camero v. Amantha Jo Camero
Houser v. McElveen, 243 S.W.3d 646, 646-47 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Vidales, Sammy
Preparing for and trying the case consumed a significant amount of defense counsel’s time. • Immediately following the conclusion of State v. Hood, defense counsel left town for vacation for the weekend. • In addition to the trials above, defense counsel was also set to appear in at least 6 different courts on behalf of 20 different clients during the thirty days following the day the Court’s opinion was released. • Due to mischance, defense counsel was scheduled for all of these various trials in the time Appellant’s Motion for Rehearing was due.2 2 See Houser v. McElveen, 243 S.W…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Vargas, Victor James
The petition will be simultaneously filed along with the filing of this request for extension of time. 1 See Houser v. McElveen, 243 S.W.3d 646, 647 (Tex. 2008) (emphasis added) (explaining that extension of time should be granted if “any plausible statement of circumstances indicating that failure to file within the [specified] period was not deliberate or intentional, but was the result of inadvertence, mistake, or mischance.”).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Lockhart v. McCurley
(4×)
also: Cited "see"
Houser v. McElveen, 243 S.W.3d 646, 647 (Tex.2008), (modifications as in Houser).
cited
Cited "see"
in the Interest of J.C., a Child
See Houser v. 2 McElveen, 243 S.W.3d 646, 647 (Tex. 2008).
cited
Cited "see"
Regional Specialty Clinic, P.A. v. S.A Randle & Associates, P.C. and Sarnie A. Randle, Jr.
See Houser v. McElveen, 243 S.W.3d 646, 647 (Tex. 2008); see also Miller v. Greenpark Surgery Ctr.
cited
Cited "see"
Sydney Raym F/K/A Sydney Dethloff v. Tupelo Management, LLC
See Houser v. McElveen, 243 S.W.3d 646, 647 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam).
cited
Cited "see"
Housing Authority of the City of Stanton v. Miranda Alexis Bermea
See Houser v. McElveen, 243 S.W.3d 646 , 646–47 (Tex. 2008); Verburgt, 959 S.W.2d at 616–17.
cited
Cited "see"
Madhavan A. Pisharodi, M.D., P.A. v. United Biologics, L.L.C
See Houser v. McElveen, 243 S.W.3d 646 (Tex. 2008) (citing Meshwert v. Meshwert, 549 S.W2d 383, 384 (Tex. 1977)).
cited
Cited "see"
in the Matter of the Marriage of Andrzej Adamski and Oksana Adamski
See Houser v. McElveen, 243 S.W.3d 646, 647 (Tex. 2008); see also Miller v. Greenpark Surgery Ctr.
cited
Cited "see"
Amir Bajmanlou v. Signad LTD
See Houser v. McElveen, 243 S.W.3d 646, 647 (Tex. 2008); see also Miller v. Greenpark Surgery Ctr.
discussed
Cited "see"
Fernando Haffid Camero v. Amantha Jo Camero
(2×)
also: Cited "see, e.g."
See Houser, 243 S.W.3d at 646-47 ; Ramos, 228 S.W.3d at 673 .
cited
Cited "see"
Ricardo Tijerina v. Robert Wysong and Houston International Aircraft Support, Inc.
See Houser v. McElveen, 243 S.W.3d 646, 647 (Tex. 2008); see also Miller v. Greenpark Surgery Ctr.
cited
Cited "see"
Ali Kafi Ford v. Edgar A. Hulipas
See Houser v. McElveen, 243 S.W.3d 646, 647 (Tex. 2008); see also Miller v. Greenpark Surgery Ctr.
cited
Cited "see"
in Re Lawrence Edward Thompson
See Houser v. McElveen, 243 S.W.3d 646, 647 (Tex. 2008); see also Miller v. Greenpark Surgery Ctr.
cited
Cited "see"
in Re Edward R. Newsome
See Houser v. McElveen, 243 S.W.3d 646, 647 (Tex. 2008); see also Miller v. Greenpark Surgery Ctr.
cited
Cited "see"
Larry Ray Swearingen v. Joye M. Carter, MD
See Houser v. McElveen, 243 S.W.3d 646, 647 (Tex. 2008); see also Miller v. Greenpark Surgery Ctr.
cited
Cited "see"
Adrienne Gallien v. Goose Creek Consolidated Independent School District
See Houser v. McElveen, 243 S.W.3d 646, 647 (Tex. 2008); see also Miller v. Greenpark Surgery Ctr.
cited
Cited "see"
Ramona B. Hill v. the Reserve at Braes Forest
See Houser v. McElveen, 243 S.W.3d 646, 647 (Tex. 2008); see also Miller v. Greenpark Surgery Ctr.
cited
Cited "see"
in Re: Rio Grande Xarin II, Ltd.
