¹ Organizational Plaintiffs. Defendants maintain the Organizational Plaintiffs have neither representational or direct organizational standing. Each is discussed in turn. i. Representational Standing Representational standing exists when an organization’s “members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right, the interests at stake are germane to the organization’s purpose, and neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.” Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 181. The Plaintiffs do not seem to contest, and the Court finds, that the interest at stake—ensuring that Republican voters can exercise their franchise—is germane to the Organizational Plaintiffs’ respective purposes. The Court can likewise dispose of the third requirement at the outset, because when injunctive relief is sought, participation of the individual members “is not normally necessary.” United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Group, Inc., 517 U.S. 544, 546 (1996). Thus, the Court will focus its analysis on the first prong of the representational standing inquiry. Defendants assert that the Organizational Plaintiffs’ members complain of nothing more than generalized grievances insufficient to confer Article III standing. The Court agrees, as it must, that generalized grievances do not normally constitute a particularized injury necessary to establish standing. Novak v. United States, 795 F.3d 1012, 1018 (9th Cir. 2015). But the fact that “a harm is widely shared does not necessarily render it a generalized grievance.” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). In fact, the Supreme Court has been clear that “where large numbers of voters suffer interference with voting rights” the interests related to that are sufficiently concrete to obtain the standing necessary to seek redress in an Article III Court. F.E.C. v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998) (holding that claims implicating voting rights “the most basic of political rights, is sufficiently concrete and specific” to establish standing); see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 206–07 (1962) (noting that prior cases have “squarely held that voters who allege facts showing disadvantage to themselves as individuals have standing to sue”). The Court finds that injuries related to voter rights are central to the Organizational Plaintiffs’ claims and stem directly from issuance of the Directive. Because the alleged injuries to the members’ voting rights at issue in this case could conceivably be asserted by any Montanan does not eradicate the standing necessary to assert these claims. On the contrary, the Supreme Court has repeatedly enumerated the principle that claims alleging a violation of the right to vote can constitute an injury in fact despite the widespread reach of the conduct at issue. In short, the harm complained of here is sufficiently concrete to pass the Organizational Plaintiffs through the standing gateway necessary to adjudicate their claims on the merits.4 ii. Organizational Standing Even if the Organizational Plaintiffs’ lacked representational standing the Court finds they similarly enjoy organizational standing. The test of whether an organizational plaintiff has standing is identical to the three-part test outlined above normally applied in the context of an individual plaintiff. La Asociacion de Trabajordores de Lake Forest v. City of Lake Forest, 624 F.3d 1083, 1088 (9th Cir. 2010). An organization establishes the requisite injury upon a showing of “both a diversion of its resources and a frustration of its mission.” Id. But, as Defendants correctly note, the Organizational Plaintiffs cannot simply “spend money fixing a problem” for the purpose of manufacturing standing. Id. Instead, the Organizational Plaintiffs are required to demonstrate “it would have suffered some other injury if it had not diverted resources to counteracting the problem.” Id. The Court is persuaded the Organizational Plaintiffs have established a diversion of resources sufficient to confer standing. 4 The Court likewise finds that this legal conclusion supports a finding of standing for the Voter and Candidate Plaintiffs, who similarly allege infringements on their right to vote. (Doc. 1 at 3– 4.) Because the Candidate Plaintiffs allege they intend to vote, the Court need not address whether they possess standing to prosecute their claims as candidates. Defendants contest this form of standing by asserting that Organizational Plaintiffs have nothing to educate their members about, since the Directive expands rather than contracts the opportunity to vote. But this assertion cannot withstand scrutiny. The Directive, while certainly expanding the remote voting opportunities of Montanans, necessarily contemplates a reduction in available in- person voting opportunities by counties that opt-in to the mail ballot option. (Doc. 81-15 at 5.) As the supplemental declaration provided by the Member-Plaintiffs establishes, there is a “73% drop in the number of in person polling places open to Montanans who want to vote in person on Election