THOMPSON, Judge.

Defendants Smoky Mountain Memorial Parks, Inc. and Sheila1 Diane

Gahagan appeal from the trial court’s order granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and denying their motion for summary judgment. On appeal, defendants contend that the applicable statute is void for vagueness, that the property in N.C. CEMETERY COMM’N V. SMOKY MTN. MEM’L PARKS, INC.

Opinion of the Court N.C. CEMETERY COMM’N V. SMOKY MTN. MEM’L PARKS, INC.

Opinion of the Court

as the actual cemetery is not disposed of.” However, plaintiff informed Gahagan that “any sale of acreage associated with Fairview and Swain as known and licensed by [plaintiff would] be prohibited and void by statute if executed. We recognize Fairview as 9.35 acres and Swain as 18.67 acres as noted in your letter.” (emphasis added). On 25 June 2021, defendant Gahagan filed Articles of Dissolution for Smoky Mountain Memorial Parks, Inc., which went into effect on 1 July 2021. On 7 July 2021, contrary to plaintiff’s warning that doing so would be in violation of the minimum acreage statute of the North Carolina Cemetery Act (Cemetery Act), defendant Smoky Mountain Memorial Parks, Inc. transferred the properties back to defendant Gahagan by warranty deed and recorded surveys that subdivided the properties into five separate tracts. Defendant Gahagan stated that three of these tracts were “not part of the cemeter[ies]” because they did not “contain burial lots or lots sold to be used as burial lots, mausoleums or columbarium[s] . . . .” On 18 August 2021, plaintiff filed complaints in Jackson County and Swain County Superior Court, seeking to void the conveyances of the subdivided properties pursuant to the minimum acreage statute of the Cemetery Act. On 26 and 27 October 2021, defendants filed motions to dismiss, answers, and counterclaims in Jackson County and Swain County Superior Courts, respectively. On 26 and 29 August 2022, defendants filed motions for summary judgment in Jackson County and Swain County Superior Courts, respectively. Plaintiff filed amended motions for summary judgment on 7 November 2022 in Jackson and Swain County Superior Courts.

N.C. CEMETERY COMM’N V. SMOKY MTN. MEM’L PARKS, INC.

Opinion of the Court

While the cases were pending, on 26 February 2022, defendant Gahagan filed her “Annual Report” for the year 2021 with plaintiff; however, in this report, for the very first time, Gahagan asserted that Swain Memorial Park consisted of “5.32” acres, and that she “disagree[d] with [plaintiff’s] interpretation of cemetery land.” The two complaints were consolidated for a hearing on 14 November 2022 in Jackson County Superior Court, and by order entered 9 February 2023, the court granted plaintiff’s motions for summary judgment and denied defendants’ motions for summary judgment. From this order, defendants filed timely written notice of appeal. II. Analysis Before this Court, defendants allege the following issues: 1. Whether the lower court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of [plaintiff] and denying [defendants]’ summary judgment [motions][?] 2. Whether the lower court erred as a matter of law in permitting [plaintiff] to restrict the sale of [d]efendant[s’] private land which is proximate to [their] cemeteries where the property [plaintiff] seeks to restrict has never been used or dedicated for use as a cemetery[?] 3. Whether [plaintiff’s] regulation of the property in question is a taking under the North Carolina and United States [C]onstitutions[?] 4. Whether the statute at issue is unconstitutionally void for vagueness as applied[?]

N.C. CEMETERY COMM’N V. SMOKY MTN. MEM’L PARKS, INC.

Opinion of the Court

5. Whether [defendants] should be estopped from taking the position that the property in question is non-cemetery property[?] 6. Whether [defendants] should have been granted summary judgment under the Marketable Title Act[?] We will address the dispositive issues, not necessarily in this order, in the analysis to follow. A. Standard of review “Our standard of review of an appeal from summary judgment is de novo; such judgment is appropriate only when the record shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” In re Will of Jones, 362 N.C. 569, 573, 669 S.E.2d 572, 576 (2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “Under a de novo review, the court considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own judgment for that of the lower tribunal.” Craig v. New Hanover Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 363 N.C. 334, 337, 678 S.E.2d 351, 354 (2009) (citation, internal quotation marks, and emphasis omitted). B. Void for vagueness As a matter of first impression, this case requires our Court to interpret a statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 65-69, which defendants argue “is unconstitutionally void for vagueness as applied” because it “fail[s] to give a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know how broadly th[e] term [cemetery] is to be applied.” Therefore, we will address defendants’ void for vagueness argument at the outset.