See Houser v. McElveen , 243 S.W.3d 646, 647 (Tex. 2008); Hone v. Hanafin , 104 S.W.3d 884, 886 (Tex. 2003) (per curiam); Meshwert v. Meshwert , 549 S.W.2d 383, 384 (Tex. 1977).
cited
Cited "see"
Bruce Wayne Houser v. Kenneth W. McElveen
See Houser v. McElveen , 243 S.W.3d 646, 647 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam).
cited
Cited "see"
Southwest Grain Company, Inc. v. Pilgrim's Pride S.A. De C v.
See Houser v. McElveen, 243 S.W.3d 646, 647 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam).
discussed
Cited "see"
Jeffrey Scott Lockhart v. Dale Patrick McCurley D/B/A Midlothian Insurance Agency
See Lockhart v. McCurley, No. 10-09-00240- CV (Tex. App.—Waco Oct. 12, 2009, order) (citing Houser v. McElveen, 243 S.W.3d 646, 646-67 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam), Verburgt v. Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615, 617 (Tex. 1997), In re B.G., 104 S.W.3d 565 , 567 (Tex. App.—Waco 2002, order)); see also Lockhart v. McCurley, 298 S.W.3d 449 (Tex. App.—Waco 2009) (Gray, C.J., dissenting).
discussed
Cited "see"
in Re XTO Energy, Inc.
See Lockhart v. McCurley , No. 10-09-00240-CV (Tex. App.—Waco Oct. 12, 2009, order) (citing Houser v. McElveen , 243 S.W.3d 646, 646-67 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam), Verburgt v. Dorner , 959 S.W.2d 615, 617 (Tex. 1997), In re B.G. , 104 S.W.3d 565 , 567 (Tex. App.—Waco 2002, order)); see also Lockhart v. McCurley , 298 S.W.3d 449 (Tex. App.—Waco 2009) (Gray, C.J., dissenting) .
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Armando Trevino v. Karla Belen Garcia, Individually and as Administratix of the Estate of Maria Luisa Aguilar
Verburgt v. Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615, 617 (Tex. 1997) (implying motion for extension of time to file appellate bond when bond was filed late but within fifteen-day period for filing motion for extension); see also Houser v. McElveen, 243 S.W.3d 646, 646-47 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (implying motion for extension of time to file notice of appeal when notice of appeal was filed late but was mailed within the fifteen-day deadline).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Armando Trevino v. Karla Belen Garcia, Individually and as Administratix of the Estate of Maria Luisa Aguilar
Verburgt v. Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615, 617 (Tex. 1997) (implying motion for extension of time to file appellate bond when bond was filed late but within fifteen-day period for filing motion for extension); see also Houser v. McElveen, 243 S.W.3d 646, 646-47 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (implying motion for extension of time to file notice of appeal when notice of appeal was filed late but was mailed within the fifteen-day deadline).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Trinity Scrap Processors, Inc. D/B/A Port of Brownsville Recycling and Intercoastal Salvage, Inc. v. Brownsville Navigation District of Cameron County, Texas
See id. at R. 26.3; see also Houser v. McElveen, 243 S.W.3d 646 , 646- 47 (Tex. 2008) (stating that a notice of appeal should be considered timely if filed within fifteen days after the filing deadline and accompanied by a motion for extension of time with a reasonable explanation for the delay).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
P. Palivela Raju, M.D. v. Dianne Jackson
See id. at R. 26.3; see also Houser v. McElveen, 243 S.W.3d 646, 646-47 (Tex. 2008) (stating that a notice of appeal should be considered 2 timely if filed within fifteen days after the filing deadline and accompanied by a motion for extension of time with a reasonable explanation for the delay).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Bernadette Morales and Sandra Gonzalez v. Omar H. Saenz, Elizabeth M. Saenz, Margarita Lopez Perez and Alfredo Morales
See id. at R. 26.3; see also Houser v. McElveen, 243 S.W.3d 646 , 646–47 (Tex. 2008) (stating that a notice of appeal should be considered timely if filed within fifteen days after the filing deadline and accompanied by a motion for extension of time with a reasonable explanation for the delay).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Belinda Vallejo v. Cameron County
See id. at R. 26.3; see also Houser v. McElveen, 243 S.W.3d 646, 646-47 (Tex. 2008) (stating that a notice of appeal should be considered timely if filed within fifteen days after the filing deadline 2 and accompanied by a motion for extension of time with a reasonable explanation for the delay).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Amf Mechanical Corporation v. Norma L. Bermudez
See id. at R. 26.3; see also Houser v. McElveen, 243 S.W.3d 646, 646-47 (Tex. 2008) (stating that a notice of appeal should be considered timely if filed within fifteen days after the filing deadline and accompanied by a motion for extension of time with a reasonable explanation for the delay).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Steve Schwerin v. Nueces County Juvenile Board, Nueces County, Texas and Michael L. Lindsey D/B/A Nestor Consultants, Inc.
P. 26.3; see also Houser v. McElveen, 243 S.W.3d 646 , 646–47 (Tex. 2008) (stating that a notice of appeal should be considered timely if filed within fifteen days after the filing deadline and accompanied by a motion for extension of time with a reasonable explanation for the delay).
cited
Cited "see, e.g."