Day across the state.” (Doc. 109-1 at 3.) This reduction requires the Organizational Plaintiffs’ to expend resources in an effort to inform their members how individual counties intend to administer the November 3, 2020 general election and where in-person voting opportunities are located. As such, the Organizational Plaintiffs’ purpose of educating Republican voters—especially those who wish to vote in person—on available voting opportunities is necessarily impacted by the Directive. Organizational Plaintiffs have provided the Court with declarations to this effect. For example, the Declaration of Sam Rubino explains how expenditure of resources is necessary to “inform voters about the directive’s changes” to voting opportunities, including “when, and where to submit mail-in ballots if they have never submitted one before; and where to cast a traditional ballot at whatever in- person polling locations counties may provide.” (Doc. 94-1 at 3.) The remaining declarations submitted by Ryan Dollar and Spenser Merwin confirm the expenditure of resources necessary to educate the Organizational Plaintiffs’ members on the Directive’s impact on voting in Montana for the November 3, 2020 general election. (Docs. 93-1 at 3; 93-2 at 3–4.) This is sufficient to confer the Organizational Plaintiffs with organizational standing. Having found that the Organizational Plaintiffs and Voter and Candidate Plaintiffs have standing, the Court possesses the constitutional authority to adjudicate all of the Plaintiffs’ claims on the merits. As such, the Court need not address the standing of Legislative Plaintiffs, who assert claims identical to that of the Lead-Plaintiffs. C. Abstention. Governor Bullock urges this Court to abstain from resolving Plaintiffs’ claims on the merits under the Pullman abstention doctrine. “The Pullman abstention doctrine is a narrow exception to the district court’s duty to decide cases properly before it which allows postponement of the exercise of federal jurisdiction when ‘a federal constitutional issue . . . might be mooted or presented in a different posture by a state court determination of pertinent state law.’” C-Y Development Co. v. City of Redlands, 703 F.2d 375, 377 (9th Cir. 1983). Pullman abstention is only appropriate upon satisfaction of a three-prong test: (1) The complaint “touches a sensitive area of social policy upon which the federal courts ought not to enter unless no alternative to its adjudication is open;” (2) Such constitutional adjudication plainly can be avoided if a definitive ruling on the state issue would terminate the controversy; and (3) The possibly determinative issue of state law is doubtful. Id. In applying these factors, the narrowness of this exception cannot be understated, and this Court should only abstain “in the exceptional circumstances where the order to the parties to repair to the state court would clearly serve an important countervailing interest.” Id. The Court find abstention inappropriate in this case. Regarding the first prong, the Court agrees that Plaintiffs’ claims regarding Montana’s electoral processes touches on a sensitive area of social policy. But it cannot be said this is an area federal courts are hesitant to enter. On the contrary, federal courts are routinely tasked with resolving issues related to the state administration of elections. See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion Cty Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008). The Court also finds that resolution of the state law issues underlying this dispute will not terminate the action. On the contrary, determination of whether Governor Bullock has exceeded his authority under state law is separate and distinct from the question of whether the provisions providing such authority comport with the Elections and Electors clauses. This second question is as essential to the resolution of the Emergency Powers Claims as the first. Finally, as discussed at length below, the Court finds that the state law issues underlying this case are far from uncertain and are readily determinable by the Court. In short, this is not the unique case in which abstention is justified. Governor Bullock urges this Court to follow the abstention path paved by the Western District of Pennsylvania in a similar case. See Trump for President, Inc. v. Boockvar, 2020 WL 4920952 (W.D. Pa. 2020). But the Court finds this case distinguishable. While not determinative, a compelling justification for abstention in Boockvar was the actual existence of state law proceedings that would resolve the state law issues present in that case. Id. at *18. No party to this action disputes that time is of the essence. Ballots are set to be mailed on October 9, 2020. (Doc. 81-15 at 4.) The Court does not find it wise to force Plaintiffs to assert identical claims in state court at this late hour with no promise of timely adjudication. Potrero Hills Landfill v. County of Solano, 657 F.3d 875, 889–90 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Federal courts are not required to send a case to the state court if doing so would simply impose