Dunbar v. City of New York, 251 U.S. 516 (1920). · Go Syfert
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Dunbar v. City of New York, 251 U.S. 516 (1920). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
119 citation events (15 in the last 25 years) across 25 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Von Wandruszka v. City of Moscow (idaho, 2024-08-19)
Treatment trajectory · 1922 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1922 1974 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 9 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Von Wandruszka v. City of Moscow
Idaho · 2024 · confidence medium
The United States Supreme Court has even upheld the imposition and enforcement of a lien against a landlord’s property for her tenant’s unpaid water bills, explaining that the tenant’s default “did not relieve the property, which we may say, would be unfit for human habitance if it could not get water.” Dunbar v. City of New York, 251 U.S. 516, 518 (1920).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) HARR, LLC v. Town of Northfield (2×) also: Cited "see"
D. Vt. · 2019 · confidence medium
Even though the water service account was opened in the tenant’s name, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth 3 See, e.g, Dunbar v. City of New York, 251 U.S. 516, 518 (1920) (finding landlord gave implied consent to imposition of lien for tenants’ unpaid water bills because city charter provided for such a lien); Puckett v. City of Muldraugh, 403 S.W.2d 252, 255 (Ky. 1966) (holding that property owner benefits from municipal water service provided to his tenants, and therefore “[i]f he requests this service or accepts it, he impliedly agrees to pay the service charge as provided in the ordi…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. City of Tacoma
Wash. · 1940 · confidence medium
Dunbar v. New York, 251 U. S. 516, 518 [ 40 S. Ct. 250 , 64 L.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Moran v. City of Seattle
Wash. · 1934 · confidence medium
Dunbar v. New York, 251 U. S. 516, 518 [ 40 S. Ct. 250 , 64 L.
discussed Cited "see" Herkimer County Indus. Dev. Agency v. Village of Herkimer
N.Y. App. Div. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
In other words, inasmuch as HCIDA accepted water service that was supplied to and used by the tenant in the facility, it "impliedly agree[d] to pay the service charge as provided in the [regulations]" ( Puckett , 403 SW2d at 255 , citing Dunbar , 177 App Div at 649 ; see Dunbar , 251 US at 517-518 ).
examined Cited "see" Sherwood Court v. Borough of South River (3×)
N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See Dunbar, supra, 251 U.S. at 517-518 , 40 S.Ct. at 251 , 64 L.Ed. at 385 ; Ford, supra, 91 N.J.L. at 672 , 103 A. 254 (“Statutory liens upon the landlord’s estate and leased real property for water rents or for water charges for water supplied thereon to the tenant must depend for their validity either upon the taxing power or upon contract.”).
examined Cited "see" Puckett v. City of Muldraugh (3×)
Ky. Ct. App. · 1966 · signal: see · confidence high
See Dunbar v. City of New York, 251 U.S. 516 , 40 S.Ct. 250 , 64 L.Ed. 384 .
examined Cited "see, e.g." Brown v. City of Barre (3×)
D. Vt. · 2012 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Dunbar v. City of New York, 251 U.S. 516, 518 , 40 S.Ct. 250 , 64 L.Ed. 384 (1920) (holding no substantive due process violation occurs when landlord is charged with tenants’ water bill as a lien on the landlord’s property even when tenants agreed in their lease to pay such charges); Mansfield Apartment Owners Ass'n v. City of Mansfield, 988 F.2d 1469, 1477 (6th Cir.1993) ("[W]e reject the claim that conditioning the receipt of water ... service on the satisfaction of past due charges for services rendered to the applicant's residence raises the question of a substantive due pro…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Opinion No. (2×)
Ark. Att'y Gen. · 2004 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See e.g., Dunbar v. City of New York, 251 U.S. 516 (1920); Mansfield Apartment Owners Association v. City of Mansfield, 988 F.2d 1469 (6 th Cir. 1993); Ransom v. Marrazzo, 848 F.2d 398 (3 rd Cir. 1988); Chatham v. Jackson, 613 F.2d 73 (5 th Cir. 1980); Sherwood Court v. Borough of South River and South River Electric Company, 294 N.J.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Dunbar
v.
City of New York
160.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Mar 1, 1920.
251 U.S. 516
1920 U.S. LEXIS 1635
Mr. Harold G. Aron, with whom Mr. Henry M. Wise was on the brief, for plaintiff in error., Mr. William Herbert King, with whom Mr. William P. Burr and Mr. Charles E. Lalanne were on the brief, for defendant in error.
McKenna.
Cited by 41 opinions  |  Published
Mr. Justice McKenna

