Winfree v. N. Pac. Ry. Co., 227 U.S. 296 (1913). · Go Syfert
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Winfree v. N. Pac. Ry. Co., 227 U.S. 296 (1913). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 4× by 2 distinct cases, last quoted 2011 · 2 courts · …a statute which permits recovery, in cases where recovery could not be had before, and takes from the defendant defenses which formerly were available .... should not be construed as retrospective. ✓
188 citation events (27 in the last 25 years) across 42 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: George G. Griffon v. United States Department of Health and Human Services (ca5, 1986-10-14)
Treatment trajectory · 1913 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1913 1969 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 16 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) George G. Griffon v. United States Department of Health and Human Services
5th Cir. · 1986 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
such defenses the statute takes away, and that none may exist in the present case is immaterial. it is the operation of the statute which determines its character.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Andrew v. Schlumberger Technology Corp. (3×)
D.N.M. · 2011 · quote attribution · 3 verbatim quotes · confidence low
a statute which permits recovery, in cases where recovery could not be had before, and takes from the defendant defenses which formerly were available .... should not be construed as retrospective.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Petropoulos v. Petropoulos
Cal. Ct. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
Co. (1913) 227 U.S. 296, 301 [ 33 S.Ct. 273, 274 , 57 L.Ed. 518 ].) To determine whether the Legislature signified an intent that this statute operate retroactively with sufficient clarity, we look to the legislative history of the two recent amendments to section 3653. 1999 Version: Section 3653, subdivision (c), was added by Assembly Bill No. 960 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.), effective January 1, 1999.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States Ex Rel. Schumer
SCOTUS · 1997 · confidence medium
Co., 227 U. S. 296, 302 (1913).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) GOMEZ-GIRALDO
BIA · 1995 · confidence medium
Co., 227 U.S. 296, 301 (1913) (employing traditional presumption against retroactive application of statute in 960 Interim Decision #3242 id. at 495-97 (interpreting sections 7345, 7346(a), and 7349 of the 1988 Act, 102 Stat. at 4471-73).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Landgraf v. USI Film Products (2×)
SCOTUS · 1994 · confidence medium
Co., 227 U. S. 296, 301 (1913) (statute creating new federal cause of action for wrongful death inapplicable to case arising before enactment in absence of "explicit words" or "clear implication"); United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. United States ex rel.
cited Cited as authority (rule) ARA Living Centers-Pac, Inc. v. SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN MATEO CTY.
Cal. Ct. App. · 1993 · confidence medium
Co. (1913) 227 U.S. 296, 302 [ 57 L.Ed. 518, 520 , 33 S.Ct. 273 ].) As we will explain, we find insufficient evidence the Legislature intended retroactive application.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Evangelatos v. Superior Court (2×)
Cal. · 1988 · confidence medium
They usually constitute a new factor in the affairs and relations of men and should not be held to affect what has happened unless, indeed, explicit words be used or by clear implication that construction be required.” ( 227 U.S. at p. 301 [ 57 L.Ed. at p. 520 ].) Because the 1908 amendment “introduced a new policy and quite radically changed the existing law,” the court emphasized that it was particularly the kind of statute that “should not be construed as retrospective.” (Id. at p. 302 [ 57 L.Ed. at p. 520 ].) As we have explained, precisely the same principle is applicable here.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Ettrick Wood Products, Inc.
W.D. Wis. · 1988 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Gulf Offshore Company v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473 , 486 n. 16, 101 S.Ct. 2870 , 2879 n. 16, 69 L.Ed.2d 784 (1981) (change in the law requiring proper instruction to jury on damages does not constitute a “manifest injustice” exception to the Bradley retroactive presumption); Winfree v. Northern Pacific Railway Company, 227 U.S. at 301-02 , 33 S.Ct. at 273-74 (if act only gives a more efficient or more complete remedy, it is to be applied retroactively); O’Hare v. General Marine Transportation Corporation, 740 F.2d 160 (2d Cir.1984) (retroactively applied remedial scheme re…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) District of Columbia Workmen's Compensation Act. v. Frank Kelly, Inc.
D.C. Cir. · 1976 · confidence medium
Ry., 227 U.S. 296, 301 , 33 S.Ct. 273, 274 , 57 L.Ed. 518, 520 (1913) 21 Ibanez de Aldecoa y Palet v. Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corp., 246 U.S. 621, 625 , 38 S.Ct. 410, 412 , 62 L.Ed. 903, 906 (1918) 22 Boilermakers Int'l v. NLRB, 114 U.S.App.D.C. 372, 374 , 316 F.2d 373 , 375 (1963), quoting United States Fidelity & Guar.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Swinton v. J. Frank Kelly, Inc.
D.C. Cir. · 1976 · confidence medium
Ry., 227 U.S. 296, 301 , 33 S.Ct. 273, 274 , 57 L.Ed. 518, 520 (1913). .
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co.
E.D. Mo. · 1920 · confidence medium
A. (N. S.) 841, affirmed 227 U. S. 296, 301 , 33 Sup. Ct. 273, 57 L.
examined Cited "see" United States Ex Rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co. (3×)
N.D. Cal. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See Winfree v. Northern Pacific Railway Company, 227 U.S. 296, 33 S.Ct. 273 , 57 L.Ed. 518 (1913).
cited Cited "see" McCarthy v. William H. Wood Lumber Co.
Mass. · 1914 · signal: see · confidence high
See American Railroad v. Birch, 224 U. S. 547 , and Winfree v. Northern Pacific Railway, 227 U. S. 296, 302 .
examined Cited "see, e.g." Crosby-Bey v. District of Columbia (3×)
D.D.C. · 1988 · signal: see also · confidence low
The classification is in keeping with the well recognized rule of statutory construction that provides “ ‘statutes affecting substantive rights and liabilities are presumed to have only prospective effect.’ ” Anderson v. USAIR, Inc., 818 F.2d 49, 53 (D.C.Cir.1987) (quoting Bennett v. New Jersey, 470 U.S. 632, 639 , 105 S.Ct. 1555, 1560 , 84 L.Ed.2d 572 (1985)); see also Winfree v. Northern Pacific Ry., 227 U.S. 296, 302 , 33 S.Ct. 273, 274 , 57 L.Ed. 518 (1913) (holding that prospective application is appropriate when “a statute permits recovery in cases where recovery could not be h…
examined Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Continental Casualty Company (3×)
E.D. La. · 1973 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e. g., Winfree v. Northern Pacific Railway Co., 227 U.S. 296 , 33 S.Ct. 273 , 57 L.Ed. 518 (1912), Pollard v. Bailey, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 520 , 22 L.Ed. 376 (1874), Partee v. St.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Winfree, as Administrator of Phipps,
v.
Northern Pacific Railway Company
139.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Feb 24, 1913.
227 U.S. 296
1913 U.S. LEXIS 2299
Mr. B. C. Mosby for plaintiff in error:, Mr. Charles W. Bunn for defendant in error.
McKenna.
Cited by 76 opinions  |  Published
1 passages pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 69%
Citer courts: D. New Mexico (3)
Mr! Justice McKenna