expense and long delay upon the litigants without hope of its bearing fruit . . . to the contrary, under such circumstances, it is the duty of a federal court to decide the federal question when presented to it”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In short, abstention is neither required nor appropriate in this case. II. Injunctive Relief. Having concluded that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar consideration of the Plaintiffs’ Emergency Powers Claims, that standing exists, and that abstention is inappropriate, the Court will adjudicate the claims presented on the merits. As noted above, in order to obtain injunctive relief, Plaintiffs must demonstrate: (1) actual success on the merits; (2) that they have suffered an irreparable injury; (3) there exists no adequate remedy at law; and (4) the balance of the hardships justifies a remedy in equity and the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction. Independent Training, 730 F.3d at 1032; Jewell, 747 F.3d at 1092.5 Each element is discussed in turn. A. Actual Success on the Merits. i. Emergency Powers Claims. The United States Constitution provides, in relevant part, that the “Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof.” U.S. Const., art. I, § 4, cl. 1. Additionally, Article II mandates that “Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as 5 The Court notes that Plaintiffs also request declaratory relief to the effect that the Declaration is unconstitutional. However, because the issuance of this relief is dependent on Plaintiffs’ actual success on the merits, the Court finds separate analysis of these claims unnecessary. the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress . . . .” Id., art. II, § 1, cl. 2. Plaintiffs contend that the Directive violates these clauses by altering the manner in which Montana conducts the November 2, 2020 general election through executive fiat rather than legislative action. In support of their argument, Plaintiffs invoke a myriad of provisions of the Montana Code Annotated which they contend either fail to permit or outright prohibit Governor Bullock from issuing the Directive. The Defendants maintain that not only has Governor Bullock acted well within the authority conferred on him by the Montana Legislature, but that this delegation of power does not offend the Elections or Electors Clauses. Resolution of these claims requires the Court to analyze the relevant statutory framework under which Montana conducts its elections and by which Governor Bullock purports to act. In doing so, the critical question becomes whether the Montana Legislature has, in its laws governing the manner in which federal elections are administered, permitted Governor Bullock to authorize counties to conduct such elections, in part, by mail ballot. The Court is convinced it has. As a starting point, the Court notes that the Montana Constitution provides that the “legislature shall provide by law the requirements for . . . administration of elections.” Mont. Const. art. IV, § 3. In exercise of this constitutional command, the Montana Legislature has adopted a comprehensive framework of laws governing the electoral process. Relevant here are the provisions outlining the process by which elections can be conducted by mail. In passing such laws, the Montana Legislature stated: The purpose of this chapter is to provide the option of and procedures for conducting certain specified elections as mail ballot elections. The provisions of this chapter recognize that sound public policy concerning the conduct of elections often requires the balancing of various elements of the public interest that are sometimes in conflict. Among these factors are the public’s interest in fair and accurate elections, the election of those who will govern or represent, and cost- effective administration of all functions of government, including the conduct of elections. The provisions of this chapter further recognize that when these and other factors are balanced, the conduct of elections by mail ballot is potentially the most desirable of the available options in certain circumstances. Mont. Code Ann. § 13-19-101. Notably, the provisions of Montana law permitting an election to be conducted by mail-ballot provide that “a regularly scheduled federal, state, or county election” cannot “be conducted by mail ballot.” Mont. Code Ann. § 13-19- 104(3)(a). Montana’s statutory framework regarding the administration of elections cannot be read in isolation, however, and particular attention to the emergency powers afforded to the Governor must be paid. Specifically, the Montana Legislature has provided Governor Bullock with the power to “suspend the provisions of any regulatory statute prescribing the procedures for conduct of state business or orders or rules of any state agency if the strict compliance with the provisions of any statute, order, or rule would in any way prevent, hinder, or delay necessary action in coping with the emergency or disaster.” Mont. Code Ann. § 10-3-104(2)(a). Emergency is defined as “imminent threat of a disaster causing