N.C. CEMETERY COMM’N V. SMOKY MTN. MEM’L PARKS, INC.

Opinion of the Court

“A statute is unconstitutionally vague if it either: (1) fails to give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited; or (2) fails to provide explicit standards for those who apply the law.” Rhyne v. K-Mart Corp., 358 N.C. 160, 186, 594 S.E.2d 1, 19 (2004) (citation, internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted). “The Constitution requires that the statute merely prescribe boundaries sufficiently distinct for judges and juries to interpret and administer it uniformly.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). N.C. Gen. Stat. § 65-69(d), which governs the “[m]inimum acreage; sale or disposition of cemetery lands[,]” provides that: The provisions of . . . this section relating to the requirement for minimum acreage shall not apply to those cemeteries licensed by [plaintiff] on or before [1 July 1967], which own or control a total of less than [thirty] acres of land; provided that such cemeteries shall not dispose of any of such lands. A nongovernment lien or other interest in land acquired in violation of this section is void. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 65-69(d) (2023). Here, defendants contend that “ ‘cemetery’ is a defined term under the Act, meaning, in essence, property where human remains are interred or preserved.” However, this is not the definition of “cemetery” pursuant to the statute, and it appears that defendants have adopted their own definition of “cemetery” contrary to the statutory definition set forth by our legislature in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 65-48(3). We do not articulate statutorily defined terms “in essence,” nor do we condone defendants’ misrepresentation of our legislature’s statutory definition of “cemetery” N.C. CEMETERY COMM’N V. SMOKY MTN. MEM’L PARKS, INC.

Opinion of the Court

in order to argue that the statute is void for vagueness because of the application of that term. Defendants correctly identified the definition of “cemetery” earlier in their appellate brief, wherein they acknowledged that a cemetery “is defined in [N.C. Gen. Stat.] § 65-48(3)” as: ‘Cemetery’ means any one or a combination of more than one of the following in a place used or to be used and dedicated or designated for cemetery purposes: a. A burial park, for earth interment. b. A mausoleum. c. A columbarium. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 65-48(3). Defendants’ argument on this point simply ignores the disjunctive “or” present in the statutory definition of “cemetery” and seems to misunderstand the nature of a cemetery, which, as plaintiff succinctly notes, includes plotted grave sites that are “used” and the remaining portion of the cemetery unplotted, “to be used.” Indeed, just because there are not yet bodies in the ground does not mean that the property is not “a place used or to be used and dedicated or designated for cemetery purposes[.]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 65-48(3) (emphasis added). Defendants’ disingenuous attempt to construe the definition of the term “cemetery” to mean “in essence, property where human remains are interred or preserved” is contrary to the statutory definition previously defined in defendants’ appellate brief, and does not pass muster.

N.C. CEMETERY COMM’N V. SMOKY MTN. MEM’L PARKS, INC.

Opinion of the Court

We conclude that the minimum acreage statute in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 65-69(d) is not unconstitutionally vague because it provides “the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited” and “provide[s] explicit standards for those who apply the law” with “boundaries sufficiently distinct for judges and juries to interpret and administer it uniformly.” Rhyne, 358 N.C. at 186, 594 S.E.2d at 19 (citation, internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted). Those boundaries require that “a place used or to be used and dedicated or designated for cemetery purposes” that is “licensed by [plaintiff] on or before [1 July] 1967, which own[s] or control[s] a total of less than [thirty] acres of land . . . shall not dispose of any such lands.” N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 65-48(3), 65-69(d) (emphasis added). Having determined that the statute that governs this case is not unconstitutionally void for vagueness as applied, we will now address defendants’ remaining arguments on appeal. C. North Carolina Cemetery Act Alternatively, defendants contend that “[t]he [n]on-[c]emetery [p]roperty was never dedicated for use as a cemetery[,]” and that “[plaintiff] should be able to show when and how the property was dedicated for such use, and that both parties complied with the prevailing laws or statutes governing dedication.” We disagree, as defendants have, again, ignored the definition of “cemetery” set forth by our legislature in making this argument.

N.C. CEMETERY COMM’N V. SMOKY MTN. MEM’L PARKS, INC.