delivered the opinion of the court.

This action was brought in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Washington, Eastern Division, by plaintiff in error (herein referred to as plaintiff) as administrator of the estate of Albert E. Phipps, deceased, against defendant in error (herein referred to as defendant) for the wrongful death, it is alleged, of Albert E. Phipps, a minor, of the age of eighteen years and five months, while acting as fireman upon a freight locomotive of the defendant in the State of Washington. The negligence of defendant is alleged and that defendant was engaged in interstate commerce; that decedent had not been emancipated nor had his parents knowledge of his employment; that they lived in the State of Wyoming[*301] and that the action was brought for their benefit under the-provisions of the act of Congress of April 22, 1908, (35 ,Stat. 65, c. 149),entitled “An Act Relating to the Liability of Common Carriers by Railroads to their Employees in Certain Cases.”

Defendant demurred to the complaint on the ground, among others, that the act of Congress upon which plaintiff relied was passed, approved and became a law after plaintiff’s alleged cause of action accrued and imposed no liability, therefore, on defendant by reason of the facts set forth in the complaint. The demurrer was sustained, and, plaintiff refusing to plead further, judgment was entered dismissing the complaint and for costs. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. 173 Fed. Rep. 65.

Plaintiff, to support his contention that the act of Congress hasYetroactive operation, presents a very elaborate argument based on the extensive effect which courts have given to remedial statutes, applying them, it is contended, to the past as well as to the future. The Court of Appeals met the argument, as we think it should be met, by saying that statutes that had received such extensive application were “such as were intended to remedy a mischief, to promote public justice, to correct innocent mistakes, to cure irregularities in judicial proceedings or to give effect to acts and contracts -of individuals according to the intention thereof.” It is hardly necessary to say that such statutes are exceptions to the almost universal rule that statutes are addressed to thefuturé, not to the past. They usually constitute a new factor in the affairs and relations of men and should not be held to affect what has happened unless, indeed, explicit words be used or by clear implication that construction be. required. It is true that it is said that there was liability on the part of the defendant for its negligence before the passage of the act of Congress and the act has only given a more efficient and[*302] a more complete remedy. It, however, takes away material defenses, defenses which did something more than resist the remedy; they disproved the right of action. Such defenses the statute takes away, and that none may exist in the present case is immaterial. It is the operation of the statute which determines its character. The Court of Appeals aptly characterized it, and we may quote from its opinion (173 Fed. Rep. 66): “It is a statute, which permits recovery, in cases where recovery could not.be had before, and takes from the defendant defenses which formerly were available, defenses which in this instance existed at the time when the contract of service was entered into and at the time when the accident occurred.” Such a statute, under the rule of the cases, should not be construed as retrospective. It introduced a new policy and quite radically changed the existing law.

It is contended. that apart from the act of Congress the complaint “states a cause of action under the statutes of the State of Washington.” This does not avail plaintiff. He admits that the statutes of Washington give the right of action to the father of the deceased minor, not to a personal representative. He, however, to justify his right of action says that the compensation recovered in an action by the father of the minor belongs under the community system to the mother as well as to the father. But we are not informed how this, if true, gives a right of action in the administrator of the minor’s estate. Damages to his estate would be a distinct cause of action from damages to his parents. Hedrick v. Ilwaco Ry. & Nav. Co., 4 Washington, 400.

Judgment affirmed.