immediate peril to life or property that timely action can avert or minimize.” Id. § 10-3- 103(8). Disaster is defined as “the occurrence or imminent threat of widespread or severe damage, injury, or loss of life or property resulting from any . . . outbreak of disease.” Id. 10-3-103(4). The Court has no trouble concluding that the COVID- 19 pandemic constitutes a disaster and emergency within the meaning of the aforementioned statutes. As such, the Court must determine whether Governor Bullock has exceeded his authority under Montana Code Annotated § 10-3- 104(a)(2). The parties devote significant argument to whether the statute in question, Montana Code Annotated § 13-19-104, is regulatory and therefore falls within Governor Bullock’s suspension power conferred on him through Montana Code Annotated § 10-3-104(a)(2). Plaintiffs urge this Court to construe “regulatory” narrowly, limiting the term to licensing statutes or other public service laws enacted pursuant to Montana’s inherent police powers. Defendants argue for a broader reading, characterizing regulatory statutes as those which apply to the conduct of state actors. Statutes governing the electoral process are by their very nature regulatory. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983) (construing Ohio’s statutory deadline for candidacy statements as part of its “regulation of elections” and exercise of the state’s “important regulatory interests”); Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433– 34 (interpreting Hawaii’s statutory framework regarding write-in voting as a facet of “the State’s important regulatory interests . . . .”); Crawford, 553 U.S. at 203 (referring to Indiana’s voter identification statute as a “neutral, nondiscriminatory regulation of voting procedure”). Indeed, the statute at issue does not permit the Governor to suspend any regulatory statute, but rather only those regulatory statutes that prescribe “the procedures for conduct of state business.” Mont. Code Ann. § 10-3-104(2)(a). None of the cases relied on by Plaintiffs interpret the reach of the Governor’s suspension power. Instead, Plaintiffs point to a series of Montana cases using the words “regulatory statute” completely divorced from the situation at hand and the powers at play. One case for example, characterizes the Montana Unfair Trade Practices Act as a “regulatory statute.” Mark Ibsen, Inc. v. Caring for Montanans, Inc., 371 P.3d 446, 455. But Mark Ibsen refers to the Montana Unfair Trade Practices Act which regulates “trade practices in the business of insurance,” not the conduct of state business. Id.; see also Mont. Code Ann. § 33-18-101. The failure to connect the word regulatory to “conduct of state business” severely undermines Plaintiffs’ proposed interpretation. The Court is convinced that the statute at issue here, Montana Code Annotated § 13-19-104(3)(a), which forbids local officials from conducting a “regularly scheduled federal, state or county election” by mail ballot, is precisely the sort of regulatory statute that falls within Governor Bullock’s statutory suspension power. After all, the administration of federal, state, and local elections is quintessentially state business. See Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 586 (2005) (noting that the Constitution “grants States broad power to prescribe the Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives . . . which power is matched by state control over the election process for state offices”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). As discussed below, the Court has no trouble concluding that suspension of Montana Code Annotated § 13- 19-104(3)(a) is necessary to facilitate Montana’s effective response to the COVID- 19 pandemic. The provisions on which Governor Bullock relies in issuing the Directive not only provide him with such authority, but likewise constitute a fundamental part of the legislative enactments governing the time, place, and manner of elections in Montana and how electors are appointed. But this does not end the matter, because there is the additional question of whether such delegation by the Montana Legislature to Governor Bullock is constitutional. Resolution of this question depends on the meaning of the term “Legislature” as used in the Elections and Electors Clauses. As an initial matter, the Court finds no need to distinguish between the term “Legislature” as it is used in the Elections Clause as opposed to the Electors Clause. Not only were both these clauses adopted during the 1787 Constitutional Convention, but the clauses share a “considerable similarity.” Arizona State Legis. v. Arizona Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 576 U.S. 787, 839 (2015) (Roberts, J., dissenting). Additionally, “[w]herever the term ‘legislature’ is used in the Constitution, it is necessary to consider the nature of the particular action in view” before affording it a certain meaning. Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366 (1932). With this in mind, the Court finds that the term “Legislature” is used in a sufficiently similar context in both clauses to properly afford the term an identical meaning in both instances. Specifically, the term “Legislature” as used in both clauses refers to a state’s legislative function as opposed to the term’s use in other places in reference to an electoral, ratifying, or consenting function. Id. at 365–66. As such, the Court conducts a singular analysis in resolving both constitutional questions. A survey of the relevant case law makes clear that the term “Legislature” as used in the Elections Clause is not confined to a state’s legislative body. On the contrary, nearly a century ago the Supreme Court concluded that the term “Legislature did not mean the representative body alone” but also “a veto power lodged in the people” by way of the Ohio Constitution’s referendum process. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565, 566–70 (1916). The Supreme Court followed the trajectory established by Davis several years later in Smiley v. Holm, where it concluded that the term “Legislature” in the Elections Clause did not “preclude[] a state from providing that legislative action in districting the state for congressional elections shall be subject to the veto power of the Governor as in other cases of the exercise of the lawmaking power.” 285 U.S. 355, 372–73 (1932). Thus, after Davis and Smiley it was clear that the term “Legislature” in the Elections Clause included not only a state’s lawmaking body, but also the citizens’ referendum power and the Governor’s veto. The Supreme Court expanded, rather than abandoned, this interpretation of the term “Legislature” just five years ago. There, the Supreme Court concluded that the term “Legislature” in the Elections Clause also encompasses an independent redistricting commission utilized by Arizona to draw congressional districts. Arizona State Legis., 576 U.S. at 804–09. In doing so, the Supreme Court concluded the Elections Clause “respect[s] the State’s choice to include” the people’s referendum power, the Governor’s veto, and an independent restricting commission in decisions regarding the times, places, and manners of federal elections. Id. at 807. Upon review of these cases, the Court finds no reason to conclude that the Montana Legislature’s decision to afford the Governor’s statutory suspension power a role in the time, place, and manner of Montana’s federal elections should not be afforded the same respect. In other words, Governor Bullock’s use of the legislatively created suspension power is not repugnant to the constitutional provisions invoked by Plaintiffs.6 As such, the Court finds that the Directive violates neither the Elections or Electors clause of the United States Constitution and judgment in favor of the Defendants on this claim is appropriate. ii. Right to Vote Claims. While not specifically enumerated, “[u]ndeniably the Constitution of the United States protects the right of all qualified citizens to vote, in state as well as in federal elections.” Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554 (1964). This right is “individual and personal in nature.” Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1930 (2018). Additionally, this right “can neither be denied outright . . . nor destroyed 6 Plaintiffs reference in passing Article III, § 1 of the Montana Constitution which forbids “the exercise of power properly belonging to one branch” by another. But not only have Plaintiffs failed to assert a stand alone claim under the Montana Constitution, jurisdictional issues attendant to such a claim aside, this constitutional provision does not require “absolute independence” which “cannot exist in our form of government.” Powder River Cty v. State, 60 P.3d 357, 231–32 (Mont. 2002). On the contrary, this provision “has never been accepted as an absolute principle in practice” and is designed to prevent “a single branch from claiming or receiving inordinate power” rather than “bar[ring] cooperative action among the branches of government.” Id. at 232. Cooperative action in the administration of elections and response to an emergency are exactly what has occurred here. As such, the Court has serious doubts about the merits of a state constitutional claim, assuming it had properly been raised in this case. by alteration of ballots . . . nor diluted by ballot-box stuffing.” Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 554. The parties have focused their argument on whether a claim for vote dilution rooted in the United States Constitution is cognizable. The Court finds such an analysis to be unnecessary because, even assuming such a claim exists, Plaintiffs have not even attempted to introduce the requisite evidence necessary to prevail. The Plaintiffs maintain that because the Directive permits counties to conduct the November 3, 2020 general election by mail ballot, this election will be ripe with fraud and thus result in unconstitutional disenfranchisement of a both direct and dilutive nature. Yet, Plaintiffs have not introduced even an ounce of evidence supporting the assertion that Montana’s use of mail ballots will inundate the election with fraud. Indeed, as indicated