Schell v. Dodge, 107 U.S. 629 (1883). · Go Syfert
Schell v. Dodge, 107 U.S. 629 (1883). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
84 citation events (10 in the last 25 years) across 23 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc. (cand, 1988-07-22)
Treatment trajectory · 1901 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1901 1963 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 10 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc.
N.D. Cal. · 1988 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
the invalidity of the new claim in the reissue does not indeed impair the validity of the original claim which is repeated and separately stated in the reissued patent.
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc.
N.D. Cal. · 1988 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
the invalidity of the new claim in the reissue does not indeed impair the validity of the original claim which is repeated and separately stated in the reissued patent.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Pennwalt Corporation, Appellant/cross-Appellee v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., Appellee/cross-Appellant (2×)
Fed. Cir. · 1987 · quote attribution · 2 verbatim quotes · confidence low
but the patentee, in his specification and in his only valid claim, has made each of the conveyors, as well as the elevator, a material part of the combination invented and patented by him
cited Cited as authority (rule) Vandenburgh v. Concrete Steel Co.
2d Cir. · 1919 · confidence medium
Gage v. Her ring, 107 U. S. 640, 646 , 2 Sup. Ct. 819, 27 L.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Suddard v. American Motor Co.
circtdma · 1908 · confidence medium
Under the provisions of the patent act, whenever through inadvertence, accident, or mistake, and without any willful default or intent to defraud ox mislead tlie public, a patentee in his specification has claimed more than that of which lie was tlie original and first inventor or discoverer, his patent is valid for all that part which is truly and justly his own, provided the same is a material and substantial'part of the thing patented, and definitely distinguishable from the parts claimed without right; and the patentee, upon seasonably recording in the Patent Oílice a disclaimer in writin…
cited Cited "see" In re Marriage of Wojcik
Ill. App. Ct. · 2005 · signal: see · confidence high
See Rose , 107 U.S. at 629, 95 L.
cited Cited "see" In Re Marriage of Wojcik
Ill. App. Ct. · 2005 · signal: see · confidence high
See Rose, 107 U.S. at 629, 95 L.
cited Cited "see" Dethmers Manufacturing Company, Inc. v. Automatic Equipment Mfg Co., Defendant/cross-Appellant
Fed. Cir. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 882 F.2d 1556, 1566-67 , 11 USPQ2d 1750, 1759 (Fed.Cir.1989) (citing Gage v. Herring, 107 U.S. 640 , 2 S.Ct. 819 , 27 L.Ed. 601 (1883)).
discussed Cited "see" State Ex Rel. Tibbals v. Dist. Court (2×)
Wyo. · 1931 · signal: see · confidence high
See Schell v. Dodge, 107 U. S. 629 , 27 L.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Festo Corporation v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., A/K/A Smc Corporation, and Smc Pneumatics, Inc.
Fed. Cir. · 2000 · signal: see also · confidence low
The Patent Act of 1836 authorized a paten-tee to surrender the claims of his original patent and to obtain a reissue patent whenever the patent was “inoperative, or invalid, by-reason of a defective or insufficient description or specification, or by reason of the pat-entee claiming in his specification as his own invention, more than he had or shall have a right to claim as new.” Patent Act of 1836, Ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117 , at § 13 (July 4, 1836); see also Gage v. Herring, 107 U.S. 640 , 644—45, 2 S.Ct. 819, 823 , 27 L.Ed. 601 (1883).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Schell
v.
Dodge; Barney v. Isler; Barney v. Cox; Barney v. Friedman
Supreme Court of the United States.
May 18, 1883.
107 U.S. 629
1882 U.S. LEXIS 1258
The Solicitor-G-eneral for Schell and Barney., Mr. John E. Parsons, contra.
Blatchford.
Cited by 19 opinions  |  Published
2 passages pin-cited by 3 cases
Pinpoint authority: bottom 88%
Citer courts: Federal Circuit (2) · N.D. California (2)
Mr. Justice Blatcheord

delivered the opinion of the court.

These are all suits in each of which a judgment was rendered against a late collector of customs for the recovery of money paid as duties. ■ There has been a certificate of probable cause in each. A writ of error in each case was brought here by direction of the government. When the cases were reached in order on the docket of this court at October Term, 1881, the Solicitor-General, on the part of the government, moved that the writs of error be dismissed, as presenting no question which he desired to argue. This was done. There was no affirmance of the judgments below, and the judgments and mandates of this court contained no direction as to interest on the judgments below during the time the writs of error were pending. Those judgments were rendered in 1878, and suspended by the writs of error for over three years. In the Dodge case the mandate was issued, but has never been presented to the court below. In the other cases, the mandates were issued[*630] and presented to the court below, and orders for judgment were entered thereon. Counsel for the defendants in error in the Dodge case were present in this court when that case was so dismissed, but in the other cases no counsel for the defendants in error was present, and the motions to dismiss were made without their knowledge, and the mandates were not issued till after the close of the term.

The defendants in error now apply to this court to correct the judgments and mandates in these cases, so as to award to them interest as such or as damages for delay. There is no doubt that, if the defendants in error in these cases had in season asked for judgments of affirmance, their applications would have been granted, and interest would have been allowed, in accordance with the decision in Schell v. Cochran, ante, p. 625. But the difficulty now is that we have no power to vary the judgments or the mandates, after the close of the term, no especial right to do so in these cases having been reserved. It has always been held by this court that it has no power, after the term has passed, and a cause has been dismissed or otherwise finally disposed of here, to alter its judgment in such a particular as that now asked for, the change of a dismissal of a writ of error, with its legal consequences, to an affirmance of the judgment below, with its legal consequences, and not an error of mere form, or a clerical error, or a misprision of the clerk, or the like. Jackson v. Ashton, 10 Pet. 480; Bank of the United States v. Moss, 6 How. 31, 38.

Applications denied.