Opinion of the Court

“The best indicia of [legislative] intent [is] the language of the statute, the spirit of the act and what the act seeks to accomplish.” Wilkie v. City of Boiling Spring Lakes, 370 N.C. 540, 547, 809 S.E.2d 853, 858 (2018) (citation and ellipsis omitted). “The process of construing a statutory provision must begin with an examination of the relevant statutory language.” Id. “It is well settled that where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for judicial construction and the courts must construe the statute using its plain meaning.” Id. (citation, internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted). “An unambiguous word has a definite and well[-]known sense in the law.” Fid. Bank v. N.C. Dep’t of Revenue, 370 N.C. 10, 19, 803 S.E.2d 142, 148 (2017) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). However, “[i]n the absence of a contextual definition, courts may look to dictionaries to determine the ordinary meaning of words within a statute.” Perkins v. Arkansas Trucking Servs., Inc., 351 N.C. 634, 638, 528 S.E.2d 902, 904 (2000). Defendants’ assertion that the “[n]on-[c]emetery [p]roperty was never dedicated for use as a cemetery” and is therefore not subject to the minimum acreage statute simply ignores the “or” in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 65-48(3), which states that a cemetery is a “place used or to be used and dedicated or designated for cemetery purposes[.]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 65-48(3) (emphasis added). “[D]esignated” is not defined in the Cemetery Act, nor does “designated” have a “definite and well[-]known sense in the law.” Fid. Bank, 370 N.C. at 19, 803 S.E.2d at 148 (citation omitted). However, Black’s Law Dictionary defines “designate” as, - 10 - N.C. CEMETERY COMM’N V. SMOKY MTN. MEM’L PARKS, INC. Opinion of the Court “[t]o choose (someone or something) for a particular job or purpose.” Designate, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). Therefore, the statute governs “a place used or to be used and dedicated or ‘chose[n] for a particular job or purpose[,]’ cemetery purposes.” Moreover, the Cemetery Act “established [plaintiff] with the power and duty to adopt rules and regulations to be followed in the enforcement of this Article.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 65-49. The Cemetery Act also provides that “[n]o legal entity shall engage in the business of operating a cemetery company . . . without first obtaining a license from [plaintiff].” Id. § 65-55. Finally, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 65-67 mandates that “[a]pplications for renewal license must be submitted . . . every year in the case of an existing cemetery company.” Id. § 65-67. Here, the record is replete with evidence that the entire 18.67 acres of Swain Memorial Park and 9.35 acres of Fairview Memorial Park were “ ‘chose[n] for a particular purpose[,]’ cemetery purposes.” Indeed, defendant Gahagan represented that Swain Memorial Park consisted of 18.67 acres, and Fairview Memorial Park consisted of 9.35 acres, when she became the owner of the cemeteries in 2013, and in defendants’ Annual Reports to plaintiff, which allowed defendants to renew their licenses to operate the two for-profit cemeteries after Gahagan became the owner of the cemeteries in 2013. Plaintiff is the entity that our legislature vested “with the power and duty to adopt rules and regulations to be followed in the enforcement of th[e Cemetery Act,]” - 11 - N.C. CEMETERY COMM’N V. SMOKY MTN. MEM’L PARKS, INC. Opinion of the Court and defendant was required to submit Annual Reports to plaintiff “every year” in order to “obtain[ ] a license” to “engage in the business of operating a cemetery company . . . .” Id. §§ 65-49, -55, -67. We conclude that defendants’ representations to plaintiff in these Annual Reports constituted a “designat[ion]” for purposes of the Cemetery Act, as “the language of the statute, the spirit of the act and what the act seeks to accomplish[,]” are reconciled under this definition of “designated.” Wilkie, 370 N.C. at 547, 809 S.E.2d at 858 (citation and ellipsis omitted). For the aforementioned reasons, we hold that the entire 18.67 acres and 9.35 acres of the properties in question are “cemeter[ies,]” subject to the minimum acreage statute, because they were “designated for cemetery purposes[,]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 65- 48(3), through defendants’ representations to plaintiff over the years that they sought licensure to operate the for-profit cemeteries. D. Constitutional takings Defendants also contend that plaintiff’s “application of [N.C. Gen. Stat.] § 65- 69(d) to the [n]on-[c]emetery [p]roperty4 constitutes a taking under the North Carolina [C]onstitution” or “a taking under the United States Constitution.” Defendants argue that “[u]nder the ‘ends’ prong of Responsible Citizens, it is not within the State’s police power to use [N.C. Gen. Stat.] § 65-69 to regulate property