at the beginning of this Order, at the September 22, 2020 hearing on the merits, counsel for both the Member-Plaintiffs and Lead-Plaintiffs conceded they do not possess any evidence establishing prior incidents of voter fraud in Montana, which has an established and well used absentee voting system. The Court is thoroughly unconvinced that will change in counties electing into the Directive’s mail ballot option. The record is replete with evidence that Montana’s elections and the use of mail ballots present no significant risk of fraud. The Declaration of Dr. Michael Herron is particularly enlightening. There, Dr. Herron concludes that there is absolutely no evidence that deliberate voter fraud has occurred in Montana from 2012 to 2020. (Doc. 75-2 at 21.) Particularly, Dr. Herron concludes that “[v]oter fraud of all types is rare in the United States and rare in Montana as well.” (Id.) Upon systematic dissection of the Lead-Plaintiffs’ motion (Doc. 8), Dr. Herron concludes that they have failed to “establish a compelling likelihood that voter fraud will occur in Montana if this state uses universal vote-by-mail in the November election.” (Doc. 75-2 at 22.) The Court also agrees that “[t]he most appropriate comparison election for the upcoming, statewide November 2020 General Election in Montana is the statewide, June 2020 Primary election in Montana” in which no evidence of voter fraud has been uncovered. (Id. at 34, 37.) The declarations provided by Governor Bullock from three election officials in Montana fortifies the conclusion that a county’s use of mail ballots does not meaningfully increase the already nominal risk of voter fraud in this State. (Docs. 81-3 at 4; 81-4 at 5.) The Intervenor- Defendants have similarly provided the Court with deposition testimony from various state officials confirming the lack of prior voter fraud in Montana. (Doc. 75-5 at 4, 9–10; 75-6 at 4–6; 75-7 at 4–5; 75–8 at 3–5.) Additionally, the Court finds no reason to believe that the electoral safeguards designed to protect the integrity of Montana’s elections and prevent fraud will not operate as they have in the past. These include, but are not limited to, Montana’s proscription on voting twice in one election, Montana’s ban on fraudulent voter registration, and the required signature verification upon receipt of a mail ballot. Mont. Code Ann. §§ 13-13-241, 13-19-309, 13-35-209, 13-35- 210(1). None of these statutory provisions have been suspended by Governor Bullock’s Directive. The Member-Plaintiffs point to the Supreme Court’s dicta in Crawford as conclusive evidence of voter fraud. (Doc. 3 at 3.) But Crawford does not limit its discussion of possible voter fraud to mail ballots. Instead, Crawford discusses prior instances of voter fraud in the registration, in-person voting, and absentee voting contexts. 553 U.S. at 194–95, ns. 11–13. Additionally, the Supreme Court in Crawford did not deploy its discussion of voter fraud to invalidate an entire electoral scheme—as Plaintiffs seek to do here—but rather to justify the imposition of the exact sort of safeguards previously discussed. Id. at 196. Furthermore, if reliance on Crawford alone without any supporting evidence were enough, it is unclear how our republic could be expected to conduct elections at all. Litigants could simply attack any electoral structure as inviting fraud and thus offensive of the constitutional rights Plaintiffs invoke here. Such a result would cripple our great democratic experiment and bolster forces determined on thwarting popular government. In the final analysis, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not established that the use of mail ballots by Montana counties will introduce any meaningful level of fraudulent behavior into the election that could possibly rise to the level of a constitutional violation. The Lead-Plaintiffs also allege that the Directive infringes on the right to vote because the “sudden surge in mail ballots” will result in requested ballots never arriving, arriving too late, or completed ballots getting lost or delayed in the return process. But this contention suffers from the same fatal flaw as that based on voter fraud, an utter lack of any supporting evidence. The Plaintiffs have failed to provide any proof that Montana’s mail system will be unable to process an influx in ballots. It takes more than mere supposition to prevail on the merits. Plaintiffs’ claim regarding errors in the mail system suffers the same fate as those rooted in voter fraud. iii. Equal Protection Claim. The Member-Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection Claim lacks clarity. In their complaint, the Member-Plaintiffs rely on the Court’s holding in Bush v. Gore and allege that because “46 of 56 Montana counties have filed mail-ballot plans,” if such plans are approved “voters in the 46 counties will have greater voting power than other-county voters.” (Doc. 1 at 38.)7 The complaint further alleges that the Directive “enhances the odds of voters in counties adopting” it of “being able to 7 As noted in this Order, the number of counties currently opting in