delivered the opinion of the court.

Plaintiff in- error, to whom we shall refer as plaintiff, is the owner of certain real property and a building thereon[*517] in the City of New York which she leased to William Hills- and William Hills, Jr., copartners doing business under the style of William Hills, Jr. The lessee covenanted to pay the charges for water which should be assessed against, or imposed upon the building during the lease, and if not sp paid it should be added to the rent then due or to become due.

The copartnership was subsequently adjudged bankrupt and at the time of the petition was indebted to the city in the sum of $379.89 for water supplied as measured by two meters which had been installed in the property.

The city proved no claim in bankruptcy and a motion by. plaintiff for an order directing the trustee to pay the water charges as a tax entitled to preference under the Bankruptcy Act was denied on the ground that they were not a tax.

The plaintiff thep. brought this action to cancel the charge as a lien upon the property and prayed.an injunction against its enforcement.

The contention against the charge of the city and the lien it asserts is that they are in violation of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and because they deprive plaintiff of property without due process of law.

Plaintiff’s argument is somewhat difficult to state' briefly. It commences by declaring that the question presented was left open in Provident Institution v. Jersey City, 113 U. S. 506, which sustained the postponement of mortgages to the lien of water rents because it was said in that case that the complainant in the case knew what the law was when the mortgages were taken, and therefore “its own voluntary act, its own consent,” was “an element in the transaction.”

Counsel assumes that the case presented an instance of an express consent. In that counsel is mistaken. The consent was implied from the fact that the law imposing[*518] the water rents preceded the mortgages. And so in the water charge in controversy, it was imposed and made a hen on plaintiff’s property by the charter of the city and therefore the Supreme Court at the first instance and afterwards in Appellate Division, and we may assume the Court of Appeals, decided that the consent of plaintiff could be implied, and any other conclusion would have been impossible. A city without water would be a desolate place and if plaintiff’s property was in such situation it would partake of the desolation. And as a supply of water is necessary it is only an ordinary and legal exertion of government to provide means for its compulsory compensation.

It is of no consequence, therefore, at whose request the meters were installed in the pr uperty. The meters .as observed by the Appellate Division were “not the instrumentalities for furnishing the wat,er,” they only registered its consumption. And besides, the lease made by plaintiff contemplated the use of water by the lessees and provided, as far as the lessor (plaintiff) could, for the payment of the charges for it. That her tenants defaulted in their obligation by reason of their bankruptcy was her misfortune but it did not relieve the property, which, we may say, would be unfit for human habitancy if it could not get water.

Counsel appear to rely on prior decisions of the court for relief of plaintiff, one in the Supreme Court, in which, it is sgid,. a doubt was intimated whether a statute making , a lessor liable for the personal debt of a lessee for water would be constitutional; and one in the Court of Appeals which, to quote counsel, “having decided in 1910, three years prior to the inception of the charges for which the lien is claimed, that the statute meant’what the earlier case had suggested, the lien became unconstitutional” ■end plaintiff cannot be charged with an “implication of assent” to it. Without attempting an estimate of the[*519] contentipn it is enough to say that the decision in this case and other cases are opposed to the contention, and that besides no constitutional rights' can be based on the error of prior decisions.

Judgment affirmed.