Kristofer Thomas Kastner v. Texas Board of Law Examiners, the State of Texas, Julia E. Vaughan, Bruce Wyatt, Jack Marshall, Dan Pozza, Jerry Grissom, John Simpson, and Susan Henricks
See, e.g., Houser v. McElveen, 243 S.W.3d 646, 647 (Tex. 2008); Ramos v. Richardson, 228 S.W.3d 671, 673 (Tex. 2007).
cited
Cited "see, e.g."
Kristofer Thomas Kastner v. Texas Board of Law Examiners, the State of Texas, Julia E. Vaughan, Bruce Wyatt, Jack Marshall, Dan Pozza, Jerry Grissom, John Simpson, and Susan Henricks
See, e.g. , Houser v. McElveen , 243 S.W.3d 646, 647 (Tex. 2008); Ramos v. Richardson , 228 S.W.3d 671, 673 (Tex. 2007).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Action Restoration, Inc. v. Kingsville Independent School District
See id. at R. 26.3; see also Houser v. McElveen, 243 S.W.3d 646, 646-47 (Tex. 2008) (stating that a notice of appeal should be considered timely if filed within fifteen days after the filing deadline and accompanied by a motion for extension of time with a reasonable explanation for the delay).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Estate of Carmen Del Fierro De Garcia
See id. at R. 26.3; see also Houser v. McElveen, 243 S.W.3d 646, 646-47 (Tex. 2008) (stating that a notice of appeal should be considered timely if filed within fifteen days after the filing deadline and accompanied by a motion for extension of time with a reasonable explanation for the delay).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Estate of Carmen Del Fierro De Garcia
See id. at R. 26.3; see also Houser v. McElveen , 243 S.W.3d 646, 646-47 (Tex. 2008) (stating that a notice of appeal should be considered timely if filed within fifteen days after the filing deadline and accompanied by a motion for extension of time with a reasonable explanation for the delay).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Bruce Wayne HOUSER, Petitioner,
v.
Kenneth W. McELVEEN, Et Al., Respondents
v.
Kenneth W. McELVEEN, Et Al., Respondents
06-0504.
Texas Supreme Court.
Jan 11, 2008.
Bruce Wayne Houser, Beaumont, TX, pro se., Kenneth W. McElveen, Edna, TX, pro se., Barbara Vanecek, Edna, TX, pro se.
Per Curiam.
Cited by 47 opinions | Published
PER CURIAM.
Petitioner Bruce Wayne Houser, a pro se inmate, sued for mandamus compelling respondent Kenneth McElveen, the county clerk of Jackson County, to probate Houser’s father’s will. The trial court dismissed the petition, and Houser asserts, without challenge, that he deposited his notice of appeal in the prison mail 35 days later. The court of appeals received it on the 46th day after the judgment was signed and dismissed the appeal as not having been timely perfected. 2006 WL 328134 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2006) (per curiam).
The notice of appeal was required to be filed within 30 days of the judgment, Tex. R.App. P. 26.1, but the court of appeals should have extended that time if, within the next 15 days, Houser filed his notice of appeal and a motion for extension with a reasonable explanation, Tex.R.App. P. 10.5(b), 25.1(a), 26.3. The notice of appeal was deemed filed on the day he mailed it, since it was received one day after the 15-day deadline, Tex.R.App. P. 9.2(b), Ramos v. Richardson, 228 S.W.3d 671, 673 (Tex. 2007) (per curiam), and a motion for exten[*647] sion was thereby implied, Verburgt v. Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615, 617 (Tex.1997). The question, then, is whether there is “any plausible statement of circumstances indicating that failure to file within the [specified] period was not deliberate or intentional, but was the result of inadvertence, mistake, or mischance.” Meshwert v. Meshwert, 549 S.W.2d 383, 384 (Tex.1977).
In his notice of appeal, and in his petition here without challenge, Houser states that he mailed a motion for new trial nine days after the judgment, and a copy of a transmittal letter bearing that date is attached. There is no motion for new trial in the trial court’s record, but Houser could reasonably have believed that the clerk would receive it within three weeks of when he says he mailed it. An inmate who does everything in his power to satisfy timeliness requirements may not be penalized for the error or tardiness of prison officials. See Williams v. T.D.C.J.I.D., 142 S.W.3d 308, 309-310 (Tex.2004) (per curiam). If a motion for new trial had been received within 30 days of the judgment, Houser’s notice of appeal would have been timely filed. Tex.R.App. P. 26.1(a)(1). This plausible statement of circumstances indicates that Houser’s failure to timely file his notice of appeal was not intentional but inadvertent. See Hone v. Hanafin, 104 S.W.3d 884, 886 (Tex.2003) (per curiam).
Houser was entitled to an extension of time in which to file his notice of appeal, and thus the court of appeals should not have dismissed the appeal. Accordingly, we grant the petition for review, and without hearing oral argument, we reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and remand the case for further proceedings. Tex.R.App. P. 59.1.