under the Directive is 45 not 46. vote and have their voices counted” and “[a]s a result, proportionally more votes will be obtained from in-Plan counties than from other counties—with the difference not being accounted for by population differences.” (Id.) The briefing submitted by Member-Plaintiffs fails to further illuminate the argument, simply contending that the Directive is a “disparate-power Plan” that provides some voters with greater voting power. (Doc. 91 at 12.) At oral argument, counsel for Member-Plaintiffs confused the issue by characterizing their equal protection argument as being rooted in the risk of voter fraud attached to the use of mail ballots. To the extent voter fraud plays a role in the Equal Protection Claim, which is not clear from the face of the complaint, such a claim can be easily disregarded for the reasons discussed above, again the complete absence of any evidence establishing that voter fraud has occurred in the past or is likely to occur by way of the Directive in Montana. In Bush v. Gore, the Supreme Court reiterated the longstanding principle that “one group can be granted greater voting strength than another is hostile to the one man, one vote basis of our representative government.” 531 U.S. 98, 107 (2000). Particularly, the Supreme Court held that “[e]qual protection applies” to the right to vote and “[h]aving once granted the right to vote on equal terms, the State may not, by later arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one person’s vote over that of another.” Id. at 104–05. Applying these principles, the Supreme Court found that the Florida Supreme Court’s ratification of disparate standards used by counties to determine what is or is not a valid vote resulted in the arbitrary and disparate treatment forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 104–09. The Court finds no such equal protection issue here. First, the Supreme Court was clear in Bush v. Gore that the question was not “whether local entities, in the exercise of their expertise, may develop different systems for implementing elections.” Id. at 109. Yet this is precisely the conduct of which the Member-Plaintiffs now complain. The crux of their argument, as pled in their complaint, is that the use of a mail ballot system by some counties and not others results in unconstitutionally disparate treatment. The Court agrees with Governor Bullock’s argument that few (if any) electoral systems could survive constitutional scrutiny if the use of different voting mechanisms by counties offended the Equal Protection Clause. Second, in any event, the Court finds Member-Plaintiffs’ complaints of disparate and unequal treatment unfounded. The Directive makes clear that even in counties electing to opt into Montana’s mail ballot procedure for the November 3, 2020 general election, in-person voting opportunities will remain available. (Doc. 81-15 at 3.) Additionally, the Member-Plaintiffs have not introduced any evidence that the 11 Montana counties electing to conduct the election without the use of mail ballots are utilizing procedures that render voters in those counties less likely to have their votes cast. Likewise, nothing in the record supports the claim that the counties who have opted to proceed under the Directive are more likely to permit their citizens to successfully cast a ballot. As such, the Directive does not condone or facilitate any disparate treatment of Montana voters, and instead, is designed to ensure that all eligible Montanans can vote in the upcoming election. In sum, the Member-Plaintiffs Equal Protection Claim is without merit. As the foregoing illustrates, Plaintiffs do not enjoy actual success on the merits of any of their claims. This conclusion alone precludes Plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief. See Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakama Nation v. Yakama Cty., 963 F.3d 982, 993 (9th Cir. 2020) (concluding that Yakama Nation was not entitled to a permanent injunctive after failing to show actual success on the merits). Nonetheless, the Court finds it prudent to address the remaining factors. B. Irreparable Injury. To establish this factor, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that they have suffered irreparable injury. It is not lost on this Court that constitutional violations are often sufficient in and of themselves to establish irreparable harm. Goldie’s Bookstore, Inc. v. Superior Court of Cal., 739 F.2d 466, 472 (9th Cir. 1984); Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Coalition for Econ. Equity, 950 F.2d 1401, 1412 (9th Cir. 1991). As noted above, the entirety of Plaintiffs’ claims consist of purported constitutional violations. But, as discussed at length, none of these claims are meritorious. Thus, Plaintiffs have not suffered any irreparable injury. Consequently, this factor weighs in Defendants’ favor. C. Adequacy of Remedies at Law. In analyzing this factor, the Court notes that “unlike monetary injuries, constitutional violations cannot be adequately remedied through damages.” Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1138 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal citations and alterations omitted). This notion, of course, depends on the actual finding of a constitutional violation, which is not present in this case. Having found no constitutional violation, the Court holds that Plaintiffs are not entitled to any relief, equitable or otherwise. D. Balance of Hardships and Public Interest. In conducting the final injunctive inquiry, this Court heeds the Supreme Court’s warning against changing the rules of the game on the eve of an election. Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205, 1207 (2020) (internal citations omitted). This warning necessarily cautions against the issuance of injunctive relief in this case, just days before ballots are to be mailed by counties who have elected to utilize the mail ballot procedures authorized by the Directive. Indeed, federal courts have time and time again been cautioned against injecting themselves into the electoral process. See, e.g., Southwest Voter Registration Educ. Project v. Shelley, 344 F.3d 914, 918 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding “[t]here is no doubt that the right to vote is fundamental, but a federal court cannot lightly interfere with or enjoin a state election”). In fact, “[t]he decision to enjoin an impending election is so serious that the Supreme Court has allowed elections to go forward even in the face of an undisputed constitutional violation.” Id. (collecting authority). This restraint on the issuance of injunctive relief is unsurprising, because ultimately an “injunction is a matter of equitable discretion; it does not follow from success on the merits as a matter of course.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 32. Accordingly, even if Plaintiffs’ had actually succeeded on the merits of their claims, which they have not, it does render the issuance of an injunction preordained. On the contrary, the Court is compelled to carefully balance the equities and the public interest before awarding the extraordinary relief Plaintiffs’ seek. In doing so, the Court finds that this factor weighs strongly in the Defendants’ favor. The evidence in the record demonstrates that issuance of the injunctive relief sought by Plaintiffs would have profound, and most likely catastrophic consequences on the administration of Montana’s general election. Election officials have extensively outlined the nearly insurmountable challenges which would arise should the Court enjoin enforcement of the Directive. These include: (1) the impossibility of procuring, training, and certifying the competency of the election judges necessary to administer an election in the absence of mail ballot procedures; (2) the logistical nightmare posed by completely reversing course at this late hour and moving from a mail ballot to traditional election administration; and (3) the difficulty, harm to election integrity, and resulting confusion that would occur if counties had to notify their citizens of the abrupt last minute change to available voting opportunities. (Docs. 81-3 at 2–3; 81-4 at 2–4; 81-15 at 7–13.) These concerns are well founded and provide strong equitable and public interest considerations against enjoinment of the Directive. This Court finds that it would not only be unequitable, but also strongly against the public interest, to upset the current election procedures of 45 Montana counties just days before mail ballots are to be sent to registered voters. Those 45 counties would be forced, likely in vain, to quickly develop the electoral infrastructure necessary to administer the general election under normal conditions. The result is the possible disenfranchisement of thousands of Montana voters who as of the date of this Order, are operating under the belief that they will shortly receive a ballot in the mail. Issuance of an injunction presumes counties could successfully notify these voters of the need to apply for an absentee ballot (which may not be successfully processed in time) in order to vote from the safety of their home or that these voters will be willing to brave the pandemic and exercise their franchise in person. Both are unlikely. As such, the injunction Plaintiffs’ seek would likely bring about significant disenfranchisement. Irrespective of these administrative issues, the Court also finds that enjoinment of the Directive would only accelerate the outbreak of COVID-19 which Montana now faces. Contrary to Plaintiffs’ assertions that Montana is out of the woods and free from the virus that continues to cripple society across the globe, Montana continues to struggle with outbreaks across the state. In fact, as of September 29, 2020, and as the following graph indicates, Montana’s COVID-19 cases continue to rise, with a commensurate increase in deaths. TOTAL REPORTED ON SEPT. 26 14-DAY CHANGE Cases 12,550 Ai2 +146% _-* Montana Covid Map and Case Count, N.Y. TIMES, https://nyti.ms/2R3F2S9 (last visited September 29, 2020). It is not hard to imagine that enjoinment of the Directive would vastly increase the number of Montanans exercising their